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In this thesis I focus on the canonically-marginalized genre of non-fictional prose 
written by men during the period 1750-1850, and I argue that in this fluid genre, 
gender, too, is unstable. I trace the congruences between recent theories of "gynesis", 
that is, "the putting into discourse of ’woman’", and the use of the trope of woman 
in Romantic texts. Borrowing Shoshana Felman’s rewriting of Freud’s famous 
question, I ask of various texts, "what is femininity - for menV The texts I consider 
(in Part II) are: Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry. Shelley’s A Defence of 
Poetry and some of his shorter essays, Keats’s Letters and De Quincey’s essays, 
especially The English Mail-Coach. Suspiria de Profundis and material included in 
Recollections of the Lakes.
In my introductory material (Part I), I contextualize the readings that follow, 
first by surveying the ways in which feminist theory is changing the boundaries of 
Romanticism, and then by discussing the issues of gender, genre and gynesis. I pay 
special attention to the trope of fashion in critical discourse, which, I argue, displays 
the constructedness of gender, and inscribes the potential mobility, rather than the 
fixity, of gender positions.
For feminist writing, style matters: I have tried to enact in this study another 
aspect of "gynesis", that is, the creation of new feminist epistemologies that are 
subversive of patriarchal discourses of mastery. I read "improper[ly]", in Burke’s 
terms, foregrounding moments of textual ’trouble’.
In Chapter Three, I analyze moments of masquerade and of the destabilization 
of the male gaze in Burke’s Enquiry: I suggest that Burke speaks through femininity 
without appropriating it. In the following chapter, Shelley’s use of the tropes of the 
mirror and the veü comes under scrutiny; I argue that, from a Lacanian perspective, 
these are the signifiers of a non-mastery that identifies Shelley with the feminine. 
Chapter Five deals with metaphors of the body in Keats’s Letters, and in criticism of 
Keats’s work; both discourses represent him as ’unweaned’, as insufficently 
distinguished from the (m)other. Finally, in Chapter Six, I listen to the language of 
flowers that blooms in De Quincey’s texts and which figures the bisexuality of the 
subject.
My focus on the circulation of the meanings of femininity, as seen from a 
masculine perspective in these texts, reveals the fragility of sexual identities. The 
fascination with femininity throws masculinity into crisis. Desiring the other, these 
speakers transgress the positionalities defined as "masculine" or "feminine", revising, 
in the process, the very notion of ’otherness’. The issues of textual transvestism that 
I discuss make an issue of gender in romantic prose, filling in some detail on the new 
maps of Romanticism.
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[Freud's] question: "what is femininity?" in reality asks: 
"what is femininity - for men ? "
Shoshana Felman
Shoshana Felman’s rereading of Freud suggests the difference it makes when one 
reads a male text from a female perspective ("Rereading Femininity" 21). To "read 
as a woman" (in Jonathan Culler’s deconstructive sense)^ is to read from the place 
of the other, to make visible the subjectivity of the woman critic - Felman’s fuU 
question is "what does the question - ’what is femininity - for menV - mean for 
womenT'; but it is also, I would argue, to investigate the traces of otherness in the 
text, to problematize the construction of the male subject. Felman’s insight into Freud 
could be applied to (at least) two other historical moments: Romanticism and late 
twentieth-century critical theory. In Acts of Inclusion. Michael Cooke argues that 
Romanticism produced "a breakdown in the grammar of opposites - and opposition - 
that had defined the situation of the sexes", with the intention of substituting a new 
ideal, "a male-a^W-female principle" where both modes of being were "included in 
each other" (xix). He claims that the "feminine" is "the crux of value in 
Romanticism". Cooke is not concerned with women writers or with actual women 
in the historical period, but rather with the "inclusion", or absorption, of feminine 
values in the male poet.^ This concern with the feminine, with woman as trope, finds 
its contemporary analogue in the work of theorists such as Jacques Derrida and others 
who have appropriated and romanticized another version of the "feminine" - woman 
as absence, potentiality, the locus of a desire inexpressible in patriarchal terms, the 
’nonknowledge’ that eludes the master narrative - making of it a condition to which
7men might aspire. Alice Jardine coins the term "gynesis" to name "the putting into 
discourse of ’woman’", that is, "the transformation of woman and the feminine into 
verbs at the interior of those narratives that are today experiencing a crisis in 
legitimation (Gynesis 25; I discuss this phenomenon, and the feminist critique of it, 
in more detail in Chapter Two).
In this thesis I attempt to combine my interest in Romanticism and in post­
structuralist literary theory by analysing the trope(s) of woman, the figure on which 
these two discourses converge. My choice of texts has been influenced by feminist 
criticism which has foregrounded the question of marginality: many feminist critics, 
particularly in their analysis of women’s writing, have turned away from high-literary 
forms to marginal genres - diaries, letters, journals, travel accounts and the like - as 
part of the project of making gender a central issue.^ I focus on the canonically- 
marginalized genre of non-fictional prose written by men during the period 1750- 
1850, and I argue that in this fluid genre, gender, too, is unstable. This study maps 
what might be described as an episode in the genealogy of gynesis. I ask of various 
texts Felman’s question, "what is femininity - for menV.
It is necessary that I should say something at the outset about my use of the 
terms "feminine", "female", "male", "masculine".'^ In common with most feminist 
critics, I use the terms feminine and masculine to refer to culturally-constructed 
gender differences, while female and male refer to biological differences. In terms 
of writing, masculine is often used to refer to writing which promotes closure and 
self-authority, while the feminine, according to Julia Kristeva, connotes a position of 
marginality (as a place from which to write, it is open to both males and females). 
Without getting involved here in the thorny post-structuralist problem of the signature.
8when I say that my concern is with ’male’ texts I do not mean to suggest that these 
texts necessarily uphold patriarchal values - indeed, I wül contend in many instances 
that they are subversive of such values - but simply that they were written by men. 
In the following chapters, "woman" names both a trope and experiential figures, such 
as the woman reader, who reads from a feminist perspective. There remain slippages 
between the terms I use, both in my own and other texts, though I trust the 
particularities of context help to clarify matters. I have tried not to burden my text 
with an excessive use of inverted commas: the reader may perhaps silently supply 
them for these difficult gender terms. The most important point is that I have tried 
to avoid an essentialist approach, for I do not assume any clear continuity between 
the gender of a body and the gender of a text; indeed, I emphasize the culturally- 
fabricated nature of this connection, focussing more on the disjunctions than the 
continuities between these entities (disjunctions that are both historically and reader 
specific).
Notes to Preface
Throughout this thesis, all italics are the author’s and all ellipses mine, unless 
otherwise stated. Further references to a cited text wül appear with page references 
after quotations and unless otherwise stated refer to the same text; passages without 
page references are from the last-cited page. A word - somewhat ironically placed 
here - about endnotes: I have used the notes as the place for the articulation of other 
voices; they function as gloss, as chorus, and as gestures towards ’elsewhere’ 
(especially in Part Two). In them, I discuss issues related to, but not contained within 
the frame of, the text. I hope they wül be read as interactive rather than merely 
secondary.
1. Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction 64 (CuUer is quoting Peggy
Kamuf’s formulations about women’s writing in "Writing like a 
Woman").
2. In the "Postscript" to his text, Cooke turns briefly from Romantic 
poetry to Romantic prose, focussing on De Quincey’s "impassioned 
prose", though he does not recur to the issue of the significance of the 
feminine. Leslie Brisman has recently developed Cooke’s insights 
about gender and romanticism; see his article, "Maud: The Feminine 
as the Crux of Value".
3. New Histoiicism has effected a simüar shift of critical attention: "in
new histoiicism, distinctions between a piivüeged category of the 
literary and other, nonliterary forms of cultural practice no longer hold. 
New historicists read the texts of legal, political, historical, and 
popular-cultural discourse alongside literary texts, as weU as the texts 
of such sociopolitical events as revolutions" (Nussbaum and Brown, 
"Revising Critical Practices" 20).
4. I should perhaps also say something about my use of the first person
pronoun, which functions as a deliberate marker of particularity. 
Borrowing Benveniste’s categories of Histoire and Discours, a feminist 
critical work might be likened to the discursive text, which inscribes 
a subject, a point of view, and a sense of an addressee, rather than the 
conventional historical text, which represses both the authorial "I" and 
the narratorial point of view, and offers a putatively objective account. 




Romantic Revisions: The Role of Feminist Theory 
in the Study of British Romanticism
In a recent article entitled "The Current Canon in British Romantics Studies", Harriet 
Kramer Linkin documents the results of a survey of American universities which she 
conducted in the fall of 1989, in which teachers of Romanticism were asked to 
identify the writers included in their Romantics courses. The survey unsurprisingly 
demonstrates the continuing hegemony of the ’Big Six’, though Linkin records that 
Mary Shelley, Dorothy Wordsworth, Jane Austen and Mary Wollstonecraft are strong 
contenders in an expanded Romantics canon. Linkin reminds us that, apart from 
Austen, these writers "always suffer the potential ignominy of being treated as poor 
relations" (556), and their inclusion in Romanticism remains problematic, for various 
reasons which I wül outline later. Significantly, though Romanticism has 
"masquerade[d] as a period" in English Studies (Linkin 556), it is, in fact, better 
described, pace Jerome McGann, as an ideology.^ The Romantic Ideology is 
arguably a masculine ideology, underwriting the poetic and economic interests of the 
canonical male poets. The blindness of post-war Romantic Studies to the insights of 
feminist theory is grounded in the mascuhnist assumptions encoded in the work of 
Romanticism’s most famous poets, and reproduced in the commentary of its best- 
known critics.^ However, this dystopian narrative of canonical stability is not the 
whole story. The belated recognition of the gendered ideology of English 
Romanticism opens a space for resistance to the Romantic tropes which shore up 
patriarchal power, as weU as the possibility of locating subversions of the Romantic
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ideology - or an alternative ideology - in women’s writing of the early nineteenth 
century.
This chapter is a survey of feminist readings of Romanticism.^ It provides an 
introduction for my subsequent readings of male Romantic prose, placing them in the 
context of feminist redefinitions of the map of Romanticism. I suggest that the 
intersections of feminist theory and Romanticism, which have been taking place over 
the last fifteen years or so, may be mapped according to Elaine Showalter’s influential 
paradigms of feminist criticism. The first type of criticism she outlines is ’the 
feminist critique’, which "is concerned with woman as reader - with woman as the 
consumer of male-produced literature"; "Its subjects include the images and 
stereotypes of women in literature, the omissions of and misconceptions about women 
in criticism, and the fissures in male-constructed literary history" ("Toward a Feminist 
Poetics" 128). In addition, I invoke Judith Fetterley’s famous figure, the "resisting 
reader", in my discussion of the feminist critique.
For the second critical approach, Showalter coins the term ’gynocritics’ to 
describe criticism which focusses on "woman as writer - with woman as the producer 
of textual meaning, with the history, themes, genres, and structures of literature by 
women" (128). I will detail the increasing critical attention given to women writers 
during the period of Romanticism.
Finally, I consider a third position in current feminist approaches to 
Romanticism, which advocates the deconstruction of sexual difference, the 
dismantling of the hierarchical binary opposition masculine/feminine. Clearly, 
Kristeva’s tripartite model of the development of feminism, outlined in her article 
"Women’s Time", is pertinent here. I will return to Kristeva at the end of this
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chapter; in the first two sections, however, I wül make use of the clarity and 
familiarity of Showalter’s paradigms.
* * * * *
He for Poetry only, she for the Poetry in him.
Taylor and Luria
"Whose heart does not stammer with the ecstasies of Keats’s odes? Whose inteUect 
is not stirred by the amorous insurrections of the Four Zoas?", asks Patricia Yaeger 
(Rev. of Romanticism and Feminism 499). She goes on to deflect the universaUsing 
tendency of these questions through the introduction of gender difference: "But what 
does this ecstasy mean for women? Can Keats’s stammer and Blake’s insurrections 
stiU be exalted by the feminist critic?". Yaeger directs our attention to the 
"uncomfortable role" that women have played in romantic poetiy. The ’feminist 
critique’ has analysed the oppressive images of femininity constructed by the male 
romantic poets, and a number of critics, foUowing Judith Fetterley’s vision of male- 
authored classics as texts which require the female reader to "identify against herself", 
have struggled to perceive the patriarchal "designs" of male texts (493,492). Irene 
Taylor and Gina Luria in their article "Gender and Genre: Women in British 
Romantic Literature" argue that women writers played a significant role in shaping 
the novel as a genre, but that "women’s importance in Romantic poetry was not as 
writer, but rather muse for the male poet" (106); as they wittüy put it, "He for Poetry 
only, she for the Poetry in him was ever the case" (115). As Taylor and Luria point 
out, women are often placed as "mirror image[s] of the poet", simultaneously 
functioning as inspiration and self-projection, providing a space where the yearnings 
of male subjectivity can be worked out. They remind us that "in Blake woman is the 
prophet’s emanation", that William’s sister Dorothy Wordsworth "’maintained for
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[him] a saving intercourse / With [his] true self’ and ’preserved [him] stül / A poet’ ", 
and that Byron’s Astarte is a figure for Manfred’s form - "’She was like me in 
lineaments’" (116). To these one might add all those silent, sleeping or dead women 
addressed by Wordsworth and Coleridge (poems in which the unconsciousness of the 
’other’ demarcates the difference of the speaking subject), as well as the fairy figures 
of Imagination who lead Keats back to "[his] sole self", and Emilia in Shelley’s 
"Epipsychidion", who is a blank page on which the poet may inscribe his desire to 
"pierce / Into the height of love’s rare Universe," (11.588-89), so blank indeed that we 
never know the colour of her hair or eyes."^
Taylor and Luria’s article dates from 1977, and though there was a relatively 
long gestation period before a more concerted feminist critique of Romanticism in the 
late 80’s, several critics do take up their concerns. Margaret Homans, in her study 
Women Writers and Poetic Identity (which deals with the poetry of Dorothy 
Wordsworth, Emily Bronte and Emily Dickinson) outlines the "masculine tradition" 
within which women were denied activity and creativity and were located as passive, 
quasi-natural objects, "objectified as the other" and made "property" by the male 
subject (37). Like Homans, Meena Alexander is concerned primarily with women 
writers, though she devotes some space in her book Women in Romanticism to 
arguing that Romanticism is the realm of the transcendent male ego, which allows the 
female only as "an otherness to which desire could be directed" (22). Anne MeUor 
divides the influential anthology Romanticism and Feminism into three sections, the 
first two of which are significantly entitled "Silencing the Female" and "Writing the 
Female". In his essay in the first section, Alan Richardson exposes the subtle ways 
in which romantic poets colonise femininity. He argues that the shift from an ’Age
15
of Reason’ to an ’Age of Feeling’ involved the male poets in a process of revalorising 
traditional female qualities such as emotional intensity, empathy, and intuition, and 
entailed a new perspective on previously denigrated bodily acts, such as breastfeeding 
and crying. Although this may seem to subvert conventional ideals of masculinity, 
in fact, Ross suggests, men resurrected androgenous fantasies in order to colonise 
traditionally female domains. He tracks the Romantic tropes of mother and child, 
especially the image of nursing, which shadow the dim regions of male identification 
with the mother, in order to demonstrate that "the Romantic tradition did not simply 
objectify women. It also subjected them, in a dual sense, portraying woman as 
subject in order to appropriate the feminine for male subjectivity" ("Romanticism" 
22)."
Richardson is one of what Jane Moore has described as the ’new men’ of 
Romantic studies." It is worth noting that all the essays in the first section of 
Mellor’s anthology are by male critics, a risky strategy in that it again foregrounds 
the masculinity of Romanticism (within the very text that is attempting to change the 
contours of Romanticism). The involvement of men in feminist studies of 
Romanticism (and more generally the involvement of men in feminism - an issue 
dealt with in more detail in the following chapter) raises the questions: how are they 
speaking? to whom are they speaking? and on behalf of whom are they speaking?^ 
Jane Moore, for example, sees Richardson’s use of Chodorowian theories as 
reenacting the colonizing gestures he critiques, an appropriative move which 
underwrites the construction of a ’politically correct’ image of himself. Marlon Ross, 
in the essay which follows Richardson’s in Mellor’s collection, argues that "critics - 
even feminist critics - have tended to overlook [the] first published female poets"
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because they have internalised the Romantic ideology ("Romantic Quest" 50); by 
implication, feminist critics should not be so easily seduced.
Most of the critics working in the mode of feminist critique assume that a bad 
faith was operative in male British Romantic texts. For them, poem after poem 
demonstrates male appropriation of the female, grounding masculine subjectivity in 
the marginalisation and silencing of the female.® In other words, "writing poetry can 
become a means for enforcing the boundaries of gender" (Ross, Contours 157). This 
is not to suggest a transcendent view of patriarchy: Marlon Ross, for example, 
contextualises his analyses by outlining the changing cultural conditions that 
inaugurate the shift from Enlightenment to Romantic ideology, a change marked by 
a new male defensiveness against what was perceived as the feminization of literary 
value in the eighteenth century. What these critics do not contemplate, however, is 
the possibility that the male Romantics inscribe subversive ’woman’ in their texts in 
order to deconstruct a binary opposition of voice, that it is precisely such moments 
of ventriloquism which transgress the self/other boundaries of gender.^ Interestingly, 
Marlon Ross inadvertently enacts this confounding of binary opposition in his 
formulation of a resisting reading: he argues that we should "question Wordsworth’s 
terms" which "means to refuse to become the aggressive [sic] male reader who is 
inscribed in each of the lyrics and tales that has determined Wordsworth’s status in 
our literary canon and his influence in our cultural history", but this injunction follows 
his statement that "Wordsworth’s best readers [who] ...have accepted Wordsworth’s 
terms" are "[l]ike the women in his poems, who are unable to dispute the inheritance 
they help to promulgate" ("Naturalizing Gender" 392). To produce a resisting 
reading, then, is to avoid being fixed on one side of the binary opposition of gender.
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However, there remains a problem about Ross’s addressee: perhaps he is addressing 
a community of men who wish to dissociate themselves from a phallocentric pose 
without adopting the passivity of Wordsworth’s women. Moreover, while producing 
an idealized, feminized version of himself, Ross deals with the anxiety of influence - 
his belatedness after Hartman and Bloom - by troping these father-figures as women, 
impregnated by the Wordsworthian ideology.
The paradigm of the ’resisting reader’ remains a useful strategic tool, 
especially in the classroom, and particularly where the hypothesis of a woman reader 
is employed. Like Karen Swann, "the knowing feminist reader might resolve to 
collude with the Romantic woman’ ("Harassing the Muse" 87). We can, for example, 
examine Dorothy Wordsworth’s gendered role in William’s poetry, annotating the 
Romantic usury by which Imagination is generated; in a recent seminar on 
Wordsworth’s "Tintem Abbey" (part of a course on Romantic Poetry), a female 
student reported how angry the poem made her, using this anger to point to the 
oppression of women and to the ’lack’ in Wordsworth’s project which could only be 
assuaged by Dorothy’s presence - Wordsworth’s Imagination may be an "unfathered 
vapour" but it depends on maternal feminine f igures .E la ine  Showalter writes of 
"the way in which the hypothesis of a female reader changes our apprehension of a 
given text, awakening us to the significance of its [the text’s] sexual codes" ("Toward 
a Feminist Poetics" 128). The hypothesis of a woman reader for Coleridge’s 
"Christabel", for example, can expose the sexual politics of its sexual poetics. 
Christabel’s striptease may exhibit the pornographic potential of the lesbian scene for 
a male reader (11.245-254), but a woman reader might want to note the passivity of 
the male observer in this scenario (he is both empowered and shut out). The poem
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foregrounds the power of the female gaze ("And on her elbow did recline / To look 
at the lady Geraldine", Christabel "eyes the maid and seeks delay", U.243-44, 
1.259).“
Karen Swann’s essay "Harassing the Muse" is an exemplary instance of 
resisting reading. Swann calls into question the knight’s innocence in Keats’s "La 
BeUe Dame Sans Merci" and insists on a feminist reading of the complicity between 
the naive knight and his knowing poetic master. She argues that Keats’s hero is not 
to be pitied at the end of the poem; she suggests that the knight, who "spends the rest 
of his days wandering in a landscape of signs that resist translation" becomes a 
modem everyman who "enacts a currently popular account of every subject’s history" 
(91). The poem prefigures psychoanalytic theorising that "identity is imaginary" and 
subjects "the effects of the symbolic", but turns this paradigm "into a thrilling 
romantic game of risk and capture" (92). As Swann reminds us, "the lady gets 
’nothing’ from this encounter", it effects her disappearance, "while the knight who 
encounters her, and the poet who knowingly exploits ... are enabled to experience a 
certain inevitable ’fatality’, not simply as submission to the law of the father, but as 
accession to a community of poetic masters, ’pale kings and princes’ who are already 
translated into text" (92). Swann is properly aware of the provisionality of meaning 
which depends on our sense of who knows what. For instance, the reader’s 
intertextual knowledge of romance plots could foster the interpretation that the knight 
attempts to domesticate the lady, as Swann puts it, "the lady makes the knight supper" 
(88), a strategy of containment which la belle dame ultimately eludes. Swarm’s most 
radical suggestion is that perhaps the knight does not wish to capture the lady in the 
first place, as he is finally rewarded with the exclusive masculine community of the
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enthralled "pale kings and princes" (90); in other words, he finally becomes "one of 
the gang". Swann asks, "Could this community, and not the ideal or even the fatal 
woman, be the true object of his quest?"
Swann produces a provocative reading which nevertheless, to my mind, fails 
to recognise that both the lady and the knight lose out in this poem (she is harder on 
the knight than I would be - his fault seems to me to be more a lack of courage than 
a wiU to power). But, significantly, she deploys the insights of current theory - she 
draws on, and critiques, the work of Jane Gallop, Stephen Heath and Jacques Lacan - 
in the service of ’images of women’ criticism.“  Her strategic ’harassment’, 
therefore, blurs the misleading opposition which has shadowed feminist criticism in 
recent years, that "opposition of bluff, blunt Yankees and wanton, witty Gauls [that] 
relies on simplistic stereotypes" (Morris 466).“
*  *  *  *  *
Survey with me what ne 'er our fathers saw,
A female band despising NATURE'S law.
Richard Polwhele
Jane Austen’s Anne Elliot has something to say about male images of women which 
are fixated on female fickleness; she informs Captain Harville that.
Men have had every advantage of us in telling their own story. 
Education has been theirs in so much higher a degree; the pen has been 
in their hands. (Persuasion 230)
Austen’s feminism is to the point: women were marginalized in the patriarchal society 
of her time and their ability to tell their own stories repressed. Ironically, however, 
the pen is in her hand and the success of women novelists was perceived as a sign 
of the increasing feminization of literature during the late eighteenth century. Certain
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women novelists have always found a place - albeit a problematic one - within 
Romanticism. Austen made it into Leavis’s ’Great Tradition’ of English classics, and 
into our schools and classrooms, whüe Mary Shelley is taught on 59% of the courses 
surveyed by Harriet Linkin, a result supported by the proliferation of editions of 
Frankenstein. The recent appearance of Betty Bennett’s Mary Shelley Reader, and 
the anthology of essays. The Other Mary Shelley, should help to direct attention to 
other Shelley texts. Dorothy Wordsworth, who writes in the non-canonical form of 
the journal, is also increasingly popular, and no longer just as ’background’ for 
interpretation of her brother’s poems. Pamela Woof has produced a new edition of 
The Grasmere Journals whüe Paul Hamüton has edited Selections from the Journals 
of Dorothy Wordsworth: she has been weU-served by criticism, including Susan 
Levin’s book Dorothy Wordsworth and Romanticism, and articles by Susan Wolfson 
("Individual in Community") and o th e r s .L in k in  writes that " [gjiven the near 
majority for D. Wordsworth (49%), our next quorum could easüy mandate her 
inclusion as the eighth Romantic writer in a changing British Romantics canon" (560). 
The novels of Mary WoUstonecraft and Mrs. Radcliffe are frequently taught and 
written about, and the latter has the advantage of appearing on courses and in books 
on the Gothic. Taylor and Luria argue that "whereas the period provided such 
important women novelists as Austen, the Bronte sisters, and even Mrs. Radcliffe and 
Mary SheUey, no woman was a major poet" (100).“  They explain this phenomenon 
by arguing that "[g]enre was ...to some extent a function of gender, and a major 
cause of that situation lay in contemporary assumptions about women’s education". 
Denied the classical education that was regarded as a prerequisite for writing poetry, 
women turned to the more accessible genre of the novel.
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But how do these texts fit into the movement - or ideology - we call 
Romantic? Marlon Ross contends that "[i]f one of Romanticism’s definitive 
characteristics is the self-conscious search for poetic identity, how can Wordsworth, 
who tended not to conceive of herself as a poet, be considered a ’Romantic’?" 
("Romantic Quest" 29).“  Ross proposes that "Mary SheUey’s writing, besides being 
in ’prose’ (the ’lower’ form of expression), dissents with Romanticism, and Mary’s 
loving devotion to the editing of Bysshe’s poems displays a confidence in his work 
that she does not seem to have in her own" ("Romantic Quest" 30).“  Anne MeUor 
takes up the point about dissent with Romanticism in her essay, "Why Women Didn’t 
Like Romanticism"; in her view, women writers "responded negatively, very 
negatively" to "romanticism’s celebration of the creative process and of passionate 
feeling" (277-78). Taking the cases of Jane Austen and Mary Shelley, both she 
argues committed to the rationality extolled by Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman. MeUor proposes that:
The male writers promoted an ideology that celebrated revolutionary 
change, the divinity of the poetic creative process, the development of 
the man of feeling, and the "acquisition of the phUosophic mind". In 
opposition, the female writers heralded an equaUy revolutionary 
ideology, what Mary WoUstonecraft caUed "a REVOLUTION in 
female manners." This feminist ideology celebrated the education of 
the rational woman and an ethic of care that required one to take fuU 
responsibility for the predictable consequences of one’s thoughts and 
actions, for aU the chUdren of one’s mind and body. The faUure of the 
masculine romantic ideology to care for the created product as much
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as for the creative process, together with its implicit assumption that 
the ends can justify the means, can produce a romanticism that, as 
Mary Shelley showed, is truly monstrous. (285-86)
Thus MeUor proposes that "in the future when we speak of romanticism, we wUl have 
to speak of at least two romanticisms, the men’s and the women’s" (285).“  The 
problems with this Une of argument are fourfold. Firstly, MeUor eUdes the 
"passionate feeling" that persists through the texts of the women writers, self- 
evidently in SheUey, though fUckers of desire also traverse the pages of Dorothy 
Wordsworth’s journals; Cora Kaplan has Ustened to the discourse of pleasure in 
WoUstonecraft’s work, whUe WoUstonecraft’s A Short Residence prompted some 
readers to faU in love with her.“  This work can help to characterize the second 
problem, for it contains many of the tropes we associate with Romanticism ’proper’ - 
it’s full of mountains, waterfaUs, sublime sights, and is permeated by the yearning of 
the romantic traveUer.^° Thirdly, the male Romantic poets are not an homogeneous 
group, and to characterise their work as monoUthicaUy patriarchal is to misrepresent 
its diversity. FinaUy - and most importantly - this notion of two romanticisms creates 
an inaccurate gender/genre paradigm: this bipartite canon invites readers to recognise 
male Romanticism as pursuing the transcendent and the universal in poetry and 
female Romanticism as locating the contingently real in prose.^^ The rediscovery 
of successful female poets working during the period is crucial to the deconstruction 
of this disabling opposition, and it is to this part of the romantic terrain that I wUl 
now turn.
Richard Polwhele’s The Unsex’d Females: A Poem (1798) invites the (male) 
reader to "Survey with me, what ne’er our fathers saw, / A female band despising
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NATURE’S law" whose "vengeance smothers aU their softer charms" (U.11-12,14).^^ 
Polwhele’s anxious invective reminds us that by the turn of the century the literary 
scene had been colonized by female poets, who have subsequently been erased from, 
or marginalized within, literary history. As recently as 1989, Gilbert and Gubar 
proposed that "given the received chronology of romanticism [they cite the dates 
1798-1832], it is possible to decide that women did not have a romantic period at all; 
at least, there are no female poets in this age who are equivalent to Blake, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley and Keats" ("Mirror and the Vamp" 164). 
However, in 1988 Stuart Curran’s trail-blazing article, "The I Altered", recovered the 
lost voices of many women poets; the following year, Marlon Ross, in his book The 
Contours of Masculine Desire: Romanticism and the Rise of Women’s Poetrv. charted 
this region extensively. The availability of primary texts is, of course, crucially 
important, some writers appear in Roger Lonsdale’s Eighteenth-Century Women 
Poets, while 1992 saw the appearance of Jennifer Breen’s anthology Women 
Romantic Poets. 1785-1832.“  I want to make some general observations - on the 
question of canonicity and on periodization - before commenting briefly on Ross’s 
work, and then in more detail on Breen’s anthology.
To recognise, and indeed to spotlight, women as readers, writers or textual 
figures - as feminist criticism of Romanticism is now doing - does more than merely 
provide a new critical perspective, or add a few names to the existing canon. 
Romanticism does seem in many ways to have been the last bastion of masculinity 
masquerading as universality, but this feminist practice acts as a type of Denidean 
’supplement’, changing the very contours of the received canon.^ ’Woman’ and 
women are not merely an accessory; feminist readings are not simply the latest critical
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fashion item. To recognise women writers exclusion from the canon demystifies the 
notion of the canon as somehow a ’natural’ (inevitable) selection of texts, and exposes 
it as a cultural construct, serving particular interests. What is appreciated in literature, 
and the modes by which it is analysed, can no longer be regarded as impartial since 
it is grounded in institutions which have silenced women writers. Though I have no 
wish to set up a new or counter canon, and though my own critical desires are bound 
up with the male Romantic prose writers, I think that it is strategically crucial to 
displace the emphasis from the male to the female poets. This in order both to 
redress the years of critical oblivion endured by these female voices, and to work 
towards a sense of the historical specificity of the revolutionary period. An important 
function of feminist criticism of Romanticism in the 1990’s is to get the women poets 
into our books, conferences and classrooms, and I am prepared to displace male 
writers in order to do this.^^
The rediscovery of these women poets raises again the question of 
periodization, reminding us that literary movements do not have fixed beginnings and 
endings. The Romantic ’period’ has always been critically fluid, with various starting 
and finishing dates chosen by the academy according to its canonical agenda(s). In 
Britain, the period popularly begins either in 1789 (The French Revolution) or 1798 
(Lyrical Balladsf  ^ - and ends in 1832 (The First Reform Bill) or as late as 1850 (the 
publication of The Prelude, the same year as Tennyson’s great Victorian poem. In 
Memoriam). This problem seems particularly acute in attempts to classify the women 
poets, many of whom seem alienated from the concerns of the romantic ideology. 
Thirteen of the twenty-six poets who appear in Breen’s anthology also appear in 
Lonsdale’s Eighteenth Century Women Poets, while Angela Leighton includes
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chapters on Felicia Hemans and Letitia Elizabeth Landon in her book Victorian 
Women Poets, though as she admits they "are not historically Victorians at aU" (2). 
Stuart Curran argues that Hemans’s preoccupation with female and domestic concerns 
marks her work as an early "transition into the characteristic preoccupations of 
Victorian verse" ("I Altered" 188). Leighton refines this position, suggesting that 
though Hemans writes "’Romantic’ poems about exile" and "’Victorian’ poems about 
female passion", her significance in literary history is that "she makes a bridge 
between the theatrical, extrovert pathos of eighteenth-century sentimentalism and the 
sincere, socially responsible pathos of Victorian sentimentality; between femininity 
as an aesthetic pose and femininity as a saving religious morality" (26-27).
Marlon Ross takes another perspective on the question of periodization, 
arguing less that the women poets are, for example, proto-Victorian (though he traces 
the genealogy of women’s writing), than for a recognition that Romanticism itself is 
only one aspect of literary activity during the Revolutionary period. Emphasizing the 
growing popularity of women’s poetry and women reviewers in the late eighteenth 
century, Ross documents the anxiety which this phenomenon aroused in male poets; 
he argues that the female voices helped to determine the formation of Romanticism, 
which was in part a defensive reaction against this encroaching féminisation of 
literature. Ross traces the ways in which Wordsworth and others constructed an 
ideology of ’self-possession’ and conquest in order to constitute the male poet as self- 
originating, master of, rather than mastered by, the affections, and that this gender- 
biased aesthetics has determined the map of Romanticism; in other words, the 
narrative that has been constructed to teU the story of Romanticism adheres to the 
contours of masculine desire. I have attended to this aspect of the romantic ideology
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- the inscriptions of sexuality in textuality - in the first section of this chapter; here 
I want to look at the second half of Ross’s book which follows the development of 
women’s poetry from the mid-eighteenth century.
Ross begins his history of ’feminine’ poetry with the "the female Augustan 
scribbler", such as Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, and moves on to the first generation 
blue stockings - Elizabeth Vesey (17157-1791), Elizabeth Carter (1717-1806), Frances 
Boscawen (1719-1805), and Elizabeth Montagu (1720-1800) - who herald the age of 
sensibility within the salons where male and female intellectuals discuss the 
importance of fee l in g .T h ou g h  these blues do not make fixed discriminations 
between masculine and feminine discourse, Ross describes how the move "from the 
Augustan coffeehouse to the bluestocking parlor, from the parlor to nature" helps to 
engender the development of a ’proper’ female discourse with the transitional figures 
of Hannah More and Anna Barbauld, which in turns leads into the confident poetry 
of domestic affections of Felicia Hemans, L.E.L.,and Joanna Baülie (Contours 189). 
These ’affectional’ poets are forced to foreground their femininity in order not to 
transgress the boundaries of propriety. Literary history has perceived this poetry as 
secondary to the macho versions of sensibility, despite the fact that increasing 
numbers of women supported themselves and their families through their writing, and 
constituted real financial competition for male poets (though, with the exceptions of 
Byron and Scott, few of the ’canonical’ male writers lived off their work). Ross 
suggests that the ’affectional’ poets formulate an ideology of their own, one which 
prioritizes a collective voice of ’other-centred’ desire, in opposition to the male 
preoccupation with self-centred power (the Wordsworthian "egotistical sublime").
Ross provides fascinating material on the conditions of literary production, the
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female networks of support which nurtured women writers, as well as much-needed 
analyses of individual texts. However, Anne Mellor has taken issue with Ross’s 
attempt to "construct a generational model of influence and development among these 
three groups of female poets"; she wonders if this model "doesn’t commit the very 
mistake he so eloquently warns us against". In other words, she questions whether 
Ross is in fact:
... reading them [the female poets] within a critical discourse derived 
from masculine experience, from developmental - even oedipal - 
models of father-son and brother-brother rivalry and influence? Had 
he begun with Katherine Philips (the "Divine Orinda") as the originator 
of female poetry rather than Elizabeth Montagu, the difference between 
the first and the later generations of female poets would have been 
neglible. Similarly, if he had included the self-consciously "radical" 
tradition of female poetic discourse - that located in the writings of 
Charlotte Smith and Helen Maria Williams [both appear in Breen’s 
anthology] - his picture of feminine romanticism might have been 
coloured rather differently. (Rev. of Ross 104)
In addition, though he reveals that ’classic’ romanticism is only part of the literary 
activity of the period, as well as attending to differences between the women writers 
and their similarities with male writers, Ross comes close to re-establishing the notion 
of two distinct Romanticisms, essentially demarcated along gender lines.
Jennifer Breen’s anthology provides an opportunity for us to make our own 
decisions about the place of the women poets, and the contours of Romanticism. 
Breen’s Introduction and the poems themselves, both explicitly and implicitly, suggest
28
a number of points that are pertinent to a gynocritical reading of Romanticism. For 
example, although Romanticism is associated with the use of popular forms and of 
the vernacular, scholars have neglected women’s contribution to this trend. It is 
worth remembering that Joanna Baülie produced a seventy page polemic arguing for 
naturalness in language two years before Wordsworth’s famous "Preface", whüe 
Baülie, Barbauld, Hannah More and Carolina Oliphant [Naime] experimented with 
oral forms, such as baUads, and with Scottish dialect (in the cases of Oliphant and 
Baülie). In articulating his poetic aim of adopting the "’language ready used by 
men’", Wordsworth "was merely endorsing theoreticaUy a change in poetry-writing 
that had already taken place" (Breen xxiv-v). Women also contributed to the revival 
of the sonnet form that we associate with Romanticism: "on Christmas Eve 1802 
Wordsworth, reading sonnets, chose a teUing list of authors — Mdton, himself, and 
Charlotte Smith" (Taylor and Luria 105; see Wordsworth, D. Journals 164).^ ® 
Women made a significant contribution to chüdren’s literature, and Breen rightly 
suggests that Mary Lamb’s "poetry should be read in comparison with Wdliarn 
Blake’s Songs of Innocence" (xxiü). Some poems expose the fettering ideology of 
femininity (see Landon’s "Lines of Life"). One aspect of this constraint is felt in the 
poets’ uneasy relation to traditional love poetry (Breen theorises a split between 
public expectations and private imperatives), for many adopt a male point of view 
(though L.E.L. and Amelia Opie wrote love poems from a female perspective).
Feminist criticism’s increasing attention to differences - for example, of race, 
nationality, religion, class, and sexual preference, as wed as of gender - wiU enable 
readings of these poems which are sensitive to the ways in which a range of social 
positions and cultural discourses inflect the perspectives of gender; servant women.
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for example, "usually wrote from the perspective of a double subservience to men and 
women" (Breen xvi). A feminist reading practice, while it may locate subservience 
to and subversions of the patriarchal construction of ’Woman’, need not elevate 
ideological innocence as a critical idol - these poems may be analyzed in terms of 
their collusion with prevailing ideologies: Hannah More’s impassioned critique of 
imperialism, "Slavery" (Breen 10-20), nevertheless patronizes the "benighted soul[s]" 
of the "sable race", using conventional colonialist imagery whereby freedom is 
synonymous with light (and, by association, with white).
Anna Barbauld’s "To Mr. [S.T.] C[oleridge]", in which she criticizes an 
"unearthly" Romanticism divorced from the contingent "things of life", sets a keynote 
of these poems. Mary Robinson, in "London’s Summer Morning", provides an urban 
documentary in which the "din" of the city is a signifier of life and fit subject for the 
poet (in contrast to Wordsworth and Keats, for example, who prefer to poeticize out 
of the hearing of the city’s din). Robinson’s lists celebrate and particularize the 
human life of the city:
...Now begins 
The din of hackney-coaches, waggons, carts;
Whüe tinmen’s shops, and noisy trunk-makers.
Knife-grinders, coopers, squeaking cork-cutters,
Fruit-barrows, and the hunger-giving cries 
Of vegetable-vendors, fiU the air. (U.9-14)^^
This is not emotion recoUected in tranquillity, nor a transcending of the life of things; 
rather, it demonstrates a loving attention to the ordinary. No hierarchies of 
significance are set up, and the poet does not turn from the scene to the question of
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subjectivity: sight is allowed to be itself without having to generate insight (into the 
poet’s self).
Many of the poets turn to domesticity as a subject, which allows them to 
valorise traditionally marginalized women’s work. Anne Grant’s heroic couplets, for 
example, mock the exclusivity of masculine poetic "Invention", affirming the poetry 
in prosiness:
And as for the friend of all poets. Invention,
’Tis a thing, of late years, I scarce think of or mention:
Or of useful inventions alone make my boast.
Such as saving potatoes and turnips from frost;
Or repulsing whole armies of mice from my cheese;
Or plucking the quills without paining the geese.
"A Familiar Epistle to a Friend" (11.29-34)
Similarly, Barbauld’s "Washing Day" subversively invokes a "domestic Muse, / In 
slip-shod measure loosely prattling on" (U.3-4 - an ironic revalorization of Popean 
rhetoric) and addresses a woman reader in colloquial language, what I would call ’the 
real language of [wojmen’.
One point this revival of names raises is the question of biography. In this era 
of the ’death of the author’, it is perhaps hard to emphasize the signature of the 
writer. The situation is especially acute for the feminist reader: Teresa de Lauretis 
asks, "why would feminists ...want author-ity and authorship when those notions are 
admittedly outmoded, patriarchal, and ethically compromised?" (Technologies 113). 
However, as Rosi Braidotti points out, women are in a different position to men, for 
"one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity that has never been fuUy granted" ("Envy"
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237), while, as Nancy Miller puts it, "[o]nly those who have it [authority, the 
signature, the phallus] can play with not having it" (Subject to Change 75)/° This 
is not to suggest that feminist critics should use biographical information in any 
simplistic way to determine the ’meaning’ of the poems; instead one might look for 
the traces and inscriptions of materiality in these texts, that is, in Miller’s words, for 
"the marks of a producing subject’ (16). Mary Jacobus reminds us that "the category 
of ’women’s writing’ remains as strategically important in classroom, curriculum or 
interpretive community as the specificity of women’s oppression is to the women’s 
movement" ("Is There a Woman" 108).^  ^ It is worth noting that, though the critical 
industry may employ the techniques of deconstruction, semiotics, psychoanalysis or 
new historicism to produce readings of male Romantic poems (in other words, 
theories which eschew ’naive’ biographical interpretation), it does in fact know a huge 
amount about the lives of Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, et al. Information is also 
available about the reception of their poems, and another crucial scholarly project is 
a feminist version of Donald Reiman’s The Romantics Reviewed, for the evidence of 
early reviews would help to reinstate the women poets to their central place within 
the period.
Another question the anthology as a whole raises - again - is whether the term 
’Romantic’ carries too much phaUocentric baggage (particularly the paradigm of the 
"egotistical sublime" whereby subjectivity is generated in opposition to, and through 
the appropriation of, feminized ’Nature’) to be a useful description of women’s 
poetry. Breen implicitly sets this vision of male poetry against, for example, Baülie’s 
precise and non-appropriative, descriptions of the natural world and rural workers. 
I would argue that the term needs to be reassessed if it is regarded as exclusive, that
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is, setting boundaries which keep women out. On the other hand, recent critics have 
deconstructed the binary paradigms of gendered writing, unravelling the ’feminine’ 
inscribed within ’male’ writing of the period (as I discuss in the next section). The 
poems collected by Breen demonstrate that women writers, for socio cultural reasons, 
emphasize certain possibilities within Romanticism. The developing ideologies of 
femininity made it unlikely, for example, that any female poets would espouse the 
role of "unacknowledged legislators of the world". Interestingly, however, in their 
emphasis on the quotidian - that buzz word of current Romantic studies - the female 
poets are likely to become central to our accounts of Romanticism. Though the term 
Romantic cannot be divested of its historical baggage, it can be opened to the effects 
of ’otherness’ (though the risk is that it it becomes so amorphous as to be 
meaningless). It may, of course, also be the case that critical sensibilities nurtured by 
postmodernism simply revel in local analyses rather than the pursuit of explanatory 
clarity.
It is worth noting that many of the women poets were more popular in their 
own time than their male contemporaries. There were more than a thousand 
subscribers to Ann Yearsley’s first volume of poetry. In 1835, WiUiam Wordsworth 
placed Felicia Hemans with Scott, Coleridge, Lamb and Crabbe as writers to be 
mourned:
Mourn rather for that holy Spirit,
Sweet as the spring, as ocean deep;
For Her who, ere her summer faded.
Has sunk into a breathless sleep. ("Extemporare Effusion", U.37-40)
By 1840, John Lockhart in his review article, "Modem English Poetesses", could
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record - to his chagrin? - that the writing women of his country are an "emancipated 
race": "they can, and they do, write, print, and publish whatever they Hke"; he 
continues, "Are publishers wanting? There is Mr. Henry Colburn. Are they 
underpaid? They obtain thousands. Are they without readers? We wish Milton had 
as many" (375). This is not to suggest that there are no grounds left from which a 
male reviewer might criticise a female poet: if, in an earlier era, she could be 
criticised for straying outwith the boundaries of poetic propriety, now she can fail by 
staying too securely within them, by adhering too scrupulously to the ideology of 
femininity. Lockhart advises that Mrs. Norton "ought ...to break through the narrow 
circle of personal and domestic feelings, and adventure herself upon a theme of 
greater variety and less morbid interest. There is a great difference between writing 
always from the heart and always about the heart, even the heart of a beautiful 
woman of genius" (382). Lacking the buccaneering poetic spirit, Mrs. Norton is 
fixated on the heart, giving way to innumerable Victorian poetesses who will focus 
on that organ of poetic generation.
* * * * *
Refusing the coercion o f the social word.
Laura Claridge
The third strand of feminist theory that is reshaping the map of Romanticism depends 
on the insights of deconstruction, Lacanian psychoanalysis and French feminism. 
Literary critics have teased out the "warring significations", to use Barbara Johnson’s 
phrase, in the construction of Romantic subjectivity, locating the inscriptions of 
femininity which traverse the work of male writers. Male romantic subjects are no 
longer seen as ’self-sufficient’ but as complex, exoticised terrains wherein patriarchal 
hegemony is destabilised through voicing the feminine. In Chapter Two I will
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analyze these theories in more detail; moreover, they are part of the texture of this 
thesis (and will often be the subject of reflexive comments). For these reasons, I 
devote less space to them here than to the other romantic revisions already detailed, 
providing only a short survey of relevant critical works.
Jane Aaron explores Charles Lamb’s atypical masculinity in A Double 
Singleness: Gender and the Writings of Charles and Mary Lamb. She reads his 
whimsical irony and feminine ’negative capability’, which upset critics as diverse as 
Carlyle and Leavis, as subversive critiques of Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s 
masculinist claims to transcendence. She makes use of Kristeva’s theories to 
illuminate the construction of Charles/Elia’s feminized subjectivity. While Lamb still 
lacks (feminist) readers, Keats, unsurprisingly, has attracted a great deal of feminist 
attention, from critics including Adrienne Rich and Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi, and 
Margart H o m a n s . I n  Chapter Five, I trace the lineaments of the body of sensibility 
in Keats’s letters, especially those to/about Fanny Brawne, reading the inscriptions of 
a type of écriture feminine. In terms of Keats’s poetry, Barbara Johnson has posed 
the question of the ’undecidabiüty’ of "La Belle Dame Sans Merci" in terms of 
gender: "By the end of the poem, it becomes impossible to know whether one has 
read a story of a knight enthralled by a witch or of a woman seduced and abandoned 
by a male hysteric" (World 37). Susan Woifson traces the process of "Feminizing 
Keats", analysing how the language of gender operates in his own poems and in the 
work of his readers and reviewers. According to Woifson:
Keats’s marginality [in terms of literary style, personal appearance, 
class origin] typically tempts critical extremes: he either triggers efforts 
to stabilize and enforce standards of manly conduct in which he is the
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negative example, stigmatized as ’effeminate’, or ’unmanly’; or he 
inspires attempts to broaden and make more flexible prevailing 
definitions, so that certain qualities, previously limited to and 
sometimes derided as ’feminine’, may be allowed to enrich and enlarge 
the culture’s images of ’manliness’ - even to the point of androgyny. 
("Feminizing Keats" 318)^ "^
Keats himself shifts between "contempt and condescension" towards women, and 
figuring himself as feminine (Woifson 326). Critics from Hazlitt to Swinburne 
castigated Keats for his enervated effeminacy, while women readers during the 
Victorian period were protective and sympathetic: Mrs. Oliphant happily declared, 
"’In poetry his was the woman’s part’" (qtd. in Woifson 321). Rather than indicating 
a period in which gender opposition is fixed, this debate suggests an era in which 
gender characteristics are in flux, in which policing is necessary to enforce ’natural’ 
boundaries.
Laura Claridge, in several stimulating essays, brings Lacanian theories of 
desire to bear on the poetry of Wordsworth, Byron and Shelley. She argues that the 
silence of the women in many of their poems may be a plenitude, a rebellious 
"refusing the coercion of the social word" ("Liminal Gender" 161).^  ^ She argues 
that Shelley’s Epipsychidion records the "penetration o f the male through female 
fullness - the light; and through absence - the lack of patriarchal linguistic signifiers" 
("Romantic Potency"). Claridge reverses the terms of what I have described as the 
’feminist critique’ of this poem, suggesting that though "Emily can be the virgin, the 
blank script that woos the poet’s silent tongue, ... she is also the occasion of this 
poem, its language holding to earth the same poet who would soar with her beyond
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its prisonhouse. Without her ’chaining’ his ’flight of fire’ there would be no 
Epipsychidion". In another essay she summarizes her project as the "wish to posit 
that Shelley explores ways to escape ’maleness’ through trying to articulate that part 
of ’femaleness’ which remains (he mythologizes) outside the ’benefits’ of the 
patriarchal language that he would disavow" ("Bifurcated Female Space" 93). 
Claridge inverts the trend in feminist criticism which sees Romantic poetry as 
appropriating the feminine: "We must acknowledge, in all fairness, that to ’use’ ... 
something or someone that appears outside as a newly experienced space that liberates 
the subject from the claustrophobia of his ... own gaze, is not necessarily a co-optive, 
possessive gesture" ("Liminal Gender" 170-71).^ *^
John Barren, too, turns to Shelley, locating in his work "a politics of gender" 
which reveals affinities with the Kristevan "semiotic" rather than with "the 
phaUocentric character of the symbolic order" (Flight of Syntax 14-15). BarreU 
argues that the language of Epipsychidion may be called ’feminine’ because it 
interrupts the monologic language "which seems ... to protect the power of the 
masculine" (15). Interestingly, BarreU deals with the issue of specificity, of 
particularizing the feminine, within the poem, but in terms other than that of the 
feminist critique: BarreU reminds us of a passage near the beginning of the poem, 
which has "been describing Emilia’s eyes, apparently as wells, fathomless impossible 
to conceive, and impossible to perceive, except as light dances on their surface", and 
then he quotes the foUowing lines:
The glory of her being, issuing thence.
Stains the dead, blank, cold air with a warm shade 
Of unentangled intermixture, made
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By Love, of light and motion: one intense 
Diffusion, one serene Omnipresence,
Whose flowing outlines mingle in their flowing.
Around her cheeks and utmost fingers glowing 
With the unintermitted blood, which there 
Quivers, (as in a fleece of snow-like air 
The crimson pulse of living morning quiver,)
Continuously prolonged, and ending never,
TUI they are lost, and in that Beauty furled 
Which penetrates and clasps and fUls the world;
Scarce visible from extreme loveliness. (U.91-104)
"Are lines like these", asks BarreU, "attempts to describe EmUia, . . .or  are they 
attempts not to describe her?" Where Drummond Bone argues that SheUey’s 
’descriptions’ despecify EmUia, in effect, empty her of meaning in the service of male 
desire, BarreU proposes that "we can see them as effecting a refusal of mastery, a 
negation of descriptions of the body" which would fix and delimit it as the object of 
the male gaze. BarreU "see[s] a relation in these lines between a refusal of ... 
monologic utterance", which privUeges closure, and "a negation of the kind of 
description of woman which attempts to represent her as passive object". However, 
BarreU then shifts his perspective, recognising that the improvisatory and 
supplementary quality of these lines could be ascribed to the fact that "the things they 
are tracking, femininity and the body of woman, are aU over the place, too fugitive 
to be caught up with or too fidgety to hold a pose". From this perspective, SheUey 
reproduces a stereotype of woman.
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I ’ve quoted BarreU’s article at length - partly because its own refusal of 
mastery is so appealing (to me), the undecidabUity of choosing between these two 
readings - but also because it helps to highlight the risks (and pleasures) of 
deconstructive feminist reading: for some critics, this mode of reversible reading may 
seem to displace questions of politics and power, in a process by which the feminist 
reader (the woman reader?) becomes merely "a wallflower at the carnival of sexual 
pluralities"/^ There is no solution sweet to problems of politics and poetics, but I 
would argue that to refuse to join the carnival is to risk creating a monolithic feminist 
criticism, a new orthodoxy that is exclusionary rather than inclusive.
In a broad sense, the critics discussed in this section may be seen as occupying 
the third position in Kristeva’s three-tiered history of feminist thought, purveyed in 
her influential article "Women’s Time". The first two positions correspond roughly, 
in terms of literary criticism, to the ’feminist critique’ and ’gynocritics’ outlined 
above (equality and difference, according to Kristeva’s scheme). In the third position, 
Kristeva writes:
...the very dichotomy man/woman as an opposition between two rival 
entities may be understood as belonging to metaphysics. What can 
"identity", even "sexual identity", mean in a new theoretical and 
scientific space where the very notion of identity is challenged? 
("Women’s Time" 214-15)
In this deconstructive mode, the feminine is viewed in terms of positionality rather 
than biological essence. As Toril Moi puts it, "[i]f femininity then can be said to 
have a definition at aU in Kristevan terms, it is simply as ’that which is marginalised 
by the patriarchal symbolic order’" ("Feminist, Female, Feminine" 126). Both men
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and women can be constructed as marginal to the symbolic order, and these positions 
can change according to shifting power structures. Kristeva herself advocates this 
third position, which has deconstructed the opposition between masculinity and 
femininity, producing not ’identity’ but a ’subject-in-process’.
* * * * *
Throughout this chapter my focus has been on the ways in which feminist criticism 
is displacing Romantic boundaries; I would like now to gesture towards another angle 
of vision. The role of feminist theory in the study of Romanticism has tended to be 
diffuse - operating on several planes at once - rather than linear, with critiques of 
male images of women, uncovering the archeology of women’s writing, and the 
deconstruction of sexual difference taking place more or less simultaneously. 
Romantic feminism bypasses the temptation to reify the modes of feminist critique, 
gynocritics and deconstructive feminism into a teleological plot (the risk involved in 
Kristeva’s f r am e w o r k ) T h e  feminist reader and teacher of Romanticism is well- 
placed to adopt these paradigms strategically, according to local contingencies. 
Feminist theory is revising Romanticism, not as a master discourse, but in a dialogic 
process whereby Romantic texts speak back to the critic, reconstructing (my) feminist 
theories. Feminist critics (and Romanticists) may gain, I think, by recognizing that 
Romanticism may play a role in feminist theory, both as a way of disrupting 
teleological paradigms, and as a means of historicizing recent feminist literary theory. 
It would be interesting to investigate, for example, Gilbert and Gubar’s claims for the 
Romantic origins of écriture feminine ("Mirror and the Vamp" 155); or Caroline 
Franklin’s insight that, "Kristeva’s theory of the semiotic, by its romanticization of 
the marginal in the politics of desire, itself owes something to this strand of Romantic
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libertarianism", that is, those philosophies (advocated by William Godwin, for 
example) that proclaim "sexuality as a potentially liberatory force, repressed by a 
corrupt civilization which has increasingly sought to regulate the private life of the 
individual" ("Juan’s Sea Changes" 69)/^ In other words, as well as feminizing 
Romanticism, my project involves romanticizing Feminism.
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Notes to Chapter One
1. See his article, "Romanticism and Its Ideologies", and The Romantic
Ideology.
2. As various critics have noted, much romantic criticism replicates and 
sustains the preoccupations of the texts it analyses. Clifford Siskin 
sees his work. The Historicity of Romantic Discourse, as "a new 
literary history" that clarif[ies] the scope of our entanglements with the 
past" (7). He "show[s] that whenever we designate certain texts as 
’literature,’ or valorize that distinction in terms of ’creativity,’ 
’imagination, ’ or ’expressiveness, ’ or analyze those qualities as 
variables of individual development, we have joined Wordsworth in 
taking the ’mind of Man’ to be the ’main haunt and region’ of our 
’song’. The traditional six-poet, 1798-1832 Romanticism of the 
anthologies and most criticism is itself a product of that haunting: a 
transformation of history into a short, and therefore sweet, 
developmental narrative (7-8).
3. Cynthia Chase provides a brief introductory section on "Feminist
Criticisms" in Romanticism (27-31). She reprints feminist articles by 
Cathy Caruth, Mary Jacobus, Karen Swann and Margaret Homans.
4. See Drummond Bone: "John Bayley once remarked that he didn’t
know what James’ Isabel Archer liked in bed; after 600 odd lines of 
Epipsychidion we don’t even know the colour of Emily’s hair" ("Detail 
of Nature" 4). Diane Long Hoeveler provides the only book-length 
study - Romantic Androgyny - of "images of women" in Romantic 
poetry. There are many accounts of the female in Blake; see, amongst 
others: Anne K. Mellor, "Blake’s Portrayal of Women" and David 
Punter, "Blake, Trauma, and the Female" (see Mellor for a more 
extensive bibliography. Romanticism and Gender 217-218).
5. Clifford Siskin notes the gender imbalance involved in male
assumption of female qualities: "When ...the Romantic artist ’full’ of 
’female softness’ is physiologically female, her activities and 
production are developmentally judged to be invariably limited and 
ultimately arrested" (174).
6. See her sophisticated critique of this phenomenon in her essay
"Plagiarism with a Difference".
7. These questions are adapted from Mary Eagleton, Feminist Literary 
Criticism 5.
8. Caroline Franklin explicitly sets out "[t]o avoid the pitfalls" of the
feminist critique, that is, "the automatic berating of the male author’s 
sexism, or the obsessive chronicling of women’s oppression" (Byron’s
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Heroines 141 She "contextualize[s]" Byron’s "patriarchalism", locating 
it in "the current debate in Regency Britain on the role of woman", and 
she considers "the heroines of Byron’s tales .. .in the context of the 
ideology of the gender of the genre [of romance] (1,14).
9. For a fascinating argument along these lines, see Laura Claridge, "The 
Bifurcated Female Space of Desire".
10. Several critics have recently analysed Dorothy Wordsworth’s role in 
WiUiam’s poetry; for interesting readings from a feminist perspective, 
see: Marlon Ross, "Romantic Quest and Conquest" and "Naturalizing 
Gender"; Margaret Homans, "Eliot, Wordsworth, and the Scenes of the 
Sisters’ Instruction"; John BarreU, Poetry. Language and PoUtics. In 
Chapter Six, I touch on De Quincey’s recognition of Dorothy’s role in 
filling the ’lack’ at the heart of WiUiam’s writing.
11. Fora feminist approach to this poem, see Karen Swann, "’Chiistabel’" 
and "Literary Gentlemen and Lovely Ladies"; also on Coleridge, see 
Sandra GUbert and Susan Gubar, "The Mirror and the Vamp", in which 
they read "Kubla Khan" from the perspectives of empirical feminist 
criticism and ’French’ Feminism.
12. See also David Punter, "Blake, Trauma and the Female", for a good 
example of how the feminist critique and psychoanalytic interpretation 
can function in the reading of romanticism.
13. Unfortunately, this is precisely the simpUstic binary redrawn in 
MeUor’s Introduction to Romanticism and Feminism, though the essays 
themselves demonstrate the inadequacy of categorising the multipUcity 
of feminist criticisms in this way.
14. See articles by Anita HempiU McCormick; Ingeborg M. Kohn; Alan 
Liu; and chapters on Dorothy Wordsworth in Margaret Homans, 
Bearing the Word and Meena Alexander, Women in Romanticism. 
Paul HamUton’s new edition unfortunately includes only tiny extracts 
from texts other than the Alfoxden and Grasmere Journals. Carol 
Kyros WaUcer is currently retracing Dorothy Wordsworth’s steps on her 
1803 tour of Scotland; her book, for Yale University Press, will reprint 
(most of) Shairp’s edition, with revised notes and photographs.
15. LesUe Rabine analyses the significance of women writers in France, 
arguing that "these women [Marie d’Agoult, Hortense AUart, Flora 
Tristan] ...chaUenged ...the Romantic concept of the self" ("Feminist 
Writers" 491).
16. Ross’s line of argument lends itself to Showalter’s caU for "a female 
framework for the analysis of women’s literature" ("Toward a Feminist 
Poetics" 131).
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17. This self-effacing role has been questioned by Mary Favret, who 
rightly points out that Mary SheUey’s editorial labour of love was also 
"an effective strategy of self-promotion" ("Mary SheUey’s Sympathy 
and Irony" 18). Susan Woifson notes how through her editorial 
privUege SheUey constructs audiences for her husband’s poetry, and her 
own position as his best reader ("Editorial PrivUege"). E.B. Murray’s 
new edition of The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe SheUey is dedicated 
to Mary WoUstonecraft SheUey, who made the present edition possible.
18. In her most recent work MeUor acknowledges the problems of this 
binary model of difference, the limitation of grouping women writers 
under the heading of "feminine" Romanticism, and constrasting this 
with the material of traditional "Romanticism", now rechristened as 
"masculine" Romanticism. She argues that this structural model 
reveals the hidden "difference that gender makes to the construction of 
British Romantic Uterature" (Romanticism and Gender 3). MeUor’s 
definitions of gender are more fluid than in her previous work, moving 
towards the positional model espoused in this thesis (for example, 
according to MeUor, John Keats and EmUy Bronte produce 
ambivalently-gendered texts); like Elaine Showalter, MeUor shifts from 
"feminism" to "gender" (I discuss Showalter’s critical reaUgnments in 
Chapter Two, and recur to the significance of the move from feminism 
to gender in my "Afterthoughts").
19. See, Cora Kaplan, "WUd Nights"; unUke Kaplan, Mary Poovey 
concentrates on what she sees as WoUstonecraft’s ideological 
commitment to the repression of female sexuality (Proper Ladv 78). 
For other feminist readings of WoUstonecraft, see Miriam Brody, 
Laurie A. Finke, and several articles by Mitzi Myers; Janet Todd 
surveys readings of WoUstonecraft (and suggests ways of 
contextualizing her writing) in Chapter Six of Feminist Literary 
History. Of A Short Residence. WiUiam Godwin writes: "If ever there 
was a book calculated to make a man in love with its author, this 
appears to me to be the book" (WoUstonecraft and Godwin 249).
20. However, Marilyn Butler has recently discussed the female discourse 
of this text in her paper, "Making the World Female". For another 
stimulating feminist reading of this text, see Moore, "Plagiarism with 
a Difference".
21. My argument here is indebted to Harriet Linkin 560. This is a binary 
opposition that Janet Todd, among others, accepts, though she does 
qualify her eUsion of women poets: "there are no women Romantic 
poets, giving that phrase aU the privUeged force it has acquired within 
later Uterary studies" (Feminist Literary History 111).
22. See Vivien Jones 186; Jerome J. McGann, Romantic Period Verse 137.
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23. Andrew Ashfield’s anthology of women’s romantic poetry is 
forthcoming from Manchester University Press. In addition, the latest 
Norton Anthology of English Literature (Vol. 2) includes several 
women poets, though they are stül hugely outnumbered by the men. 
This has crucial implications at institutions where the Norton is used 
as the primary teaching text. Jerome J. McGann’s The New Oxford 
Book of Romantic Period Verse aims "to make a fair representation of 
the work ...being read in the period" (xxiv), but the women poets 
remain underrepresented.
24. This is not to suggest that this destabilization of the literary canon is 
confined to Romanticism: the question of the literary canon has been 
at the forefront of critical debate in recent years. Nor is it to suggest 
that the Romantic canon was immutable before the work of feminist 
critics; see "How It Was" in Studies in Romanticism 21 (1982), for the 
reminscences of several major Romantic critics on the different 
versions of Romanticism they have experienced during their careers 
(ten critics contribute to this ’celebration’, none of whom are women). 
It is, perhaps, premature to claim the revisioning of Romanticism: as 
Susan Woifson, in her 1993 review of two collections of essays 
published in 1990 (Gene W. Ruoff, ed., The Romantics and Us. and 
Kenneth R. Johnston et al., eds.. Romantic Revolutions!, notes, "It is 
striking that, in the 800 hundred pages of these two volumes ... there 
is scant attention to the many women writing and publishing in the age 
that both volumes designate as the ’Romantic’" (130). Derrida’s theory 
of the ’supplement’ is outlined in Of Grammatology. esp. 141-64, 165- 
268.
25. On a course I taught in 1993 on Romantic Poetry, I sacrificed
Coleridge (except Chiistabel: in future years I may ’lose’ other major 
poets). A revised Romantic canon remains a dilemma for me, since I 
find it hard to abandon the pantheon of six men who have meant so 
much to me for so long.
26. Another popular alternative is 1770, the year of Wordsworth’s birth. 
An early starting date for Romanticism has the advantage of including 
the poets of sensibility, such as Gray and Collins. I would suggest 
Charlotte Smith’s birthdate in 1749 as another alternative.
27. For a detailed account of ’the bluestocking circle’, see Sylvia
Harcstock Myers.
28. On Smith’s sonnets, see the fine article by Stella Brooks, "The Sonnets 
of Charlotte Smith". She reprints and analyses ten sonnets in terms of 
their Romantic preoccupations and their specificity. Significantly, she 
writes: "I do n o t. ..wish to praise Charlotte Smith’s work by using that 
of her male contemporaries as model and measure. Most of the poems 
discussed here were written in or before 1784, so they predate those of
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the more well known Romantic poets. Properly speaking we should 
speak of her influence on them, particularly with regard to her 
virtuosity in the sonnet form" (13-14).
29. This is in the tradition of Swift’s "After a Shower of Rain". 
Wordsworth did not ignore the city, but his preference is for a 
Whisterlesque sleeping city (see the sonnet "Composed Upon 
Westminster Bridge").
30. Equally, one might argue that only those who don’t have it can play 
with having it - but the symmetry of the rhetorical reversibility is not 
matched by an equality of power play. On feminist criticism and the 
premature ’death of the author’, see Cheryl Walker. Jo-Anna Isaak 
observes that, "The death of the author and the consequent failure of 
narcissistic fantasies about the self-procreating artist have wholly 
different implications for those who have never been ’cocksure’ in this 
manner of credulous man" (12).
31. To emphasize the category of "women’s writing" is, as I suggested 
above, a politically strategic move. If we believe that there is no 
’essential’ subjectivity, for men or women, yet we may still want to 
equalize the historical imbalance that has resulted from the fact that 
patriarchal culture has not allowed the ’female subject’ to exist.
32. A recent reviewer for the British Association of Romantic Studies 
Bulletin and Review wittily suggested changing the Association’s name 
to the British Association of Georgian Studies: this would mean getting 
rid of the macho-sounding acronym BARS and replacing it with the 
more feminine BAGS (Aaron, Rev. of Ross 10). Janet Todd 
emphasizes, "When I use the term ’Romantic poets’ or ’Romanticism’, 
I am referring both to an element within male poetry of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, rarely found in female 
writing, and to the construction that has been made from this element 
by later literary criticism" (Feminist Literary History 112). She offers 
no alternative terminology for women’s writing. For pragmatic and 
theoretical reasons for retaining the term "Romanticism", see Anne K. 
Mellor, Romanticism and Gender 210-212. See also Penelope 
Fielding’s review article in which she asks, "Is the very term 
’Romanticism’ so bound up with contemporary views of the self, 
power and language as to be by definition a male discourse?" (129), 
and Susan Woifson’s review ruminations in Studies in Romanticism on 
the continuing utility of the term (130). One move might be to cease 
capitalizing (and thereby reifying) the term; David Punter records his 
preference for the small r ’ in his article on Don Juan (150).
33. Rich and Gelpi praise Keats’s "negative capability", comparing it to 
Chodorow’s work on the "so-called ’weak ego boundaries of women’", 
which they suggest "might be a source of power" (Gelpi and Gelpi,
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Adrienne Rich’s Poetry 115). Margaret Homans, less sympathetic to 
Keats, argues that he "habitually makes the apparent femininity of his 
negative capability enhance masculine power and pleasure" ("Keats 
Reading Women" 345). See Chapter Five for further consideration of 
these views.
34. The move towards androgyny is not necessarily a feminist gesture; for 
extensive discussion, see Diane Long Hoeveler, Romantic Androgyny. 
It is worth noting that though Woifson’s work could be described as 
deconstructive, it is historically detailed in ways that mark it off from 
some of the other critics considered here.
35. It is, of course, always possible to invert this proposition: rather than 
refusal and silence being interpreted as plenitude, they may be seen 
simply as emptiness.
36. See also Claridge’s Lacanian reading of Don Juan. "Love and Self- 
Knowledge".
37. This wonderful phrase is not mine, but after an extensive search I still 
cannot discover where I read it.
38. In fact, Kristeva is careful to emphasize that the phases are 
simultaneous, and Toril Moi states that they have to be worked on at 
the same time ("Feminist" 129). In one sense, the possible hegemony 
of the third position in Romantic studies has already been displaced by 
’new historicism’.
39. Franklin’s essay is a socialist-feminist reading of Don Juan, which 
takes up the question of sexuality in the poem’s discourse of 
orientalism. She reads the poem through the lens of Cora Kaplan’s 
article, "Pandora’s Box". For further feminist readings of Byron, see 
Franklin’s "’Quiet Cruising O’er the Ocean Woman’" and Byron’s 
Heroines. See also my note "Lord Byron Borrows a Figure", and 
Malcolm KelsaU’s focus on Byron’s female figures in his article "The 
Slave-woman in the Harem". I would Hke to take this opportunity to 
cite a couple of other influential feminist readings of Romantic texts 
not previously discussed: Mary Jacobus’s wonderfully detailed study 
of sexual poHtics, Romanticism. Writing and Sexual Difference, and 
Gayatri Spivak, "Sex and History in The Prelude".
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Chapter Two
Dressing Up: Feminist Approaches to Gender, Genre and Gynesis
Genre
Though issues of gender and genre provided an important starting point, this thesis 
does not deal in any detail with questions of genre. The texts on which I focus may 
be grouped under the generic heading of non-fictional prose, but there are, of course, 
great differences between, for example, Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry and 
Thomas De Quincey’s The English Maü-Coach: they are separated in time by almost 
a century (published in 1757/59 and 1849/1854, respectively); Burke’s Enlightenment 
discourse (and ideological commitments) contrasts with De Quincey’s "impassioned 
prose" (Cooke 242); the Enquiry was published in book form and reprinted 
approximately every third year for thirty years, while The English Mail-Coach, like 
other of De Quincey’s writings, appeared in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine. 
Equally between these and SheUey’s A Defence of Poetry and Keats’s letters, a huge 
generic chasm yawns (without beginning to consider differences between these texts). 
As is weU known, SheUey’s text was written (at least partly) in response to Peacock’s 
The Four Ages of Poetrv. but it was dislocated from this immediate context, finding 
a readership only in a later age. Keats’s letters were written for private, if at times 
communal, perusal not for pubUc consumption, and were not pubUshed until MUnes’s 
Biography of 1848, while the letters to Faimy Brawne were first pubUshed in 1878. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I have worked with a flexible notion of the historical 
boundaries of Romanticism, an extended Romanticism that encompasses Burke’s 
treatise, since his categorization of the sublime and the beautiful had far-reaching
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effects, and De Quincey’s essays from the middle of the next century, which are so 
often fixated on an earlier period.
The definition of these prose texts as "marginal" is also open to question. 
Certainly, as I discussed in the previous chapter, within the received version of 
Romanticism, the limelight has been hogged by six male poets. But, Burke, Shelley, 
Keats and De Quincey are hardly non-canonical names.^ It remains the case, 
however, that in university courses on Romanticism, Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France is far more likely to make an appearance than his aesthetic 
treatise; De Quincey is most likely to be represented by Confessions of an English 
Opium-Eater, whüe the prose of SheUey and Keats has historicaUy been valued as an 
heuristic device for the reading of their poems. In this sense, the texts I read may be 
seen as marginal to the Romantic canon.^
It is worth noting that genre is not an essential category, but is highly reader 
specific: certain genre distinctions wiU only be clear to certain classes of readers (with 
the added variable of careless or careful reading), while critical perceptions of genre 
change over time.^ Caroline Franklin recognizes that "as a genre itself consists of 
the coexistence of overlapping modes, a rigidly schematic approach is not appropriate, 
but the value of broadly indicating ...generic parameters ...has a mediatory function, 
aUowing a diachronic perspective both on the Uterary forms themselves and the 
specific historical context of the texts under consideration" (Byron’s Heroines 10)."^  
To speak of the gender of genre, as I wiU do in the foUowing pages in order to 
contextuaUze my interpretations of romantic prose, is not to retrieve an essential 
gender identity of particular genres; rather, I foreground the reception of texts, and 
the critical industry that marks out the gendered boundaries of reading and writing.^
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The novel is, from its beginnings in the early eighteenth-century, associated 
with the feminine. Tom Jones and Robinson Crusoe notwithstanding, novels are full 
of female voices, whether ventriloquized, as in the case of Richardson’s Clarissa, or 
issuing from the female pen. The novel of sensibility’s "man of feeling" is marked 
by the signs of femininity, such as tears and other displays of emotion, which are 
becoming newly-acceptable for men. Increasing literacy, the decreasing cost of book 
production, and the rise of the circulating libraries made novels available to a 
relatively wide range of people.^ Female authorship remained circumscribed: 
according to B.G. MacCarthy, "To venture safely into print a woman should be either 
morally didactic, dilettante, or distressed" (11:40).  ^ The novel was at times decried 
because of its association with women: appropriating Pope’s dictum, the Monthly 
Review. 20, 1759, declared "Most novels have no character at all" (Jones 176), and 
women were not encouraged, or even permitted, to read (all) novels.
Moralists, educationalists and conduct-book writers sought to limit the genres 
deemed appropriate reading matter for the female gender. This is part of the 
ideological project of circumscribing female education in order to produce an ideal, 
domestic woman. Political and scientific tracts, philosophy, anything radical or 
controversial, was out of bounds for women readers, as were certain types of novels.* 
James Fordyce, in Sermons to Young Women (1776), warns of "that fatal poison to 
virtue, which is conveyed by Profligate and Improper Books" (1:144). Hannah More 
finds novels "dangerous", for they are "employed to diffuse destructive politics, 
deplorable profligacy, and impudent infidelity" (28). Novels are seen to be ’naturally’ 
more attractive to the female mind than other more high brow genres. The problem 
with novels (and poems) is that they can be consumed in private, and therefore there
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is no way of controlling their influence on impressionable minds, other than 
prohibition. John Bennett’s Letters to a Young Ladv (1789) makes this point: "Plays, 
operas, masquerades, and all the other fashionable pleasures have not half so much 
danger to young people as the reading of these books. With them, the most delicate 
girl can entertain herself, in private, without any censure; and the poison operates 
more forcibly, because unperceived" (11:72). "[L]oose and luscious" narratives are 
"improper" material for female readers: "she who can bear to peruse them must in her 
soul be a prostitute"; young women are encouraged to read Richardson’s novels 
because he presents models of "female excellence" (Fordyce 1:147-149). These books 
can be used in the same way as conduct-books, providing ideal models to be imitated, 
as is suggested by Bennett’s comment: "If . ..I wished a girl to be every thing, that 
was great I would have her continually study his Clarissa. If I was ambitious to 
make her every thing, that was lovely, she should spend her days and nights, in 
contemplating his Byron" (11:102). Mary WoUstonecraft, while criticizing conduct- 
book discourse, and urging women to free themselves from such ideological shackles, 
nevertheless makes clear the anxiety about mimetic behaviour that is at the heart of 
such discourse: she writes of women who read novels that they will "plump into 
actual vice" (Rights of Woman 306).^
Some writers, such as Hester Chapone in Letters on the Improvement of the 
Mind, addressed to a Young Ladv (1773), consider reading poetry to be the best way 
of cultivating the "charming" faculty of female imagination (Jones 106).^° But 
Poetry, like novels, attracts censorship, for both reading and writing it distracts 
women from their domestic duties: "It heightens [a woman’s] natural sensibility to an 
extravagant degree, and frequently inspires such a romantick turn of mind, as is
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utterly inconsistent with all the solid duties and proprieties of life" (Bennett 1:208). 
"[S]hort but spirited essays", however, "convey the rules of domestic wisdom and 
daily conduct" (Fordyce 1:279). Such essays as appear in the Guardian. Tatler and 
Spectator are "proportioned to the scope" of young ladies’s "capacities" (Fordyce 
1:281-82).“ EUen Messer-Davidow sums up the appeal of such texts: "Short, 
topical, uncomplicated, lively, and familiar, these essays, like the extracts that young 
ladies study, put edifying information into the form most comprehensible to the 
untutored female intellect" (48).
If novels were both associated with women and proscribed to them, the 
continuing hegemony of the male Romantic poets fosters the view that poetry was a 
masculine form, the hegemonic form, both sublime and social, making a difference 
in its world. In her discussion of the ideological work of Victorian society, Mary 
Poovey, however, suggests "the extent to which what may look coherent and complete 
in retrospect was actually fissured by competing emphases and interests" (Uneven 
Developments 3). In this respect, William Wordsworth’s famous dictum that a poet 
is "a man speaking to men", and Percy Shelley’s triumphant defense of "the 
unacknowledged legislators of the world" may be read against the grain as revealing 
often unacknowledged t ruths:Will iam’s use of "man" and "men" is perhaps not 
(or not merely) unconscious phaUocentrism, a blithe acceptance of the male as the 
universal, but a deliberate masculinization of the genre (or a masculinization of the 
language in which poetry is discussed - even metre is "manly" [609]), while Shelley’s 
comment exposes the marginahty of poets to the actual events of political life.^  ^ It 
is interesting that both poets express and anchor their claims for poetry in prose. In 
the Preface to Lviical Ballads. Wordsworth affirms "that there neither is, nor can be.
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any essential difference between the language of prose and metrical composition" 
(though he does want to keep the distinction at the level of ideas) he uses organic 
metaphors ("They both speak by and to the same organs ...the same human blood 
circulates through the veins of them both") to reclaim poetry (which is gendered as 
"she") as solid (602). Because he wants to assert the social and political efficacy of 
poetry, Wordsworth gives it a ’body’, a palpable presence in the ’real’ w o r l d . T h e  
"very language of men", which is engendered by, and grounded in, experience, makes 
the poet a man of action as well as words.
As I have already suggested, in an increasingly feminized marketplace, with 
increasing numbers of women both writing and reading poetry, the male poets turned 
to "masculine metaphors of power", tropes of conquest for example, "to reassert the 
power of a vocation that is on the verge of losing whatever influence it had" (Ross, 
"Romantic Quest" 29). That this is a battle that needs to be fought throughout the 
period is suggested by Hazlitt’s view that Burke’s "prose never degenerates into the 
mere effeminacy of poetry" (7:229). Mary WoUstonecraft, in A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, pits her plain prose against the pernicious artificiaUty of the 
language of the novel, that debased amd feminized genre consumed in vast quantities 
by languishing ladies. Where Wordsworth wants to make poetry more Uke prose (his 
version of Professor Higgins’s "Why can’t a woman be more like a man"?), 
WoUstonecraft wants to separate two types of prose. At issue here, as Mary Favret 
points out, is the "struggle over the gendering of genre and its poUtical effects" 
("Mary SheUey’s Sympathy" 24).
Wordsworth and WoUstonecraft, in different ways, could be seen as claiming 
prose as masculine. Conversely, HazUtt teUs us that he is indebted to Coleridge’s
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description of "poetic prose" as "the second hand finery of a lady’s maid" ("On the 
Prose-Style of Poets" 12:15)/^ Juhe Ellison, however, points out in her discussion 
of Coleridge, that "much of the argumentative and figurative language of The Friend 
tries to insist that nonfictional prose is to fiction as masculine is to feminine" (191). 
The gendering of genre in the Romantic period was a process of "uneven 
developments" (to borrow Poovey’s phrase), but in general terms it is possible to 
assert that the very heterogeneity of the texts that we group under the heading of non­
fictional prose raises the spectre of sexual, as well as textual, fluidity.
In this study, I do not consider in detail the tradition of the Spectator-type 
essay, continued during the period by Charles Lamb, for example, but I would like 
to make some observations here on other types of prose. The addition of prose 
prefaces (and notes), for example, was a strategy used by poets to secure the sexually- 
ambiguous genre of poetry within an authoratitive framework. “ Such paraphernalia 
locates the poem in the tradition of the edited text, giving it an academic/theological 
lineage. Caroline Franklin notes that Byron, Scott and Southey prided themselves on 
the historical accuracy of their romances, and enveloped these texts, which were 
considered feminine. In a "paraphernalia of prose dedications and notes ...directed not 
at the female readership but at a small circle of predominantly male friends and 
literati"; in this way they could "capitalize on the new middle-class and largely female 
readership [by producing romances], yet also be recognized as literati, addressing a 
mainly male, classically-educated, and aristocratic elite (as in the eighteenth century)". 
SheUey’s A Defence of Poetry bears the signifiers of class, as much as of gender, for 
it is in the mode of the gentleman’s conversation, whUe De Quincey’s essays are in 
the tradition of the continental fragment, the organic, subversive, and insecurely
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gendered form of Schlegel, for example/* The chiasmic symmetry of De Quincey’s 
’poetic prose’ to Wordsworth’s ’prosaic poetry’ marks out an area of debate about 
gender as much as genre. Indeed, the hybrid genre of ’poetic prose’ (a description 
which, despite differences in tone fits the texts considered in this thesis), perhaps 
provokes the most acute insecurities about gender. In Mary WoUstonecraft’s words, 
the mixture of verse and prose produces "the strangest incongruities" (Rights of Men 
65).^  ^ I want to emphasize that I offer no comprehensive theory of the gender of 
Romantic non fictional prose. I have focussed on a Umited number of texts that, in 
my opinion, put pressure on the contours of gender, that possess the potential to 
reveal and displace the binary paradigms that structured the Romantic symboUc 
economy.
* * * * *
Gender: The composition o f Man*s woman
It is difficult to map the contours of gender within the period in the confines of this 
chapter, but I wiU make a few preliminary comments in an attempt to ’place’, in an 
historical context, the ideologies of gender that concern me in this study. Diane 
Hoeveler argues that "sexual difference first became an obsessive concern ...during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries" (xvii). This concern, which is 
expressed as a binary model of difference, is evident in the changing scientific 
representation of the body. Indeed, notions of biology increasingly anchor theories 
of social roles, but biology, Uke other discourses, is not outside of ideology. 
Anatomy may be destiny, but it is cultural, not natural. As Thomas Laqueur has 
demonstrated in fascinating detail, there is a shift between ancient and Renaissance 
accounts of the body and those of late eighteenth and early-nineteenth century medical
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men/^ The former are influenced by Galen’s writings, which stress the 
physiological homology between men and women, that is, women’s reproductive 
organs are exactly like men’s except that they are internal rather than external. This 
interiority was connected with the ’fact’ that women were positioned lower in the 
hierarchy of "heat" than men: lacking the generative heat that would cause their 
reproductive organs to extrude, women remain imperfect men. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, women were seen as fundamentally similar, though biologically 
and socially inferior, to men. In the latter writings, bodily differences come to be 
seen in terms of binary oppositions. The foregrounding of women’s reproductive 
system underlined the difference rather than the similarities between the sexes, while, 
at the same time, it marginalized differences between women, concentrating on their 
common childbearing c a p a c i t y . I n  other words, a hierarchical system based on 
homology - a difference in degree between men and women - is replaced by a 
hierarchical system that is based on a difference in kind.
Why should this shift towards a binary model of sexual difference take place 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries? One way of understanding this 
change is to connect it with the dislocation of social roles experienced in a period of 
revolutions (French and American), industrialization and urbanization, socioeconomic 
changes and the growth of dissenting religions. The revolutionary events which 
shattered the stability of the eighteenth-century inspired "a revolution in the ’manners 
and morals’ of the nation" (Davidoff and Hall 82).^  ^ Davidoff and Hall foreground 
the 1780’s and 1790’s (and, later, the 1830’s and 1840’s) as "decades of acute social, 
political and economic disturbance and disruption associated with significant shifts 
in class relations and political power" (75).^ To summarize it crudely, the
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bourgoisie attempted to preserve a realm of tranquil domesticity, untainted by public 
problems; woman presides over, and comes to represent, this domestic space. This 
is a long and complex process, for as Davidoff and Hall demonstrate the ideology of 
separate spheres purveyed in late eighteenth-century texts does not exist in widespread 
material form until the 1830’s (earlier in the period women are likely to have been 
involved in their husband’s or family’s business, and home and workplace were 
frequently combined). John Bennett’s Letters to a Young Lady (1795) provides 
evidence of the domestication of the feminine: in this conduct manual, Bennett, 
locating gender roles within domestic space, casts men as architects, or labourers, they 
"build the house", while women merely add a ’feminine’ touch to the interior design 
(they "are to fancy, and to ornament the ceiling" and to "dispose [the furniture] with 
propriety"). Tropes of surface and depth figure the difference between men and 
women: men and masculinity are associated with solidity, discrimination and depth 
("to examine a subject to the bottom"); women and femininity are all surface gloss, 
adding to a subject "its brilliancy and aU its charms" (1:168-69). This oramentation 
is always secondary to the main structure.
As the nineteenth-century progresses, the Angel in the House comes to be seen 
as the ideal female figure. There is a broad shift from seventeenth and early 
eighteenth-century writing on women, which emphasized their voracious sexual 
desires, to the late eighteenth-century suppression (partly under the influence of 
Evangelicalism) of this trait in favour of an emphasis on female modesty. Women 
are essentially sexually passive, such feelings only evoked within the context of 
marriage and motherhood (Davidoff and Hall 170).
Moralistic discourses, as well as legal and economic structures, constrain
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female agency and support a gender hierarchy. Thus, John Bennett instructs young 
ladies in Miltonic dichotomies:
His Eve reveres her husband. She listens to his conversation, in order 
to be instructed. In him, she feels herself annihiliated and absorbed.
She always shows that deference and consciousness of inferiority, 
which, for the sake of order, the all-wise Author of nature manifestly, 
intended. (11:90)
His Eve displays none of the subversiveness of Milton’s, and is no more than a 
passive cipher who confirms the superior status of masculinity. The legal status of 
married women in England at this time reinforces Bennett’s representation. William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) reveals that, "The 
husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of 
the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated 
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs 
everything" (qtd. in Taylor and Luria 98).^  ^ The woman is "annihilated", 
"absorbed" or "incorporated" into the man.^  ^ Interestingly, as I have already noted, 
the men of Romanticism incorporate certain feminine qualities into their male 
pysches: Adam’s dream is more often androgyny than Eve.^^
I would Uke to connect this male absorption of femininity with moralizing 
discourses about female purity, for the attributes to be appropriated should not taint 
their new ’host’. Davidoff and HaU point out that.
The concept of purity had taken on a special resonance for women 
partly because of fears associated with the polluting powers of 
sexuality. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the middle class
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was their concern with decorum in bodily functions and cleanliness of 
person. Thus, maintaining purity and cleanliness was both a religious 
goal and a practical task for women. (90)
To go back to Felman’s reading of Freud, the question "what is femininity - for 
m enT, leads me to analyse the masculine construction of otherness, but also to 
examine the feminine within men. One trajectory that could be read into this thesis 
is the story of increasing anxiety about the lack of distinction between self and other, 
the absorption of the one by the other. It is paradoxical that while definitions of 
masculinity and femininity become increasingly rigid as the nineteenth-century 
progresses, the very notion of women as secondary, dependent, legally incorporated 
into men, lends itself discursively to a blurring of distinctions. A further premise of 
this study is that male fears about female sexuality, and, more broadly, about the 
security of sexual difference, are not so much suppressed as displaced; the readings 
in the following chapters annotate this manoeuvre.
* * * * *
Gynesis: Post-structuralist theories in a Feminist Context
In speaking of the construction of the male subject, and in referring throughout this 
study to questions of subjectivity, I draw on particular feminist theories about the 
relationship between subjectivity and language. Jane Gallop outlines the difference 
between French and American approaches to this issue: "Americans - like Nancy 
Chodorow - speak of building a ’strong core of self, whereas French - Eke Josette 
Feral - talk of the ’subversion of subject’ ...The ’self’ impEes a centre, a potentially 
autonomous individual; the ’subject’ is a place in language, a signifier that is already 
aEenated in an intersubjective network" (GaUop and Burke 106).^* GaEop herself
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has emphasized that "French" and "American" do not necessarily denote the 
nationalities of the critics, so much as the intellectual traditions within which they 
work/^ Though I draw on a range of theoretical paradigms, I would certainly locate 
my work within the ’French’ tradition.
This post-structuralist emphasis on the "subject" as "a place in language" 
fosters a view of sexual difference as positional rather than fixed and natural (or even 
experiential).^® Such theories are predicated ultimately on Saussure’s account of 
difference: Saussure argued that individual words do not possess intrinsic meaning, 
but that they become meaningful only by being distinguishable from other words, for 
"in language there are only differences without positive terms" (120). Saussure’s 
insight has influenced deconstructive and psychoanalytic theories, and, without 
attempting to summarize these wide-ranging and complex bodies of writing, I would 
like to articulate those aspects that are most important to this thesis, and to briefly 
outline the advantages and the problems of poststucturalist theory for feminism.
Derrida, following Saussure, argues that "difference inscribes itself without any 
decidable poles, without any independent, irreversible terms" (Dissemination 210), but 
he radicalizes Saussurean difference by doing away with the notion of a stable 
signified. Difference is rewritten as differance, the spelling inscribing a difference 
within difference, both temporal and spatial, both "differing" and "defeiing". It is a 
difference that is seen but not heard, a way of marking the slippages, gaps and 
undecidabilities that punctuate our knowledge of the world. Experience itself is 
always already textual, which undermines the potentially oppressive truth claims of 
unmediated experience. Deconstructive difference also undermines traditional 
Western concepts of identity, which are structured around a series of binary
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oppositions, pre-eminently the opposition man/woman (I discuss these binaries in 
more detail in subsequent chapters). The appeal of deconstruction for feminism is its 
attempt to dehierarchize and dismantle these dichotomies; deconstruction displays that 
the seeming priority of the privileged term is a fraud, and Derrida argues that the 
primary term is fissured by otherness - difference is "supplementary" rather than 
oppositional. Phallogocentric logic displaces and projects this internal otherness onto 
an external, secondary term (such as woman) in order to maintain the fiction of its 
own self-presence.^^
Deconstructive ideas have been taken up by many feminist critics, such as
/  \
Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva amongst others, who deploy a 
strategy of reversal, celebrating the marginal term as a way of subverting hierarchical 
difference(s).^^ A major problem with poststructuralist theories is their perceived 
lack of a political programme; as Michele Barrett notes, deconstructive politics "tend 
towards the textual and the local" and are thus of limited value in instituting social 
reform ("Concept of Difference" 35). Many feminists consider that the emphasis on 
textuality, and textual resistance, marginalizes the important social struggle over 
meanings.^^
According to Sally Alexander, psychoanalysis offers feminism "a reading of 
sexual difference rooted not in the sexual division of labour (which nevertheless 
organises that difference), nor within nature, but through the unconscious and 
language" (132). Both Freud and Lacan stress the bisexuality of the drives and the 
mobility of desire, arguing that sexuality at the fantasmic level is not fixed and is only 
stabilized through societal conventions. Lacan’s oft-quoted statement that "The 
unconscious is structured like a language" gives access to the argument that
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subjectivity and sexuality are not stable, but constituted by discontinuous differences. 
Samuel Weber describes the Freudian unconscious in a way that emphasizes its 
affinities with Derridean differance:
If the unconscious means anything whatsoever, it is that the relation 
between self and others, inner and outer, cannot be grasped as an 
interval between polar opposites but rather as an irreducible dislocation 
of the subject in which the other inhabits the self as the condition of 
its possibility. (32-33)
I will take up in subsequent chapters aspects of psychoanalytic, especially Lacanian, 
thought (such as the notorious Lacanian "phallus"); for the moment, I will simply 
state that psychoanalytic discourse, like deconstruction, is open to charges of 
ahistoricism. Moreover, it is hard to forget that though Freud argued that "pure 
masculinity and femininity remain theoretical constructions of uncertain content", he 
also tended towards the essentialism of "Some Psychical Consequences of the 
Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes" (19:241-58).
Some feminists also suffer from the anxiety of influence, worrying that in 
imitating male theory (theory itself comes to be coded as male) feminist critics lose 
their way. According to Elaine Showalter,
For some pioneering feminist critics ...the glittering critical theories of 
Derrida, Althusser, and Lacan seem like golden apples thrown in 
Atalanta’s path to keep her from winning the race. In the adaptation 
of continental theory to feminist practice they see the dictatorship of 
the dominant, the surrender of hard-won critical autonomy to a reigning 
language and style. The post-structuralist feminist ... is a rhetorical
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double-agent, a little drummer-girl who plays go-between in male 
critical quarrels. ("Women’s Time, Women’s Space" 36)
There remains much room for debate about the usefulness of deconstruction and 
psychoanalysis for feminism, but I want to focus more specifically here on the role 
of woman in (as) the subject matter of poststructuraHsm. I will examine the 
phenomena of "gynesis" and "men in feminism", and ask why male critics want to 
occupy the cultural space of woman, however provisionally, and how female critics 
have responded to this desire.
Alice Jardine analyses the metaphorization of Woman that subtends much 
postmodern French philosophy; the process she describes as "gynesis" is brought 
about by the questioning occasioned by the breakdown of the paternal "Master 
Discourses" of rehgion, history, science and philosophy:
In France, such rethinking has involved, above all, a reincorporation 
and reconceptualization of that which has been the master narratives’ 
own "non-knowledge", what has eluded them, what has engulfed them.
This other-than-themselves is almost always a "space" of some kind 
(over which the narrative has lost control), and this space has been 
coded as feminine, as woman. (Gynesis 25)
The poststructuraüst woman is "neither a person nor a thing, but a horizon ... a 
reading effect, a woman-in-effect that is never stable and has no identity" (25). She 
becomes the trope for the other of phallogocentric discourse.^^ This "putting in 
discourse of ’woman’" has less to do with the writing of women, than with, for 
example, Derrida’s terminology of the "invaginated text" and the "hymen" and the 
process of "becoming woman" in the work of Barthes and BaudrUlard, Deleuze and
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Lyotard (to name of some of Jardine’s examples)/^
Jardine argues that "at the heart of gynesis" is the project "[t]o give a new 
language to these other spaces" and that this project is "filled with both promise and 
fear", because, as she points out,
[Tjhese spaces have hitherto remained unknown, terrifying, monstrous: 
they are mad, unconscious, improper, unclean, non sensical, oriental, 
profane. If philosophy is truly to question those spaces, it must move 
away from all that has defined them, held them in place: Man, the 
Subject, History, Meaning. It must offer itself over to them, embrace 
them. (73)
It is worth noting that this passage articulates in microcosm my own analyses of male 
Romantic prose writing, which chart precisely the oscillation between rejection of the 
space of gynesis as other, as monstrous, improper (Jardine’s vocabulary echoes 
Romantic gothicism), and the embrace of these spaces in ways which disarticulates 
phallogocentric meaning.
Jardine draws attention to the fact that many women writers are participating 
in the process of gynesis. One might cite Luce Irigaray’s argument in Speculum of 
the Other Woman that woman in patriarchal discourse is constructed as the negative 
mirror-image of man; the corollary of this is that man is not a clearly bounded entity 
but is traversed by difference since the coherence of his identity depends on the 
supplement of the female. However, Jardine primarily addresses the texts of male 
writers of gynesis, and it is these that feminist critics have found most problematic. 
At stake, as Cary Nelson has pointed out, is the "struggle[s] over who wiU keep 
possession of the metaphysical body of woman" ("Men, Feminism" 168).
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Jardine sees the writers she discusses as "women’s compagnons de route" 
(38)^ *; other feminist critics are not so sure that they want to take this journey at all, 
and they worry that men are tagging along (or overtaking) opportunistically because 
feminism is fashionable, the margin is the trendy place to be seen. If the 
predominantly male use of the trope of woman is viewed with distrust, so too is the 
related phenomenon of "men in feminism", of men practising feminist criticism. 
Both might be seen as instances of what Marguerite Waller has memorably called the 
"TOOTSIE trope" (2).
Elaine Showalter turns to the Tootsie trope in her influential essay, "Critical 
Cross-Dressing", in which she exposes the motivations of male critics who dress up 
in the accoutrements of feminism and suggests why women should worry about these 
transvestite hero(in)es. Showalter argues that the 1982 film Tootsie does not reveal 
Dustin Hoffman to be an ideal feminist but rather a phallic woman. According to 
Showalter, "Playing Dorothy is an ego trip" (for Michael Dorsey/Dustin Hoffman), 
and "[tjhis success comes ...from the masculine power disguised and veiled by the 
feminine costume" (123). There is a comic gap between the female disguise and the 
masculinity underneath, as when Dorothy lowers her voice to had a cab. For 
Showalter, the implication of Dorothy’s "feminist" speeches "is that women must be 
taught by men how to win their rights".
Having analysed this paradigm, Showalter applies her insights to a number of 
male critics who use feminist theory. In particular, she sets up Jonathan Culler (the 
good male feminist) against Terry Eagleton (the bad usurper of feminism). For 
Showalter, Culler in On Deconstruction avoids "the flamboyant self-promotion of 
Tootsie" (123), he resists "female impersonation", "[tjhat is to say he has not read as
65
a woman, but as a man and a feminist" (126). Eagleton, on the other hand, 
participates in "the Rape of Feminist Theory"; his book. The Rape of Clarissa, "is 
meant to have the dash and daring of a highwayman’s attack" and "Eagleton’s 
’feminist criticism’ is ... [a] well-barricaded preserve to be penetrated by the daring 
Marxist Macheath" (127). Eagleton appropriates feminist theories but ignores 
feminist readings of Clarissa: he fails to acknowledge his own gender position, and 
ultimately mirrors the Lovelace of his own interpretation, who rapes Clarissa in order 
to recover the lost phallus: Showalter reads Eagleton as " ’possessing’ feminist 
criticism", appropriating its "phallic" power, as a way of recuperating his fears that 
"writing (rather than revolutionary action) is effeminate" (128). Eagleton’s book is 
contrasted unfavourably with Terry Castle’s Clarissa’s Ciphers: the polarity Showalter 
constructs is between a woman critic who "responds to the silences in Clarissa" and 
a male critic who "silences ...feminist criticism by speaking for it" (129)."^ ®
At the end of her essay, Showalter recounts a dream of "the feminist literary 
conference of the future", inspired by the covergirl of a recent Diacritics special issue 
on gender (132). The front cover shows an androgenous figure in high heels and 
tuxedo, without head or hands, while the back displays items of female fashion ("a 
dress, hat, gloves, and shoes arrange themselves in a graceful bodiless tableau in 
space"). Her nightmare features a demonic, mutating woman, the headless Diacritical 
woman, and a third speaker, a man who is "forceful", "articulate" and "wearing a 
dress" (132). What Showalter fears is that the search for woman (the summer 1982 
Diacritics to which she alludes is titled "Cherchez La Femme: Feminist 
Critique/Feminine Text") wiU yield only "the ephemera of gender identities, of gender 
signatures".
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I have dwelt on Showalter’s essay because it encapsulates, memorably and 
wittily, a moment in recent feminist thought when the question "what do men want" 
was very much in vogue, and when certain feminist critics perceived male fascination 
with femininity and feminism as a mode of colonization. Showalter is by no means 
a lone voice: Rosi Braidotti finds herself "viscerally opposed to the whole idea [of 
men in feminism]" ("Envy" 233). Some critics in Men in Feminism worry about the 
penetrative connotations of the preposition, whUe the misciting of the anthology as 
Men on Feminism suggests the missionary-position hermeneutics potentially encoded 
in male feminism (De Lauretis, Technologies 29)."^  ^ Braidotti observes that male 
critics unfortunately lack lack, that is, they lack "the historical experience of 
oppression on the basis of sex", and they are therefore denied full participation in the 
"ferment of ideas that is shaking up Western culture" ("Envy" 235). She sees the 
feminization of male thinkers as "a contemporary version of the old metaphysical 
cannibalism" (237-38). In their introduction to their anthology Out of Bounds. Laura 
Claridge and Elizabeth Langland discuss the implications of men writing against 
patriarchy, which is not necessarily disinterested:
A male writer may simply need the space of what he or his culture 
terms the feminine in which to express himself more fuUy because he 
experiences the patriarchal construction of his masculinity as a 
constriction. He may, that is, appropriate the feminine to enlarge 
himself, a process not incompatible with contempt for actual women.
(3-4) ''
What is most interesting about Showalter’s essay, however, is her use of the 
trope of fashion. She dislikes disguises, men dressing up as feminists or otherwise
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feminized, for her theories, of gynocritics, for example, are grounded in the 
ontological stability of gender, the security of the signature. Clothes which mix up 
the semiotic message figure the possibility that there may be no essential gender 
difference under the surface signs. In an earlier essay, "Toward a Feminist Poetics", 
Showalter declares that feminist theory "cannot go around forever in men’s ill-fitting 
hand-me-downs, the Annie Hall of English studies" (139): she believes that feminist 
theory needs to cast off its masculine accoutrements, get its act together and dress Eke 
a woman, Showalter patrols the boundaries of sexual definitions, legislating against 
transvestism (and transsexuaEty) which disturb the propriety of gender identity.'^
There is another way of looking at cross-dressing, one which sees it as 
productively destabilizing the fixity of gender identities (I have paid attention to the 
dysphoric version precisely because it is not the one that is crucial to my thesis; I do 
not mean to suggest that the counter voices are not worth Estening to). In Shoshana 
Felman’s words,
if it is clothes, i.e.,a cultural sign, an institution, which determine our 
reading of the sexes, which determine mascuEne and feminine and 
insure sexual opposition as an orderly, hierarchical polarity; if indeed 
clothes make the man - or the woman - are not sex roles as such, 
inherently, but travesties? ("Rereading Femininity" 28)"
Judith Butler asks, "Is drag the imitation of gender, or does it dramatize the signifying 
gestures through which gender itself is estabEshed?" (Gender Trouble x). Where 
Showalter worries about the erasure of sexual identities, of the specificity that grounds 
feminist interest in women writers and readers, Butler shifts the angle of vision: 
"Does being female [or male, for that matter] constitute a ’natural fact’ or a cultural
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performance, or is ’naturalness’ constituted through discursively constrained 
performative acts that produce the body through and within the categories of sex?" 
It is, I would claim, the reification and essentiaEzing of various characteristics as 
mascuEne or feminine that secures the patriarchal sexual hierarchy. Thus, a critical 
emphasis on the constructedness of gender is one way of undermining this hierarchy 
and of putting in question humanist theories of the stable subject."
For feminism, style matters: the project of "gynesis" is, at the level of a 
woman writing criticism, the attempt to write a different kind of text, "the putting into 
discourse of ’woman’" as a different modaEty of textuaEty. Jane GaEop speaks of 
an "epistemological revolution" which might be effected through reading strategies 
that subversively undermine the patriarchal Elusion of mastery. In Reading Lacan, 
in response to an anonymous reader who thought that she demonstrated an inadequate 
command of her material, GaEop writes: "I was and am trying to write in a different 
relation to the material, from a more unsettling confrontation with its contradictory 
plurivocaEty, a sort of encounter I beEeve is possible only if one relinquishes the 
usual position of command, and thus writes from a more subjective, vulnerable 
position" (19)." GaEop concocts innovative strategies of reading, fiirting with the 
master discourses she analyses and analysing her own anxieties. SimEarly, Luce 
Irigaray interrupts the history of western phEosophy, by speaking back to its architects 
and asking impertinent questions (see, for example, her dialogue with Freud’s lecture, 
Femininitv. in Speculum!."  The present text is an attempt to write from the position 
of the female other; its form and style are part of my feminist project.
In A PhEosophical Enquiry. Edmund Burke addresses his reader: "I only desire 
one favour; that no part of this discourse may be judged of by itseE and
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independently of the rest" (54); "This manner of proceeding" he judges "very 
improper" (4). My methodological principles in this study are deliberately 
"improper". I foreground particular passages, or images, even (or especially) when 
they might seem marginal to the text as a ’whole’.'* I abandon the traditional (or 
new critical) search for cohesive patterns of meaning in favour of a focus on moments 
of ’trouble’ .'^ In a symptomatic reading, the text, like the speech of the analysand 
in the psychoanalytic situation, can be made to reveal what it attempts to conceal. 
Freud suggested a parallel between his work and Morelli’s connoisseurship, for both 
are "accustomed to divine secret and concealed things from unconsidered and 
unnoticed details, from the rubbish-heap, as it were, or our observations" ("The Moses 
of Michelangelo" 8:222).^ ® Feminist theory over the last couple of decades has 
encouraged reading ’against the grain’, as a way of revising cultural narratives and 
creating new spaces of discourse, what Teresa de Lauretis, using a metaphor drawn 
from cinema, calls the "space-off", that area that is not always represented but is 
inferable from the frame (Technologies 25). The encounters between text and reader 
- the reading subject who is in part constituted by these encounters - may not always 
run smoothly. Institutionally-authorized readings, as well as the text’s own signposts 
to its preferred reading, may be rejected or negotiated by the feminist critic. 
Interpretation, like the connnection between sexuality and textuality, has to do with 
fabrication. Edmund Burke’s Enquirv is concerned with the maintainence and 
enforcement of an ideology of gender;^  ^ perhaps interpretative impropriety - along 
the lines of the "useful and scrupulously fake readings" that Gayatri Spivak suggests 
should take the place of "the passively active fake orgasm" - may upset the socio- 
sexual order patriarchy tries to uphold ("Displacement" 186).^'
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Notes to Chapter Two
1. There are some recent studies of the prose essay in the Romantic 
period: see, Annette Wheeler Cafarelli, Prose in the Age of Poets: 
Romanticism and Biographical Narrative from Johnson to De Ouincev: 
John C. Whale, Thomas De Ouincev’s Reluctant Autobiography: 
Thomas McFarland, Romantic Cruxes: The English Essayists and The 
Spirit of the Age: David Bromwich, Hazlitt - The Mind of a Critic, and 
Jane Aaron’s feminist study, A Double Singleness: Gender and the 
Writing of Charles and Marv Lamb.
2. Joel Haefner provides another perspective on marginality: he suggests 
that "the Romantic essay is central in the development of this flexible 
genre because the essay became, under the hands of Hazlitt, Lamb, De 
Quincey, and others, an experiment of seE, a trial of human memory, 
dream, imagination, reason and emotion", so that "[e]ven as an 
embryonic experiment, the essay insists on its marginality" (196,204), 
Since the essays appeared in journals and periodicals, they could also 
be seen as central: recent historicized accounts of Romanticism stress 
the crucial role of the periodical in constructing and sustaining an 
audience for Eterature during the period (see Jon Klancher, The 
Making of EngEsh Reading Audiences, and Marilyn Butler, "Culture’s 
medium").
3. See CEfford Siskin’s discussion of his choice "to write a generic 
history" of romantic discourse, rather than a history of genre which 
tends to produce an "organic" narrative of development (10). Stuart 
Curran’s Poetic Form and British Romanticism provides an overview 
of the multipEcity of poetic genres during the period.
4. With regard to the essay form, and the romantic essay in particular, 
Joel Haefner points out that it "is an almost ideal example of 
intergenreality: the conflation, consumption of genres into a single 
genre that, in the process of fusion, assumes traits and characteristics 
dEferent from those from which it drew its initial forms. ...Derrida ... 
caUs this process ’invagination’" (197).
5. I do not deal here with other genres, such as drama. Several of the 
Romantic poets wrote plays, which could be seen as a pubEc, and 
therefore impEcitly mascuEne, forum for them concerns (though, of 
course, several of the plays they wrote are ’closet’ dramas, never 
performed in them Efetimes). On the other hand, the theatre has long 
associations with femininity, and male writers in the Romantic period 
would have had to deal with the fact that the most important dramatist 
of the time was a woman, Joanna BailEe. On Romanticism and the 
theatre, see JuEe Carlson.
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6. On these issues, see Terry Lovell, Consuming Fiction 49-53.
7. As Vivien Jones points out, "[t]hough the gendering of mental qualities 
associated femininity with imagination and creativity ... pubUshing 
exposed an essentially private activity to the public gaze, blurring the 
conduct-book delineation of separate spheres" (140). Women’s writing 
was seen as a socially transgressive act, and was even associated with 
a loss of chastity; for this reason, "women’s texts [and by extension the 
authors] were judged according to strict moral criteria" (Jones 140).
8. Laetitia Matilda Hawkins, writing in 1793, places the study of poEtics 
in "the climax of unfitness" for "so strongly does it appear to [her] 
barred against the admission of females, that I am astonished that they 
ever ventured to approach it" (Jones 120).
9. WoUstonecraft writes the rationaEst, feminist reply to, amongst others, 
Fordyce and Gregory (whose work figures in this thesis); see, 
especiaUy, Rights of Woman 111-122, 191-200.
10. When citing Vivien Jones’s anthology, here and elsewhere in this 
thesis, I usuaUy also mention the title of the text in question and the 
original pubEcation date.
11. See Kathryn Shevelow for a discussion of the role of the periodicals 
in constructing gender dEference; she comments in detail on the 
representation of femininity guided by Addison and Steele, which 
involved "the systematic naturalization of a normative, domestic figure"
(52).
12. SheUey’s desEe to make poets matter is marked by his reuse of the 
phrase from "A PhEosophical View of Reform" (Clark 240).
13. On Wordsworth’s attempts to recapture poetry for men by 
masculinizing the language in which it is discussed, see Susan 
Matthews, "The Sexual Theory of Metre".
14. The real distinction, according to Wordsworth, is between "Poetry and 
Matter of Fact, or Science" (602). For SheEey’s deconstruction of the 
dEference between prose and poetry, see Defence 484-85.
15. Wordsworth declares, "I have wished to keep my Reader in the 
company of flesh and blood" (600). In contrast, SheEey often eschews 
this anchorage, claiming, fEppantly, that he does not deal in flesh and 
blood (Letters 11:363). In traditional western thought, the body is 
frequently associated with the feminine, as we wiE see in my 
discussion, in Chapter Five, of Keats’s rhetoric of embodiment.
16. This figure caEs up Cora Kaplan’s insight that, "Masculinity and 
feminity do not appear in cultural discourse, any more than they do in
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mental life, as pure binary forms at play. They are always, already, 
ordered and broken up through other social and cultural terms, other 
categories of dEference. Our fantasies of sexual transgression as much 
as our obedience to sexual regulation are expressed through these 
structuring hierarchies. Class and race ideologies are, conversely, 
steeped in and spoken through the language of sexual dEferentiation. " 
("Pandora’s Box" 148)
17. This is, of course, a gross generalization: in Chapter Four, I refer to 
some of SheUey’s prefaces wherein the exploration of love and desEe 
does not necessarily uphold masculine paradigms; moreover, as Jane 
Stabler has pointed out Byron’s glosses tend to be subversive, 
fragmenting the act of reading the poem and often contradicting, or 
digressing from, the content. On prose prefaces and romantic poets, 
see John F. ScheU; on SheUey’s prefaces, see EUse M. Gold.
18. Going forward on the diachronic axis, in theE "juxtaposition of the 
psychological and the philosophical, the empirical and the imaginative", 
De Quincey’s essays "resemble ...some of the writings of the modem 
French critics" (Haefner 203).
19. See Joshua Wilner, who analyzes "a sequence of nineteenth-century 
texts by three male writers [Wordsworth, De Quincey, BaudelaEe] 
whose work worries the distinction between poetry and prose"; with 
special reference to BaudelaEe, Wilner argues that "the subversion of 
the hierarchical distinction between poetry and prose is bound up with 
a subversion of gender hierarchies" (1086). His article does not 
support this claim in convincing detaU.
20. I take this phrase from Mary Hays, Appeal to the Men of Great Britain 
in behaE of the Women. 1798, extracts from which are included in 
Vivien Jones, Women in the Eighteenth Century. 231-237 (231).
21. See his "Orgasm, Generation, and the PoUtics of Reproductive 
Biology", especiaUy 18-19, 23-24; the historical changes in thinking 
about the body are discussed at book-length in Laqueur’s Making Sex.
22. I paraphrase Mary Poovey’s formulation of this revised hierarchy of 
dEference and sameness (see. Uneven Developments 6). The question 
of female "heat" continues to be debated during the period, with 
women figured either in terms of excess or of lack. A Physician’ in 
an early sex-manual writes: "some Physicians have maintained, that 
Women were hotter than Men, because they are sooner ripe for 
Business, for E generaUy speaking, say they, they have more Blood, 
they have also more Heat, because the natural Heat resides after a more
eminent manner, where there is most of that Humour I think, I
might without any manner of dEficulty prove the contrary of what is 
said of the Constitutions of Women. I could show, that the great 
quantity of Blood proceeds rather from the Mediocrity than any Excess
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of Heat; that Women are rather fickle and Eght than ingenious; that if 
they Engender and grow old sooner, it shows the weakness of that 
Heat: That Excess of Love cannot be particularly ascribed to the force 
of this same Heat, but to the Inconstancy of them Imagination, or rather 
to the Providence of Nature, that has made them to serve us for 
Playtoys after our more serious Occupations." (The Pleasures of 
Conjugal Love Explained. In an Essay Concerning Human Generation. 
[1740], in Jones 81-82)
23. It is a crude generalization to see the eighteenth-century as "stable", but 
it is perhaps reasonable to assert that is was perceived as comparatively 
stable by succeeding generations.
24. Davidoff and Hall provide the most detailed and readable account of 
changing gender roles in the period 1780-1850 that I have come across. 
They are particularly concerned with what happens when you insert 
women into socio-economic accounts of history. They pay special 
attention to the centrality of various religious beliefs to the 
consolidation of the middle-class (see, especially, chapters 1 and 2 of 
Family Fortunes!.
25. The writer of The Hardships of the English Laws in relation to Wives. 
1735 petitions the King and ParUament "for an Alteration or a Repeal 
of some Laws, which, as we [wives] conceive, put us in a worse 
Condition than Slavery itseE" (Jones 217). Throughout the period 
analogies are drawn between the state of marriage and that of slavery; 
for a full discussion of women’s relation to the slave-trade and the use 
of slavery as a trope for marital bondage, see Moira Ferguson, Subject 
to Others. Male writers also recognize, though they tend to justEy, the 
unequal position of women in marriage: George Savile, Marquis of 
HalEax, writes that, "the Laws of Marriage, run in harsher stile 
towards your Sex. Obey is an ungenteel word, and less easie to be 
digested, by making such as unkind distinction in the Words of the 
Contract" (Jones 17). Savile’s The Lady’s New Year’s Gift: or. 
Advice to a Daughter was first pubEshed in 1688, and was "reprinted 
at least fourteen times throughout the eighteenth century" (Jones 14).
26. Though under certain cEcumstances husbands could obtain a divorce, 
women could not do so untü the biE of 1857 that reformed the 
marriage and divorce laws of England.
27. On Romantic androgyny, see Diane Hoeveler’s "Introduction" to The 
Woman Within.
28. As critics have pointed out, the discrediting of the unitary seE is not 
a recent invention; the historicity of this concept is discussed by Terry 
Eagleton in the television series Talking Liberties (Channel Four, 
1992).
74
29. See Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics xiv, and Naomi Schor, 
"Introducing Feminism" 95.
30. This does not mean that the meanings of sexual difference are not 
effected by cultural experience, or that they do not vary in different 
societies and historical periods, but it is to mark the distinction between 
theories which foreground experience and see the categories of 
masculinity and femininity as relatively unproblematic, and those 
theories which consider sexual identities as the products of a 
continuous process of differentiation. See Michele Barrett’s helpful 
surveys of the concept of "difference" in feminist theory ("Some 
different meanings" and "The Concept of Difference").
31. I discuss the failed suppression of the "dangerous supplement" of 
woman in Chapter 6.
32. I retain the traditional spelling rather than the reformation of this word, 
since I don’t wish to mark the texture of my work as exclusively 
Derridean.
33. For detailed discussion of the complicated and often fraught 
relationship between feminism and deconstruction, see, amongst others, 
Elizabeth Meese, Crossing the Double-Cross, and, with Alice Parker, 
The Difference Within: Gayatri Spivak, "Feminism and Deconstruction, 
Again"; Barbara Johnson, World of Difference and Jül Marsden, 
"Strange Alliances".
34. All references to Freud are to the Standard Edition, ed. James Strachey, 
cited by volume and page number(s).
35. In other words, what seems to happen in practice is that the liminahty 
of a "horizon" stabilizes into an "other".
36. Cary Nelson discusses Derrida’s use of the trope of woman and his 
sexualized vocabulary; he argues that Derrida’s terms, such as "hymen" 
and "double, chiasmic invagination", are "contaminated by the same 
system they would critique", whüe to use the metaphor of woman to 
connote undecidability is "to make a certain libidinal investment in the 
image of woman in one’s own work" ("Men, Feminism" 169). 
Jonathan Culler notes that "Feminists are rightly disturbed that in this 
deconstructive paleonomy ’woman’ may no longer refer to actual 
human beings defined by historical representations of sexual identity 
but serves rather as the horizon of a critique identifying ’sexual 
identity’, ’representation’, and the ’subject’ as ideological impositions"; 
"But", he argues, "this is the other front of a struggle that also involves 
the celebration of the work and writing of women" (On Deconstruction 
175). I am much in sympathy with Culler, but the gap between these 
positions remains a problem.
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37. For a lucid analysis of the destructuring of Western society purveyed 
in Jardine’s book, see Barbara Creed, "From Here to Modernity". 
Drawing her examples from movies. Creed focusses on five areas that 
are of particular relevance to the relation between feminism and 
postmodernism: "the collapse of the master narratives of the West; the 
breakdown of the paternal metaphor; the crisis in representation; the 
decentring of the subject; the critique of binarism" (50).
38. Jardine takes up this image again in her article "Men in Feminism", 
though she is less sanguine at this point about the status of men in 
feminism: the present traveUing-companions are shifted into the future 
tense, as both desire and possibility ("We need you [men] as traveling 
compagnons into the twenty-first century" [61]). I am indebted to my 
colleague Duco van Oostrum for stimulating conversations about men 
in feminism.
39. This issue has been hotly debated in a number of texts, notably in the 
following edited collections: Alice Jardine and Paul Smith, Men in 
Feminism: Linda Kauffman, Gender and Theory: Laura Claridge and 
Elizabeth Langland, Out of Bounds.
40. Showalter praises Eagleton’s Literarv Theory, finding him in this 
instance "self-aware" rather than "self-interested", "here he accords it 
[feminist criticism] a full measure of autonomy and respect" ("Critical 
Cross-Dressing" 130).
41. It is possible to invert my argument: in other words, the symptomatic 
prepositional shift annotates a change from a penetrative ("in") to a 
non-penetrative ("on") textual position, a type of textual safe-sex for 
the ’90’s.
42. Claridge’s own critical positions fluctuate; see her comments quoted in 
Chapter One (34-35).
43. In "The Problem of Definition", Jane Gallop turns to Showalter’s use 
of territorial metaphors in "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness". Ever 
with her finger on the critical pulse, Showalter has in her most recent 
work shifted from fixed notions of sexual identities to "Speaking of 
Gender".
44. See Mary Jacobus’s wide-ranging and provocative essay, "Reading
Woman (Reading)" in her book Reading Woman which analyses,
amongst other texts, Woolf’s Orlando. Felman’s article and the
Showalter essay discussed above. Janet Todd comments on 
Showalter’s "Critical Cross-Dressing" in Feminist Literary History 122- 
125, and adds to the latter’s criticism of Eagleton. Sandra Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar examine transvestism as metaphor in No Man’s Land. 
Vol.2 (Chapter 8). They argue that male modernists’ use of the trope 
of cross-dressing is conservative, whüe for women writers it is
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revisionary; they take Showalter’s side in the ’men in feminism’ 
debate. Other critics have used the trope of fashion in discussing 
feminist literary theory. For example, analysing "the question of an 
effective feminist practice", Nancy Miller characterizes the polarities 
of French and American criticism: "This problematic may also be 
understood in relation to shoes: as in the sturdy, sensible sort worn by 
’American’ feminists, and the more frivolous, elegant type worn by 
Cixous" (Subiect to Change 69; as Miller notes, Cixous herself uses 
this metaphor). Miller tries to imagine some sort of alliance between 
ludic and materialist feminisms: "What we might wish for ... is a 
female materialism attentive to the needs of the body as well as the 
luxuries of the mind. Can we imagine, or should we, a position that 
speaks in tropes and walks in sensible shoes?" (76).
45. I have a - true - story that speaks to the constructedness, and mobility, 
of gender/identity: in February 1992, I was on my way to a job 
interview at the University of Groningen in The Netherlands. On the 
train from Amsterdam, a man stopped as he was walking through the 
train and spoke to me. "You must be Amanda Gilroy", he said. I 
asked how he knew, and he replied: "You’re reading Men in 
Feminism". (The man is Fred Botting - both of us had been told the 
names of the other applicants, but we had not met before).
46. On Gallop’s ’voice(s)’, see Jane Moore, "An other space" 71-72. It is 
easy to see how "negative capability" might come in here, but, because 
it has generated different readings, I have deferred discussion of this 
concept until Chapter Five.
47. See also This Sex, especially 199-169, for further discussion of a new 
feminine syntax. Shoshana Felman employs an impertinent strategy in 
the essay with which I began this study - by ventriloquizing Freud’s 
question, she displaces and disrupts the "misleadingly self-evident 
universality of its male enunciation" ("Rereading Femininity" 21).
48. To focus on the part rather than the whole is also, of course, to be an 
unPopean critic.
49. My use of this word is meant to evoke the title of Judith Butler’s book. 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.
50. The analogy between Freud and MoreUi is discussed by Jane Gallop, 
Thinking Through the Body 135-148, and, adding Sherlock Holmes to 
the scenario, by Naomi Schor, Reading in Detail 65-67, and Carlo 
Ginzburg.
51. Though, as I argue in Chapter 3, this gender ideology is disrupted by 
his own fascination with femininity.
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Introduction to Part Two
Tropes are the dreams o f speech. 
Nabokov, Ada (416)
Each of the subsequent chapters is clustered around a trope (or tropes), figures which, 
as Nabokov suggests, are hke dream-sciipts revealing more than they seem to tell. 
But they are "dreams", too, for the feminist critic in that they expose the 
constructedness of gender and thus open spaces for new ways of fabricating sexual 
identities. In Chapter Three, I examine Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry : 
I use the category of the masquerade to point up the inherent instability of the male 
gaze. I argue that the "beautiful" is (re)produced as a female figure, whom the male 
speaker both desires and identifies with. Chapter Four takes a selection of Percy 
Bysshe Shelley’s prose texts, especially A Defence of Poetry and his essays "On 
Love" and "On Life", and analyzes Shelley’s use of the tropes of the mirror and the 
veil. The male gaze is again an issue as I comment on the discourse of specularity 
in Shelley’s writing. Using Lacanian theories of the construction of subjectivity, I 
trace Shelley’s self-divisions, his failure to project division onto women - the strategy 
of patriarchal culture - and thus the failure to maintain the illusion of his own 
wholeness. The traditional feminine connotations of the figure of the veil further 
complicate the texture of SheUeyean subjectivity. In Chapter Five, I turn to Shelley’s 
contemporary, Keats, reading him alongside Julia Kristeva. The cross-over between 
these two writers is their interest in the body, in metaphors of the body. In reading 
Keats’s letters, I am interested in moments that display a type of boundary confusion, 
especially confusion at the level of the gendered body. Finally, Chapter Six listens
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to the language of flowers in the work of Thomas De Quincey, particularly The 
English Mail-Coach, the Suspiria de Profundis and the episode dealing with the death 
of Kate Wordsworth in Recollections of the Lakes and the Lake Poets. I argue that 
flowers figure the bisexuality that is at the heart of De Quincey’s writing, and I enlist 
Freud and Derrida, amongst others, to support my contention that that which is 
figured as feminine, as exotic, alien, outside an entity, is ultimately a self-fissuring, 
and self-fashioning, difference.
My focus on the circulation of the meanings of femininity, as seen from a 
masculine perspective, in the texts under consideration reveals the fragility of sexual 
identities. The fascination with femininity throws masculinity into crisis. Desiring 
the other (within a Lacanian economy of desire), these speakers transgress the 




Observe that part o f a beautiful woman": Masquerade 
and the Male Gaze in Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry
...a  very pretty treatise on the Sublime. 
David Hume^
In an attempt to theorize the cultural construction of sexual difference, Laura Mulvey 
analyzes the significance of the (en)gendered gaze:
In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been 
split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male 
gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled 
accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are 
simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded 
for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote 
to-be-looked-at-ness. Woman displayed as sexual object is the leit­
motif of erotic spectacle: from pin-ups to strip-tease, ... she holds the 
look, and plays to and signifies male desire. ("Visual Pleasure" 19)
In this theory of sexual difference, male scopophilia is focussed on the female form. 
Men perform as active agents; women are passive, frozen as objects of erotic 
contemplation. These arrested images of beauty (which derive, as John Berger has 
argued, from the tradition of western easel painting) are staged to secure male 
pleasure. However, Mulvey speculates that this pleasure is endangered by the very 
image of woman which evokes castration anxieties in the male spectator. In 
Mulvey’s formulation, men are the makers of meaning, women merely the bearers of
82
meaning; women signify sexual difference, and the female body, perceived by men 
as lacking a penis, bears the threat of castration. Fetishism and voyeurism are the two 
main strategies, according to Mulvey, by which the male viewer disavows this threat, 
and sustains the availability of visual pleasure. In other words, "patriarchy must first 
flaunt women as lacking [so that it appears full of power] and then try to contain that 
lack" (Saper 37).
The cultural equation between the beautiful image and the beautiful woman^ - 
between the production of aesthetics and the production of femininity - is found in 
paradigmatic form in Edmund Burke’s treatise A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757/1759).^ Mulvey’s 
critique of masculine investment in the aesthetic of female beauty provides a frame 
in which to analyse Burke’s treatise."  ^ The feminine is produced as a passive erotic 
image contained within the parameters of the male gaze. However, I will argue that 
Burke’s text cannot attain a single, seamless economy of looking along John Berger’s 
lines that "men act and women appear" (47). Mulvey’s article, though it provides 
useful paradigms, has been criticized for, among other things, its binary opposition 
of masculine and feminine, and for its homogeneous model of the spectator as 
masculine and heterosexual.^ One important question raised by Mulvey’s work on 
the cinematic gaze is, why should the male viewing position be so much simpler than 
the female? Tania Modleski, in her book The Women Who Knew Too Much, argues 
that it is not; feminist critics might now turn their gaze on the heterogeneity of the 
male spectator. Psychoanalysis offers a model of an unstable, divided subject, 
propelled by ’bisexual’ drives so that both male and female subjects are fissured by 
otherness. Poststructuralist theories have worked to blur the boundaries between the
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text and its reader/spectator: if ’meaning’ is created in the space between these two 
entities, both are involved in the instabilities of the other. In other words, though I 
will retain the notion of the "male gaze", that seeing of the world through male eyes 
that structures and supports an oppressive (for men and women) patriarchal system, 
I am most interested in this chapter, as elsewhere in this study, in those moments of 
slippage that blur the binary opposition of gender, clearing space(s) for a mobile 
subject who moves between positions socially constructed as masculine or feminine.^ 
My main focus is the discourse of the "beautiful" in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, and the role of this discourse in the construction of gendered 
subjectivities. As Teresa de Lauretis suggests, "the representation of woman as image 
(spectacle ...vision of beauty ...)is so pervasive in our culture that it necessarily 
constitutes a starting point for any understanding of sexual difference and its 
ideological effects in the construction of social subjects" (Alice Doesn’t 37).
This chapter, perhaps more than the others, is marked by a type of "double 
vision", in that the female subject subversively undermines male constructions of 
femininity, and is seen to be a maker as well as a bearer of meaning. Before turning 
in detail to the Burkean category of the beautiful, I will outline two critical contexts: 
first, the ways in which Burke’s treatise enforces eighteenth century cultural 
assumptions about gender difference, especially the ideology of femininity,^ and 
second, the continuing hegemony of the sublime in critical discourses.
* * * * *
In a footnote to his essay "A Brief Appraisal of the Greek Literature", Thomas De 
Quincey notes that the idea of "the sublime by way of polar antithesis to the Beautiful 
... grew up on the basis of sexual distinctions - the Sublime corresponding to the
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male, and the Beautiful, its anti-pole, corresponding to the female" (Masson 10:300- 
301).* Though the category of the Sublime was used as a critical term from the end 
of the seventeenth century, and the Beautiful had come to be seen as its feminine 
opposite, Burke expounded most clearly the gendered distinctions of his society. The 
qualities of sublime objects are culturally masculine ones: vastness, ruggedness, 
hardness, roughness. The sublime is associated with infinity and power, both in terms 
of the scale of the object and the effect on the observer.^ "[Fjortitude, fidelity, and 
firmness" are sublime attributes, which Burke, in his Speech on American Taxation 
calls "the great and masculine virtues" (105). The sublime is located in "[wjhatever 
is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is 
in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner 
analogous to terror", though importantly this takes place "at certain distances" from 
danger, when fear is aestheticized as delightful pain (Enquiry 39,40).^° As W.J.T. 
Mitchell sums up: "Sublimity, with its foundations in pain, terror, vigorous exertion, 
and power, is the masculine aesthetic mode" (129). Conversely, the features 
annotated by Burke as defining objects experienced as beautiful are conventionally 
’feminine’ ones: smallness, smoothness, fragility, lack of resistance, quietness, as well 
as soft colours and curviness. If the sublime implies the transgression of boundaries, 
that is, vast objects which have an overwhelming effect on the spectator, the beautiful 
is associated with contained form, and the experience of "reliefs, gratifications, and 
indulgences" (Enquiry 111). In accordance with the ideology of separate spheres, 
beautiful virtues operate in the private sphere rather than the public arena of "strong 
virtues". Hazlitt sums up the two categories in terms of "contrast" and "conformity" 
("Outlines of Taste" 20:390)."
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The gender distinction that grounds the sublime and the beautiful exposes these 
categories as a hierarchical rather than a neutral system of difference: the "softer 
virtues" are described as "subordinate" ones, and the sexual politics of Burke’s 
aesthetics are clearly revealed:
There is a wide difference between admiration and love. The sublime, 
which is the cause of the former, always dwells on great objects, and 
terrible; the latter on small ones, and pleasing; we submit to what we 
admire, but we love what submits to us; in one case we are forced, in 
the other we are flattered into compliance. (111,113)
Burke reproduces conventional gender alignments in his scenario of diminutive 
damsels whose submissive deference gratifies the male subject (and the implied male 
reader)."
If Burke marginalizes the beautiful, and women, recent critics have tended to 
perpetuate this system of privilege in "their rush to ... the sublime" (Ferguson, 
"Sublime" 68)." In their well-known books, Thomas Weiskal, Neü Hertz and Peter 
de Bolla all focus on the sublime. Frances Ferguson observes that "this indifference 
to the beautiful.. .draws a certain authority from prominent eighteenth and nineteenth- 
century accounts of the sublime and the beautiful. Burke, for example, has repeatedly 
been observed to droop in his discussion of the beautiful; and Kant, similarly treats 
the beautiful as a more limited area of perception than the sublime". Similarly, James 
Boulton argues that the binary hierarchy established by Burke may explain the neglect 
of the beautiful: "The principal weakness in Burke’s theory arises from the sharp 
distinction he draws between the sublime and the beautiful. He reserves to sublimity 
aU that is awe-inspiring and powerful in its impact and by contrast reduces beauty to
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a weak and rather sentimentalized conception." (xxv); Boulton quotes Dugald 
Stewart’s disparaging observation that "the idea of female beauty was evidently 
uppermost in Mr Burke’s mind when he wrote his book".
Feminist critics, disenchanted with ’the beauty myth’,^ "^ have begun to explore 
the differing relationships of male and female Romantic writers to the Sublime (a 
category conceived in general terms, but indebted to Burke). Patricia Yaeger argues 
that ”[t]he Romantic sublime is a genre that is, historically and psychologically, a 
masculine mode of writing ...concerned with empowerment, transport, and the self’s 
strong sense of authority" ("Toward a female sublime" 192); in her view, the 
"feminine" experience is of the "faded sublime", whereby the female subject is 
disempowered (201). Jane Moore finds the "failed sublime" enacted in Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s A Short Residence in Sweden. Norway and Denmark: the woman 
writer’s experience of the sublime (rocks and waterfalls) involves a loss of "self­
orientation" or a forgetting of the experience ("Plagiarism" 153). However, the male 
writers’ relation to the sublime is not as secure as one might suppose (indeed, it is 
worth noting that the "egotistical sublime" is intentionally oxymoronic in that the 
sublime and the self are not the same thing). Moore interprets Coleridge’s plagiarism, 
in "Kubla Khan", of Wollstonecraft’s text as a "failed attempt" to consume and erase 
the traces of the feminine, and attain "sublime oneness" (158,157)."
Meena Alexander gives a positive slant to Yaeger’s notion of the feminine 
"failed sublime": in women’s writing, she argues, "there is a crossing back, at the 
brink of visionary revelation, to the realms of ordinary, bodily experience - whether 
that experience is rendered subtle and elusive, as with Dorothy Wordsworth, or 
imaged in almost brutal excess, as with Mary Shelley" (167). The significance of this
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gesture is that it "chooses to preserve rather than forget the materials of ordinary 
female life. And this choice, implicit, even covert at times, restructures a new 
feminine sensibility". In other words, the resistance to sublimity is a resistance to 
cooption by masculine structures, and the traditionally devalued (’female’) side of a 
series of binary oppositions - domesticity/sublimity, body/spirit, earthly/visionary - is 
given precedence."
Other critics have found in the Sublime an aesthetic category which is more 
directly disruptive of patriarchal paradigms. These critics draw on the sublime as "a 
signifier of the transgression of boundaries" (Mattick 294)." Because the Sublime, 
as Burke and Kant recognized, does not depend on form (it is associated in Burke 
with obscurity, which blurs the definition of boundaries), it is an arena where 
uncertainty and deviance may be enacted." In two essays on the female nude, 
Lynda Nead argues that "[t]he sublime is not simply the site for the definition of 
masculinity but is also where a certain deviant or transgressive form of femininity is 
played out. It is where woman goes beyond her proper boundaries and gets out of 
place." ("Art, obscenity and the female nude" 219). The female nude becomes either 
obscene or grotesque if it exceeds the harmonious contours of beauty, if it challenges 
the containment of the ’frame’; for example, Nead reads Jo Spence’s photographic 
series "Narratives of Dis-ease" as making visible the unrepresentable female body (in 
exposing a body marked by cancer and surgery) and, in its mode of direct address, 
as disrupting the boundaries between self and other ("The Female Nude"). This turn 
towards the grotesque appropriates for feminist ends the anxiety about the confusion 
of categories evident in Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France. The high 
point of horror in this text, the moment which cannot be framed for aesthetic
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contemplation, is the moment when the king and queen are forced from their palace 
"amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous 
contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused 
shape of the vilest of women." (85) In ’manhandling’ Marie Antoinette, the epitome 
of beauty, these "swinish" and "vile" women transgress both the proper role of women 
and the ordered separation of the social classes." Patriarchal privilege, in the person 
of the king, is dethroned, and the division within the sign "Woman" undermines the 
secure polarity sublime/beautiful, masculine/feminine. This experience "press[es] too 
nearly" (Enquiry 40) for Burke to experience the thrill of sublime delight (it poses too 
great a threat to the British political system).
The association of the sublime and masculinity has also been subverted, 
providing another lever for the destabilization of Burke’s oppressive hierarchies. One 
of Burke’s earliest and most effective readers, Mary WoUstonecraft, rejects "libertine 
notions of beauty" that degrade women, comparing such women to soldiers who are 
"attentive to their persons, fond of dancing, crowded rooms, adventures, and ridicule." 
(Vindication of the Rights of Woman 106) These feminized men cannot attain the 
sublime which is relocated in heroic (but as Mattick points out "desexuahzed" [300]) 
women. More recently, Vivien Jones takes another perspective on this gender- 
bending. She notes that women "are implicitly excluded as subjects from Burke’s 
text" but that "[o]ne of the effects of this male exclusivity is actually to complicate 
gender stereotypes by describing the possibility of acceptable "feminine" behaviour 
for men" (4). Jones quotes a passage in which Burke speculates about the place of 
the grandfather in the family structure: "we generally have a great love for our 
grandfathers, in whom this authority [of the father] is removed a degree from us, and
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where the weakness of age mellows it into something of a feminine partiality." 
(Enquiry 111) It is worth recalling also the passivity of the male figure in the face 
of the sublime, which compromises the association of masculinity and activity. These 
slippages in Burke’s categories site the ’feminine’ as a position that can be occupied 
by men, and they would repay further feminist analysis. However, I would like to 
move on to consider the category of the beautiful in more detail.
* * * * *
We know that women are mean to look perfect.
Jacqueline Rose
Focussing on female beauty within a masculine economy of vision, Jacqueline Rose 
writes, "we know that women are meant to look perfect, presenting a seamless image 
to the world so that the man, in the confrontation with difference, can avoid any 
apprehension of lack" (Sexualitv 232). Rose suggests that only a feminist project can 
demand the renunciation of this perfection of form.^° Burke himself, however, 
argues against the notion that "[pjerfection is the constituent cause of beauty" 
(Enquiry 110). He writes that beauty,
where it is highest in the female sex, almost always carries with it an 
idea of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this; 
for which reason, they learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to 
counterfeit weakness, and even sickness. In all this, they are guided 
by nature.
The renunciation of the perfection of female form (by a ’male’ author) remains open 
to a feminist critique; to use Judith Butler’s formulation, this might be an example of 
women "signify[ing] the Phallus through ’being’ its Other, its absence, its lack, the 
dialectical confirmation of its identity" (Gender Trouble 44).^  ^ Burke’s discourse
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is certainly not exempt from this critique; however, it is necessary to reintroduce here 
the question of historical difference, in other words to assess the (subversive) force 
of Burke’s text within its particular historical context. In embracing imperfection as 
the mark of female beauty, Burke rejects the neo-classical ideals of beauty current 
during the period. Reynolds, for example, in the Third of his Discourses (delivered 
in 1770) posits the artist’s task as that of correcting imperfections. In terminology 
close to Burke’s, he argues that "[t]he most beautiful forms have something about 
them like weakness, minuteness, or imperfection" but the trained eye of the (male) 
artist "being enabled to distinguish the accidental deficiencies, excrescences, and 
deformities of things, from their general figures, he makes out an abstract idea of their 
forms more perfect then any one original" (106). The devalorized nature which needs 
to be both pared down and made complete is feminine: the artist "corrects nature by
herself, her imperfect state by her more perfect".^* The neo-classical aesthetic
betrays a distrust of and disgust for the human - implicitly the female - body, which 
is to be regulated through the discipline of artistic form.
This aspect of neo-classical ideals (and the tenacity of this discourse, which 
extended into the nineteenth-century) may be revealed through a brief glance at the 
career of Emma Hamilton. Emma Hamilton was the mistress, and then the wife, of 
Sir William Hamilton, the British ambassador to Naples and the connoisseur whose 
collection of Roman coins, Greek vases and other archeological remains was
influential in shaping Neoclassical taste (FothergiQ 64). Emma cultivated a
remarkable and uncanny skill in impersonating classical statues. Horace Walpole 
called her the "Nymph of the Attitudes", and these "attitudes" perversely illuminate 
a central tenet of neoclasscial aesthetics, the desire "to transfer living charms to an
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inanimate surface" (Hazlitt, "On Sitting" 12:112-113). Emma Hamilton constituted 
herself in the the process of posing in the frozen forms of classical statuary, making 
for herself another ’purer’ body, purged of the deformities of Hfe: her flesh valorized 
by reference to the marble statue which she imitated.^ A few days after her 
marriage to Hamilton (in 1791), Walpole wittily observed that "Sir William Hamilton 
has actually married his Gallery of Statues, and they are set out on their return to 
Naples"; the World newspaper proposed that Sir William should have gone abroad 
with some of Romney’s portraits of Mrs. Hart [Emma Hamilton] rather than the living 
modeH, "a piece more cumbrous and changeable than any of the foregoing" (qtd. in 
Fothergill 251,218). The work of art is privileged over the model, though in this 
latter instance the ’real’ woman has first provided the matter for the ideal: Walpole’s 
witticisms suggest the minimal ontological distance between art work and model, and 
point,, albeit in a light-hearted way, to the hierarchies of neo-classicism. The uncanny 
transfîerence between the real and the ideal repeats commonly held beliefs in the art 
world: there is a long tradition for works of sculpture serving as models - until the 
latter part of the nineteenth-century, academic drawing was taught in three phases, 
with students learning the rudiments of drawing, then moving on to drawing casts 
taken from figurative statuary, before finally studying the human model in the Life 
Room. Even in the Life Room models were frequently required, hke Emma 
Hamilton, to adopt the poses of famous statues, for models embodied the subordinate 
state of the Real rather than the authority of the Ideal (represented by casts and 
statues). In the 1830’s, Turner, teaching in the Life Room at the Royal Academy, 
placed the hving model next to a cast of the Venus de Medici and instructed students 
to draw one beside the other (Wilham Etty’s drawing Female Nude with a Cast of the
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Venus de Medici was one result). His pedagogic purpose was "original and very 
instructive: it showed at once how much the antique sculptors had refined nature", the 
living model "looked common and vulgar" in the comparison (Redgrave 93-94).
I will return to a consideration of statuary later in this chapter; for the moment 
I will consider another important aspect of neo-classical aesthetics - the privileging 
of metaphysical beauty, that of valuing ’inner’ qualities (though with an implied 
correspondence between inner and outer perfection) which continues into the 
nineteenth century. Wüliam Hazlitt cites Flaxman’s dictum that "the most perfect 
soul is the most perfect body" (10:347)." Leigh Hunt provides a good illustration 
of this elision of the material and the spiritual in his essay "Criticism on Female 
Beauty": "The first step in taste is to dislike aU artifice; the next is to demand nature 
in her perfection; but the best of all is to find out the hidden beauty, which is the soul 
of beauty itself, to wit, the sentiment of it" (236). The female body is dematerialized 
in favour of an ideal figure without history or desire whose ’depth’ ("hidden beauty") 
is valorized over her surface. The perfect surface paradoxically redirects attention to 
inner beauty. The ideological project of this discourse bolsters essentiaHst concepts 
of subjectivity, that is, female identity is based on the assumption of a seamless 
(though nonetheless hierarchical) continuity between inner and outer. The exterior 
is viewed as the ’natural’ image of the self. This theory produces both an oppressive 
ideal of Woman to which women must aspire, and attempts to endow the sign 
"Woman" with semiotic stability (I discuss at the end of the next section the way 
language frustrates this project).
* * * * *
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Misled by these trope and figure ladies.
Hannah More^ ®
Burke’s gaze, focussing on the material rather than the metaphysical, is located in the 
margins of contemporary thought." This is not to say that Burke’s aesthetics should 
necessarily be read as a feminist subversion of the ideology of the Ideal, but his 
emphasis on femininity as a construct makes his text available to a feminist rereading. 
It is worth reiterating that conduct manuals and fiction, as well as political and 
educational tracts, also provide perspectives on the ways in which female nature is 
imag(in)ed in this culture. I have dealt briefly with these discourses in Chapter Two, 
and will return to them subsequently. My reasons for foregrounding Burke’s text are 
that his categories of the sublime and the beautiful are crucially influential throughout 
the Romantic era, and, as we wiU see, Burke puts the male gaze under the spotlight.
For Burke, the weakness of the ’weaker sex’ is artificially produced, though 
he adheres to the commonplace that artifice is paradoxically ’natural’ to women ("In 
all this, they are guided by nature". Enquiry 110). In taking pleasure in the 
demonstration of female weakness (lisping and tottering), Burke, as Naomi Schor 
notes, "fetishizes women’s displays self-mutilation" (Reading in Detail 151). Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), written in response to 
Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), presents a feminist critique 
of this ideology, exposing its contradictions and analyzing its debilitating effects on 
women. WoUstonecraft reads Burke’s Reflections through the lens of his aesthetic 
treatise,^* in a critical move which reveals the interdependence of the discourses of 
aesthetics, politics and sexuality. Her most explicit and extended reference to Burke’s 
Enquiry concentrates on the passage quoted above. Addressing Burke directly, 
WoUstonecraft writes of those "ladies [who] may have read your Enquiry into the
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Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, and, convinced by your 
arguments, may have laboured to be pretty by counterfeiting weakness" (111-112). 
WoUstonecraft notes ironicaUy that women must labour in order to fabricate the 
appearance of delicacy, and she continues:"
You may have convinced them that littleness and weakness are the very 
essence of beauty ... Thus confining truth, fortitude, and humanity, 
within the rigid pale of manly morals, they might justly argue, that to 
be loved, woman’s high and great distinction! they should ’learn to 
lisp, to totter in their walk, and nick-name God’s creatures’. (112)
The cosmetic refinements, or mutUations, advocated by Burke "makes those beings", 
as she writes earlier in this first Vindication, "vain inconsiderate doUs, who ought to 
be prudent mothers and useful members of society" (54).*°
I want to suggest that WoUstonecraft’s reading of this passage may function 
as an heuristic device for excavating the subversiveness of Burke’s text. I wUl 
examine, in particular, the significance of WoUstonecraft’s hybrid reference to the 
Enquiry and to Hamlet, and of the example she offers of those women who may have 
read Burke’s treatise. WoUstonecraft’s argument is directed at the ideology that 
enforces and perpetuates the desirability of doU-like women; Thomas Love Peacock 
uses the same metaphor to criticize the reduction of women to passive objects in a 
male system of exchange: "But how is it that their [women’s] minds are locked up? 
The fault is in their artificial education, which studiously models them into mere 
musical doUs, to be set out in the great toy shop of society" (Nightmare Abbey 42). 
To be doU-like is to be objectified, commodified, decorative. Yet WoUstonecraft’s 
aUusion to Hamlet is taken from a speech which conflates the sUpperiness of women
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and art and which poses the woman-as-artist (rather than the material to be modelled 
into shape) as a threat to male power; Hamlet tells Ophelia, "I have heard of your 
paintings too well enough. God has given you one face, and you make yourselves 
another: you jig, you amble, and you lisp, and nickname God’s creatures, and make 
your wantonness, your ignorance. Go to. I ’ll no more on’t, it hath made me mad" 
(3.1.147-49). A woman’s art, the ability to make and remake herself though the 
media of cosmetics and performance makes men mad for it cannot be controlled by 
them (or even by the ultimate patriarchal authority, God).*  ^ Burke, as I have noted, 
savours the very artifice that Hamlet abhors, but a similar reversal of conventional 
gender/power relations is encoded in his text: he teUs us that "to be affected [by a fine 
woman], there is no need of the concurrence of our wiU" (Enquiry 110). Indeed, 
Leigh Hunt annotates just such a reversal in his description of Marie Antoinette, who, 
"in her triumphant days, ... swam through an antechamber like a vision and swept 
away the understanding of Mr Burke" ("Criticism" 257-58). Here the woman’s 
fluid/fluent power cannot be contained by the male gaze, and the male spectator is 
rendered passive, an aspect of his masculinity ("understanding") negated.
According to WoUstonecraft, "the fair ladies" who are the products of Burke’s 
aesthetic are those "whom ...the captive negroes curse, in aU the agony of bodUy 
pain, for the unheard of tortures they invent" (Rights of Men 111). She suggests that 
after watching a flageUation, these women "compose their ruffled spirits and exercise 
their tender feelings by the perusal of the last imported novel". Since manners act as 
"a painted substitute for morals", women are only required to maintain the fiction of 
delicacy. Enmeshed in the destructive ideology of femininity, these women lack "the 
dignity ...of sensibiUty" and faU to attain "manly morals".*^ Though WoUstonecraft
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is vilifying the tyranny of certain women, her startling picture - of ladies who take 
sadistic pleasure in the pain of those less powerful than themselves and yet who 
produce tears for fictional suffering - empowers a feminist reading of both her own 
and of Burke’s text. If conventional femininity is not innate, but culturally 
constructed; if "women of fashion" are fashioned by costume and customs (48); if 
women are manipulated by current discourses of ’female excellence’, nevertheless, the 
image of femininity is also manipulable by them.
Interestingly, Hannah More may be invoked to lend support to my argument 
here. Though Richard Polwhele, in a footnote to his poem The Unsex’d Females 
(1798), writes that "Miss Hannah More may justly be esteemed, as a character, in aU 
points, diametrically opposite to Miss WoUstonecraft" (Jones 91), the conservative 
More nevertheless cites the same passage from Hamlet in her discussion of female 
sensibiUty (More 52).** More criticizes the "standard of feebleness" which is held 
out to women when they "are complimented with being ’Fine by defect, and 
deUcately weak’"; she argues that "softness and indolence can easUy act up [to this 
standard], or rather act down, if I may be aUowed the expression" (260). She likens 
the Ufe of a young woman to that of an actress, "the morning is aU rehearsal, and the 
evening aU performance" (73-74). She sees "dissimulation" as "the result of 
weakness", "the refuge of doubt and distrust", that is, as the product of an 
unreasonable ideology of femininity (262). Nevertheless, the potential for male 
anxiety and the subversive possibilités of female submissiveness are evident in her 
account of contemporary femininity:
The beauty of simpUcity is indeed so intimately felt and generaUy 
acknowledged by aU who have a true taste for personal, moral, or
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intellectual beauty, that women of the deepest dissimulation often find 
their account in assuming an exterior the most foreign to their 
character, and exhibiting the most engaging naivete. It is curious to 
see how much art they put in practice in order to appear natural) and 
the deep design which is set at work to display simplicity. And indeed 
this feigned simplicity is the most mischievous, because the most 
engaging of aU the Proteus forms which artifice can put on. For the 
most free and bold sentiments have been sometimes hazarded with fatal 
success under this unsuspected mask. And an innocent, quiet, artless 
manner has been adopted as the most refined and successful 
accompaniment of sentiments, ideas, and designs, neither artless, quiet, 
nor innocent. (262)
There' is no necessary correlation between inner and outer. More suggests that ideal 
femininity may be an accessory (an "accompaniment") worn to captivate unsuspecting 
men, and which gives them the power to both invite and evade the epistemological 
penetration of men. If women are constituted by duplicity, if they are, as Burke says, 
"guided by nature" in the counterfeiting of weakness, it is impossible to isolate a core 
of ’truth’, or determine if such a core exists.
More’s strictures are grounded in the conduct literature that flourished in the 
eighteenth-century and which provided a set of guidelines for female behaviour. 
Whüe seeking to control the female body, to domesticate it, these texts nevertheless 
frequently deploy traditional imagery which figures the body as double or 
deceptive.W etenhaU  Wilkes, in A Letter of Genteel and Moral Advice to a 
Young Lady, which ran through eight editions between 1740 and 1766, writes of the
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disappointment of "the amorous youth, who, endeavouring to plunder an outside of 
bloom and beauty, finds a treasure of impenetrable virtue concealed within!" (Jones 
30). The images of virtuous femininity depict an essence of Woman, an ideal figure 
in whom there is no distortion of the relationship between inside and outside. Though 
her foppish admirer may think she is all surface, this is merely the mirror of her inner 
beauty, and the continuity between body and soul makes her impenetrable. However, 
the image of virtue as a type of buried treasure unavoidably refigures the female body 
as double (as well as introducing the question of female sexuality, that is, inscribing 
the body as penetrable at precisely the point when Wilkes would like to argue that it 
is "impenetrable"). The ornamentation of the body, especially in terms of dress, 
provokes particular anxiety and feeds a discourse that tries to regulate the disguise 
facilitated by female fashions, and to marginalize the cultural contingency and change, 
of which fashion stands as a symbol, as opposed to the unchanging essence of 
womanhood." Wükes censures "that girl, who endeavours, by the artifice of dress, 
to attract the admiration, to stir up languishing desires, and to provoke the wanton 
wishes of her gay beholders"; he counsels the modest woman: "Therefore be not 
industrious to set out the beauty of your person; but, ...let your dress always resemble 
the plainness and simplicity of your heart" (Jones 30). Again, Wilkes privileges inner 
beauty, an essence without artifice ("plainness and simplicity") that apparently 
manifests itself as a readable surface (we can see here the continuity between neo­
classical aesthetic theory and conduct material).*^ Or, to look at this from another 
perspective, the very notion of a readable surface (and hermeneutic stability) depends 
on the positing of an unadulterated core of meaning. Yet Wilkes, cautioning the 
female reader against "an affected modesty" argues that "[t]he part of virtue may be
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over-acted” (Jones 29): the implicit theatrical metaphor, which will be developed at 
length by Hannah More, perversely casts the modest woman as a consummate actress 
who gives a subtle performance of a ’part’ which presumably has to be rehearsed.
The ideal woman is required to construct a self which will attract admiration, 
a body to be consumed by the male gaze, but, equally, she is to appear self-effacing. 
The female ’object’ is curiously both passive and self-exposing, or "exhibitionist", as 
Laura Mulvey puts it. Dr James Fordyce praises feminine skill in unselfconscious 
self-presentation:
Amongst many other advantages resulting from female meekness, I 
must not omit to mention how much it will conduce to Personal 
Attraction. ...Imagine a circle of handsome young women, where one 
is distinguished above the rest by a flowing yet composed affability;
... in which there appears no consciousness of beauty, no return upon 
herself, no study to become the object of the company, no visible 
attention to her dress or person ... what superior pleasure and respect 
will her presence necessarily inspire! (11:283-84)
The important thing is that she should not "appear" conscious of her charms, for 
"[tjhere is nothing so engaging as bashful beauty" (1:96). In another sermon, Fordyce 
writes of the "transports" of those parents whose modest, flower-bke daughter is the 
object of general admiration, yet "like that same flower, she appears unconscious of 
her opening charms" (1:14).
Dr John Gregory, in A Father’s Legacy to His Daughters (1774) celebrates the 
charm of a girl who "is disconcerted even at the gaze of admiration" (26). Like 
Fordyce, he is concerned with the relation between (apparent) female modesty and
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male admiration, recognising that these subject positions depend on female 
dissimulation:
Dress is an important article in female life. The love of dress is 
natural to you, and therefore is proper and reasonable. Good sense wiU 
regulate your expence in it, and good taste wiU direct you to dress in 
such a way as to conceal any blemishes, and set off your beauties ... 
to the greatest advantage. But much delicacy and judgment are 
required in the application of this rule. A fine woman shows her 
charms to most advantage, when she seems most to conceal them. The 
finest bloom in nature is not so fine as what imagination forms. The 
most perfect elegance of dress appears always the most easy, and the 
least studied. (55-56)
The processes of production (the industry that achieves "perfect elegance") are 
obscured to create the impression of effortless ease. Gregory claims: "I do not want 
to make you anything: I want to know what Nature has made you, and to perfect you 
on her plan" (54-55). Gregory’s pragmatic advice makes clear that all this feminine 
activity is for the benefit of the male ’consumer’, and he details the imaginative 
surplus which results from female concealment.^^ This point is also explicit in 
Hogarth’s Analysis of Beauty (an important source for Burke’s Enquiry!. wherein 
women are advised to display "modesty in dress, to keep up our expectations, and not 
suffer them to be too soon gratified" ; Hogarth observes that "the body ... would soon 
satiate the eye, were it to be ...constantly exposed ...But when it is artfully cloath’d 
and decorated, the mind at every turn resumes its imaginary pursuits concerning it" 
(53).
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It is clear that conduct books sought to instil an image of femininity in men, 
as well as in women. In defining the genre, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard 
Tennenhouse propose a double subject/object dichotomy:
P]n determining what kind of woman a woman should desire to be, 
these books also determine what kind of woman men should find 
desirable. Thus the genre implies two distinct aspects of desire, a 
desired object, and a subject who desires that object. (5).
I want to make two observations here which are pertinent to my reading of Burke’s 
concept of beauty. Firstly, for aU the patriarchal privileging of female simplicity, it 
is male fascination with the tricks of femininity, their investment in a duplicity that 
confirms the difference of masculinity, that is constantly emphasized in these texts; 
secondly, as eroticized objects women are framed by the possessive male gaze but 
they must not be indifferent to this gaze (though they are usually encouraged to feign 
indifference). Male ’looking’, which is supported by social, economic and physical 
practices, is supplemented by female reception of the gaze. This narcissistic 
consciousness of the gaze may be another "mechanism of oppression", women "must 
have internalized a certain assignment of positions" (Devereux 341).^ ® Alternatively, 
this feminine ’acting for the gaze’, woman’s participation, indeed, at times in these 
texts, orchestration of the seduction scenario, potentially subverts the active/passive, 
male/female binary oppositions on which definitions of the sublime and the beautiful 
depend.
Sarah Kofman asserts that, "Because with ’woman’ men never know for sure 
with whom they are dealing, they try to overcome her lack of ’proper’ nature and 
propriety by making her their property" (207). The aestheticization, and covert
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commodification, of femininity is one ’property-owning’ strategy employed by a 
range of eighteenth-century writers, when outlining female behaviour or admiring 
female beau ty .H annah  More has a wonderful little narrative which reveals the 
problems of this commodity ethic, and which returns us again to the issue of women’s 
doubleness, of the potential gap between inside and outside:
If, indeed, woman were mere outside, form and face only, and if mind 
made up no part of her composition, it would follow that a ball-room 
was quite as appropriate a place for choosing a wife, as an exhibition 
room for choosing a picture. But, inasmuch as women are not mere 
portraits, their value not being determinable by a glance of the eye, it 
follows that a different mode of appreciating their value, and a 
different place for viewing them antecedent to their being individually 
selected is desirable. The two cases differ also in this, that if a man 
select a picture for himself from among aU its exhibited competitors, 
and bring it to his own house, the picture being passive, he is able to 
fix it there: while the wife, picked up at public place, and accustomed 
to incessant display, will not, it is probable, when brought home, stick 
so quietly to the spot where he fixes her; but will escape to the 
exhibition-room again, and continue as if she were not become private 
property, and had never been definitively disposed of. (279)
In Chapter Six I wül suggest that More’s brand of conservative feminism aims to 
promote the interests of women by demarcating a domain of unassailable propriety 
Here she deploys traditional metaphors of surface and depth, to ascribe a valuable 
depth in women which is lacking in portraits (as discussed above, this figure
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reinscribes notions of female duplicity). However, her parable invites a subversive 
reading, one which undercuts the security of the male gaze: More locates the unfixing 
of conventional femininity, that which is owned and controlled by men (the picture 
of their desire), in the notion of the display of that femininity, the very display that 
is paradoxically purveyed in conduct manuals, and manifested in the consumer ethos 
of late eighteenth-century society. At this point, I would recall that Burke’s ladies do 
not transgress the boundaries of the beautiful by, for example, aping masculinity or 
by appropriating sublime attributes (as the unruly mob of women described in the 
Reflections do), but they in fact guarantee Burke’s category of the Beautiful through 
displaying, even faking, fem inin i ty .The  implications of this gender masquerade 
will be further considered in the next section.
Burke is seemingly untroubled by the epistemological (indeed, ontological) 
problems unleashed in the cultural production of the fashionable woman, but this 
component of his aesthetic theory troubles the security ("we love what submits to us") 
of his sexual politics. Perhaps the traces of anxiety may be located in the desire for 
precise definitions of the sublime and the beautiful, in the obsessive concern to keep 
these categories rigorously separate (a desire that notably mirrors the ideology of 
sexual difference). In his Preface to the first edition, Burke outlines the motives that 
prompted him to write the Enquiry, chiefly his observation that "the ideas of the 
sublime and the beautiful were frequently confounded; and that both were 
indiscriminately applied to things greatly differing, and sometimes of natures directly 
opposite" (1).*  ^ He teUs us that "the abuse of the word Beauty, has been stiQ more 
general [than of the sublime], and attended with stiU worse consequences." In the 
third part of the treatise, Burke observes:
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It is my design to consider beauty as distinguished from the sublime;
... But previous to this, we must take a short review of the opinions 
already entertained of this quality; which I think are hardly to be 
reduced to any fixed principles; because men are used to talk of beauty 
in a figurative manner .... (91)
Women represent the paradigm of beauty, but they also colour the discourse on 
beauty, for this figurative "loose" language is femininely indirect, all over the place, 
misleading its male speakers (112)."^  ^ Burke’s theory of language, the medium of 
differentiation, is precisely that which frustrates the desire for certainty and 
determinacy. According to Burke, words have no innate essence, their meanings are 
conventional, cultural not natural (Enquirv 163-65). The property/propriety of 
language, and of discursively constituted gendered bodies, is subject to the 
contingencies of a system in which meaning is only ratified by consent.'*  ^ Like 
language whose meaning can never be fixed, the female body can never be simply, 
as it is for Kant, "the proper reference point" of the beautiful (Kant 77): the body is 
an object to be defined and manipulated, that is, an aesthetic/erotic object framed by 
male makers of meaning, but this ’trope lady’ may have her own ideas about the 
frame-up.
* * * * *
[W]e are watching a woman demonstrate the representation 
of a woman’s body.
Sylvia Bovenschen
The masquerade of femininity is a play with the paradigms that conventionally 
construct the woman as superficial, as when Hannah More, differentiating male and 
female modes of education, describes the latter as the "appliquée of the embroiderer"
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and the former as knowledge which has been "burnt in" (218-19). These tropes, 
which align the female with surface, the decorative and the domestic, and the male 
with depth, pain and endurance reproduce conventional gender stereotypes, and are 
close to Burke’s formulations of the sublime and the beautiful. The question which 
then arises is. Why might a woman want to flaunt the applique of femininity, to 
foreground the masquerade, as she does according to Burke’s treatise?
There have been different readings as to what exactly, if anything, is masked 
by the masquerade, and it has provoked contradictory responses even within the work 
of individual c r i t i c s J o a n  Riviere’s influential account theorizes the masquerade 
of femininity as a defensive reaction to the female identification with, and 
appropriation of, masculinity. Riviere analyses the case of a university lecturer who 
usurps the position of subject rather than object of discourse, giving an "exhibition 
in public of her intellectual proficiency" (37). The woman then compensates for this 
transsexual performance by a display of feminine flirtation, which Riviere interprets 
as "an unconscious attempt to ward off the anxiety which would ensue on account of 
the reprisals she anticipated from the father-figures after her intellectual performance". 
Riviere defines "womanliness" as something that "could be assumed and worn as a 
mask, both to hide the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected 
if she was found to possess it" (38) Luce Irigaray argues that "the masquerade 
... [is] what women do in order ...to participate in man’s desire, but at the price of 
renouncing their own" (This Sex 133). The woman confirms her bondage to the 
patriarchal system through her masquerade of femininity; her self-commodification 
secures her status as the object and symbol of masculine desire within the economy 
of circulation. However, Irigaray’s notion of ’mimeticism’ could be interpreted as
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another version of masquerade, but in this instance woman’s repetition of masculinist 
ideas and images of the feminine has a subversive effect that points to an "elsewhere" 
(This Sex 76). This logic has proved seductive for many feminist critics, for the 
masquerade fractures the assumed identity between image and self and undermines 
patriarchal assumptions of an essentially passive femininity.Indeed, if we return 
to Riviere, we find that she equates femininity and masquerade:
The reader may now ask how I define womanliness or where I draw 
the line between genuine womanliness and the ’masquerade’. My 
suggestion is not, however, that there is any such difference: whether 
radical or superficial, they are the same thing. (38)
In one sense Burke’s dissimulative "beauty in distress" serves the male ego: 
"we love what submits to us", and, according to Burke, men are "flattered into 
compliance" by the submissive performance of femininity which massages and shores 
up the illusion of male superiority (flattery makes these men feel good). Yet, the 
gendered hierarchy of active male and passive female cannot be secured so easily. 
Like Riviere’s intellectual woman, these women make a spectacle of themselves, they 
give a performance of femininity which holds open the possibility of a critical 
distance (for them, and for the feminist reader) from the tropes of femininity, such as 
passivity and flattery. The masquerade fashions a speculative distance from the motif 
of proximity to the body, that "claustrophic closeness" which has characterized some 
recent theories of feminine specificity (Doane, "Füm and the Masquerade" 80)."^ * 
The concept of masquerade foregrounds the body as a third term between woman-as- 
image and feminine identity; women must fashion themselves to fit the ideology of 
femininity, the body is trained to lisp and totter, and this ülusionistic skill undermines
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the cultural and disciplinary ascription of a feminine ’essence’. These are women 
dressed up in the accoutrements of ’Woman’. As Sylvia Bovenschen observes of 
Marlene Dietrich’s performances: "we are watching a woman demonstrate the 
representation of a woman’s body" (129)."^  ^ This theory of the masquerade reacts 
against the paradigms of voyeurism and fetishism that posit a generic masculine 
spectator and opens up the question of female pleasure and agency in the production 
and consumption of images/texts.
The recuperation of female duplicity (discussed in the previous section), that 
quality which is historically a cause of women’s marginalization, and the valorization 
of masquerade or mimicry, remains a risky strategy for the feminist critic, for it 
potentially reinscribes traditional representations of women. Domna Stanton, among 
others, takes issue with Irigaray’s ascription of a ludic or subversive impact to female 
miming: "The adoption of the mimetic function, traditionally assigned to woman, may 
freeze and fixate the feminine at the mirror stage, rather than lead to a difference 
beyond the same old binary plays" ("Difference on Trial" 172). Yet the self- 
reflexivity of recent feminist theories, the stealing and self-conscious reworking of 
male images of women, does, I think, provide a way out of the prisonhouse of 
language and opens up new discursive spaces. Reading influential earlier texts 
through the lens of such theories is one way of viewing differently the historical 
baggage we have carried into our present moment.^®
* * * * *
Observe that part o f a beautiful woman ...
Edmund Burke
If, from one perspective, Burke’s aesthetic of the beautiful produces the female body 
as fetish to serve the male gaze, from another it produces the feminine as masquerade.
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whereby women mime and make strange, the gestures of femininity. This scandalous 
performance blurs the male image of Woman (the passive, contained, perfect form) 
and threatens the whole "masculine structure of the look" (Montrelay 93; Doane, 
"Film and the Masquerade" 82). It is necessary to consider here the implications of 
the traditional masculine gaze, in order to appreciate the subversion of this system of 
viewing in Burke’s treatise. As Hilde Hein argues, "[s]ince Plato’s glorification of 
the ’eye of the mind’ vision has been regarded as the noblest and most theoretical of 
the senses, and indeed the propadeutic to the highest form of ’seeing,’ which is non­
physical" (287). In modem aesthetics, the certainty and security of vision has 
continued to be privileged over the other senses, valorized because of its detachment 
from its object. Vision is a less intimate sense than touch, taste or smeU; it is 
considered a more civilized, more philosphical sense. In his Lectures on Aesthetics. 
Hegel claims that "vision ... finds itself in a purely theoretical relationship with 
objects, through the intermediary of light, that immaterial matter which truly leaves 
objects their freedom, lighting and illuminating them without consuming them" (qtd. 
in Heath, "Difference" 84). Moreover, this mode of looking produces a certain 
bounded spectacle of the ideal, and legislates the spectatorial position as one of 
measured detachment, the steady eye that confirms the stability of the I’, the viewing 
subject. As Joshua Reynolds explains in his discussion of aesthetics, "[W]e must take 
care that the eye be not perplexed or distracted by a confusion of equal parts, or equal 
lights" (VU: 126); in another of his Discourses, he writes: "Where objects are scattered 
and divided into many equal parts, the eye is perplexed and fatigued from not 
knowing where to rest. The piece wants repose" (Vni:147).^^ In his essay "On 
Beauty", Hazlitt writes that Burke "has very admirably described the bosom of a
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beautiful woman, almost entirely with reference to the ideas of motion. Those 
outlines are beautiful which describe pleasant motions" (4:72). The theory of 
"pleasant motions", which Hazlitt illustrates with reference to Burke, follows his 
discussion of Grecian beauty:
The head of the girl in the Transfiguration (which Raphael took from 
the Niobe) has the same correspondence and exquisite involution of the 
outline of the forehead, the eyebrows, and the eyes (circle within 
circle) which we here speak of. Every part of that delightful head is 
blended together, and every sharp projection moulded and softened 
down with the feelings of a sculptor, or as if nothing should be left to 
offend the touch as well as the eye ... the whole of the Grecian face 
blends with itself in a state of the utmost harmony and repose. (4:70)
In other words, Hazlitt’s reading of Burke traces the melting lines of the object as 
serving spectatorial composure; nothing offends or disturbs the viewer.
In his essay "On Sitting for One’s Picture", Hazlitt includes a provocative 
comment on a section of Burke’s treatise that will be central to the argument of this 
chapter. Hazlitt unsurprisingly invests in the look, but he usefully, for my purposes, 
locates the male gaze at a beautiful woman within a particular viewing scene and 
power dynamic: "Mr Burke, in his Sublime and Beautiful, has left a description of 
what he terms the most beautiful object in nature, the neck of a lovely and innocent 
female, which is written very much as if he had himself formerly painted this object, 
and sacrificed at this formidable shrine" (12:112-13).^^ Hazlitt gives voice to the 
erotics of production (and, by implication, consumption, since the artist 
metonymically represents the spectator), and he exposes the threat to the phallocentric
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gaze:
The relation between the portrait-painter and his amiable sitters is one 
of established custom: but it is also one of metaphysical nicety, and is 
a running double-entendre. The fixing an inquisitive gaze on beauty, 
the heightening a momentary grace, the dwelling on the heaven of an 
eye, the losing oneself in the dimple of a chin, is a dangerous 
employment. The painter may chance to slide into the lover - the lover 
can hardly turn painter. (112)
There is no way back to the public sphere of employment once the artist has 
succumbed to the charms of beauty; to be a lover is to relinquish the mastery of the 
painter. Hazlitt isolates the nude as a particular problem ("a temptation to gallantry"), 
rapturously possessed by the eye of the artist; however, fortunuately for the artist (and 
the sitter), his "pencil acts as a non-conductor to the grosser desires". Hazlitt offers 
a (still) familiar paradigm of sublimated, because aestheticized, desire:
There is no doubt that the perception of beauty becomes more exquisite 
... by being studied and refined upon as an object of art - it is at the 
same time fortunately neutralised by this means, or the painter would 
run mad. It is converted into an abstraction, an ideal thing ... (113) 
Transforming the real into the ideal, the artist resists the temptations that might lead 
to a loss of self. He preserves the social proprieties (Hazlitt teUs us that "the sense 
of duty, of propriety interferes" in the trajectory of desire) and protects himself 
against the dangerous proximity of exposed femininity.
The artist can now gaze endlessly, safely, at his possession, which, vampire­
like, seems to drain the life from the real model: "The health and spirit that but now
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breathed from a speaking face, the next moment breathe with almost equal effect from 
a dull piece of canvas ...the eye sparkles, the lips are moist there too: and if we can 
fancy the picture alive, the face in its turn fades into a picture, a mere object of 
sight". Focussing on the naked figure, Hazlitt argues that "the painting A Diana and 
Nymphs is like plunging into a cold bath of desire: to make a statue of a Venus 
transforms the sculptor himself to stone". In Hazlitt, the real, the woman, is 
immobilized as ideal, while the distance between male and female is doubly inscribed 
by the imagery which speaks of the artist’s masculine solidity.
What feminist critics have done is to expose the politics of this epistemology 
by questioning the purely theoretical gaze. Luce Irigaray critiques the masculine 
gaze:
Investment in the look is not privileged in women as in men. More 
than the other senses the eye objectifies and masters. It sets at a 
distance, maintains that distance. In our culture, the predominance of 
the look over smell, taste, touch, hearing, has brought about an 
impoverishment of bodily relations. It has contributed to disembodying 
sexuality. The moment the look dominates, the body loses its 
materiality, (qtd. in Owens 70)
Freud’s theory of the supplanting of a matriarchal by a patriarchal society involves 
just such an "impoverishment", for the immediacay of olfactory sexuality is replaced 
by a mediated, visual sexual i ty .Burke’s discourse of beauty apparently presents 
an implied male subject who gazes, with a disinterested detachment couched in 
Enlightenment metaphors, at female (or feminized) objects, investing precisely in the 
mode of looking critiqued by Irigaray. He writes of his aim "to establish a clear and
112
settled idea of visual beauty" and that "the diversities of the several senses ...will ... 
help to throw lights from one another to finish one clear, consistent idea of the 
whole"; "By this means," Burke argues, "nature is ... scrutinized; and we report 
nothing of her, but what we receive from her information" (Enquiry 122-23). Like 
Reynolds, he advocates the avoidance of lines "that may weary or dissipate the 
attention" (156).
We are now in a position to turn to that passage in Burke alluded to by Hazlitt 
wherein woman’s threat to the masculine structure of the look is displayed:
Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most 
beautiful, about the neck and breasts; the smoothness; the softness; the 
easy and insensible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for 
the smallest space the same; the deceitful maze, through which the 
unsteady eye slides giddily, without knowing where to fix, or whither 
it is carried. (Enquiry 115)^ ^
The emphasis falls differently in Burke with regard to each of the interconnected 
hegemonic paradigms I have drawn attention to, that is, the disembodiment (of both 
surveyor and surveyed) held in place by the phallocentric gaze; the discursive 
construction of beauty as Ideal, a refining or transcending of reality; and the stability 
of the masculine gaze. Firstly, Burke’s spatial emphasis produces a type of embodied 
space, whde his obsession with exploring the objectified body’s meanings in terms 
of its surface qualities runs counter to the masculinist project of neo-classical 
aesthetics (as well as other types of coercive discourse, such as conduct writing). 
Burke inherits the preoccupation with surface in part from Hogarth. In the Analysis 
of Beauty. Hogarth’s "line of beauty" is the serpentine line (rechristened by Burke,
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the "waving surface" and "the winding surface"); though line would not normally 
suggest the multiple properties of surface, Burke does seem to want both the sense 
of contour and surface. Hogarth, too, advocates the advantage of "considering solid 
objects as only thin shells composed of lines, like the outer-coat of an onion" 
(Analysis 8-9). Burke is particularly seduced by ''Smoothness'', "[a] quality ... 
essential to beauty" (114).^  ^ This quality of beauty incites a tactile pleasure, 
analogous to the visual: "All bodies that are pleasant to the touch, are so by the 
slightness of the resistance they make. Resistance is either to motion along the 
surface, or to the pressure of the parts on one another; if the former be slight, we call 
the body, smooth; if the latter, soft" (120). Unlike that of Hazlitt’s artist, Burke’s 
desire is not "neutralised" for he cannot resist the temptation to touch, and so 
compromises the pure distance of vision.
Moreover, Burke reverses the conservative trajectory from the real to the ideal 
(exemplified in Hazlitt’s writing): just before his description of a beautiful woman, 
in the section entitled "Gradual VARIATION", Burke outlines "the view of a 
beautiful bird" which "agrees very well with most of the conditions of beauty" (its 
lines are "perpetually changing", "its parts are ...melted into one another"). He 
writes: "In this description I have before me the idea o f a dove" (115, my italics). 
Then comes the passage beginning, "Observe that part of a beautiful woman .. .".In 
other words, Burke shifts from a phrase that invokes the Platonic Ideal, to the texture 
of the contingent real. The shift from the ideal to the real does not necessarily 
connote a move away from art (indeed, as I have argued, Burke’s perception of 
beauty is intimately entangled with the notion of artifice, with the feminine as 
masquerade); rather, I would say that the artifice of art comprehends the ideal and the
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material (I will argue that Canova’s Borghese statue is an appropriate visual 
analogue). For the purpose of constructing a feminist aesthetics, what is significant 
about Burke’s refusal of the ideal is that it involves a refusal to objectify the female 
body, to set it at a distance.
Most significantly, far from ensuring spectatorial repose, the beautiful woman, 
whose pose both conforms to and helps to construct the image of ideal womanhood, 
disorientates the spectator. Note the semantic emphasis on the ever-changing surface 
which frustrates the attempt of the eye to "fix" its position, to repose in one place 
(this shiftiness is carried grammatically by the short subclauses). Disobedience and 
entanglement are suggested by the reference to "the deceitful maze", whde the excess 
of alliteration and assonance produces an insidious seepage of meaning from phrase 
to phrase, blurring the contours of the vision. The effect of the mutability of line and 
surface - "the unsteady eye slides giddily, without knowing where to fix, or whither 
it is carried" - is similar to that of Hogarth’s line of beauty which "leads the eye a 
wanton kind of chace" (Analysis 25). Male vision is disarticulated and spectatorial 
possession of the object of the gaze continually deferred.
In the essay cited above ("On Sitting for one’s picture"), Hazlitt provides a 
summary of the masculine mode of looking: "We take rapturous possession with one 
sense, the eye" (12:113).^* The third person plural pronoun inscribes the ’universal’ 
view of the male artist/spectator which masters the female object of sight. In 
contradistinction, the contemporary feminist Michele Montrelay writes of how in 
women’s texts the emphasis on the appropriative look is displaced: "[N]o contour is 
traced on which the eye could rest" (qtd. in Heath, "Difference" 84). Burke’s text, 
in this sense, maps a feminine aesthetic. In the passage I have been analysing, the
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male gaze is disordered, the male subject is not in control of the gaze, he is shifted 
out of the security of the voyeur’s look. What happens in this revised specular 
economy is that the boundaries between male and female, subject and object, active 
and passive become fluid: the giddy gaze is produced by and mimics the mazelike 
surface of the woman’s body.^  ^ The lack of separation between male and female 
engendered by this mimicry, which I will discuss in more detail in the following 
section, points, as I wiU argue, to a masculine identification with woman as 
spectacle.
* * * * *
[TJhat sinking, that melting, that languor, which is the 
characteristical effect o f the beautiful.
Edmund Burke
Hannah More, upholding conventional gender aUgnments, proposes that the male "wiU 
... attain his object by direct pursuit, by being less exposed [than the female] to the 
seductions of extraneous beauty" (203).®^  Burke, however, faUs to keep to the direct 
male path, precisely because he is exposed to, and seduced by, beauty. The Beautiful 
refashions the the viewer in its own unsteady, feminine image. Throughout the 
Enquiry, in defining beauty, Burke constantly recurs to the notion of "melting", which 
suggests uncontainabiUty, a blurring of boundaries: beautiful objects should have "a 
variety in the direction of the parts" and "to have those parts not angular, but melted 
...into each other" (117). The contemplation of the melting curves of "beautiful 
bodies" engenders a mimetic melting of the spectator’s body (116). Burke writes of 
"that sinking, that melting, that languor, which is the characteristical effect of the 
beautiful, as it regards every sense" (123). Anne Mellor observes that "[hjundreds of 
upper-and middle-class women in England in the Romantic era aspired to become the
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languorous, melting beauty that Burke envisioned" (Romanticism and Gender 109);*  ^
though we should not, of course, lose sight of the intrication of beauty and domestic 
ideology, I would reiterate my point that this image is manipulable by women, and 
that Burke is crucially concerned here with what happens to the male subject.
Beautiful objects inspire love, which manifests itself physically in the erotic 
relaxation of the body:
When we have before us such objects as excite love and complacency, 
the body is affected ... much in the following manner. The head 
reclines something on one side; the eyelids are more closed than 
ususal, and the eyes roll gently with an inclination to the object, the 
mouth is a little opened, and the breath drawn slowly, with now and 
then a low sigh ... All this is accompanied with an inward sense of 
melting and languor. These appearances are always proportioned to the 
degree of beauty in the object, and of sensibility in the observer. ... 
from this description it is almost impossible not to conclude, that
beauty acts by relaxing the solids of the whole system Who is a
stranger to that manner of expression so common in aU times and in all 
countries, of being softened, relaxed, enervated, dissolved, melted away 
by pleasure? (149-50)^^
Activity is replaced by passivity; it is notable that the five verbs in the last sentence 
quoted above, all emphasize bodily dissolution (there are only marginal differences 
between the meanings of these words, and what amounts to repetition enacts the idea 
of erosion). The proprietorial gaze is foreclosed ("the eyelids are more closed than 
usual"), refracted into bodily experience, solidity is transmuted into softness and
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fluidity. That the issue is one of gender is clear from Burke’s own polarities of 
sublime/beautifiil, optical/tactile, objectivity/subjectivity which, as I pointed out early 
in this chapter, invite comprehension by analogy with the couple masculine/feminine. 
The male viewer is so fascinated by the spectacle of femininity that he comes to 
identify with it. If the mirror stage classically confirms subjectivity, with the m/other 
playing a support role, at issue here is that seeing the self as the other that undermines 
the coherence of the gaze, of subjectivity, and of gender, for it is not merely the body, 
but subjectivity itself that is jeopardized: in Mary WoUstonecraft’s words, "beauty 
relaxes the solids of the soul as well as the body" (Rights of Men 115). Burke 
postures as an autonomous subject but the dangerous curves of female beauty 
deconstruct him.
Before going on to discuss the significance of the theatricality of Burke’s 
posturing, I wiU mention some alternative readings of male ’melting’. John Gregory 
speaks of "the effects of love" on men: "If the fascination [with a woman] continue 
long, it will totally depress his spirit, and extinguish every active, vigorous, and manly 
principle of his mind" (87). The enervating effects of beauty continue to provoke 
debates which are couched in gender terms through into the Victorian period. W.J. 
Courthope argues that Keats demonstrates how the "pursuit of mere Beauty of Form 
...involves a relaxation of aU the nerves and fibres of manly thoughts, the growth of 
affectation, and the consequent encouragement of aU the emasculating influences that 
produce swift deterioration and final decay" (qtd. in Wolfson, "Feminizing Keats" 
333). In this scenario, the male subject is divested of his traditionaUy masculine 
attributes and decays into the negatively-coded condition of effeminacy.^ Frances 
Ferguson and Tom Fumiss have recently discussed the enervating effects of the
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beautiful on the male subject of Burke’s writing. Fumiss reminds us that Burke 
figures beauty in terms of "luxury", and that "luxury was typically associated with 
effeminacy and figured as feminine" (69). Indeed, in the Vindication of Natural 
Society (1756), the debauched aristocracy are mired in "effeminate luxury" (41).^^  
Fumiss points out that the allure of luxury and the feminine is "physically and 
politically dangerous", debilitating the individual body (in Burke’s words, "beauty acts 
by relaxing the solids of the whole system") and the body politic (Helen’s "fatal" 
beauty leads to the destmction of Troy). Both critics cite examples of the negative 
effects of beauty, in case we should be misled into thinking that Burke celebrates 
these sensations: Ferguson writes that Burke "aligns bodily entropy with the beautiful 
quality of sweetness, which appeals to the sense of taste yet finally ’very much 
enfeebles the tone of the stomach’" ("Sublime" 75; Enquiry 154); Fumiss quotes the 
following passage: "[I]n this languid inactive state, the nerves are more liable to the 
most horrid convulsions, than when they are sufficiently braced and strengthened. 
Melancholy, dejection, despair, and often self-murder, is the consequence of the 
gloomy view we take of things in this relaxed state of the body" (70; Enquiry 135). 
These critics, then, focus on the dysphoric, emasculating effects of the beautiful, 
whereby the male subject is stripped of the accoutrements of masculinity - solidity, 
activity, rationality, and even a good digestive system.
Carole Fabricant provides an altemative reading which is more generous in its 
treatment of the deconstmction of masculinity in Burke’s text. She suggests that, 
[Pjublished shortly after his marriage to Jane Nugent in 1756, the 
Philosophical Enquirv reveals in part the sensibility of a bridegroom, 
of a man very much concemed with the joys of surrender and release.
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and very aware of the extent to which aU pleasure, aesthetic as well as 
sexual, requires a relinquishing of control, a yielding up of oneself to 
wondrous and mysterious forces whose value lies precisely in their 
independence of man’s mastering wül. (75-76)^®
Though she fits Burke within the parameters of masculine sexuality ("the joys of 
surrender and release"), and reproduces (or remystifles) the feminine as "wondrous 
and mysterious". Fabricant does gesture to an ’elsewhere’ in which gender roles are 
not fixed. In particular, she notes the productive dialectic of male submission and 
female independence, and she presents us with a proto-Keatsian Burke in her reading 
of his passive "receptivity" (his "observing [of] the world ...from the perspective of 
a lover"), which engenders aesthetic, sexual and textual pleasure.
In the Enquiry, the sublime intervenes to arrest this slide towards effeminacy. 
The beautiful emasculates, "relaxing the solids" of the body and making it femininely 
fluid; it "not only disables the members from performing their functions, but takes 
away the vigorous tone of fibre which is requisite for carrying on the natural and 
necessary secretions" (135). Burke’s "remedy" for "these evüs" is labour, that is, the 
salutary sublime "pain" caused by "an exertion of the contracting power of the 
muscles" (135). Pain and terror are the means of "self-preservation", by which the 
sinews of masculinity are reinscribed (136). However, this réinscription is never 
absolute: the Burkean voice is dialogic, osciUating between gender positions, 
identifying with and speaking the discourse of the sublime and the beautiful.
* * * * *
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Even the ladies, Sir, may ... retail in theatrical attitudes 
many o f your sentimental exclamations.
Mary WoUstonecraft
Burke’s mirror-play, his mimicking of the melting curves of the beautiful object, 
which destabilizes the boundaries between the masculine and the feminine, may be 
interrogated further by placing it in the context of critical responses to Burke during 
the Romantic period. Though I consider mainly responses to the Reflections. I am 
most interested in those which illuminate aspects of the Enquiry. One interesting 
feature is the critical focus on the place of spectacle in Burke’s work, a criticism that 
often rests on assumptions about gender difference. Burke’s contemporaries, as well 
as more recent critics, have been quick to point out that Burke presents the revolution 
as a theatrical performance, the apotheosis of which is, in Ronald Paulson’s words, 
"the double scene of the king being led in triumph by his rebellious subjects and the 
queen attacked in her bedroom as the mob cuts down her guard" (Representations 60).
Thomas Paine writes of "the tragic paintings by which Mr Burke has outraged 
his own imagination, and seeks to work upon that of his reader"; such paintings are 
"very well calculated for theatrical representation", they are "a dramatic performance" 
which produces "a stage effect". Paine links this theatricalization with Burke’s 
clothing imagery, arguing that "[h]e pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird" 
(Rights of Man 71-73). We recall that Burke tells how Marie Antoinette fled "almost 
naked" (this is Burke’s addition to other contemporary accounts) from the mob who 
violated her bedchamber, and that this literal stripping of the queen grounds the 
metaphorical assertion that "[a]ll the decent drapery of life is to be rudely tom off", 
exposing "our naked shivering nature" (Reflections 171). Paine’s metaphors respond 
to Burke’s language, but also to the rhetoric of WoUstonecraft’s reply to Burke,
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Vindication of the Rights of Men, which, as I noted earlier, illuminates Burke’s 
aestheticization of politics. In her first Vindication, WoUstonecraft feminizes Burke, 
turning his clothing metaphors against him: addressing Burke directly, she writes that 
she wishes "to strip you of your cloak of sanctity" and "to show you to yourself, 
stripped of the gorgeous drapery in which you have enwrapped your tyrannic 
principles" (56,88). WoUstonecraft’s strategy of gender transference impUcitly 
responds to the gender instabUities already present in Burke’s text(s), as, for example, 
the "melting" of the male subject in the Enquiry, or Burke’s ambivalent staging of his 
relation to Marie Antoinette, which comprehends his role as chivaMc defender and 
his emotive identification with "beauty in distress", or the disconcerting spUt within 
Woman, symbolized by the difference between the etherealized vision of the French 
queen and and the mob of "harpies" who assaU her.^ ^
WoUstonecraft writes of Burke’s fashionable discourse that "[ejven the Ladies, 
Sir, may repeat your sprightly saUies, and retaU in theatrical attitudes many of your 
sentimental exclamations" (5). This comment may be read as a summary of the 
camivalesque possibiUtes inscribed in Burke’s texts. We recaU that in the Enquiry 
femininity is represented as a type of masquerade, and that Burke is femininized 
through his identification with the spectacle of woman; in WoUstonecraft’s plot we 
find women mimicking the gestures of a male figure who is already marked by the 
’femininity’ of the theatrical.^® Gender identity is caught up in a series of 
transferences, it has to do with performance, a matter of ’attitudes’ rather than 
essence. The economic resonances of the verb "retaU" are not insignificant, for 
Burke’s discourse is precisely a commodity which is outwith his control (he can’t, for 
instance, prevent women from reading his texts, appropriating his words and turning
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them against him).
In his essay "The Character of Mr Burke", Hazlitt also associates Burke with 
the theatrical, observing that "[h]e constructed his whole theory of government ...not 
on rational but on picturesque and fanciful principles; as if ...the whole of society 
[were] a theatrical procession" (7:228). After aligning Burke with the "fanciful" (or 
feminine) rather than with masculine rationality, Hazlitt goes on to discuss the 
engenderment of Burke’s prose style. I quote from this interesting passage at length: 
It is his impatience to transfer his conceptions entire, living, in all their 
rapidity, strength, and glancing variety, to the minds of others, that 
constantly pushes him to the verge of extravagance, and yet supports 
him there in dignified security -
’Never so sure our rapture to create.
As when he treads the brink of aU we hate. ’
He is the most poetical of our prose writers, and at the same time his 
prose never degenerates into the mere effeminacy of poetry; for he 
always aims at overpowering rather than at pleasing; and consequently 
sacrifices beauty and delicacy to force and vividness. (7:229)
Hazlitt raises, and then forecloses, the idea that Burke’s poetic writing is effeminate; 
similarly, he introduces the notion of "extravagance" but places this excess on secure 
foundations ("dignified security").^^ In other words, he suggests a dangerous sliding 
towards femininity, but then contains this gender threat by reinscribing masculinist 
boundaries. However, the intertextual allusion (the adapted citation from Pope) is, 
I think, radically destabilizing.^® There is an odd effect of transvestism as Burke is 
cast in Calypso’s part but with the pronominal signifiers of masculinity. It is worth
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recalling here the linguistic travesty/transvestism of both the portrait of Martha Blount 
as a "softer man" which concludes "Epistle to a Lady", and the "vile Antithesis" 
which constitutes the Sporus portrait in the "Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot" (the negative 
version of the androgenous ideal). Burke is pushed towards the margins of 
conventional masculinity, to the very brink of effeminacy, hovering (like Marie 
Antoinette) between the sublime and beautiful, prose and poetry, masculinity and 
femininity.
Hazlitt presents himself as part of a male audience enraptured at Burke’s 
performance. Burke’s writing, which metonymically stands in for his person, 
constitutes a spectacle for the male gaze. In an another essay, Hazlitt writes of 
Burke’s behaviour in the public, political arena: "he seems fond of conqueting with 
the House of Commons, and is perpetually calling the Speaker out to dance a minuet 
with him" (7:302). To read Hazlitt’s account alongside the Enquiry is to see Burke 
as mimicking his own theorizations of the feminine. Burke’s posing constitutes a 
masquerade of femininity. It is, of course, important to note the structural differences 
between male and female performances, or masquerades, of femininity; as Nancy 
Miller puts it, "only those who have it can play with not having it" (Subject 75). 
However, it is clear that Burke’s gender is not culturally secure: Hazlitt’s flirtatious 
actress is of most interest to me, but Kramnick also points out that rumours of 
homosexuality circulated amongst Burke’s contemporaries, fuelled partly by his 
protest in the House of Commons in 1780 against the treatment of two homosexuals, 
and this during a period of increasing persecution of sexual non-conformity 
(Kramnick 83-87).
* * * * *
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In his discussion of (aestheticized) erotic spectacle, HazUtt draws national as well as 
gender boundaries, or, more accurately, he marks the difference between the domestic 
and the foreign which takes place over the body of a woman (and is signified by that 
body):
[T]he heedless, unsuspecting licence of foreign manners gives the artist 
abroad an advantage over ours at home. Sir Joshua Reynolds painted 
only the head of Iphigene from a beautiful woman of quality: Canova 
had innocent girls to sit to him for his Graces. The Princess Borghese, 
whose symmetry of form was admirable sat to him for a model, which 
he considered as his master piece and the perfection of the female 
form. (12:112-113)
In the final section of this chapter I will suggest that we may read this statue as 
revising the passive "to-be-looked-at-ness" of the woman posited by Laura Mulvey; 
notions of display and of mastery are complicated here in ways that resonate with, 
and extend, my reading of Burke’s aesthetic of the beautiful. The feminist critic can 
intervene in the static scenario male/female, subject/object, active/passive, that has so 
often determined the parameters of the gaze: to see the female nude as always already 
a "master-piece", the object of the appropriative male gaze, is to elide the 
potentialities of multiple viewing positions, and to turn away from the possible 
subversion of monolithic gender identities. As in the cases of Burke’s view of a 
beautiful woman and his own posturing, the crucial questions are. What is being 
posed here and for whom?^^
Fred Licht analyses the Canova statue (1804-08) in the context of three other 
images of reclining female figures from the early nineteenth-century. For the record.
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they are Goya’s Nude Maja (c.1800), David’s portrait of Madame Recamier (1800) 
and Ingres’s Grande Odalisque (1814). Licht argues that "of the four artists who first 
describe the various incarnations of modem womanhood, Goya, David, and Ingres see 
their subjects from a deeply entrenched masculine point of view. Only Canova seems 
to have been able to spy behind enemy lines. There is a slightly unsettling complicity 
between him and the woman that allows him to state from a female point of view 
subtleties that one can recognize but that defy description" (135). These other figures 
will not form part of my discussion, though it is worth noting that they are all painted 
images and that in each case the figure looks out towards the viewer. It would 
probably be possible to destabilize the masculine point of view which Licht ascribes 
to the artists, and implicitly the gender position they create for the sp ec ta to ro n e  
might also analyse the significance of Licht’s metaphorics of sexual warfare. What 
interests me here, however, is that Licht, whose own rhetoric bears the marks of a 
certain masculinity ("caressing rhythm", "everything rises to the blossoming climax 
of the bosom", "the fullness of the bosom stands revealed as a supple flower") is 
unsettled by the perceived, but unarticulable ("defy description") "complicity" between 
male and female points of view. The statue engenders a troubled gaze which involves 
seeing it from two points of view, belonging to the male and female body. This 
double vision can be examined in terms of the context of the sculpture’s production 
and of the formal details which help to ’produce’ the spectator.
Paolina Borghese, Napoleon’s sister who had married into a respectable 
aristocratic family, wanted a nude portrait of herself. Canova’s dilemma was how to 
satisfy her exhibitionist desire without scandalizing society (a scandal that could have 
affected both sculptor and sitter). Canova’s first solution was to allegorize the figure
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by portraying Paolina as Diana. She resisted this decorous disguise, refusing the 
emphasis on chastity rather than beauty along with the drapery that could preserve 
"Diana’s" propriety. She agreed to pose as Venus Victorious (a motif which is almost 
unknown in classical sculpture). Licht argues that "which disguise she was to assume 
was relatively unimportant to Canova’s strategy"; he argues that "the real issue was 
between the idea of a portrait of Paolina Borghese as PaoHna Borghese and the idea 
of a portrait of Paolina Borghese as a goddess in classical guise" (139). History 
seems to have minimized Canova’s strategic gain: the portrait is rarely referred to by 
its full title, and the statue, we are told, "unlike any other naked statue in the 
Borghese museum, still evokes uncomfortable feelings today" because it figures "a 
recognizable individual to whose intimacies we are in no way entitled"
Canova and Paolina Borghese collude in the ordering of the female body; their 
competing, and ultimately entangled, desires, may be read as a narrative which tells 
of the spatial relationship between sculptor and model. In a wonderful essay 
Elizabeth Hollander explores "the model’s perspective on making pictures [which] has 
not had a place in the standard discourse on art" (133). She comments on different 
media, but in particular notes the "strain of posing for sculpture", of having to endure 
"the sculptor’s voracious, demanding, often clinical scrutiny" without the security of 
a "frame" (a single perspective and distance); but the sculptor is similarly ’unfixed’, 
"continually moving around the model (or moving the model around), and continually 
varying the distance between them" (138). Though this seems, in one sense, to 
replicate the hierarchical gendered opposition activity/passivity, this binary is 
reinflected by the perceived absence of a frame for both participants: the work of art 
emerges from the combined authorial role of the artist and "[t]he model’s authority
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of embodiment" (145). Sustaining their encounter across time and space, artist and 
model are involved in a process of construction that attests to the materiality, the 
physicality, of both subjects.
The Borghese statue speaks to the traditional positioning of the male body as 
spectator: the female body is posed as landscape, a geographical span to be consumed 
by the male gaze.^  ^ The gaze is defined as an issue because the woman’s is averted 
(from the spectator, and from her own body): the figure is presented frontally but the 
head is in profile (this revises Canova’s painting Venus and Satyr, c.1792, which has 
been seen as a progenitor of the sculpture). Licht proposes that this "sudden 
counterpoise ...snaps us out of the planar presentation of the body" (138). The turn 
of the head deflects the gaze of the viewer; if the statue is viewed frontally, the gaze 
is directed to the unoccupied space between Paolina’s feet and the end of the bed. 
This space helps to fund an oscillation between embodiment and disembodiment: it 
leads the spectatorial gaze out of and away from the body, but it nevertheless remains 
in dynamic relation with the body. Curiously, though sculpture is a spatial presence, 
Licht does assume a single viewing perspective. Since the bodüy syntax of the 
female figure is disarranged when viewed from any of the possible viewing 
perspectives (in one position she would look towards us, but her body would be 
turned away), the viewer is deprived of any single-point fetishistic position: the 
subjectivity of the (male) body is multiply dislocated in the very act of viewing. To 
return to Burke’s scenario: the eye/I is unsteady, the viewer can neither fix his gaze 
nor turn away, but is compelled to yield to the image.
The feminine refusal of the gaze, a refusal of the signifier of the erotic 
appropriation of the female body, may be viewed from yet another, but similarly
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destabilizing, perspective. The turn of Paolina Borghese’s head could be seen to 
ironize the gaze on the body, by suggesting a mental attitude, another plane from the 
physical display. This gesture towards female autonomy is supported formally by the 
inward curves of Paolina’s arms and of the drapery, which suggest interiority and 
self-containment. There is also a certain self-reflexivity, whereby the pose fashions 
the exterior contours of arm and torso as interior spaces. The physicality of the 
female body is displayed, but made inaccessible. The traditional male gaze is 
deprived of the security of its own exteriority, the confidence of a subjectivity defined 
against an object.
This is a scene that offers subversive spectatorial possibilities. The ground for 
viewing the female body shifts, en-gendering new perspectives. Subjectivities are 
produced in the space(s) between the eye and the sculpture, between the model and 
the sculptor, the ’I ’ and the other. Gender identities are in process in these in- 
between spaces, literally positional rather than essential.
* * * * *
I have argued that the eighteenth-century cultural discourse of "beauty in distress", 
the debilitated femininity purveyed in novels, conduct manuals, and aesthetic treatises, 
is an image that may be manipulated by women. Burke’s Enquiry contributes to the 
shaping of middle-class domestic ideology which kept women in their proper place, 
but because these man-made images of women depend on female artifice, a space is 
held open for female subjectivity. I have suggested that "beauty in distress is [indeed] 
the most affecting form of beauty", for the male viewer, whose language constructs 
this vision, is affected to the extent that he is himself feminized (Enquiry 110). Burke 
is seduced by the spectacle of feminine beauty: gazing at a beautiful woman (or, if
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I may fantasize another scene, at the statue of Paolina Borghese) Burke’s own body 
mimics the object of perception, and the boundaries of subject and object dissolve.
The question remains - and it is one that recurs throughout this thesis - 
whether this destablization of gender boundaries is an appropriative move, whereby 
the characteristics of femininity are absorbed by the male subject. Does this 
revisionary moment continue to give the ’masculine’ subject, however deconstructed, 
all the speaking parts? After all, both the aesthetic treatise and the statue which have 
been my concern in this chapter are the creations of men out of the material of 
femininity. According to Irigaray, the problem for woman is that, because she is the 
material used in the construction of men’s ’house of language’, this linguistic domain 
is not available to her. In "When Our Lips Speak Together", Irigaray ponders how 
to reinvent the phrase "I love you", which entails nothing less than creating a new 
language of the body, a mobile language that resists the stasis of a patriarchal frame 
of reference, the petrification signified by statues (This Sex 214; I return to this new 
choreography at the end of Chapter Six). As others have suggested Irigaray’s use of 
"statue" here may be a subversive intertextual reference to Lacan’s infamous comment 
on the jouissance of Bernini’s St. Theresa: "you only have to go and look at Bernini’s 
statue in Rome to understand immediately that she’s coming, there’s no doubt about 
it" (Mitchell and Rose 147). Irigaray asks, "What pleasure are we talking about? 
Whose pleasure" (This Sex 91). As opposed to the arrogant certainty of Lacan’s 
reading of Bernini’s statue, Burke and Borghese offer other pleasures. Towards the 
end of his essay "On Sitting for One’s Picture", after alluding to the "license of 
foreign manners" and to the fact that the Princess Borghese posed naked for Canova, 
Hazlitt recounts an anecdote: "when asked if she did not feel uncomfortable while it
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was taking, she replied, with great indifference, ’No: it was not cold’" (12:114)7^ 
Though she may pose as a pin-up, Paolina Borghese cannot be pinned down;^  ^ her 
voice, like her body, resists fixed definitions: is this an aristocratic put-down line? an 
assertion of the literal over the figurative (the sexual innuendo of her questioner)? is 
she indifferent to the male gaze because it is her own fascination with femininity that 
is being staged (and this would make a difference)?^® Similarly, at precisely the 
moment in Burke’s text when we might expect appopiiation, female beauty 
unexpectedly provides us with a new way of looking at the masculine subject. Joseph 
Boone asks, "even when the male writer focuses on the ’feminine’, might there be 
alternatives beyond ’appropriation’"? (18) The passages in the Enquiry on which I 
have focussed are instances, I suggest, when the male writer "has let femaleness 
transform, redefine his textual erotics, allowed himself to be read through femininity 
and femaleness, rather than seeking to become the authorizer speaking on behalf of 
it" (Boone 18).
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Notes to Chapter Three
1. Cited in Wichelns 646.
2. Elisabeth Bronfen’s reading of this connection adds death to the 
equation: she argues that ”[t]he beauty of Woman and the beauty of the 
image" are "analogously positioned in relation to death" ; providing "the 
illusion of intactness", both seem to offer an impossible transcendence 
of "death’s ubiquitous ’castrative’ threat to the subject." (64) She 
argues, further,that "Beauty ...always also includes death’s inscription, 
because it requires the translation (be it in fantasy or in reality) of an 
imperfect, animate body, into a perfect, inanimate image, a dead 
’figure’." The connections between "Death, femininity and the 
aesthetic" within a male scopic economy are traced in detail throughout 
her wonderful and wide-ranging book. Over Her Dead Body.
3. All references are to the edition by James T. Boulton, which is based 
on the second edition of 1759 (subsequently cited as Enquiry followed 
by page numbers).
4. Though Mulvey is concerned with twentieth-century cinematic 
discourse, her gender paradigms in many ways reproduce the traditional 
opposition of the sublime and the beautiful. Thus, I hope I am not 
merely imposing contemporary theory on a text from another historical 
era; rather, I see the two discourses - though bearing the marks of their 
historical contexts - as mutually illuminating.
5. It is curious that a stable male gaze could be predicated on ’moving 
pictures’; this has a lot to do with the fact that Mulvey based her 
theories on what she perceived as classic, realist cinema, wherein 
though the camera moves, the point of view does not necessarily do so.
With regard to the female spectator, Mulvey in her more recent work 
offers alternative positions. In "Visual Pleasure", the female spectator 
is theorized as either identifying masochistically with the passive 
screen image of woman, or transsexually assuming the gaze of the 
male voyeur, or as oscillating between these positions in a form of 
psychic transvestism. In "Afterthoughts", Mulvey argues that the 
female spectator’s identification with the male allows her to return 
imaginatively to the Freudian "early masculine period" of the female 
child (37). Though this formulation gives a more positive slant to 
female spectatorial pleasure, the problem remains that in order to 
experience this the viewer must revert (or regress) to an earlier stage 
of psychosexual development. On anxieties in current theories of the 
gaze, see Craig Saper.
6. As Norman Bryson points out, Mulvey’s theory does not address the 
question of men looking at other men: while Mulvey’s theory is
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"particularly probing of issues to do with the male’s perspective on the 
female, as pre-ordained object of its looking, it may be relatively 
underdeveloped in dealing with what is at stake in the male gaze upon 
another male" (3). This is not an area that I deal with in the present 
work, but I concur with Bryson that what is at stake is the question of 
the continuous production of gender, the "anxieties of producing the 
masculine".
7. I do not mean to suggest that Burke’s text merely mimetically 
reproduces a differential system inherent in society: borrowing Nancy 
Armstrong’s comment on novels, I would say that Burke’s treatise is 
"both the document and the agent of social change" (Desire and 
Domestic Fiction 5). It records and itself helps to construct gendered 
hierarchies.
8. Though De Quincey proposes that the gendered binary opposition of 
the sublime and the beautiful is "an idea altogether of English growth" 
(Masson 10:300), it is also evident in the work of European writers, 
notably Kant (in both his Observations, a text which I discuss in more 
detail in Chapter Six, and in the Third Critique! and Rousseau. In 
particular, we find the oppositions activity/passivity, power/love; 
according to Rousseau, the differences between the two sexes are 
necessary to the order of society: "One ought to be active and strong, 
the other passive and weak." (Emile 214) Woman "is made to please 
and to be subjugated," while man’s "merit is in his power; he pleases 
by the sole fact of his strength. This is not the law of love". Burke’s 
work is preceded in Britain by John BaiUie’s Essay on the Sublime. 
published ten years before the Enquiry: Baillie distinguishes between 
sublime passion and the limited love of "a narrow Object", such as "a 
Child, a Parent, or a Mistress" (23).
9. In the second edition of his treatise, Burke acknowledges a sublime of 
the supremely small (72).
10. See also Enqiry 136.
11. References to Hazlitt are to essay title, volume number and page 
number(s).
12. Burke’s use of the third person plural pronoun always implies a generic 
male reader, while the status of his text as ’philosophy’ types it as 
masculine, and out of bounds for female readers. All the contemporary 
reviews discussed by Wichelns are by male writers. Mary 
WoUstonecraft, whose comments I will discuss in more detail, is a 
notable exception to the policing of this boundary. On the elision of 
"softer" and "subordinate", see Vivian Jones (4).
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13. A recent (1985) issue of the journal New Literary History, entitled The 
Sublime and the Beautiful: Reconsiderations, basically reconsiders the 
sublime. Two notable exceptions are Ferguson herself and Tom 
Fumiss. Ferguson sees the sublime as a self-preserving defence against 
the dissolution effected by beauty, but she is not concerned with 
differentially gendered subjects. In Fumiss’s impressive article 
"Gender in revolution", the beautiful remains marginalized because 
Fumiss (following Mary WoUstonecraft) uses the Enquiry as an 
heuristic device for reading the Reflections, giving most emphasis to 
the categories of the sublime and the grotesque.
14. On beauty as a patriarchal Ue which oppresses women, see Naomi 
Wolf, The Beauty Mvth.
15. See also Meaghan Morris who analyses, within a feminist framework, 
the reverbations of the category of the sublime in Lyotard’s version(s) 
of postmodemity (The Pirate’s Fiancee 213-39).
16. See Susan Levin for a reading of Dorothy Wordsworth that analyses 
at length the significance of domestic detaU as the trace of a non- 
appropriative female aesthetic.
17. Mattick’s article is a succinct and insightful account of the use of 
Burke’s gendered categories in art theory and criticism.
18. Ronald Paulson cites an interesting comment from Bosenquet, "’[the 
Sublime] may depend on "Unform", a useful idiom which may cover 
both formlessness and deformity’" (Representations 169).
19. For discussion of this episode, see Paul Mattick 299, and Tom Fumiss, 
"Gender in Revolution".
20. As I noted earlier, feminist critics have been rewriting the oppressive 
paradigm of the ’perfect image’, especiaUy in their preoccupation with 
the grotesque body. See, in particular, Mary Russo, "Female 
Grotesques".
21. Paul Mattick also quotes this passage, but he seems to read "weakness" 
and "imperfection" as synonymous terms (294). See Nicholas Roe on 
the subversive connotations of the word "lisping" as used by 
contemporary critics of Keats.
22. Tania Modleski explains how in Lacanian theory the female body is 
imaged as both perfect and imperfect: "On the one hand, then, there is 
the anticipation of bodüy ’perfection’ and unity [at the mirror-stage] 
which is, importantly, first promised by the body of the woman; on the 
other hand, the fantasy of dismemberment, a fantasy that gets 
disavowed by projecting it onto the body of the woman, who, in an 
interpretation which reverses the state of affairs the male chüd most
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fears, eventually comes to be perceived as castrated, mutilated, 
’imperfect.’" (The Women Who Knew Too Much 801 I discuss the 
significance of the phallus in feminist theory in Chapter Four.
23. On the alignment in Reynolds of woman and nature, and of woman 
and the deficient detail, see Naomi Schor, Reading in Detail 15-16. 
The male analysis of feminized Nature continues to propel the 
"religious, commercial and scientific ideologies" of the early nineteenth 
century; "In all these endeavours, a male intelligence analysed a 
feminized ’Nature’. Men frame rational scientific practice just as they 
pushed forward quantitative thought; it was their birthright, seen as an 
inborn, natural quality of masculinity." (Davidoff and HaU 27)
24. My focus on what we might call, after Elisabeth Bronfen, "death’s 
inscription" in the beautiful image, is not to deny the kitsch 
theatricality of this tableau vivant.
25. On the Ideal in Hazlitt’s work, see Leonard M. Trawick, m. He 
argues that though for Hazlitt "the essence resides in the particulars", 
nevertheless "his own concept of the ideal seems hardly more than a 
revamping, in a new vocabulary, of selected parts of [Reynold’s] 
Discourses" (247).
26. The quote appears in Strictures on the Modem System of Female 
Education (143).
27. See, though, Terry Eagleton’s rewriting of aesthetic history: "Aesthetics 
is bom as a discourse of the body" (The Ideology of the Aesthetic 13); 
Eagleton discusses Burke (along with Shaftesbury and Hume) in 
Chapter Two of his book.
28. I am indebted to Tom Fumiss for this insight (66); on WoUstonecraft’s 
critique of Burke, see also Mitzi Myers, "Politics from the Outside" 
and Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic 56-59.
29. Davidoff and HaU make a different point about female labour: 
"women’s domestic tasks which took place in the private sphere of the 
home have been unacknowlegded as work. The contribution which 
married women made ... to the famUy enterprise through their labour, 
their contacts and their capital was equaUy obscured. As long as 
’production’ is narrowly defined, such connections literaUy cannot be 
seen" (33). In A Letter to the Women of England, on the Injustice of 
Mental Subordination (1799), Mary Robinson (’Anne Frances RandeU’) 
acutely places the question of physical labour within the context of the 
ideology of delicate femininity in order to point up the intemal 
contradictions of such thinking: "If woman be the weaker creature, why 
is she employed in laborious avocations? why compeUed to endure the 
fatigue of household dmdgery; to scmb, to scower, to labour, both late 
and early, whUe the powdered lacquey only waits at the chair ...of his
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employer? ... Are women thus compelled to labour, because they are 
of the WEAKER SEX?" (Jones 240).
30. WoUstonecraft is not the only feminist writers of the period to castigate 
this debilitating ideology: Mary Hays’s heroine in the novel Memoirs 
of Emma Courtney laments, "Why have I been rendered feeble and 
delicate by bodUy restraint, and fastidious by artifical refinement?" 
(31). Emma labours to convince the tedious Mrs. Melmouth "that to 
be treated Uke ideots (sic) was no real compliment, and that the men 
who condescend to flatter our foibles, despised the weak beings they 
helped to form" (32).
31. Fora discussion of male anxiety about cosmetics during the eighteenth 
century, see Roy Porter, "Making Faces".
32. It is interesting that WoUstonecraft sees sensibility as an attribute of 
masculine morality; on the shifting significance of sensibility during 
the Romantic period, see Janet Todd, SensibUity: An Introduction. On 
the complex relation between women and slavery, especiaUy the female 
colonial treatment of slaves, see Moira Ferguson, Subject to Others, 
esp. 161-62.
33. As Harriet Guest has recently pointed out, writers of the period use a 
common language in which to describe the corruptions of femininity 
("The Dream of a Common Language").
34. On the metaphorics of feminine duplicity in eighteenth-century texts, 
especiaUy Richardson’s Pamela, see Tassie GwUliam, "Pamela and the 
Duplicitous Body of Femininity"; for an extended discussion of 
conduct material, see Nancy Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction.
35. The sermons of James Fordyce are punctuated by his concern about 
female apparel, an anxiety about ornamentation that cannot, I think, be 
whoUy contained within the Christian parameters of his discourse.
36. Wilkes, as Leigh Hunt wUl do later, uses the trope of the female body 
in the service of valorizing inner beauty - the discourses of 
metaphysics and morality coincide over the woman’s body. See also 
James Fordyce’s Sermons to Young Women (1766): in the context of 
describing a young man surveying a number of young women in a 
public place, he declares, "it is the soul we seek ... That which is 
presented to our eyes attracts us merely as an image of that which they 
cannot perceive" (11:101).
37. In Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Mary WoUstonecraft criticizes 
the modes of conduct purveyed by Gregory and Fordyce; aUuding 
again to Hamlet, she writes: "It is this system of dissimulation, 
throughout the volume [Gregory’s Legacy], that I despise. Women are 
always to seem to be this and that - yet virtue might apostrophize them.
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in the words of Hamlet - Seems! I know not seems! Have that within 
that passeth show! (199).
38. Like Mulvey, Devereux is concerned with the cinematic gaze.
39. I have already noted that English marriage laws made women subject
to their husbands. Catherine Macaulay Graham, in her Letters on 
Education (1790), explains the sexual double-standard in terms of male 
’property-owning’: "I shall intimate, that the great difference now 
beheld in the external consequences which follow the deviations from 
chastity in the two sexes, did in all probability arise from women 
having been considered as the mere property of the men; and, on this 
account had no right to dispose of their own persons: that policy 
adopted this difference, when the plea of property had been given up; 
and it was stiU preserved in society from the unruly licentiousness of 
the men" (Jones 115).
40. Having been neglected by feminist critics in favour of her
revolutionary contemporary, Mary WoUstonecraft, More’s contribution 
to feminism is currently being reassessed; see, Lucinda Cole,
"(Anti)feminist Sympathies"; Kathryn Sutherland, "Hannah More’s 
counter-revolutionary feminism"; Mitzi Myers, "Hannah More’s Tracts 
for the Times", and Davidoff and HaU, FamUy Fortunes 167-172.
41. See Burke’s account of the "furies of heU", in the abused shape of the 
vUest of women" who march on VersaUles (Reflections 165).
42. In the Preface to the Second Edition, Burke again insists on the project 
of differentiation, though, interestingly, the phUosophic enquiry of the 
Enlightenment man, who "direct[s] the lights we derive from such 
exalted speculations" Uluminates a curiously bisexual programme, for 
the taste is endowed with "phUosophical solidity" whUe "the severer 
sciences" accrue "some of the graces and elgancies of taste" (6).
43. Though Margaret Homans, in Bearing the Word, argues that women 
are associated with the literal, there is also a long paraUel tradition that 
Unks femininity and figurality. In her Introduction to Romanticism. 
Cynthia Chase discusses both these positions in feminist criticism of 
Romantic texts (27-31).
44. On this issue, see Tom Fumiss, who draws a paraUel with Burke’s 
notions of property-ownership and government, both of which are 
legitimated through "longevity of possession" (86). JacqueUne Rose 
argues that, according to post-Lacanian thought, "[t]he divisions of 
language are in themselves arbitrary and shifting: language rests on a 
continuum which gets locked into discrete units of which sexual 
difference is only the most strongly marked. The fixing of language 
and the fixing of sexual identity go hand in hand; they rely on each 
other and share the same forms of instability and risk" (Sexuality 228).
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45. The most insightful and detailed reading of the phenomenon of the 
masquerade is Mary Ann Doane’s "Füm and the Masquerade". For an 
intriguing account of eighteenth-century masquerades, and their 
subversive potential in fiction of the period, see Terry Castle, 
Masquerade and C iv i l iz a t io n .  Castle deals with a different type of 
masquerade to that analysed by Doane, but both forms are associated 
with scenarios of seduction.
46. Riviere draws on Nietzsche’s conception of the Feminine as enigma, 
self-adornment, in her notion "of womanliness as a mask, behind which 
man suspects some hidden danger" (43).
47. It is worth recalling here that Burke himself was suspicious of 
essentialism, his whole concept of the state, and his epistemology, is 
that of a dynamically-evolving organism. There is, of course, a world 
of difference between the artifical and the organic, though in Burke’s 
Enquiry "woman" mediates between the two, destabilizing the 
opposition (see note 56).
48. In Chapter Five (on Keats), I make use of precisely these tropes of 
proximity, but in relation to a biologically male author.
49. Also quoted in Mary Ann Doane, "Film and the Masquerade" 82, and 
Stephen Heath, "Joan Riviere" 57. See Heath’s comments on Marlene 
Dietrich’s performance in Sternberg’s Morocco: Dietrich, he argues, 
"wears all the accoutrements of femininity as accoutrements, does the 
poses as poses, gives the act as an act". Heath sees this as "not a 
defence against but a derision of masculinity".
50. Helene Cixous famously advocates the feminist theft of masculine 
discourse on women, in order to fly beyond the old phallocentric order, 
in her article "The Laugh of the Medusa". Tania Modleski suggests 
that we abandon the term "masquerade" with its compensatory 
connotation and disavowal of the self, and replace it with the term 
"performative" ("Some Functions" 23). She defines a performative 
feminist criticism as follows: it "aims at seizing authority from men at 
the same time that it seeks to redefine traditional models ... of 
authority, power, and hierarchy" (22), and she suggests that Virginia 
Woolf’s prose is a good example of performative writing. Though I 
take Modleski’s point, "masquerade" remains, for me, a usable - and 
sexy - term.
51. Pronouncements on sculpture, especially, emphasize the qualities of 
stability, universality and repose, in both object and spectator. 
According to Reynolds, "sculpture is formal, regular, austere; it 
disdains aU familiar objects, as incompatible with its dignity" (X:187). 
Hazlitt, reviewing Flaxman’s Lectures on Sculpture, confirms the 
continuing hegemony of this discourse of non-particularity in referring 
to "the purity, the severity, the abstract truth of sculpture" (10:353).
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52. The sense of touch is invoked, but only negatively ("nothing should be 
left to offend the touch"); this does not, therefore, signal the type of 
rhetoric of embodiment that I will discuss below.
53. This is the same passage to which Hazlitt alludes in "On Beauty". 
Innocence is Hazlitt’s own addition to Burke’s beautiful woman, a 
move that is congruent with the spirit of his age: Davidoff and HaU 
point out that the "gendered connotations" of Burke’s model of the 
beautiful "were later attached to moral quantities" (28).
54. This theory is outlined in CivUization and Its Discontents, and 
discussed in Owens 70-71. The Freudian theory of castration depends 
on the visible (or its lack) as the mark of sexual difference.
55. After revising this chapter, I discovered that this passage has recently 
caught the gaze of other feminist critics; see, JuUe Carlson 154 and 
Anne K. MeUor, Romanticism and Gender 108-109.
56. In his meditations on beauty, Burke places women between the organic 
and the ornamental: "In trees and flowers, smooth leaves are beautiful; 
smooth slopes of earth in gardens; smooth streams in the landscape; 
smooth coats of bird and beast in animal beauties; in fine women, 
smooth skins; and in several sorts of ornamental furniture, smooth and 
poUshed surfaces" (Enquiry 114). The persistence of Burke’s 
paradigms is evident in the work of John Claudius Loudon, for 
example, whose books, according to Davidoff and HaU, "dealt with 
every aspect of home life, from the planting of garden seeds to the 
appropriate authors to display on a dining room bookshelf" (189). 
Loudon was concerned with educating, and designing for, the gentrified 
commercial class, and he thought that women played a crucial role in 
inculcating good taste. Moreover, "[t]hey were themselves the ultimate 
expression of taste, for beauty was best expressed in the female form. 
...In an appendix to a treatise on country residences, he saw beauty as 
associated with love of possession and considered those quaUties as 
most beautiful, ’which approach nearest to that of woman: thus gentle 
undulations, insensible transitions, smooth and soft surfaces, circular or 
conical forms’" (191). The point is that Burke’s theories lend 
themselves to the reification of female beauty in nineteenth-century 
middle-class ideology; the difference is that beauty for Burke lacks the 
moral charge it has for later writers.
57. It could be argued that the pleasure gained here, the erotic frisson of 
resistance, simply extends the domain of masculine power. However, 
it is worth considering another possibility, that is, that Burke’s interest 
in articulating the beautiful in relation to all the senses refracts the 
hegemony of the visual. The beautiful in taste, in smell and in sound 
is a translation of the alluring surface into other media. For example, 
Burke admires "the smoothness and slippery texture" of liquids (152),
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the "sweet" smell of flowers (he remarks "that in some languages soft 
and sweet have but one name" [154]), and he quotes from Milton’s 
L’Allegro to describe the beautiful in sounds, focusing on those those 
in which the speaker desires to be enveloped in "soft Lydian airs", by 
"The melting voice through mazes running" (122). In researching the 
chapter on Keats, I came across David Masson’s speculations on the 
traditional (and continuing) privileging of visual over other pleasures. 
In an article, "The Life and Poetry of Keats", published in Macmillan’s 
Magazine in 1860, he writes: "Now, though it may be admitted that, in 
so far as ministration of material for the intellect is concerned, sight is 
the most important of the senses, yet this all but absolute identification 
of love of nature with sensibility to visual pleasures seems erroneous. 
It is a kind of treason to the other senses - all of which are avenues of 
communication between nature and the mind, though sight may be the 
main avenue. In this respect I believe that one of the most remarkable 
characteristics of Keats is the universality of his sensuousness." 
(Matthews 379).
58. For an insightful reading of this essay, which in many ways dovetails 
with my own, see Peter De BoUa 220-222.
59. Moreover, to construct the surface as a "deceitful maze" is also to 
deconstruct the opposition of surface and depth. While I am interested 
in highlighting the subversiveness, or sublimity, of beauty in the 
de/construction of gender ideology, as I noted earlier the engendering 
of the sublime is by no means stable: the passivity of the male 
spectator in the face of the sublime, for example, upsets the alignment 
of activity and masculinity.
60. According to Ronald Paulson, while Burke redefined current definitions 
of the sublime by producing it as an alienating experience, beauty for 
him remained in the Addisonian mould, and is characterized by 
"repose" (Representations 69). Analyzing the passage about a beautiful 
woman, Paulson writes that Burke refers to "the mother’s breast, and 
the experience of beauty is quiet, passive, and regressive, a return to 
childhood experience" (132). Rather than emphasizing the erotic 
aspect of Burke’s beautiful woman, Paulson is interested in the 
construction of the ideal woman as a nurturing mother. As social 
historians of the period argue, a new domestic ideology developed 
during the eighteenth-century which constructed an idealized mother 
who breastfed and cared for her children, and who constituted the 
cornerstone of the nuclear family, presiding over domestic, affectional 
space. Tracing an oedipal narrative, Paulson disavows the 
disconcerting potential of female beauty (69; this strategy of erasing 
women is spectacularly displayed in the De Quincey criticism analysed 
in Chapter Six). He contrasts this "regressive" experience of beauty, 
which we might describe in current terminology as the conservative 
closure of the Lacanian Imaginary, with the sexy subversiveness of
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Hogarthian beauty. Hogarth, he argues, "declines to accept [the] 
categorization that separates the beautiful and the sublime, and 
consistently emphasizes the connotations of disobedience, rebellion and 
entanglement as well as beauty" (132). However, Burke seems closer 
to Hogarth than Paulson will allow. Interestingly, it is precisely at this 
point (the description of a beautiful woman) that Burke acknowledges 
his debt to Hogarth: in the second edition of the Enquiry. Burke added 
a section on the pleasure it gave him to find that he could strengthen 
his theory by reference to Hogarth’s line of beauty (115). On the 
politics of the family in the eighteenth-century, see Lawrence J. Stone, 
and the work of Leonore Davidoff and Catherine HaU.
61. More, like Elaine Showalter, turns to the story of Atalanta to exemplify 
her argument (see my discussion of Showalter in Chapter Two).
62. MeUor suggests that Letitia Landon "constructed both her life and her 
poetry as an embodiment of Burke’s female beauty", with fatal 
consequences (110).
63. The last sentence here (and those, not quoted, that follow it) was an 
addition made for the second edition in response to criticisms in the 
Critical Review: it was suggested that the pleasure caused by love 
might be considered "an exertion of the nerves to a tension that borders 
upon pain" (qtd. in Wichelns 658). This would break down the 
polarities of the sublime and the beautiful, pleasure and pain, which 
Burke was anxious to maintain.
64. I have been troubled by my slippage between the terms ’effeminate’ 
and ’feminine’ as ways of characterizing a man who accrues the 
characteristics traditionally ascribed to women. I have allowed both 
terms to remain, for in a sense they represent the problem that besets 
any act of criticism, how to negotiate between two historically specific 
contexts, then and now. The term ’effeminate’ (or ’effeminacy’), most 
famously used in HazUtt’s essay, sums up the mainstream/malestream 
response to this type of transgression during the historical period under 
consideration, while my use of the term ’feminine’ is the mark of my 
own position of enunciation. It is worth noting, however, that female 
critics, of Keats for example, used transgressive terms positively: Mrs. 
Oliphant declares that "[i]n poetry his was the woman’s part" (qtd. in 
Wolfson, "Feminizing Keats" 321). Burke’s best-known woman critic, 
Mary WoUstonecraft, since she upholds the benefits of ’masculine’ 
Reason, tends to see Burke as failing to attain proper masculinity.
65. In this early work, Burke criticizes a "degenerate" aristocracy which is 
parasitical on the poor; his class predUictions undergo a sea-change 
between this text and his more famous Reflections. Burke added a 
preface to the second edition of the Vindication, explaining that it was 
an ironic text (that is, it was intended to ridicule the beUefs of
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Bolingbroke whom Burke allowed people to assume was its author). 
Isaac Kramnick questions this ironic reading in The Rage of Edmund 
Burke (88-93). More generally in his book, he traces Burke’s 
ambivalent stances in the social, sexual and political realms, basing his 
readings on an Oedipal framework. Though I am often not in 
agreement with his reduction of texts to pyschobiographical symptoms, 
Kramnick provides a wealth of information which illuminates this 
complex figure, as well as readings of neglected texts (such as the 
Vindication!.
66. Kramnick, too, writes of Burke’s marriage, which he sees as stabilizing 
Burke’s sexual and social Hfe: Burke "emerged from his years of self- 
discovery by resolving his crisis [over career - law or public, political 
life] and fixing on his identity, choosing the masculine alternative in 
both cases" (79). In marrying Jane Nugent, Burke apparently confirms 
his heterosexuality after years of intimate friendships (not necessarily 
homosexual) with men, especially Will Burke (WUl, however, 
continued to live as part of the new household). Kramnick argues that 
Burke’s treatise "provides interesting indications of his sexual 
ambivalence" (94); "For Burke the sublime is WUl and the beautiful 
Jane, and both are essential to peace and weU-being"; Burke "seems to 
assert his masculine identity in his marriage to Jane and to repress his 
feminine identity and his attachment to WUl" (97). I remain 
uncomfortable with the one-to-one equation of Hfe and text, and with 
the eHsion of femininity and homoeroticism (or homosociaUty), though 
I am fuUy in agreement that the Enquiry is fuU of shifts in the 
representation of sexuaHty.
67. It could be argued that both Marie Antoinette and the female mob 
exhibit sublime quaUties, and therefore participate in the masculine 
order, the Queen because she is disembodied, transcending matter and 
glowing above the horizon, whUe the other women could be seen to be 
sublime in their unfeminine rage and violence. On the impHcations of 
the "disembodied splendour" of Marie Antoinette, see JuHe Carlson 
(152-53). Carlson’s fine article was pubUshed as I was doing the final 
revisions to this chapter, and my arguments about Burke intersect with 
hers in various respects. We are both interested in the question of 
theatricaUty, and use HazUtt as our ’bridge’ into the Romantic age. 
Carlson then focuses on the career of Sarah Siddons, whUe I turn to 
Canova’s Borghese statue. On women in the Reflections, see also 
Linda M.G. ZerilH, who argues that Burke’s beautiful Queen is a 
defensive screen against the "unfamUiar, sublime image of 
[revolutionary] women" (50).
68. The theatre is traditionaUy devalued as a ’feminine’ form, associated 
with ideas of display (increasingly, during the Romantic era, the 
display of women’s bodies), and seen as the venue of prostitution. For 
the male Romantics, the theatre provided a pubHc forum for the poetic
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voice, a wider audience than that of the inwardly-turned lyric, but it 
entailed the risk of femininization (we might recall that the most 
successful playwright of the period was Joanna Baillie). On the 
"dangerous liason between theater and ’femininity’", see Carlson (151). 
WoUstonecraft’s personal mode of address and her mimicry of Burke’s 
own flirtatious discourse mark her as a forerunner of the likes of Luce 
Irigaray and Jane GaUop.
69. HazUtt’s notion that poetry is effeminate may seem a curious aUgnment 
within Romanticism. Previously, I might have been incUned to argue 
that this is the defensive gesture of a prose writer within an age of 
Poets; however, as I suggested in Part 1 of this study, the recent 
’rediscovery’ of the huge number of women poets writing during the 
period suggests that it is an historicaUy accurate gender/genre 
observation (in which case, HazUtt’s comment remains defensive, but 
in a different sense).
70. On HazUtt’s ambivalent attitude to Burke (aesthetic appeal versus 
poUtical antagonism), see John Whale, "HazUtt on Burke". Tom 
McFarland also discusses HazUtt’s fluctuating opinion of Burke, and 
HazUtt’s use of quotation (70-75). The particular intertext here
reminds us of Pope’s own critique of the perceived feminization of
culture in The Dunciad. wherein Dulness is a figure for femininity, 
chaos, and a hybrid writing that erases the proper boundaries between 
prose and poetry (see, esp. U.273-274).
71. I am indebted here to the questions EUsabeth Lyon’s poses about 
photography (169).
72. See, for example, the work of Wendy Leeks on Ingres.
73. Licht is right that recognizable individuaUty frustrates easy scopic
appropriation, but always assumes a heterosexual, male gaze: viewed 
from other positions of gender and sexuaUty, the statue might evoke 
feeUngs other than "uncomfortable" ones.
74. Though I am indebted to HoUander’s argument, I have emphasized the 
relationship between model and artist, whereas she argues that this 
dynamic is displaced into "a more problematic relationship between the 
model and the sculpture itself" (139). I have not been able to ascertain 
exact details of the production of the Borghese statue (art criticism has 
tended to focus on product rather than process).
75. See Carol M. Armstrong’s insightful essay on the ways that Degas’s 
nudes revise the gendered syntax of viewing.
76. This narrative recurs in Thomas Love Peacock, Nightmare Abbey.
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77. I paraphrase Craig Owen’s memorable observation on the photographer 
Cindy Sherman (though she "may pose as a pin-up, she stiU cannot be 
pinned down" [75]).
78. It remains a problem that though I want to talk about the ’female 
voice’, it is still spoken by a male writer.
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Chapter Four
"Man’s desire finds its meaning in the desire o f  the otheP^i 
Mirrors and Veils in Shelley’s Prose Writings
I  have read Shelley a little more with more love. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson^
An alternative way of reading this thesis would be to move now to Chapter Six, for 
De Quincey, like Burke, inscribes sexual instability in the space of the subversion of 
the polarity sublime/beautiful; De Quincey himself comments on Burke, giving hints 
of a connection between them.^ On the other hand, in turning to Shelley’s writing 
I continue the theorizing of the male gaze that preoccupied me in the previous 
chapter. As I have already suggested, the demystification of the patriarchal and 
ideological motives of the male gaze risks occluding the dynamics of ’looking’. 
Paradigms of surveillance may ignore the undecidability and power of images of 
women (Burke’s "beautiful woman" and the statue of Paolina Borghese), as well as 
the identification with the feminine that such figures suggest. In this chapter I will 
analyze the deconstruction and double-gendering of the ’Subject’ in Shelley’s prose. 
My discussion focusses primarily on the shifting significances of two paradigmatic 
Romantic tropes, the mirror and the veil, as they appear in Shelley’s essays "On 
Love" and "On Life" and in A Defence of Poetrv.® Some reference wiQ be made to 
other prose writings, including letters, and to certain poems. I am particularly 
interested in extending my discussion of the male gaze to include those elements that 
elude vision, as such, that is the discourse of desire in Shelley’s texts. The desiring 
subjects under analysis include the reader: I will attempt to outline those readerly
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positions, inscribed within the texts, that invite a feminist reading practice.
* * * * *
The mirror must remain intact.
Sidonie Smith
In her Introduction to the recent collection of critical essays. Romanticism and 
Feminism. Anne MeUor briefly discusses what she views as the impUcit 
phaUocentrism of the Romantic ego, in the poetry of Blake, Coleridge and SheUey, 
the three major poets of the Romantic canon who are absent from the volume itself. 
She argues that "Percy SheUey carried to an extreme [the] dual strategy of deifying 
the male ego even as it cannibalized the attributes of the female", citing SheUey’s 
essay "On Love", in which "he defined the beloved female as the antitype of the 
male, ’a miniature as it were of our entire self, yet deprived of aU that we condemn 
or despise, the ideal prototype of every thing exceUent or lovely that we are capable 
of conceiving as belonging to the nature of man’" (7). MeUor asserts that this "image 
of the beloved woman as the perhaps unattainable reflection and completion of the 
male ego recurs obsessively in Percy SheUey’s poetry, from the veUed maidens of 
’Alastor’ and ’The Witch of Atlas’ and the fleeting glimpses of InteUectual Beauty 
to the radiantly revealed Asia of ’Prometheus Unbound’" (7-8). MeUor focusses on 
what she caUs the "narcissistic dimension" of SheUey’s thought.
WiUiam Ulmer eschews the narcissistic in favour of the "egocentrism" of "On 
Love", which he discusses in order to outline the parameters of "SheUey’s Poetics of 
Love". Placing the essay in its Platonic context (it was written in July 1818, between 
Shelley’s translation of The Symposium and his Discourse on the Manners of the 
Antient Greeks Relative to the Subject of Love!, he argues that "’On Love’ and the 
androgenous myth of The Symposium concur in viewing desire as an impulse to
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reunify sundered psychic complements", but that the differences between these two 
accounts of love "can be summed up by observing that the words ’likeness’, ’portrait’, 
’mirror’, and ’correspond’ - so crucial to Shelley’s sense of the relationship of self 
and antitype - are entirely missing from the relevant passage of The Symposium as 
he translated it." (6) Ulmer is concerned with the relation between Shelley’s 
"insistence on the likeness of lovers" and the role of metaphor in his work; what 
attracts me is the rhetoric of (self)representation, the terminology of the mirror.'  ^ To 
enter Shelley’s text(s) is to enter a haU of mirrors, portraits and miniatures. These 
mirror figures may be viewed from a number of angles. I propose first to turn on 
them the sort of feminist gaze implicit in MeUor’s argument, that is, that woman is 
framed as the mirror which reflects man back to himself, and by which male 
subjectivity is (apparently) enabled whUe female subjectivity is disabled.
SheUey proposes that the self sees itself "dimly" in the desired other, who acts 
as a mirror in which "aU that we condemn or despise" is obscured whUe "every thing 
exceUent or lovely" is Uluminated ("On Love" 473); this is "a mirror whose surface 
reflects only the forms of purity and brightness" (474). The other is a "miniature" 
whose smaUness serves to emphasize, in effect, to magnify, the lover’s stature.^ 
SheUey’s looking-glass prefigures Woolf’s magic mirrors in A Room of One’s Own: 
"[Wjomen have served aU these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and 
deUcious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size. " (35)^ This 
"enlarge[ment]" is predicated on "the inferiority of women", and is put at risk if the 
woman "begins to teU the truth" (36). More recently, in Speculum of the Other 
Woman. Luce Irigaray has revealed the "plane mirror" which focusses ’Woman’ as 
the objectified other by which man confirms his position as knowing subject; the
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plane mirror privileges sameness, symmetry and visibility. Though she is unable to 
see herself, woman reinforces and reassures man’s vision of himself, safeguarding his 
narcissistic investment of the penis which is threatened by the discovery of the female 
sexual organs.^ To castrate woman by denying her difference is to inscribe her in 
the economy of the same; at the same time, as the image of what man is not, she 
confirms what he is. As Sidonie Smith puts it, "In order to sustain the idea of man 
as that which is not woman, the mirror must remain intact; the slick, artificial surface 
of specularity cannot crack" (48).
Shelley Unks the desire "within us which ...thirsts after its likeness" to the 
relation between mother and chUd: "It is probably in correspondence with this law 
that the infant drains milk from the bosom of its mother; this propensity developes 
[sic] itself with the development of our nature." ("On Love" 473) Twentieth-century 
critical theories have echoed SheUey’s impUed link between mirrors and mothers: we 
recaU that in object-relations theory the role of the mother is to reflect the chUd, 
giving it first security and then emancipation from her; in Lacanian theory, the mother 
is the privUeged mirror before which the chUd performs the drama of subjectivity. 
Note that, Uke Woolf’s, the Lacanian mirror-image is a mirage: it provides an Ulusory 
identity through the process by which subjects misrecognize a construct for an 
absolute (I wiU come back to the congruences between SheUey and Lacan). Kristeva 
also aUgns mirrors and mothers: "we direct towards the mother not only our needs for 
survival but above aU our earUest mimetic aspirations. She is the other subject, an 
object that guarantees my being as a subject." (Powers of Horror 43) As Kristeva’s 
syntax reveals, the mother as subject rapidly inverts to object, as mirror of the chUd’s 
desire.
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The notion of mirroring is important as a subject of Shelley’s essay, but also 
as a formal principle.® This is particularly evident in the recurrence of rhetorical 
structures governed by the logic of repetition, as in the following example: "If we 
reason, we would be understood; if we imagine, we would that the airy children of 
our brain were bom anew within another’s; if we feel, we would that another’s nerves 
should vibrate to our own" ("On Love" 473). The predicate of desire ("we would") - 
the desire to validate the self through the reciprocity of an/other - is grounded in the 
wishful-thinking of syntactical and grammatical mirroring.^ The Defence of Poetry 
is, in some ways, a mirror image of "On Love" : in the earlier essay, love is "that 
powerful attraction [which] ... seek[s] to awaken in all things that are, a community 
with what we experience within ourselves" (473); in the Defence. "[t]he great secret 
of morals is Love; or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of 
ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own" 
(487). In the first instance, in Donald Reiman’s words, "the external world [must] 
respond or conform to the ideal within the self", in the second, "the self seeks the 
beautiful without" (SheUev and His Circle 6:645): either the outer becomes inner, or 
the inner becomes outer in a form of rhetorical rec ip ro c ity .T h is  mirror play, 
which elides the differences between entities, is encapsulated in a sentence from 
Shelley’s essay "On Life": "Those who are subject to the state called reverie feel as 
if their nature were dissolved in the surrounding universe, or as if the surrounding 
universe were absorbed into their being. They are conscious of no distinction" (477).
I will discuss later the effects of this lack of consciousness of distinction(s), 
the attempt to reconcile subject and object and assert "the one Life within us and 
abroad" that Rene WeUek has defined as central to European Romanticism. Here I
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want to suggest that from one feminist perspective, Shelley’s speaker, like Narcissus, 
endlessly contemplates his own reflection in this play of mirrors, but that the figures 
who guarantee his subjectivity - and as "beautiful" figures they are implicitly feminine 
(explicitly in many of the poems)“ - lack even Echo’s fading presence. Shelley’s 
letters, especially those written in the early days of his relationship with Mary 
Godwin, would seem to confirm this reading of the male subject. Writing to Thomas 
Jefferson Hogg early in October 1814, Shelley speaks of "Mary’s character": "so 
intimately are our natures now united, that I feel whilst I describe her excellencies as 
if I were an egoist expatiating upon his own perfections" (Letters 1:402). In a letter 
to Mary Godwin written towards the end of the month, he exults: "How divinely 
sweet a task it is to imitate each other’s excellencies - & each moment to become 
wiser in this surpassing love - so that constituting but one being, aU real knowledge 
may be comprised in the maxim [know thyself]"; "Your thoughts alone", Shelley tells 
his correspondent, "can waken mine to energy" (Letters 1:414). If we appeal again 
to Woolf, we find that "the looking-glass vision is of supreme importance because it 
charges the vitality; it stimulates the nervous system" (Room 36). Later, as Woolf’s 
narrator looks along the bookcase at the biographies of "great men" (one of whom, 
significantly, is Shelley), she speculates upon male dependence on women: there is 
"some stimulus", she asserts, "some renewal of creative power which is in the gift 
only of the opposite sex to bestow" (82); the sight of a woman in the "drawing-room 
or nursery,.. .among her children perhaps, or with a piece of embroidery on her knee 
...would at once refresh and invigorate" the male spectator (83). Shelley’s desire 
may not have had such a domestic focus - perhaps a volume of WoUstonecraft 
substituted for the embroidery - but nevertheless, the illusion of the mirror is
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integrative, constituting the male subject as "an whole accurately united" (Letters 
1:403), self-knowing, and stimulating his creative energy.
Compare Mary Godwin’s reply:
Goodnight my love - tomorrow I wül seal this blessing on your lips 
dear good creature press me to you and hug your own Mary to your 
heart perhaps she will one day have a father tlQ then be every thing 
to me love - & indeed I wiU be a good girl and never vex you any 
more I will learn Greek and - but when shall we meet when I may teU 
you all this & you wiU so sweetly reward me - oh we must meet soon
for this is a dreary life I am weary of it - a poor widowed deserted
thing no one cares for her - but - ah love is not that enough - indeed 
I have a very sincere affection for my own Shelley - 
(Mary Shelley, Letters 1:4-5)
Her epistolary prose is characteristically fluid, with only dashes and spaces 
punctuating the flow of thought. Theories of écriture feminine have extolled this sort 
of writing as figuring a self jubilantly untrammelled by the hierarchy of grammar, a 
diffuse textuality that mimics the rhythms of the female body. But this letter 
disturbingly enacts a dystopian version of this paradigm, the overwhelming impression 
is of disintegration: sentences collapse, unfinished, into the gaps which demarcate
them; Shelley alternates between the first and the third person, suggesting a self
radically divided; she refers to herself by the abstract noun "thing", as though she 
were an inanimate object. Most distressing is the rhetoric of ’Daddy’s girl’, the 
promise to be "a good girl" for Percy Shelley, the father/lover, the desire to be the 
image of his desire ("I wÜl leam G reek")."Im itat[ing] each other excellencies"
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seems to entail more work on the woman’s part than on the man’s. Mary Shelley 
presents herself through the lens of masculine ideology as secondary, as other, 
exposing the female ’lack’ that confirms male wholeness. Traditionally denied the 
right to be ’subjects’, women do not have the same access to even the illusion of 
(self-)mastery. John Bennett promotes this female self-effacement in Letters to a 
Young Ladv: his comments, in a passage already quoted in Chapter Two, expose the 
gender ideology that shaped Shelley’s self-presentation: "She listens to his [her 
husband’s] conversation, in order to be instructed. In him, she feels herself 
annihilated and absorbed. She always shows that deference and consciousness of 
inferiority, which, for the sake of order, the all-wise Author of nature manifestly, 
intended" (11:90). Shari Benstock points out how stylistic discontinuités may be a 
function of gender, so that "[i]n identifying the ’fissures of female discontinuity’ in 
a text ... we also point toward a relation between the psychic and the political, the 
personal and the social, in the linguistic fabric" ("Authorizing" 21).^^
It is perhaps worth noting at this point - as a prelude to the following in which 
I suggest an alternative reading of the Shelleyan ’mirror stage’ - the inherent 
instability of Percy’s "integrity" which I have thus far implicitly polarized in 
opposition to Mary’s disintegration. If we return to the letter to Hogg cited above, 
we find Shelley’s confident assertion: "I never before felt the integrity of my nature, 
... & learned to consider myself as an whole accurately united rather than as an 
assemblage of inconsistent and discordant portions" (Letters 1:403). Shelley’s 
language attempts to seal the fissure between the self as "whole" and the self as an 
"assemblage" of parts: the word "integrity", used in the Defence, for example, in the 
context of Imagination’s production of thoughts, "each containing within itself the
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principle of its own integrity" (480), carries resonances of the organic. It suggests, 
therefore, a DNA-like reduplication and development, a series of connections rather 
than discontinuity. The "inconsistent" "portions" are like seeds which come to 
fruition in Mary’s presence, this "future [self] is contained within the present as the 
plant within the seed" (Defence 4 8 1 ) . The paradox remains that the subject can 
only be whole if construed by itself as an object, if it perceives itself, from outside 
as it were, as "an whole accurately united", and differentiates itself from a previous 
disintegrated self. Wholeness, thus, is grounded in the enabling project of diff­
erentiation.^^ As Coleridge puts it in the Biographia Literaria. "the spirit must in 
some sense dissolve this identity [between object and subject], in order to be 
conscious of it", it cannot "be a subject without becoming an object" (1:274). The self 
is always already self-alienated, doubled, even before it seeks the other, the external 
double who will seal its split.
Though it is important to note conformity to traditional gender paradigms, to 
read only the image of male self-mastery and female objectification is to succumb to 
ideological closure and the fixing of the terms "male" and "female". I want to return, 
therefore, to Percy Shelley’s texts and analyze the ways in which the mirror may act 
as a destabilizing device, simultuaneously constructing and questioning both gender 
and selfhood. My reference above to the ’mirror stage’ emphasizes that the angle of 
vision here will be along the lines of Lacan’s disruptive paradigms of subjectivity and 
desire.
* * * * *
The chasm o f an insufficient void.
P.B. Shelley, "On Love"
In the following I will draw on Lacan’s notoriously difficult theories of the
153
construction of human subjectivity, especially his terminology of the "Real", the 
"Imaginary" and the "Symbolic", suggesting the usefulness of these concepts in 
reading Shelley, wherein they are pre-emptively mirrored. In this I follow Paul Fry’s 
provocative conviction that "[i]n the Defence, and everywhere in the poetry too, there 
is much that could be called a Lacanian psycholinguistics in embryo" ("Made Men" 
451)."
The Lacanian mirror stage is initiated by, and perpetuates, the acknowledgment 
of lack, of "insufficiency" (Ecrits 4); the Real, the order that precedes the ego, is the 
realm of pure plenitude, what Lacan calls "the lack of a lack" and is that which is 
"unassimilable" in representation (Four Fundamental Concepts 55). The Real can 
only be conceptualised retroactively: "Let us recollect our sensations as children. 
What a distinct and intense apprehension had we of the world and of ourselves. ...We 
less habitually distinguished all that we saw and felt from ourselves. They seemed 
as it were to constitute one mass." ("On Life" 477, my italics). Shelley’s nostalgia 
here - and most famously, in "Ode to the West Wind" in which he remembers that, 
as a "comrade" of the wind’s "wanderings", "to outstrip [its] skiey speed / Scarce 
seemed a vision;" (49-51) - is close to the Lacanian Real. Plenitude is always already 
lost: consciously annotated, it is inscribed as appearance ("seemed") not substance. 
The Lacanian mirror-stage is salutary for the child’s identity, providing a moment of 
jubilation as the infant sees an image of completeness which denies the helplessness 
of the actual body. However, the moment when the child (mis)recognizes itself in the 
mirror as a (potential) totality coincides with the moment when it recognizes that it 
is not ’one’, that is, whole, needing no supplements, merged with the world and the 
(m)other, "constitut[ing] one mass". The mirror is the locus of an imaginary
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wholeness and the site of self-alienation: "The specular constitution of the subject 
alienates the subject, providing a selfhood that, mediated by the otherness of the 
transposed image, remains riven by otherness." (Uhner, W. 115).
Jacqueline Rose has helpfully discussed the complex roles of the mirror and 
the mother:
For Lacan, ...the very image which places the child divides its identity 
into two. Furthermore, that moment only has meaning in relation to 
the presence and the look of the mother who guarantees its reality for 
the child. The mother does not (as in D. W. Winnicott’s account ...) 
mirror the child to itself; she grants an image to the child, which her 
presence instantly deflects. Holding the child is, therefore, to be 
understood not only as a containing, but as a process of referring, 
which fractures the unity it seems to offer. (Mitchell and Rose 30)^ ®
The image splits the child’s identity - just as I noted above that Shelley’s "integrity" 
depends on division - while the mother doubles this process: imaged in the mirror 
along with the child, her presence is similarly split, so the child has to negotiate the 
contradictions of the tactile (her embrace) and the visual (her image), as well as the 
gap between being corporeally contained and mentally complete (that is, identifying 
with the mirror-image).^^ The state of satisfaction in which the child merges with 
the mother, "conscious of no distinction" ("On Life" 477), which Lacan construes as 
deadlock rather than idllyic dyad, is replaced by a mode of being characterized by 
lack, gap and splitting. In Elizabeth Grosz’s words, "It will attempt to fill its 
(impossible, unfillable) lack ... This gap will propel it into seeking an identificatory 
image of its own stability and permanence (the imaginary), and eventually language
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(the symbolic) by which it hopes to fiU the lack" (Jacques Lacan 35). If we look 
back at the mirror figures with which I began, they seem from this perspective more 
the anxious signifiers of lack seeking stability, than, pace MeUor, the masterful 
appropriation of the feminine.
The mirror holds out the possibility that the self may coincide with the other, 
but it simultaneously marks the cleavage of self and other, constructing the subject 
in a dialectic in which it depends on the other’s recognition. In the Defence. Shelley 
praises Athenian drama: "The tragedies of the Athenian poets are as mirrors in which 
the spectator beholds himself", and, replicating the magic mirrors of "On Love", these 
looking glasses present an image of "ideal perfection" (490). Significantly, Shelley 
acknowledges that "[njeither the eye nor the mind can see itself, unless reflected upon 
that which it resembles" (491). The pun on "eye", as well as the reference to "the 
mind", emphasizes that it is subjectivity that is at stake here. Lacan’s insight that the 
aim of desire is not fulfilment but recognition is pertinent: "man’s desire finds its 
meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the 
object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other" 
(Ecrits 58). Lack, "the chasm of an insufficient void", crystallizes as desire, the 
search "to awaken in aU things that are a community with what we experience 
ourselves" ("On Love" 473).
It is perhaps worth summarizing at this point the significance of the dialectics 
of desire that subtends the Romantic subject. Desire is predicated on the existence 
of an object, something outside the subject, differentiated from the self, an other. 
Though it is not an issue that I wül go into here, I should note that the typical 
Romantic manoeuvre is to make of a possible plurality an essential ’other’ (this is
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related to the question of conceiving gender as a general abstract). This difference 
exposes the subject to Tack’, and s/he attempts to seal the gap between self and other: 
"Be thou me", SheUey’s speaker implores the West Wind, just as he assures Emilia 
"We shall become the same, we shall be one / Spirit within two frames" 
("Epipsychidion" 11.573-4). Such plenitude would be the death of desire. The erasure 
of the object, its introjection by the self (or the absorption of the self into the object), 
paradoxically also negates the self for it negates difference. The subject is constituted 
in the dialectic of plenitude and difference, in the oscillation between the Imaginary 
and the S y m b o l i c . A s  Lacan puts it, "when the subject appears somewhere as 
meaning, he (sic) is manifested elsewhere as ’fading’, as disappearance" (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 218); shifting the Lacanian emphasis slightly, I would say that 
the Shelleyean subject lives in the fading, that is, in the ellipses of desire.
The rhetoric of dissolution is the characteristic mode of Shelleyan desire. 
Shelley’s speakers want to dissolve aU the boundaries separating the loving subject 
from the loved one, to erase the barrier between the self and the ideal other, to 
coUapse the two sides of the mirror and heal the split within the self. "[I]f we feel," 
writes Shelley, "we would that another’s nerves should vibrate to our own, that the 
beams of their lips should kindle at once and mix and melt into our own" ("On Love" 
473; the erotic resonances of SheUey’s verbs corporealize - unavoidably solidify - the 
rhetoric of dissolution). SheUey uses the image of the circle to figure this totalizing 
desire, "a soul within our soul that describes a circle around its proper Paradise which 
pain and sorrow and evU dare not overleap". (474) This circle which encompasses 
self and ideal antitype would seem to correspond to Lacan’s "Real", that hermeticaUy 
sealed circuit of paradisal completeness; but the Real is what is ’impossible’. This
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is what Malcolm Bowie calls "the indefinitely receding goal towards which the 
signifying chain tends; the vanishing point of the Symbolic and the Imaginary alike" 
(134), or, as Shelley poignantly recognises, "the invisible and unattainable point to 
which Love tends" ("On Love" 474). It can only be conceptualized retroactively, 
always out of the reach of the subject who is constituted in the Imaginary/Symbolic 
dyad. In the realm of representation, the meaning of the circle is not immanent, but 
subject to interpretation, and, like a mirror-image, its significance may be inverted. 
The circle both includes and excludes, it may be full or empty, the "circumference of 
bliss" desired in "Epipsychidion" (1.550) or the "void circumference" acknowledged 
in "Adonais" (1.420).^ ^
In a letter to John Gisborne in 1821, Shelley makes reference to his reading 
of Plato and of the Greek dramatists, praising, especially, Sophocles’s Antigone. 
"Some of us", he writes, "have in a prior existence been in love with an Antigone, & 
that makes us find no full content in any mortal tie" (Letters 11:364). Presumably part 
of the allure of Antigone might be that she privileges her brother over her future 
husband (it is also, as Iiigaray has suggested in Speculum, that Antigone, the difficult 
Oedipal daughter, defies patriarchal law [in the figure of Creon] as the assertion of 
her maternal lineage: she buries Polyneices because he is her mother’s son, and thus 
she pays tribute to their shared connection to the mother against the edicts of the 
surrogate father). In other words, in posing the brother - biologically related to the 
self (and the mother) - as ’other’, the play works to minimize the gap between self 
and other. SheUey argues that because of this anterior attachment to a "sublime" 
Ideal, it is impossible to find "fuU content" in any present "mortal" relation. The 
word "content" derives from the Latin "contentus" (con + tenere, to hold), and the
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dictionary teUs us that it means "contained, hence satisfied" (OED). Thus, complete 
satisfaction is predicated on a figure of enclosure, an encircling which completes the 
self. As weU as the obvious sexual connotations, the secondary resonances of the 
word are textual, gesturing towards achieved meaning, the satiation of signification, 
full utterance. In the same letter, Shelley writes - he is talking about "Epipsychidion" : 
"As to real flesh & blood, you know that I do not deal in those articles, - you might 
as well go to a ginshop for a leg of mutton, as expect anything human or earthly from 
me" (363). Apart from constituting a wittily prescient parody of Arnold’s "ineffectual 
angel" caricature,^^ this comment suggests that there is no ’real’ origin for Shelleyan 
desire: Antigone is already a representation, a linguistic construct, a "sublime ... 
picture of a woman!" (my italics). Shelley is not concerned with "flesh and blood", 
but with other "articles", a grammar of desire which traces the relations between love 
and language.
To talk of a ’grammar’ of desire is to suggest a generative grammar, those 
patterns which constitute the textual enactment of desire. I realise that the 
connotations of this word for Shelley are nearly always negative and prescriptive, but 
I want to argue that Shelley’s very attempts to evade the Symbolic - at the least, to 
escape the limitations of language - produce the desiring and desirable texture of his 
prose. Demonstrating the role of the "I" in language, Benveniste argues that 
subjectivity is linguistically generated: "’Ego’ is he who sccys ’ego’" (224). The 
personal pronoun is a "shifter", a position to be occupied rather than stable entity, and 
one which has meaning in relation to other linguistic positions (’you’, ’it’, etc). 
"What then is the reality to which I  or you refers?" asks Benveniste, "It is solely, ’a 
reality of discourse’, and this is a very strange thing. I  cannot be defined except in
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terms of a ’locution’, not in terms of objects as a nominal sign is. I  signifies the 
’person who is uttering the present instance of the discourse containing (218). 
Moreover, the subject is split - in a grammatical analogy of the mirror stage - between 
the T" who speaks and the "I" who is spoken. Shelley writes: "The words. I, you, 
they, are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the assemblage of 
thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote the different 
modifications of the one mind" ("On Life" 477-78).^ Shelley’s attitude to language 
is marked by the desiie to suture the split within the self, and between the self and 
others. Linguistic mobility can lead to the type of bliss envisaged by Helene Cixous: 
"Languages pass into my tongue, understand one another, ...blend their personal 
pronouns together in the effervescence of differences" (qtd. in Defromont 119); but 
it also threatens subjectivity: "We are on the verge where words abandon us, and what 
wonder if we grow dizzy to look down the dark abyss of - how little we know" ("On 
Life" 478).
Shelley recurs throughout his prose and poetry to the topos of the inadequacy 
of language, the weakness of words to realise the self or ’truth’. To Elizabeth 
Hitchener, he laments: "Methinks words can scarcely embody ideas - how wretchedly 
inadequate are letters." (Letters 1:191); in "Epipsychidion", "The winged words on 
which my soul would pierce / Into the height of love’s rare Universe, / Are chains of 
lead around its flight of fire" (U.588-90): words frustrate the realization of the divine 
Emilia, and, significantly, they also defer penetrative sexual satisfaction ("would 
pierce"). In "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty", an "awful LOVELINESS" is invoked to 
"give whate’er these words cannot express" (11.71-72). Words can only mediate the 
"truth": "Flowers, ruins, statues, music, words, are weak / The glory they transfuse
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with fitting truth to speak" ("Adonais" 467-68). In "On Life", Shelley asserts: "How 
vain it is to think that words can penetrate the mystery of our being. Rightly used 
they may make evident our ignorance to ourselves, and this is much" (475-76). The 
examples proliferate; however, perhaps the most poignant evocation of the inadequacy 
of language occurs in the margins (a footnote) of the fragment on love, and it is the 
Tove language’ of this essay that I want to turn to again.
In "On Love", the speaker teUs us how his spirit, enfeebled through its 
"tenderness", seeks "sympathy", correspondence, with others, a quest that is fissured 
by failure: "I ...have found only repulse and disappointment" (473). Specifically, he 
tells us: "I have found my language misunderstood hke one in a distant and savage 
land." Keats’s knight in "La Belle Dame Sans Merci", wandering in an alien 
land(scape) and facing problems with the linguistic medium of desire, asserts 
hopefully: "She looked at me as she did love / And sure in language strange she said, 
I love thee true.’ Shelley’s speaker is more radically estranged, for his own 
language is an alienating medium. He desires another being on whom to transfer aU 
his thoughts and feelings. This Other is, in Lacanian terms, ’the locus of the 
signifier’s treasure’, "the subject supposed to know" (Mitchell and Rose 139); his/her 
discourse is not alienated and s/he knows the meaning of the subject’s own language. 
Shelley’s anxious footnote on the inadequacy of language, "These words are 
inefficient and metaphorical - Most words so - No help -" ("On Love" 474), is located 
between his comment that the ideal other is the "portrait" of our external being, and 
the reference to this antitype as an idealizing mirror, in other words, between two 
figures supposed to guarantee subjectivity. Lack is engendered at the point where 
words become inadequate for expressing an authentic subjectivity, but this coincides
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with the recognition that there are no words beyond these weak words, no language 
that can close the gap between sign and referent, and no self which is lacking the lack 
and non-satisfaction to which the subject is condemned in the symbolic order?^
What SheUey in the Preface to "Alastor" caUs "the vacancy of [the spirit]" 
(70), or, in "On Love", "the chasm of an insufficient void" "within our own thoughts", 
is the precondition of desire (473). The mirror provides the necessary iUusion of self- 
possession, the fiction which sustains the thirst to "resemble or correspond" with the 
other, to have one’s desire recognised (474). It is this desire wliich generates the 
Romantic text.
* * * * *
...the power o f awakening in others sensations like 
those which animate my own bosom.
P.B. SheUey
SheUey frequently uses the mirror trope to figure both poetry and poets. His 
enigmatic pronouncment in the Defence is perhaps the most radicaUy disorientating 
of these statements: "Poets are ...the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity 
casts upon the present" (508). In acting as "mirrors" for "shadows", poets reflect an 
image of something that is already a type of mirror-image; any possibUty of 
(logocentric) ’presence’ is doubly deferred. The adjective "gigantic" ascribes, as 
TiUotama Raj an argues, "a mythic status to what the text portends", as though the 
adjective can overwhelm the noun it qualifies (Rajan, Supplement 294). These are 
shadows cast by the future, which makes of the present an "insufficient void" whose 
meaning can only be anticipatory, and which requires the reader to fiU in the gaps in 
the text. The poet is Uke the Lacanian subject who is constituted by anticipating what 
it wiU become: the jubUation of the infant in the face of the iUusion of mastery
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provided by the mirror is tied to a dialectical temporality. Jane Gallop describes the 
child as "being captivated by an analogy and suspending his disbelief" (Reading 
Lacan 78). For Shelley, the words of poets "unveil the permanent analogy of things 
by images which participate in the life of truth" (Defence 485). The poet is 
captivated by an analogy which is grounded in representation, in images reflected in 
the dark mirror of language. Specularity both promises and defers closure, and 
renders reading an indeterminate (and interminable) activity.
The phenomenology of reading in Shelley partakes of the looking-glass vision 
that constructs the relation between self and other within the t e x t s T h e  poet’s 
sensations are to be reflected, reanimated, in the reader. Shelley’s characteristic 
rhetoric establishes correspondences between writers and readers via the metaphor of 
textual mediation; poems are "[t]he sacred links of that chain ...which descending 
through the minds of many men is attached to those great minds [the poets], whence 
as from a magnet the invisible effluence is sent forth, which at once connects, 
animates and sustains the life of all" (Defence 493). In the Preface to The Revolt of 
Islam. SheUey wonders:
How far I shaU be found to possess that more essential attribute of 
Poetry, the power of awakening in others sensations like those which 
animate my own bosom, is that which, to speak sincerely, I know not; 
and which, with an acquiescent and contented spirit, I expect to be 
taught by the effect which I shaU produce upon those whom I now 
address. (Hutchinson 35)
The power of poetry is connate with the subjectivity of the poet, and both depend on 
reader response to guarantee them, on the poet’s sensations being mirrored by the
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reader. Significantly, Shelley’s speaker is passive ("acquiescent"), opening the self 
to readerly instruction / construction in a reversal of the normative power dynamic 
(writer/reader: teacher/pupil). The relationship between texts and bodies, and between 
poets and readers, is explicitly both specular and erotic. Particularly in the Defence. 
Shelley recurs again and again to the "pleasure" of poetry, in language which 
cumulatively suggests sexual pleasure ("excess", "intensity", "delight", "mingling"); 
the "faculty of approximation to the beautiful ...exists in excess [in] poets" and this 
produces a representational order "from which the hearer and spectator receive an 
intenser and purer pleasure than from any other" (Defence 482, 481). "The pleasure 
resulting from the manner in which they [poets] express the influence of society or 
nature upon their own minds communicates itself to others and gathers a sort of 
reduplication from that community" (482); in this sense, poetic pleasure is the effect 
of the interaction between self and other(s) and which is then reproduced in these 
others, in a series of unending involutions. "Poetry is ever accompanied with 
pleasure: all spirits upon which it falls, open themselves to receive the wisdom which 
is mingled with its delight. "(486) In this final quote, the reader is (sexually) receptive 
to the text, inverting the mirror-effect alluded to in The Revolt of Islam in which the 
poet is open to the reader’s reading. Shelley destabilizes the positions of writer and 
reader, and, in imag(in)ing the diffuse delights of openness and reversibüty rather than 
an economy of penetrative pleasure (I will discuss this paradigm in more detail in 
relation to Shelley’s use of the figure of the veü), his writing moves towards a type 
of jouissance in which gender identities are potentially unfixed.
Part of the disjunctive potential of the mirror for the reader is that there is 
always (at least) a double image, that is, a spectator reading his (or her) image within
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the text, and a reader outside the text interpreting this scene of reading (and searching 
for her/his own image). I would like to look briefly at two scenes that frame the 
reader’s gender improperly, or perhaps, that teU a truth about gender, but tell it 
slant. In the Defence. SheUey argues that "[t]he story of particular facts is as a 
mirror which obscures and distorts that which should be beautiful: Poetry is a mirror 
which makes beautiful that which is distorted" (485). The chiasmus suggests the 
(illusory) jubUation of the mirror image, but the rhetorical reversibiUty also hints at 
how difficult it is to maintain the separation of the beautiful and the distorted, the 
possibUity that poetry (or prose, for "[t]he distinction between poets and prose writers 
is a vulgar error" [484]) may invert into a particularity that blurs the ideal image. 
One such instance occurs in the short essay "Even Love is Sold". SheUey personifies 
"society", or conventional moraUty, as "the pure and virtuous matron" who rejects the 
prostitute as monstrous, "an abortion" to be cast "from her undefUed bosom" (Clark 
117). He proposes an ethical reading which turns the lens on the matron: "How 
would moraUty, dressed up in stiff stays and finery, start from her own disgusting 
image should she look in the mirror of nature! ". Here, a figurative "woman" looks 
at herself in a mirror ("nature") which is also conventionaUy feminine. How is the 
’real reader’ en gendered? I suggest that this image of a woman posing in front of 
a mirror in corsets and "showy adornments", which coUapses the difference between 
the prostitute and the matron (presumably SheUey’s moral point), has a pornographic 
frisson. Though the main point is that the woman is repeUed by the image in the 
mirror, another effect is that the reader is produced as the possessor of a second, 
controlling gaze - the gaze of a voyeur, whose safe distance (and mastery) is 
emphasized by the mirror-displacement within the scenario. In other words, the
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reader here is placed in a conventionally masculine role. A woman reading is likely 
to find herself in the uncomfortable position of a woman reading as a man.^^
According to John BarreU, "the imagination ... seems to become phaUicised in 
the Defence. It is ’the great instrument of moral good’, the ’organ of the moral 
nature of man’; and it is the task of the poet or of poetry, as Shelley teUs us twice, 
to ’enlarge’ that organ" (Flight 17). °^ However, along with this phallic rhetoric is 
another which may be more disorientating for the male reader. For Shelley, poetry 
is "a strain which distends and then bursts the circumference of the hearer’s mind" 
(Defence 485); though this suggests a type of phallic violence, the verb "distends" 
has other gender possibilities. "The imagination is enlarged by a sympathy with pains 
and passions so mighty, that they distend in their conception the capacity of that by 
which they are conceived" (490): to distend is to swell, and along with the reference 
to conception, the word modifies the phallic effect by gesturing towards the pregnant 
female body. We recall that Dante’s words are "pregnant with a lightning which has 
yet found no conductor" and that the work of art is imaged as "a child in the mother’s 
womb" (500,504). Both these latter examples are part of the long philosophical 
tradition which understands creation as (male) reproduction, and whose texts teem 
with male mothers and midwives and their immaculate progeny. Yet if this is a 
colonization of the female domain, it is complicated in reading Shelley by the fact 
that the reader mirrors the writer’s pregnancy: the "mirror[s] in which the spectator 
beholds himself" reveals a distended, pregnant, female body, an image of the ’other’. 
Sexuality becomes positional rather than essential, positions which take their 
significance from the symbolic differentiation of gender and which are available to 
aU subjects. As Jacqueline Rose comments in her reading of Lacan: "AU speaking
166
beings must line themselves up on one side or the other of this division [the division 
of gender enacted in language], but anyone can cross over and inscribe themselves 
on the opposite side from that to which they are anatomically destined" (Mitchell and 
Rose 49).
* * * * *
It is by our fragility that we seduce.
Baudiillard
Laura Claridge has argued recently that "[i]n some ways , SheUey may weU be one 
of our least phaUic writers, if we understand Lacan’s rendering of the phaUus to mean 
aU-knowing, aU-powerful, promising closure" ("Bifurcated" 103). Lacan argues that 
the phaUus is what everyone wants and no-one has, that the subject, regardless of 
biological sexuality, is subject to castration. This castration is symboUc: it is the lack 
of the power to generate and control meaning, for language is like "a distant and 
savage land" which we cannot master; we "can only signify ourselves in a symboUc 
system that we do not command, that, rather, commands us" (GaUop, Reading Lacan 
20). Both Lacan and SheUey seem to me to be ’feminine’ writers to the extent that 
they relinquish, or at least recognise, the impossibUity of phaUic mastery.
The confusion between the phaUus and the penis is at the root of the problem 
of using Lacanian theory to read SheUey, and other male writers. "[Fjeminists find 
that central, transcendental phaUus particularly hard to swaUow", as Jane GaUop puts 
it (Thinking 125). Lacan insists that the phaUus does not equal the penis, that it is 
not an organ, but an attribute (the possession of an unaUenated language, Humpty 
Dumpty’s abiUty to make words mean what he wants them to mean); it takes on 
meaning only in relation to castration. But the phaUus does also refer to the penis, 
which is often seen as the representational mark of the phaUus (and it is for this
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reason that some feminist critics are unhappy with the Lacanian genealogy of 
desire).
SheUey’s texts inscribe a "desire endlessly impossible to speak as such", a 
stammering discourse that I find endlessly seductive (Rose 45). According to 
BaudriUard, "It is by our fragiUty that we seduce, never by powers or by strong signs" 
(qtd. in GaUop, "French Theory" 114). The poUtics of seduction remain a problem 
for many feminist critics. Just who is being led astray here? TraditionaUy, feminists 
have found much to resist in Lacan, the ladies’ man, and in other male theorists who 
flirt with the feminine (the putting of "Woman" into discourse, discussed in Chapter 
Two of this study). MeUor remains unmoved by SheUey, designating his interest in 
the feminine a sign of his "harem mentaUty". VulnerabUity may be yet another male 
ruse; perhaps feminist readers, in succumbing to these Cartesian orphans, are simply - 
in Meaghan Morris’s memorable phrase - "being thoroughly screwed" (55).^  ^ Alice 
Jardine admits to being seduced the vulnerabUity displayed in Stephen Heath’s article 
"Male Feminism", but says: "I wasn’t necessarily seduced as a theorist; I was seduced 
as a feminist reader and Ustener" (Men in Feminism 248). This odd aUenation is a 
sign of the feminist anxiety about seduction: in her spUtting of the self. Jardine retains 
a part of herself that wiU not take male feminism lying down. WhUe I recognize 
Jardine’s dUemma, I would give equal weight to Jane GaUop’s notions of the 
subversiveness of seduction, as a paradigm (of reading, of relationships) that 
deconstructs the binary opposition active/passive.^^
* * * * *
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Veil after veil may be undrawn and the inmost naked beauty 
o f the meaning never exposed.
P.B. Shelley
In discussing the mirror trope in Shelley, I have argued that it marks the site of a split 
subject, fissured by the lack that engenders desire, and that the articulation of this 
desire in language gestures towards a space outside conventional masculine 
parameters. In theorizing the poetics of the veil, I will suggest that its associations 
with femininity move Shelley further and further away from teleological, monologic 
utterance, towards the production of a text that, in Kristeva’s words, is "an 
intersection o f textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning)" (Desire 65).
Before analysing Shelley’s usage, it is worth rehearsing some of the functions 
of the veil: it acts as a protective screen, against the sun, for example, and also, of 
course, the gaze. Traditionally, it is women who need this sort of veiled protection 
(think of all the ’screens’ that surround Edna PonteUier at the start of The 
Awakening!: "it is the woman who exists behind the veil in patriarchal society, 
inhabiting a private sphere invisible to public view" (Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman 
4 7 4 ) . Nuns ’take the veil’, enclosing and concealing themselves in a convent. The 
veil connotes concealment, perhaps the hiding of a secret. Gilbert and Gubar note the 
"long gothic tradition which embraces the veil as a necessary concealer of grotesque 
revelations of sin and guilt, past crimes and future suffering" (469).^  ^ The 
concealing veil is opaque, it shuts out the gaze. Yet though "the veil resembles a 
wall, ... even when it is opaque it is highly impermanent, while transparency 
transforms it into a possible entrance or exit. Unlike a door, which is either open or 
shut, however, it is always potentially both" (Gilbert and Gubar 468). It is this 
quality of simultaneous concealment and revelation, the provocation and the blocking
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or deferral of the gaze, that fits the veil to its role in representing the seductive tease 
of femininity. Salome epitomizes the erotic and mysterious female otherness behind 
the veil. Gilbert and Gubar argue that women writers demystify the iconography of 
the veil which has been in male hands, so that the veil is either "a symbol for women 
of their diminishment into spectral remnants of what they might have been", or the 
insight and duplicity of "a veiled lady becomes a strategy for survival in a hostile, 
male-dominated world" (472,473). Maria Edgeworth’s statement in Letters for 
Literarv Ladies (1795) reveals the place of this figure in the burgeoning ideology of 
femininity: "[W]omen must always see things through a veil, or cease to be women" 
(qtd. in Hoeveler 262).
According to Alice Jardine, "[t]he image of the veil is a Romantic one. Blake, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Emerson, and SheUey, for example, make extensive use of 
it as something to be ’lifted’ rather than ’played with’" (Gynesis 198). These 
Romantic veUs are impUcitly opposed to Derrida’s deconstructive veUs (in texts such 
as Spurs and Glas). In the iconography of the romantic veU, the moment of unveiling 
is privUeged, it is what is behind the veU that is significant, the signified rather than 
the signifier. The romantic veil is enmeshed in the discourse of metaphysics; its 
presence seems to guarantee profundity, a significant depth concealed behind the 
trivial surface of things. William Wordsworth writes, in a phrase that suggests that 
this movement becomes pathological, of "penetrating the unsightly and disgusting 
surfaces of things" (671). The veU holds out the promise of revelation, a 
transcendence of the quotidian by "burning through the inmost veU of Heaven" 
("Adonais" 1.493). The metaphysical desire remains grounded in the feminine 
genealogy of the veU, and this emphasis on the lifting of the veü or the penetration
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of the surface, underwrites an imperialist epistemology.
There is much in Shelley to support the notion that the stripping of veils is an 
ascendent ’striptease’ towards the ’Idea’/Woman, a progression controlled and 
consumed by the active male subject. Poetry is frequently presented as the medium 
by which veils, or coverings, are lifted. "Poetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty 
of the world" (Defence 487); "It strips, as it were, the painted curtain from this scene 
of things" ("On Life" 476). It performs a type of Brechtian defamiliarisation in 
"mak[ing] familiar objects be as if they were not familiar" (Defence 487) and helping 
us to see more clearly into the life of things: poetry "purges from our inward sight 
the film of familiarity that obscures us from the wonder of our being" (505). Poetry 
is the discourse of inspired maschismo: "Poetry is a sword of lightning, ever 
unsheathed, which consumes the scabbard that would contain it" (491).
In his "Notes on Sculptures in Rome and Florence", Shelley is fascinated with 
the drapery of statues: "A Venus Genitrix" is "[rjemarkable for the voluptuous effect 
of her finely proportioned form being seen through the folds of a drapery, the original 
of which must have been the ’woven wind’ of Chios" (Clark 346). These feminine 
"folds" are provocative, especially in the evocation of transparency suggested by 
wind-like drapery. Contemporary female fashions may have been as much in 
Shelley’s mind as classical statues: among the "corrupt consequences" of the 
cultivation of "pernicious modes of artificial gratification", Hannah More ranks "the 
unchaste costume, the impure style of dress, and that indelicate statue-hke exhibition 
of the female figure, which, by its artfully disposed folds, its seemingly wet and 
adhesive drapery, so defines the form as to prevent covering itself from becoming a 
veil" (59).^  ^ Similarly, "the sinuous veil / Of woven wind" reveals the veiled maid’s
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"glowing limbs" to the poet in "Alastor" (U. 176-77). Whether floating or clinging, 
these veils are revealing. The desire for transcendence is figured through images of 
translucence, but even absolutely transparent veils act as erotic membranes, which 
both invite and bar access to the (feminine) body.
The sexual resonances of unveiling are exposed in the description of the 
paradisal isle in "Epipsychidion" (the topographical analogue of the veiled Emily): 
Veil, after veil, each hiding some delight.
Which Sun or Moon or zephyr draw aside.
Till the isle’s beauty, like a naked bride 
Glowing at once with love and loveliness.
Blushes and trembles at its own excess: (11.472-76)^^
The "unsculptured image" behind the veil is revealed to be a Galatea, a bride stripped 
bare and illuminated by the semiotics of sexual promise ("glowing", "blushes", 
"trembles"). However, as I noted earlier, the speaker’s desire to merge with the 
blushing bride is always anticipatory, not achieved ("We shall become the same, we 
shall be one"). Language itself defers and reveUs the vision, for "[t]he winged words 
. . . /  Are chains of lead" (11.588-90), which impede the poet’s flight. As Jerome 
McGann recognises, "’Epipsychidion’ is [Shelley’s] veiled vision" ("Shelley’s Veils" 
208).^*
Poetry "strips the veil of familiarity from the world, and lays bare the naked 
and sleeping beauty, which is the spirit of its forms" (Defence 505). Here again 
Shelley’s rhetoric is (deliberately) oxymoronic, but the materiality of "naked" and 
"sleeping" resists assimilation to "spirit"; "Poetry ...appears as a less than charming 
prince who takes a mean advantage of the Sleeping Beauty" (BarreU, FUght 17). Yet
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this removal of the veil does not bring us into privileged contact with what lies 
beneath or behind it, for poetry itself is imaged as a veil. Critics have noted "the 
constant and troubling vacillation of aesthetic representation between surface and 
depth which takes place within the essay’s imagery" (Rajan, Dark Interpreter 28). 
"And whether it spreads its own figured curtain or withdraws life’s dark veü from 
before the scene of things, it equally creates for us a being within our being. It 
makes us the inhabitants of a world to which the familiar world is chaos" (Defence 
505). Poetry connotes the withdrawal of "life’s dark veü" to reveal a core of beauty, 
a depth unstained by historical contingency and corruption, but it is also itself a 
"figured curtain". The veÜ embodies and stimulates contradictory desires - for the 
truth behind the veü, and for its surface. Moreover, the (positive) "figured curtain" 
recaüs the (negative) "painted veü" of the sonnet "Lift not the painted veü", behind 
which Hope and Fear ("those sisters wüd", in "Epipsychidion", 1.380) weave a 
covering - another veü - over the dark chasm. The "painted curtain" of "On Life" is, 
like "life’s dark veü", something to be stripped away.^^ The play of this self- 
perpetuating costume drama ("the aüoy of costume ...temper[s]" the "splendour" of 
poetic "conceptions" for mortal apprehension [487]) remains entangled with traditional 
gender paradigms, particularly the logic of the male gaze. Sheüey can not unchain 
language from its famüiar moorings. In the Defence, he argues that:
... a poet considers the vices of his contemporaries as the temporary 
dress in which his creations must be arrayed, and which cover without
concealing the eternal proportions of their beauty The beauty of the
internal nature cannot be so far concealed by its accidental vesture, but 
that the spirit of its form shaü communicate itself to the very disguise.
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and indicate the shape it hides from the manner in which it is worn.
(487, my italics)
The writer’s desire is veiled by periphrasis: though Shelley does not explitly gender 
the figure which is tantalizingly concealed and revealed, "beauty" suggests the 
feminine (as opposed to sublime masculinity) and the whole scenario smacks of 
voyeurism within a heterosexist economy. The sartorial seductions of poetry are:
... like the diaphanous 
VeUs, in which those sweet ladies oft array 
Their delicate limbs, who would conceal from us 
Only their scorn of all concealment:
("The Witch of Atlas" 11. 562-65)
Yet I would suggest that Shelley revitalises the tired trope of the veü - 
femininity as dissimulation - giving it a positive value, and thereby destabilizing 
metaphysical hierarchies. The vacillation of imagery (especially within the Defence! 
disrupts the hierarchizing of depth over surface in its relation to truth, engendering 
a space in which binary oppositions cannot easüy be maintained. The ’male’ subject 
is lost in a tissue of veüs, a play of surfaces; he - and the reader - can no longer see, 
or know or decide what is or isn’t there. The text dissimulates; it is the fabric of its 
own unweaving, a succession of veüs continuaUy withdrawn and rewoven which 
generate meaning as a process not as a s y s t e m . Veüs to be "played with" rather 
than merely "lifted" or penetrated.
Veüs have figured prominently in certain texts of phüosophy and 
psychoanalysis; within these discourses they are signs of truth under analysis, and the 
disorientating shifts noted in SheUey’s essays are reproduced here. I want to look at
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some of these texts, particularly from Lacan and Derrida, in order to demonstrate 
more clearly what is at stake in Shelley’s usage of this trope/^ In the work of both 
Lacan and Derrida, the veil is weighted by its metaphysical baggage, its connotations 
of a dissimulating surface, behind which the profundity of truth is waiting to be 
revealed. Like Shelley, Derrida attempts to rework the trope, by focussing on 
suspension and deferral, a point between veiling and unveiling:
’Truth’ can only be a surface. But the blushing movement of that truth 
which is not suspended in quotation marks casts a modest veil over 
such a surface. And only through such a veil which thus falls over it 
could ’truth’ become truth, profound, indecent, desirable. But should 
that veil be suspended, or even fall a bit differently, there would be no 
longer any truth, only ’truth’ - written in quotation marks. (Spurs
59)42
The veil has the same function as woman in Derrida’s texts:
There is no such thing as the essence of woman because woman averts, 
she is averted of herself. ... And the philosophical discourse, blinded, 
founders on these shoals and is hurled down these depthless depths to 
its ruin. There is no such thing as the truth of woman, but it is 
because of that abyssal divergence of the truth, because that untruth is 
’truth.’ Woman is but one name for that untruth of truth. (Spurs 51) 
Woman as truth is a split subject, without integrity, "averted" - veiled - from herself. 
She embodies the suspension of truth. The veil conceals/reveals only undecidability, 
an "uncertainty of vision" that, for Derrida, is affirmative and that he privileges as 
"feminine" (Jardine, Gynesis 198).
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In an interview published as "Women in the Beehive", Derrida negotiates some 
of the questions which feminists have posed about the place of the "feminine" in his 
work, that is, the way woman is treated as the unconscious material of 
signification/^ Mary Ann Doane asks, "The question is why the woman must 
always carry the burden of the philosophical demonstration, why she must be the one 
to figure truth, dissimulation, jouissance, untruth, the abyss, etc., why she is the 
support of these tropological systems, even and especially antimetaphysical or 
antihumanisitic systems" ("Veiling" 139). She theorizes that philosophy defuses its 
own insecurities in relation to truth by projecting them onto the woman, and that 
poststructuraüst discourse is attracted by the same trope, though here woman is 
revalued as the object of desire at the limits of theory. I want to give as much weight 
to Doane as to Derrida, though I admit that I am seduced by Derrida’s answer to the 
question: "Of course, saying that woman is on the side ...of undecidability and so on, 
has only the meaning of a strategical phase. In a given situation, which is ours, 
which is the European phallogocentiic situation, the side of the woman is the side 
from which you start to dismantle the structure" ("Beehive" 194). Derrida advocates 
the use of the "feminine force" to reverse and undermine the opposition man/woman, 
after which the term "woman" wiU no longer have the same meaning and wiU no 
longer be the best trope to refer to undecidability, etc. Both Derrida’s and Shelley’s 
veils remain intiicated in the patriarchal discourse they try to find ways to evade, but 
the desire to speak outside this discourse appeals as a feminist gesture.
The Lacanian trope of the veil is invested in the phallus not in the woman, and 
from this perspective - that it is not parasitic on the feminine - it might be seen as 
more amenable to feminist theory. One of Lacan’s most famous and oft-quoted
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pronouncements is that the phallus "can play its role only when veiled" (Ecrits 
2 8 8 ) . I have already alluded to the phallus/penis confusion that has alienated some 
feminist readers of Lacan; here I want to refer to the counter argument that the 
Lacanian phallus is feminized. Mary Ann Doane reminds us that, "[t]he woman’s 
relation to the phallus is that of ’being’ rather than ’having’" ("Veibng" 128), while 
the ’phaUic mother’ has become a familiar figure in feminist discourse. Jane Gallop 
returns us to a SheUeyan grammar of desire in her analysis of the transvestite 
grammatical articles which modify the phallus ("la" rather than "le" in a revealing slip 
of the type), and the sexual indeterminacy of Lacan’s veils in "The Signification of 
the Phallus" which she links with the sails which appear in "The Agency of the 
Letter". Lacan offers "thirty sails" as an example of metonymy for thirty ships, 
telling us that "the disquietude [he] felt" over this classic illustration "obscured 
(voilait) not so much those illustrious sails (voiles) as the definition they were 
supposed to illustrate." (Ecrits 1 5 6 ) Gallop observes that "[t]he ’voile’ in 
’Agency’ (sad) is feminine, whereas ’voüe’ meaning ’veü’ is masculine. But ’voüe’ 
for sail is derived from ’voile’ for ’veil, ’ and it may be just this sort of slippage 
between a masculine and a feminine term that is at play in Lacan’s notion of the 
phallus, which is a latent phallus, a metonymic, maternal, feminine phallus" (Reading 
131). Interestingly, the Derridean veil, too, is epicene: in Spurs, it is le viol, la viole, 
le viole, la voile.
The fuU sentence in which Lacan’s famous proposition appears is: "AU these 
propositions merely conceal the fact that it can play its role only when veUed, that is 
to say, as itself a sign of the latency with which any signifiable is struck, when it is 
raised (aufgehoben) to the function of signifer" (Ecrits 2881. The veUed phaUus
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interposes a screen between the signifier and the signified: the signifier can never 
close definitively on a signified, which always remains latent, concealed. This split 
in language mirrors, indeed constructs, the split in subjectivity: the subject is self­
divided, desiring that full utterance which is always out of reach in a linguistic system 
dependent on differences."^  ^ The phallus, as a signifer perpetually in search of a 
signified, unveils the perpetual deferral of meaning. "Veil after veil may be undrawn 
and the inmost naked beauty of the meaning never exposed" (Defence 500): in 
Shelley’s logistics of the veil, unveiling is always non-coincident with the exposure 
of truth. Yet it is the promise of meaning that draws us, and constitutes us as 
desiring subjects: "For the signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates meaning by 
unfolding its dimension before it. As is seen at the level of the sentence when it is 
interrupted before the significant term: ’I shall never . . . ’,’AH the same it is . . .’,’And 
yet there may be . . .’. Such sentences are not without meaning, a meaning aU the 
more oppressive in that it is content to make us wait for it" (Lacan, Ecrits 153, 
ellipses in original). Meaning becomes a demanding lover.
*  *  *  *  *
In interpreting the text, the reader takes her or his place in this involuted series of 
veils. Charles Sander Peirce provides a theory of interpretation which echoes 
Romantic language and which speaks to the experience of reading Shelley:
The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation.
In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped 
of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing can never be completely 
stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So 
there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interprétant is nothing
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but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along;
and as representation, it has its interprétant again. Lo, another infinite
series. (1:77/^
Pierce’s metaphor of (impossible) unveiling mirror’s Shelley’s veiled discourse. 
Interpretation is an erotic process in which the reader (or the reader’s 
readiing/interpretation) becomes in turn a "diaphanous" veil be reinterpreted, revealed, 
reveiiled by another reader. The traces of metaphysical desire remain in the figuring 
of tnuth as light, but this desire is reinflected as communal, not solitary but other- 
centred. The critic eschews imperialistic desires, that drive towards mastery of the 
text which depends on origins and ends, and gains instead the pleasures of 
pronniscuous interpretation. The texture of Shelley’s prose suggests that a poem, or 
text, is not an object with a core or kemal of meaning to be triumphantly uncovered, 
but something analogous to Roland Barthes’s and Nancy Miller’s tropologies of the 
text: the text is "an onion, a construction of layers ...whose body contains, finally, 
no heart, no kemal, no irreducible principle, nothing except the unit of its own 
surfaces" (Barthes qtd. in Miller, Subject 3)/* This multi-layered body is mirrored 
by the "unending involutions" of interpretation. Unveiling Shelley’s Witch, for 
example, reveals only that "love" which "becomes idolatry" (1.48). "The sympathetic 
reader", as Jerrold Hogle acknowledges, "should put aside all the priestly sanctions 
of the critics and give into a worship of graven images for their own sake that breeds 
an endless desire for images to come" ("Metaphor and Metamorphosis" 330). 
Shelley’s texts reserve a space for the reader, they call for a complicity between 
writer and reader, a relationship that is non-authoritarian. This readerly, and writerly, 
humility, a position of non-mastery in relation to a text, may be interpreted, as I
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argued in Chapter Two, as a feminist practice: several recent critics have suggested 
that a criticism which speaks "a discourse of hesitancy" rather than "a discourse of 
knowledge" (Barbara Johnson in Salusinsky 173) may unsettle the uprightness of 
phallogocentrism.
* * * * *
The desire to linger or dilate.
Patricia Parker
The following passage resonates with my discussion of SheUeyan desire; it speaks to 
that particular pleasure which provoked me to write about SheUey in the first place. 
It is taken from a letter to Thomas Jefferson Hogg written in December 1817, in 
which SheUey justifies his reluctance to use a lexicon when reading Greek literature 
in the original;
I am not at this moment very classicaUy employed, nor have I 
summoned courage to accept Scapula as my mentor and guide thro’ the 
bowers of Greek delight.
Might I not, by a confidence in Scapula, lose the end whUe 
busied about the means; and exchange the embraces of a living and 
tangible Calypso for the image of a Penelope, who, though wise, can 
never again be young. (Letters 1:569)
The first part of the second sentence, about "ends" and "means", might weU be read 
as the ’essence’ of SheUeyan thought, at least, that aspect which has been 
foregrounded in much SheUey criticism. If we cast this privUeging of the end in 
terms of the veU metaphor, we might uncover the risk that "to lay too much weight 
on poetic forms is to be trapped by the texture of the veU (or its many colours as he 
[SheUey] often images it) and distracted into seeing it as end rather than only as
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means" (Bone, "Contemporary Poetry" 76). The texture of the veil is the formal 
features of language, the surface particularity of words, the contingent, the artificial, 
the feminine; in other words, aU those seductive detours from the eternal and the 
universal. However, the second part of the sentence, though apparently adding to and 
amplifying the first, is oddly disjunctive, reversing the established hierarchy. In 
privileging Calypso over Penelope, SheUey privUeges the mistress rather than the 
wife, infidelity over marriage, youth rather than the security of wisdom, the journey 
rather than the homecoming, that is, the means rather than the end, but a means 
perceived as affirmative in their own right. SheUey as Odyssean reader enjoys a sexy 
encounter with the text, taking pleasure in the process of reading itself whUe resisting 
epistemological certainty. SheUey casts himself as a feminist reader.^ ® I am drawn 
to this episode - and I admit in advance that I make this brief encounter do a lot of 
work - because it is a pressure point where SheUey both risks the charge of a "harem 
mentaUty" and the loss of the traditional, masterful male subject. It is a moment 
when the instabUity of the text generates multiple meanings, when it opens itself to 
the reader.
At first, then, SheUey eschews the precision and distracting piecemeal quaUty 
of a lexicon; he wants his experience of the text to be unmediated, for to attend to the 
mechanics of translation is necessarily to alienate the ’real’ meaning (translation is 
"the act or process of turning from one language into another" [OED]; the word 
derives from the Latin, to transport or t r an sfe r )Howeve r ,  with the Odyssean 
analogy SheUey embraces the sensuous tangibility of the alien words, the arousing 
texture of the veU rather than the Platonic image.^^ Thus, SheUey first resists 
translation, but then succumbs to seduction, another form of transport (UteraUy it
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means "to lead astray"). EtymologicaUy, Calypso’s name derives from the Greek 
word for "covering" or "veil" We are back with a play of veils. Perhaps 
Odysseus is feminized by this " cov e r ing " . In  a provocative comment, Patricia 
Parker suggests that our first view of Odysseus at the enchantress’s dwelling is of a 
"latent hero" (12). The encounter with Calypso, for SheUey-as-Odysseus, displaces 
the teleological quest for legitimate or univocal meaning; as a paradigm of reading 
and writing, it suggests the excitement of textual infidelity, a prose dedicated to 
pleasure, the plural and the improper. As Parker suggests of Roland Barthes, "the 
properly narrative desire to reach an end and the properly hermeneutic desire to 
penetrate a text’s meaning are countered by the desire to linger or dilate" (12). In 
terms of gender, the desire to reach an end has been perceived, textuaUy and sexually, 
as masculine, whereas feminine sexuality, and by analogy, feminine textuality, has 
been conceived as ’jouissance’ - "sparks of pleasure ignited by contact at any point, 
...not waiting for a closure, but enjoying the touching" (Gallop, Feminism 30-31). 
This definition of jouissance resonates with Shelley’s open-ended prose, his emphasis 
on the tangible, the body, the sparks of pleasure ignited throughout the Defence 
(though these sparks remain, of course, entangled with the Promethean). Shelley’s 
preference for Calypso constitutes a slightly perverse reading of The Odyssey, in 
which, for aU his dilatory progress, Odysseus retains the desire to return home to 
Penelope. Yet, it is worth remembering that The Odysseus is an open-ended text: we 
are told that Odysseus, after his return home, will set out again.^  ^ Recall, too, that 
Penelope is also a veil-maker, who deploys her own delaying tactics: weaving by day 
and unweaving by night, she strategically suspends the masculine privilege of her 
suitors in a temporal void. All these veils tend to destabilize the difference between
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Penelope and Calypso, between means and end. We reach towards a feminine 
’sextuality’, a realm where, in Wallace Steven’s words, "the bride / Is never naked. 
A fictive covering / Weaves always glistening from the heart and mind" ("Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction" Vm).
* * * * *
[T]he poet is distinguished ...by having what other men want.
W.S. Walker
The rhetoric of Shelley’s contemporary reviewers tends to support my contention that 
Shelley is not a phallic writer, indeed, that his writing disrupts the symbolic, 
patriarchal order. There is, of course, no contemporary criticism of the Defence, so 
I must content myself with references to reviews of the poetry, taking them as 
representative of the construction of ’Shelley’. Interestingly, "On Love" was well- 
received by the press on the left, though to describe it as an "exquiste morceau" (as 
did the The Monthlv Review in 1829) is to locate its author on the margins of 
masculinity (this tallies with the ’pruned’ Shelley which flourished in the gift-books 
for middle-class women).However ,  many reviewers registered complaints which 
reveal the hidden politics of language. In an unsigned review in The Lonsdale 
Magazine or Provincial Repository, the critic asserts that:
...whenwriters, like ...Shelley, envelope their destructive theories in 
language, both intended and calculated to entrance the the soul by its 
melodious richness, to act upon the passions without consulting the 
reason, and to soothe and overwhelm the finest feelings of our nature; - 
then it is that the unwary are in danger of being misled, the indifferent 
of being surprised, and the innocent of being seduced.
(Barcus 249)
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Shelley seduces his (female? male?) readers through the glittering surface of his texts; 
he subverts the hegemony of (male) reason over passion, luring his readers "to 
wander" from the straight patriarchally-demarcated "paths of virtue and innocence" 
(Barcus 248; here the reader seems more certainly feminine). Yet this reviewer has 
just devoted a paragraph to the seductive allure of the "Syrens", of whom Shelley is 
the contemporary example. No longer even the feminized Odysseus outlined above, 
Shelley is here the archetypal femme fatale, whose "flowers of rhetoric" lure ’her’ 
male (or lesbian) readers into sexual and textual "indulgence", away from fidelity, 
settled meanings, and the secure demarcations of gender difference (Barcus 248).
Many other critics pick up on the siren-like surface of Shelley’s writing, which 
frustratingly fails to yield a significant ’deep’ meaning. W.S. Walker in The 
Quarterly Review (October 1821) asserts that:
The want of meaning in Mr. Shelley’s poetry takes different shapes. 
Sometimes it is impossible to attach any signification to his words; 
sometimes they hover on the verge between meaning and no meaning, 
so that a meaning may be obscurely conjectured by the reader, though
none is expressed by the w riter  (Barcus 255)
In other words, Shelley’s meaning is ’suspended’; it is a marginal discourse which 
affronts the symbolic order by refusing to meet the "demand [for] clear, distinct 
conceptions" (which Walker regards as ’our’ "right"), offering only an unsettling 
"confusion" of "forms". Shelley is frequently criticized for his disruption of 
conventional grammar and syntax and for his non-referential language; W.S. Walker 
refers to "the absurdities" which are "accumulated ...in defiance of common sense, 
and even of grammar" (Barcus 257); in "Seraphina and Her Sister Clementina’s
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Review of Epipsychidion" in The Gossip (July 14, 1821), the two sisters and a 
gentleman friend satirize the strange "coupling]" of adjectives and nouns and the 
endlessly supplementary quality of Shelley’s imagery, which leads the reader "through 
a crowd of disjointed figures that darkened the subject they were intended to 
illumine" (Barcus 290, 294)/^ As John Barrell points out, with reference to this 
review, the "oppressively knowing gentleman will do to remind us of the phaUocentric 
character of the symbolic order, only too liable to denounce whatever threatens to 
interrupt it as typically feminine" (Flight 14-15). Walker suggests that Shelley’s 
"poetry is in general a mere jumble of words and heterogeneous ideas, connected by 
slight and accidental associations, among which it is impossible to distinguish the 
principal object from the accessory." (258) Shelley’s text may be heavily metaphoric, 
yet this quote might suggest that metonymy is the guiding principle of his writing, 
which is a chain of contingent "associations". As I will suggest in my reading of De 
Quincey, "the principal object" and "the accessory" are a disorientating intermixture. 
Shelley’s language accords well with Kristeva’s notion of the rhythmic pulsions of 
the semiotic which disorder the symbolic.^* His rhetoric is apparently 
"unintelligible" (254) within the symbolic order.
"We would wish to persuade him," writes Walker, "that the poet is 
distinguished from the rest of his species ...by having what other men want." (Barcus 
263). On the contrary, it seems to me that the mark of Shelley’s distinction (for the 
feminist critic) is his inscription of lack, precisely of his not-having what other men 
want, that is, transcendental meaning, authority, the phallus.
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Notes to Chapter Four
From a letter to Margaret Fuller OssoU, June 7 or 8, 1840; this line 
only quoted in Barcus 374.
See my reference in Chapter Three (81-82). There is another curious 
connection in that De Quincey lived for a time in what had been 
Burke’s house in Bath.
All references to "On Love", "On Life" and A Defence of Poetry, and 
to Shelley’s poems (and prefaces) are to Reiman and Powers, eds., 
Shelley’s Poetry and Prose. Since this text includes only a limited 
selection of the prose, other references are to David Lee Clark’s 
edition, which, though unreliable, remains widely-used (references to 
such texts will be cited as Clark). The most recent edition is E.B. 
Murray’s The Prose Works of Percy Bvsshe SheUey: Volume One 
takes us up to 1818.
Mirrors and metaphors are not, of course, unconnected. A metaphor 
is a type of self-representation, in that it is a generated representation 
of the thing first represented: a metaphor enacts the idea of 
representation which it supports. For Shelley, "Poetry ...reproduces aU 
that it represents" (Defence 487). The mirror and the metaphor share 
a number of traits or effects: transference, displacement, division, 
deferral, that is, if we read from a deconstructive, rather than an 
idealist, perspective. Jerrold Hogle convincingly argues that SheUeyan 
metaphor generates meaning(s) "from a process of transfer and 
substitution rather than from a first Unity or grounding Presence." 
("SheUey’s Poetics" 159) See, also Hogle’s tracing of the decentering 
metaphoric processes of "The Witch of Atlas", a poem in which he 
suggests that "every image comes less from a ’seed’ or ’cause’ and 
more from the ways that metaphor shifts beyond or beside itself into
new analogies ___" ("Metaphor and Metamorphosis" 330). WiUiam
Ulmer places more emphasis on SheUey’s ideaUst rhetoric, on his 
desire to "unveU the permanent analogy of things by images which 
participate in the life of truth" (Defence 485; qtd. in Uhner 7). Though 
my own emphasis is on the deconstructive version - which I find 
strategicaUy more productive for a feminist reading - I acknowledge 
that some readers wiU consider that this engenders a distorted image of 
SheUey.
This is an ’otherness’ which is also within the self: "We dimly see 
within our inteUectual nature a miniature as it were of our entire self, " 
(473), whUe the mirror reflects both the inner and the outer self: "Not 
only the portrait of our external being, but an assemblage of the 
minutest particulars of which our nature is composed". There is a long 
Uterary tradition which sees the miniature as a pure, distiUed essence
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of the self; see, especially, the poems of the Metaphysicals, in which, 
often, a purified version of the viewing subject is perceived in the 
lover’s eyes.
6. It is worth recalling that, though the SheUeyan ’other’ is generaUy 
assumed to be feminine, "On Love" was written, as I have mentioned, 
between SheUey’s translation of Plato and his Discourse on the 
Manners of the Antient Greeks. It is thus framed by texts which 
privUege the relations between men; from this perspective, it might be 
seen as an ’hom(m)age’ to love. On the homoerotic tints of SheUey’s 
Discourse (discussed with the "deUcate caution" he ascribes to SheUey), 
see Chapter One of Nathanial Brown’s, SexuaUty and Feminism.
7. For a reading of Irigaray which takes up the question of specularity, 
see Josette Feral, "Antigone or The Irony of the Tribe". For wide- 
ranging discussions of women and mirrors, see Jan Montefiore, 
Feminism and Poetry, esp. Chapter Four, and Jenijoy La BeUe, Herself 
Beheld.
8. On "the specular dimension of everything associated with the name of 
Percy Bysshe SheUey", see Gary FameU, "Rereading SheUey".
9. Though the mirror is absent from the Platonic text, it is, simUarly, 
rhetoricaUy inscribed through repetition: "the soul of each [of the 
androgenous beings] manifestly thirsts for, from the other, something 
which there are no words to describe, and divines that which it seeks, 
and traces obscurely the footsteps of its obscure desire. " (Notopoulos 
432, my itaUcs) The repetition foregrounds the signifier, casting a 
material aspect over the soul’s desire.
10. Reiman’s phrase "the self seeks the beautiful without", that is outside 
of the self, enables the wonderful semantic - and very SheUeyan - 
possibUity of a beauty without attributes. Like Reiman, Barbara 
Charlesworth Gelpi notes that "SheUey posits two possibiUtes: one that 
the boundary around the perceiving consciousness is dissolved, the 
other that the boundary expands to include aU that it perceives." She 
goes on to examine the terrifying aspects of this euphoric-sounding 
experience (SheUey’s Goddess 14).
11. Though "Beauty" is apparently a masculine quaUty in "Epipsychidion", 
"Which penetrates and clasps and fUls the world" (1.103).
12. Mary Devereaux, in her analysis of feminist aesthetics, provides a 
summary of this position: "As de Beauvoir explains, women, unlike 
men, do not leam to describe the world from their own point of view. 
As the ’other’, woman learns to submerge or renounce her subjectivity. 
She finds her identity in the subjectivity of the men to whom she is 
attached (father, husband, lover). In the eyes of men, she finds her 
identity as the object of men’s desire. (340)
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13. Mary Jean Corbett provides an alternative reading of Mary Shelley’s 
Journals. She argues that a feminist inteipretation needs to move away 
from the privileging of the journal as confessional, a space for the 
construction of individuality; instead, "Shelley’s Journals [construct] a 
space in which the mutual is privileged over and above the individual, 
in which the self cannot be a self without the familial context that 
shapes identity in particular ways, not all of them necessarily either 
liberating or constraining". Corbett proposes that "we need to hold 
onto some part of the feminist ideology that values community over 
isolation" and in this way we "can open a new direction in our writing 
of the history of women’s subjectivity" (86). On the same issues, see 
Susan J. Wolfson’s interpretation of Dorothy Wordsworth’s texts 
("Individual in Community"). Corbett’s detailed reading of the 
Journals is convincing, but I would argue that the particular epistolary 
moment I examine displays "intersubjectivity" as "constraining".
14. On this complex issue, see J. Drummond Bone, "Organicism and 
Shelley’s A Defence of Poetry", from whom I borrow the DNA image. 
David Punter takes up the question of parts and wholes from another 
angle: in his essay, "Parts of the body", he analyzes "some instances of 
dismemberment and healing" in romantic texts (from Blake, Burke, 
Coleridge, Keats) through the lens of Melanie Klein’s work on the role 
of the part-object in the process of maturation.
15- Another aspect of the letters to Mary Godwin discussed above that 
destabilizes male mastery is that the subject is decentred, literally 
displaced: written in late October/early November 1814, when Shelley 
was on the run from the bailiffs, the letters - presumbably for 
pragmatic reasons - are merely superscribed "London" (followed by the 
date) and are unsigned. The effect is that the subject haunts a blank 
space, lacking any particular origin or marker of identity.
16. Interestingly, the OED defines "integrity" negatively: "The condition 
of having no part or element taken away or wanting" (OEDl), "The 
condition of not being marred or violated; unimpaired or uncorrupted 
condition" (0ED2); that is, it is a condition which takes its significance 
only from what it is not.
17. See Laura Claridge "Romantic Potency" and "Bifurcated Space" for 
readings of Shelley’s poetry which amplify this insight.
18. My use of Lacan is indebted to Rose’s extraordinarily helpful guide 
through the Lacanian labyrinth in her Introduction to Feminine 
Sexuality. Other insightful texts are Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan, and 
Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan.
19. To describe "holding the child" as "a process of referring", provides an 
image of signification itself, in which each entity (or word) refers to 
another, but in which signifier and signified can never completely
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coincide.
20. See Catherine Belsey on the role of desire in "The Romantic 
construction of the unconscious". On the significance of the 
’unconscious’ o f Romanticism, see David Punter, The Romantic 
Unconscious.
21. The circle is an ambivalent image in many romantic texts, though 
writers such as Blake tend to represent it as negative. Hannah More’s 
use of this figure makes it clear that it is also inscribed in a socio- 
sexual context: "Women in their course of action describe a smaller 
circle than men; but the perfection of a circle consists, not in its 
dimensions, but in its correctness" (Coelebs in Search of a Wife, qtd. 
Davidoff and HaU 455).
22. This phrase occurs in his essay "Byron". Arnold was not the first to 
’angelicize’ Shelley: Mary Shelley and others of his circle start to 
construct this mythological creature soon after his death. Percy Shelley 
himself thought that a poet "is more delicately organized than other 
men" (Defence 507). Mary Favret and Susan J. Wolfson discuss Mary 
SheUey’s role as her husband’s editor, and the self-construction and 
reproduction of ’SheUey’ that this involved (see their articles in Fisch 
et al. The Other Mary Shelleyl.
23. On the relation between love and language, see Frances Ferguson’s 
essay "SheUey’s Mont Blanc". in which she uses the essay "On Love" 
as an heuristic device for reading SheUey’s famous poem, tracing the 
poet’s effort "to convert epistemological language into love language." 
(208)
24. SheUey’s anxiety about being constrained by grammar is suggested by 
the fact that he almost immediately repeats his observation about 
pronouns: "The words /, and you, and they are grammatical devices 
invented simply for arrangement and totaUy devoid of the intense and 
exclusive sense usuaUy attached to them." ("On Life" 478)
25. See Barbara Johnson’s wonderful essay (in her World of Difference! 
on gender in romantic criticism, in which she argues that the balance 
of undecidabUity in the poem - specificaUy, what we think about the 
lady - depends on the "as" here.
26. My formulation here is indebted to Laura Claridge, "Bifurcated Female 
Space" esp. 103-104.
27. See WUUam Ulmer’s discussion of SheUey as an "unacknowledged 
legislator" attempting to reform the reader through his texts (esp. 18- 
24). Ulmer argues that "SheUey intended his texts to transmit 
resemblances by which the reader’s consciousness would be 
UnguisticaUy reshaped to accord with the poet’s consciousness, to
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reflect the poet’s emotions and values as mirrored in turn by the words 
of his poem. Poets and readers are lovers in Shelley, and the text, ... 
’no better than a go-between. ’ " (19) I am in full agreement with 
Ulmer that Shelley’s political project is inseparable from his rhetoric 
of love; where I take issue with him is his contention that "[djespite his 
avowed feminism, ... SheUey accepted models of poetic creation that 
regard the author as ’a father, a progenitor, a procreator, an aesthetic 
patriarch whose pen is an instrument of generative power Uke his 
penis.’" (23; Ulmer is quoting GUbert and Gubar, Madwoman 6). 
Quite apart from the fact that the pen/penis analogy has been 
overworked of late, the en-genderment of SheUey’s writing is not 
nearly as certain as this essentiaUst metaphor suggests.
28. EUzabeth Ann Dobie has written from a feminist perspective about new 
paradigms of the relationship between text and reader: "The recognition 
[through psychoanalytic theory] that a subject’s intentions are not 
purely present to herself, has led to a rejection of the theory of 
interpretation that held (the true) meaning to be conveyed by authorial 
intentions. Instead, meaning is produced at the site of intersection 
between work (text or image) and the audience" (388). Dobie argues 
that this "has empowered the recipient, thus upsetting the hierarchical 
authority of the producers". This new relationship can be seen as an 
aspect of the feminist epistemologies discussed in the final section of 
Chapter Two. Dobie, however, cautions that "the focus on audience 
has brought to Ught the frequency with which reception positions have 
been forced into masculine postures". In other words, as feminist 
critics we need to interrogate the gendered (re)production of meaning, 
practising the ’resisting reading’ advocated by Judith Fetterly.
29. I reaUse that my interpretation of this gendered process occludes the 
differentials of class, race, etc, as weU as aUgning itself with a 
heterosexist perspective. Gay men and lesbian women may weU have 
a different angle of vision, though I would stiQ argue that voyeurism - 
where the object of the gaze is female - is a predominantly 
heterosexual male activity.
30. I should note that Shelley’s usage of the word "organ", though 
available to a phallic reading, depends on the Greek word ’organon’, 
meaning ’tool’. His usage of ’organized’ is an attempt to collapse the 
difference between the mechanical and the life-like, for the word 
organic derives from the same root (on this issue, see J. Drummond 
Bone, "Organicism").
31. Given the confusion between the terms "phallus" and "penis", I should 
note that I (usually) follow Lacan’s rendering of the ph^us, that is, the 
notion that both men and women are castrated, lacking the phallus, 
which then becomes the very signifier of desire, the promise of 
fulfilment and closure. Jacques-Alain Miller outlines the function of
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the phallus for Freud and Lacan:
It has scandalized feminists that Freud said there is only 
one symbol for both sexes, one symbol of reference, and 
that is the phallic symbol. He was not choosing 
between men and women to give the advantage to men.
The problem is that this symbol is exterior to both sexes.
Freud himself referred to that as a symbol and also 
spoke of what you could find at the entrance of the 
Ancient Roman bordellos. The phallic symbol was at 
the entrance. There, it is, I must say, for men. Nobody 
would think that men are equal to this symbol. It’s 
rather the measure of their impotence ....[T]he question 
of the phallic symbol is not only ’to have or to have 
not’, biologically speaking . . . . [I]t’s a question of the 
meaning it takes on. (qtd. in Saper 45)
The phallic function is not the penis, but the mark which stands 
between the sex, defining each in terms of the other. I take Miller’s 
point (though I could do without his dismay at "scandalized feminists" 
and the dismissive assurance of "Nobody would think that men are 
equal to this symbol"), however, as I suggested, the penis tends to erect 
itself as the visible mark of phallus. Rita Felski suggests that 
"Lacanian theory ...tends to ontologize existing social and cultural 
relations in such a way as to suggest a necessary and inherent 
connection between the structures of symbolic language [terms such as 
the ’phallus’ and ’Name of the Father’] on the one hand and patriarchal 
power on the other, and thus to rationalize existing systems of 
domination by making them appear as the natural and inevitable 
extensions of the constraints imposed by linguistic structures" (41). 
For a full discussion of the issue, I refer the reader to Jane Gallop’s 
informative and thought-provoking chapter "Beyond the Phallus" in her 
Thinking Through the Body (119-133).
32. See the debate about male fragility which is conducted in Jardine and 
Smith, Men in Feminism. In "A Conversation" with Alice Jardine 
(reproduced in the text), Paul Smith complains that the women critics 
responded sympathetically to Stephen Heath’s article ("Male 
Feminism"), while he and other male readers clearly found Heath’s 
"abjection in regard to feminism" (246) rather distasteful, suspecting 
Heath’s vulnerability as being a pose, implicitly a seductive wile to 
please women.
33. See Gallop’s Feminism and Psvchoanalysis. and "French Theory and 
the Seduction of Feminism". For an alternative view of the politics of 
seduction, see Linda Kauffman, Special Delivery. She is briskly 
dismissive of this paradigm: "I do not endorse the hyperbolicaUy 
sexualized rhetoric which describes feminists as being ’seduced’ by 
’male’ theory, for this rhetoric falsely refigures the feminist as Clarissa, 
virtuous victim who must vigilantly ward off the masculine seductions
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of loveless, disembodied ’Theory’. Those who perpetuate this rhetoric 
may (like Clarissa) end up starving to death" (xxiii). Kauffman makes 
the sensible point that poststructuralist theories have been transformed 
by feminism (rather than feminist theory having been stolen by men).
34. I want to emphasize that I am concerned with the function, and trope, 
of the veil in western discourse; there are no doubt other factors to be 
considered outside of this context (the veiling of Muslim women, for 
example).
35. They cite Poe’s "The Case of M. Valdemar", Dickens’s "The Black 
Veil" and Hawthorne’s "The Minister’s Black Veil" in which "the veü 
is a symbol of secret guüt" (469-70). For an insightful discussion of 
the veü in film texts, see Mary Ann Doane, "Veiling over Desire".
36. James Laver documents the emphasis on fashionable simplicity in 
women’s clothes in the wake of the French Revolution, and for the first 
two decades of the nineteenth-century. "[W]omen wore a robe en 
chemise, which did indeed look like an undergarment, for it consisted 
of a white, high-waisted muslin cambric or calico garment falling to 
the feet and sometimes so transparent that it was necessary to wear 
white, or pink, tights underneath. Sometimes the material was 
dampened so that it clung to the body in imitation of the folds of the 
Greek dresses represented in antique statues" (Laver 152; as I 
suggested in Chapter Three, with reference to the female body life 
often imitates art). The Lady’s Magazine in 1803 observes that "with 
the ladies, it is the object to shew how little wiU do for a dress", and 
La Beüe Assemblée in 1807 notes that "the dress of women should 
differ in every point from that of men. This difference ought even to 
extend to the choice of stuffs; for a woman inhabited in cloth is less 
feminine than if she were clothed in transparent gauze, in Ught muslin, 
or in soft and shining silks" ("On Modem Taste and Style" 375, 
"Fashion" 196; qtd. in Gelpi, Sheüey’s Goddess 54). Richard Polwhele 
writes of those fashionable ladies who "Scarce by a gossamery film 
carest, / Sport, in fuU view, the meretricious breast" (Jones 187). 
Barbara Gelpi notes that "the contradiction enunciated by Davidoff and 
HaU between ’claims for women’s superiority and their social 
subordination’ informs the significance of Regency fashion: women’s 
flimsy, revealing garments encode a sexual vulnerability and 
socioeconomic dependence prescribed by a contractual system arranged 
among men; yet by their aUusion to the drapery outlining ... [the] form 
of goddesses in antique statuary, these garments also serve as 
exhibitions of female autonomy and fertility. They are power clothes" 
(Sheüey’s Goddess 60).
37. See also "The Sensitive Plant" U.29-32.
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38. J. Hillis Miller, in his comments on "Epipsychidion" and "The Triumph 
of Life", argues that: "Shelley’s poetry is the record of a perpetually 
renewed failure" to "destroy the barriers between sign and signified" 
because "the language which tries to efface itself as language to give 
way to an unmediated union beyond language is itself the barrier which 
always remains as the woe of an ineffaceable trace" ("The Critic as 
Host" 236-37, 245-46).
39. On the doubling of the veil figure in the Defence, see WiUiam Keach’s 
detailed reading, which revolves, Uke my own, around the tropes of the 
mirror and the veil. He reads the essay as an "uncertain triumph over 
...the linguistic skepticism which pervades SheUey’s other writing" 
(SheUev’s Style 33). Where I see these tropes as bound together in the 
drama of subjectivity, Keach locates a movement from one to the 
other: "Language in the Defence begins as a mirror and ends as a veü 
of the poet’s thoughts. The veü reveals as weU as conceals; it makes 
meaning infinite and inexhaustible for the reader by hiding the original 
conception of the poet; it gives articulate form to pure thought which 
would otherwise elude mortal perception. But in the end the veü of 
language remains as evidence of ’the limitedness of the poetical 
faculty’, in spite of Shelley’s wondrous capacity to make a virtue of 
that limitedness. " Keach remains closer to an ’ideaUst’ SheUey than I 
do; gender does not figure in his reading.
40. Jerome McGann’s wonderful essay "Sheüey’s Veüs" is an affirmative 
reading of this trope: "The song of the poet is a veü of imagery. In 
this case there is no stripping away of obscuring veüs but only a 
successive process of re-reveiling. The process is itself the crucial 
thing, for if words are helplessly ineffectual and metaphorical, the 
activity of continuous and related image-making reveals the self- 
creative powers of the mind" (206). I differ from McGann in his 
impUcation that this process underwrites self-identity, and see it rather 
as enacting the perpetual construction and deconstruction of the subject. 
On Sheüey’s veüs, see also Peter Butter, and Carol Jacobs.
41. The difference between them is surely a question of intention - if I may 
be aUowed the use of that word in these post-structuralist days: 
Derrida’s deconstruction of metaphysics (and his use of veüs and 
"Woman" in this process) is self-conscious in a way that Sheüey’s 
project is not.
42. Derrida’s theorization of the veü is based on his reading of Nietzsche; 
see Mary Ann Doane on the significance of Nietzsche’s veüs 
("Veiling" esp. 119-126). His use of "blushing" here plays with the 
uncertainty about femininity that punctuates eighteenth century conduct 
texts: is the blush real or fake, is it a signifer of guüt or innocence? 
See, for example, John Gregory, 26-27.
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43. As Mary Ann Doane points out, there are problems for a feminist with 
Derrida’s abyssal, feminine ’truth’. The woman’s dissembling is 
unconscious; its significance is as the voyeuristic object of the male 
gaze: "It is impossible to resist looking for her" (Derrida, Spurs 71). 
She is the representation of a truth she herself cannot understand, once 
again object not subject (though the ’subject’ is in any case a 
problematic term in psychoanalysis): "Closing her eyes to herself she 
becomes the pure construct of a philosophical gaze" (Doane, "Veiling" 
123).
44. This essay, "The Signification of the PhaUus", also appears in Mitchell 
and Rose, Feminine Sexuality: their translation differs slightly: "the 
phallus can only play its role as veiled" (82).
45. Ironically, there is a typographical slip at this point in Sheridan’s 
translation of "The Agency of the letter in the unconscious" - 
"obscured" appears as "obsured".
46. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, the idea that any signifying system 
depends on differences - between words, sounds, phonemes, etc. - has 
been a founding principle of linguistics and semiotics since de 
Saussure: "in language there are only differences without positive 
terms" (120). Saussure also argued that the sign is split into a signifier 
and a signified, and that the relationship between them is arbitrary 
rather than natural (in other words, their relationship is differential).
47. Also quoted in Naomi Schor, Reading 129. Here is how Peirce 
explains his term "interprétant" :
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It 
addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind of 
that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more 
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the 
interprétant of the first sign. (2:228)
For a discussion of Peirce’s theories, in a feminist context, see Teresa 
de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender, esp. 58-62.
48. Miller uses the figure of the artichoke (which she sets against an older 
view of the text figured as an apricot). She distances herself from the 
implications of Barthes’s tropology: "For me, a supplement of 
experience comes to check a critical politics dependent for its practice 
on the free-play of signifiers" (Subject 3; Miller’s onion ends up in the 
kitchen).
49. My use of the terms "phallogocentrism" and "phaUocentrism" may be 
confusing, given that elsewhere I appropriate the Lacanian "phallus" for 
feminist purposes. However, since the term "phaUocentrism", for 
example, is widely used to connote the cultural privUeging of 
masculinity, I refer to it in this context. Tania Modleski, amongst
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others, is critical of feminist readers who want to give up "authority" 
before they have really been granted equal textual rights ("Feminism" 
127).
50. I realise that other interpretations are possible here: to privilege youth 
may be simply a sign of the egocentrism of a youthful subject; to 
valorise the mistress and infidelity might be seen as a male privilege. 
Other feminist critics may take exception to my own privileging of a 
textual encounter that allows the (male) subject to have it aU.
51. The locus classicus on ’translation’ in SheUey is Timothy Webb’s The 
Violet in the Crucible.
52. Compare Peter Finch’s analysis of this passage: Finch maps SheUey’s 
reading practice as an erotic journey, and though he perceptively 
observes that this (sexual) excitement is the result of infidelity "to 
language’s distant prospect of settled and legitimate wisdom", his 
rhetoric nevertheless reinscribes a mascuUnist and metaphysical 
teleology: in the reading process, "the mind, seeking ...that second self 
far dearer and more fair, penetrates the text’s shifting, glimmering 
surface, that flow of signifiers both aUuring yet alien, and discovers 
beneath them a deeper and more intimate rezUm" (32). Finch’s own 
signifiers enable the hegemony of the signified, of depth, of 
penetration, to reassert itself.
53. I was deUghted with this find - as though I had discovered the 
signifier’s treasure.
54. See Susan Wolfson on how Byron’s Don Juan is feminized by 
Haidee’s coverings ("’Their She Condition’" 600).
55. Some classical scholars regard this as a later ending, the original text
supposedly finishing with Odysseus and Penelope in bed.
56. I am indebted to a footnote in Susan Wolfson’s article "Editorial
PrivUege", in which she documents the existence of reviews of "On
Love". She notes that "The Athenaeum declared that it [the essay] 
demanded atonement from those who have ’wronged [SheUey’s] 
memory’ with the brand of ’infidel’, for it revealed him as ’one of the 
most earnest, affectionate, truth-seeking, humble, and self-denying men 
that ever Uved on this earth’ (55 [Nov. 12, 1828], 864)" (70). Here, 
though ’manly’, SheUey (Uke Keats) is impUcitly cast in the feminized 
role of wronged maiden. On the culture of the annual gift books, see 
Sonia Hofkosh, "Disfiguring Economies".
57. For negative responses to SheUey’s language, see, amongst many 
possible examples, the unsigned review of The Cenci in The British 
Review and London Critical Journal (June 1821) and the comments on 
"Alastor" and "The Revolt of Islam" by J.W .’ in The Champion
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(December 23, 1821), in Barcus 217-223 and 287-88. The twentieth 
century reception of the Defence (until recently) largely recapitulates 
the contemporary reaction to SheUey’s poetry: Earl Wasserman 
observes that "[r]unning through most of the commentaries is the 
assumption not only that the essay is unusable [as a practical theory of 
poetry] but also that it repeatedly shifts its grounds" (204).
58. I foUow John BarreU’s invocation of Kristevan paradigms in his 




"Such a never ending still beginning sort o f  a Body^  ^\ 
Keats’s Letters and the Boundaries of Gender
The quotation in this chapter’s title comes from Keats’s letter of 16 May 1817 to 
Taylor and Hessey (Letters 1:145)/ The body, or more accurately, the bodies in 
question are the importunate creditors whom Keats has metamorphosed into a many­
headed Hydra (1:145). "[S]uch a never ending stiU beginning sort of a Body": the 
phrase appeals to me because it figures a body with shifting boundaries, a body 
improperly defined, while the temporality of "never ending stiU beginning" evokes 
what Kiisteva has called the "questionable subject-in-process" (Desire in Language 
125). Keats uses the masculine pronoun in referring to this "body", but he also tells 
us that it is "like my Landlady of the Bell" (1:146). It is, then, both masculine and 
feminine, multiple, monstrous, a body that dissolves its form and melts the contours 
of gendered subjectivity.
In traditional Western thought, mind and body are perceived as two separate 
entities. The body is associated with nature, with instrumentality, passivity, the 
palpable; as an organic object, the body is subordinated to the mind. The mind is 
associated with culture, reason, agency. As Hàène Cixous has pointed out in her 
essay "Sorties", these binary oppositions, these "couples", come back to "the" couple 
man/woman (102). Cixous argues that woman’s place in the history of Western 
thought has been at the negative pole of a series of binary oppositions, whereby male 
privilege is sustained by ascribing to women passivity (and thereby powerlessness), 
and through maintaining the oppressive Cartesian mind/body duality. "This
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association of the body with the female," as Judith Butler explains, "works along 
magical relations of reciprocity whereby the female sex becomes restricted to its 
body, and the male body, fully disavowed, becomes, paradoxically, the incorporeal 
instrument of an ostensibly radical freedom" (11). To read Keats (as I do in this 
chapter) in terms of a feminist body politics is to attempt to move through the binary 
thinking that privileges mind over body, male over female. This is not to disavow 
the mind, but to rethink the hierarchy; nor is it to suggest that there is any body 
outside of discourse, for I concur with Mary Ann Doane that "[t]he positing of a body 
is a condition of discursive practices" ("Woman’s Stake" 226).
Feminist theory, especially Kristeva’s notion of the "semiotic", provides a 
terminology for analysing the structuring concepts of Keats’s letters, a way of naming 
those ’traversable boundaries’ or ’threshhold’ sites between order and its subversion, 
inside and outside, body and culture, as well as between mother and child, and 
masculine and feminine.^ Though in this chapter, as in the rest of this book, I am 
interested in the intersections between contemporary feminist theories and Romantic 
texts, I have tried not to simply erase the specifities of the historical context, and to 
this end I make reference to Keats’s earliest readers and to nineteenth-century 
discourses of gender in my analysis of "the ’fantasmatics’ ... of the correspondence" 
(Bossis 69).
*  *  *
A collective obsessing about an idea called "woman ".
Peggy Kamuf
A few preliminary comments on letters in general, and Keats’s letters in particular, 
are necessary here. Keats’s letters have always been culled by critics for biographical 
information and used as a source of poetic theories to illuminate his poems; recently.
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critics such as David Luke and Susan Wolfson have examined the aesthetic qualities 
of the letters, that is, read them as ’texts’ in their own right. Susan Wolfson and 
Anne Mellor have turned to Keats’s letters to examine the gender ideology of the 
period. To shift the critical gaze from Keats’s poems to his letters is in itself a 
political, and potentially feminist, gesture, for, as Anne Mellor remarks, it "contest[s] 
the traditional academic assumptions that poetry and fiction are superior genres of 
literary discourse, more deserving of analysis and propagation than other kinds of 
writing such as journals and letters" (Romanticism and Gender 186).
In contrast to the other texts examined in this study, most of which were 
written for publication, or at least circulation, this chapter deals with an essentially 
private discourse made public. To read a published private correspondence is to 
transgress the boundary between public and private; but a letter, of its very nature, 
deconstructs this opposition. As Terry Eagleton argues,
[I]n the very heart of anguish or confession, the letter can never forget 
that it is turned outwards to another ... The other to whom the letter is 
addressed is included within it, an absent recipient present within each 
phrase. As speech-for-another, the letter must reckon that recipient’s
likely response into its every gesture The letter is the sign doubled,
overhearing itself in the ears of its addressee; and in this sense ’public’ 
and ’private’ are inseparably interwoven within it.
(Rape of Clarissa 52)
The letter is itself an ambiguous ’body’, both intimate and exposed, self-centred and 
other-directed. The letter can never be self-identical, can never figure a singular self, 
as is demonstrated by Keats’s letters to Fanny Brawne. Keats urges Fanny Brawne:
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"[Y]ou must write to me - as I will every week - for your letters keep me alive" 
(11:131). It seems that his subjectivity can only be validated through correspondence 
with an other. But to send a letter is also to risk being (mis)construed by the 
addressee, to compete for the control of meaning. Keats’s anxieties about self-identity 
surface in his attempts to control Fanny’s writing (like Richardson, the "editor" of 
Clarissa. Keats authorizes elisions and revisions that wiU shore up his position): "I 
enclose a passage from one of your Letters which I want you to alter a little - 1 want 
(if you will have it so) the matter express’d less coldly to me" (11:312). The force of 
authorial desire is carried in the reiterated "I want" ; Fanny is invited to concur with 
Keats’s desire, to read him according to his script. Fanny’s desire is parenthesized, 
contained, though the conditional inscribes the possibility of non-concurrence. Sonia 
Hofkosh sums up the scenario: "Keats’s love letters demonstrate that ’the love of a 
woman’ involves competition over who writes the story of the poet’s desire" ("The 
Writer’s Ravishment" 106-107).
The epistolary subject is constructed relationally (or competitively) with his/her 
addressee, and is subject to peipetual revisions during a correspondence. Susan 
Wolfson argues that "[t]he flexibility of letter-writing ...appealed to Keats" because 
it enabled him to annotate the "compositions and decompositions" of the mind, and 
she distinguishes this record of the self from the life-writing of other Romantic 
figures:
[Tlhough a sum of letters may in effect constitute a version of 
autobiography, the epistolary composition of self is conditioned 
primarily by the immediate occasion, compared to the retrospective 
self-fashioning refmed by the autobiographer. In the overall processes
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of letter-writing, self-representation is for the moment, to be cast and
recast on subsequent occasions. ("Keats the Letter-Writer" 44-45) 
Letter-writing is the activity of a subject-in-process.
Traditionally, the literary history of letters is associated with women: the 
eighteenth-century epistolary novel (whether by male or female writers) marks "a 
collective obsessing about an idea called ’woman’" (Kamuf, Fictions ix).^ Mary 
Favret has recently reminded us that the "fiction of the letter’s ’femininity’" is 
precisely that, a fiction, and as such it figures only one possible, though privileged, 
narrative about epistolarity (Romantic Correspondence 15). It is worth recalling the 
range of eighteenth-century ’letters’: the century that witnessed Clarissa’s voluminous 
correspondence, which turned on the preservation of the integrity of the female self, 
in other words an ostensibly private discourse about sexuality, also saw Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, a public discourse about the security of the 
state and its institutions."  ^ Nevertheless, the femininity of the letter and the 
(ef)feminization of the letter-writer, are paradigms that are still evoked in the theories 
of Derrida and Barthes, in an on-going correspondence with the epistolary genre.^ 
As Derrida points out, the letter is a paradigmatic text: originating out of a lack of 
presence, it substitutes for the body of the writer, and in this sense, too, it may be 
perceived as feminine, lending itself to comprehension by analogy with the female 
body. For Ruth Perry, the confessional quality of letters marks out a private space 
that, "like virginity, invites violation" (Women. Letters 70). Letters are doubly at risk, 
in that as physical artifacts which stand as metonyms for the body of the writer, they 
may be tampered with: think of Lovelace, unable to keep his hands off Clarissa’s 
letters - the violation of her letters is a prelude to, and analogue of, the violation of
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her body; or recall De Quincey’s advice to his male readers if they "desire to read our 
noble language in its native beauty": "steal the mail bags", he tells them, "and break 
open all the letters in female handwriting" (Jordan 66-67).
Letters memorialize the absence of the other; Barthes has explored the 
implications of this lover’s discourse:
Historically, the discourse of absence is carried on by the Woman ...
It is Woman who gives shape to absence, elaborates its fiction, for she 
has time to do so; ... in any man who utters the other’s absence 
something feminine is declared: this man who waits and who suffers 
from his waiting is miraculously feminized. A man is not feminized 
because he is inverted but because he is in love. (A Lover’s Discourse 
13-14)
The question that must be asked, at least in the terms of this discussion, is whether 
a man can articulate this amorous absence from the place of the woman? Is the male 
letter-writer, the writer of love letters (and I ’m thinking here, in particular, of Keats’s 
letters to Fanny Brawne), merely in drag, or is he, in Anne MeUor’s more favourable 
terminology, an "ideological cross-dresser", who embraces a feminine ideology 
(Romanticism and Gender 171)?^
* * * * *
A p o e t ... has no Identity - he is continually 
in for - and filling some other Body.
John Keats
Margaret Homans is a resisting reader of Keats; she acknowledges that "[a]t first 
glance, it might seem that women readers, then and now, would be especially 
sympathetic to Keats above the other high romantics. His lower-middle-class origins
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and lack of university education - he couldn’t read Greek and kept getting the 
pronunciations of classical names wrong - make him a candidate for honorary 
membership in Virginia Woolf’s ’Outsider’s Society’" ("Keats Reading Women" 341). 
She argues, however, that this reading is ultimately misguided, and that Keats’s letters 
and poems demonstrate an "assertion of masculinity" which makes him "a member 
of the male club" of high literature (368). Homans contends that Keats’s quest for 
identity involves a characteristically Romantic colonization of the "other" through 
"acts of self-aggrandizing appropriation", which is Homans’s description of "negative 
capability" (352).^ I will come back to the details of Homans’s argument; I would 
place my own reading, however, in the genealogy of women readers, like Mrs. 
Oliphant, who align Keats with "the woman’s part".
Throughout the nineteenth-century Keats was marketed as especially 
appropriate for female readers, and denominated "The Daintiest of Poets" by a woman 
writer in the Victoria Magazine (May 1870). As Wolfson notes, Keats’s poetry 
flourished in publications such as The Young Lady’s Book of Elegant Poetry (1835) 
and The Ladies’ Companion (1837); The Girl’s Second Help to Reading (1854) 
claimed to present "such passages as referred specially to the high duties which 
woman is called upon to perform in life", though it curiously included three stanzas 
(xxiii-xxv) from "The Eve of St. Agnes" (Matthews, Critical Heritage 10).* While 
male readers frequently castigated Keats’s character and work as "effeminate", women 
readers bonded with Keats in the sympathetic identification of mother and child. 
Susan Wolfson has documented the way "[a]U those expressions of ’poor Keats! ’ [the 
phrase is used, for example, by Elizabeth Barrett Browning] evoked responses 
conventionally deemed ’feminine’, activating impulses to pity, nurture, and protect"
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("Feminizing Keats" 324)/ The post-Adonais perception of Keats as a fragile flower 
aroused the chivaMc feelings of male defenders but appealed primarily to women/® 
Mrs. Oliphant’s heartfelt defence of the "poor young poet ... savagely used by the 
censors of literature" is paradigmatic (qtd. in Wolfson 324). Oliphant’s sympathetic 
feminization/ infantabzation of Keats continues through Amy Lowell’s characterization 
of the "Poor little shaver, so pitiably unable to cope with his first great sorrow" (1:14). 
Recent feminist critics have reinflected Victorian ideologies of the maternal and the 
feminine through the use of Chodorowian theories, valorizing those aspects of Keats’s 
work that seem to avoid the egotisitical subliminity of much male Romanticism. “ 
In particular, several critics have appropriated Keatsian "negative capability" for 
feminism. I would like to look in some detail at the rhetoric of these claims, and at 
Keats’s own definitions of poetic identity, as a way into the body of my argument 
about the destabilization of gender boundaries.
Keats defined ''Negative Capability" as "when man is capable of being in 
uncertainties. Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason" 
(1:193). David Masson describes this as "a power of remaining, and, as it were, 
luxuriously lolling, in doubts, mysteries, and half-solutions, toying with them, and 
tossing them, in aU their complexity, into forms of beauty, instead of piercing on 
narrowly and in pain after Truth absolute and inaccessible" (Matthews 374). For 
Masson, writing in 1860, Keats fails to take the sublimely painful path of masculinity. 
If Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty, this comment tells us all we need to know about 
the rhetoric of violence that encodes the male poet as an explorer penetrating and 
colonizing beauty and truth.
Erica Jong rejects this masculine mode:
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[F]eminism means empathy. And empathy is akin to the quality Keats 
called ’negative capability’ - that unique gift for projecting oneself into 
other states of consciousness, (qtd. in Wolfson 349)^^
In the eighteenth-century, empathy was marked as a feminine quality, though, like 
tears and other emotional reactions, it was increasingly appropriated by the "man of 
feeling" purveyed in the literature of sensibility. Jong perceives Keats’s "negative 
capability" as feminist in that it involves the identification of the self with other[s], 
thereby destabilizing Aristotelian hierarchies. This empathetic identification is 
resistant to a monolithic, masculinist construction of identity. However, Jong’s 
formulation focusses on consciousness-raising at the expense of consciousness-risking: 
the self-confidence of the term "projecting" suggests that, unlike Keats, Jong has no 
fear of flying over the abyss of identity. In an interview between Adrienne Rich and 
Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi, Keats’s phrase is again invoked to underwrite the 
revalorisation of feminine sensibility.^^ Rich suggests that the
so-called ’weak ego boundaries’ of women might be a negative way of 
describing the fact that women have tremendous powers of intuitive 
identification and sympathy with other people. And, yes, a woman 
could get totally lost in that - she can lose all sense of her own ego, 
but that is not necessary - it might be a source of power.
BCG: John Keats had weak ego boundaries.
AR: Negative capability. Exactly. Any artist has to have it to some 
extent. ... The male ego, which is described as the strong ego, could 
really be the weak ego, because it encapsulates itself. (Gelpi and 
Gelpi, Adrienne Rich’s Poetrv 115)
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Rich’s comments (in contrast to Jong’s) articulate precisely the double drift of 
Keatsian subjectivity. The male ego, that "Wordsworthian or egotistical sublime" is 
"a thing per se, and stands alone", as Keats puts it (1:387); it "encapsulates itself" in 
Rich’s words, and she perceives these strong boundary lines as a limitation, weakness 
masquerading as strength. The permeable ego boundaries of women are valorized 
over the unitary male self, though Rich’s use of modals ("might", "could") suggests 
the power of the hegemonic ideologies of gender within which this reversal of values 
must operate.
In a letter to Woodhouse (27 Oct. 1818), Keats proposes that,
[T]he poetical Character itself ... is not itself - it has no self - it is
everything and nothing - It has no character - it enjoys light and shade;
it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or 
elevated. ...A  poet ...has no Identity - he is continually in for - and 
filling some other Body. (1:387)
Identification with the other enables a potential plenitude (’filling some other Body’), 
the pleasures of the polymorphously perverse "cameUon poet" ; but on the other hand, 
this decentredness carries the risk of loss, of emptiness (the overall semantic and
grammatical emphasis is negative). Anne MeUor suggests that Keats’s fluid sense of
self is similar to Dorothy Wordsworth’s, especially as imaged in her "Floating Island" 
poem, but this poem itself may be read from contradictory perspectives, as either 
figuring the positive expansion of the self (the female subject as capacious, nurturing, 
plural) or the dispersal of any sense of identity.
In the letter to Richard Woodhouse in which he theorises about the "poetical 
character", Keats reproduces a scene of self-erasure:
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When I am in a room with People if I ever am free from speculating 
on creations of my own brain, then not myself goes home to myself: 
but the identity of every one in the room begins to press upon me that,
I am in a very little time anhilated [sic] - not only among Men; it 
would be the same in a nursery of Children. (1:387)
Jong and Rich claim Keats for feminism because of his malleable ego boundaries. 
These ego boundaries are also bodily boundaries, as is suggested by the double 
signification, psychic and physical, which is felt in the verb "to p ress" .B arb ara  
Gelpi, adapting the work of Carole Pateman, points out that "men interact with one 
another through an individuality established in the capacity of their bodies as their 
own bounded property to possess the ’permeable’, unbounded bodies of women" 
(Shelley’s Goddess 11).^  ^ In his comments that "[a] poet ...has no Identity", Keats 
tellingly shifts from "It" to "he" precisely at the moment when the poet is "filling 
some other Body": this phrase and the pronomial slippage irrestistably suggests an 
appropriative (hetero)sexual matrix, the penetration of the weak-boundaried feminine 
by the strong male ego and the cannibdization of those qualities it d e s ire s .B u t 
this colonization is unstable for Keats cannot remain self-identical ("not myself goes 
home to myself"): in the same letter, he occupies the feminine position, pressed upon, 
permeable, possessed by others, the body over which other men (or even children) 
assert their identities.
HazHtt’s critique makes explicit the cultural resonances of Keats’s anxiety of 
authority. He cites the latter’s poetry as an example of "effeminate style", a poetry 
deficient "in masculine energy of style ...there was a want of strength and substance 
...All is soft and fleshy, without bone or muscle" ("On Effeminacy of Character"
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8:254-55). Hazlitt invokes the material sexuality of the female body (lacking definite 
boundaries, matter without form) to characterise the textual body of Keats’s poetry. 
Hazlitt consigns Keats to ’otherness’, to the marginal (or Hminal) position of 
effeminacy. For Virginia Woolf, Keats is an example of the ideally "androgenous" 
writer ("man-womanly ...and woman-manly"); "The androgenous mind is resonant 
and porous", writes Woolf (Room 94). Though their value judgments are 
diametrically opposed, Woolf and Hazlitt deploy a rhetoric which suggests the 
instability of bodily parameters, Woolf’s "porous" mind proleptically figuiing the 
"shapeless" woman without "a bone in her body" who is overshadowed by the 
egotistical rigidity of the male
The emphasis on the somatic dimension of the self, in Keats’s own comments 
and in the cultural critique of his work, involves a telling gender reversal along the 
lines suggested by Judith Butler above (see 194-5); the implications of patriarchy’s 
dualist engendering of the body are perhaps most clearly expressed by Patricia 
Yaeger:
[I]f somatophobia, or fear of the body’s fleshliness and mutability, 
characterizes our conflicts with women’s bodies, then asomia, or 
bodilessness, characterizes our way of describing and thinking about 
the father. ("The Father’s Breasts" 9)
To trace the perpetual construction and deconstruction of the subject in Keats’s letters 
is to traverse the no man’s land of "Negative Capability", that area of doubt, which, 
far from being disembodied, is an uncertainty inscribed in a rhetoric of embodiment, 
a discourse that that figures the (male) subject’s fear of his own (female) 
fleshliness.
* * * * *
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A gordian complication o f feelings.
John Keats
Some feminist critics might not wish the critical focus to shift quite so quickly to "the 
woman within" the male writer (in Diane Hoeveler’s phrase). How can my reading 
deal with the traditional distinctions of gender and corresponding sexist, even 
misogynistic, judgements that litter Keats’s letters? We remember Keats’s "opinion 
... of the generallity [sic] of women - who appear to me as children to whom I would 
rather give a Sugar Plum than my time" (1:404; this accords with the view of Byron’s 
Don Juan, who thinks that a looking-glass and a few plums will satisfy a woman). 
Or, consider this misogynist ascription of lack and erasure of differences:
This same inadequacy is discovered ...in Women with few exceptions 
- the Dress Maker, the blue Stocking and the most charming 
sentimentalist differ but in a Slight degree, and are equally smokeable.
(H: 18-19)
He insists that he does not write for women but for men, and that "[he] dislLke[s] the 
favour of the public with the love of a woman", both are "cloying treacle" 
(H: 163,144). He writes of his ambition "to upset the drawling of the bluestocking 
literary world", a comment that trivializes women’s writing as mere "drawling", 
though the ambition itself suggests that the male writer must compete within a 
feminized literary market-place (H:139).^® Diane Hoeveler asserts that Keats’s 
"poems ... reflect his own sense of castration at the hands of a feminine marketplace, 
increasingly dominated by women as both readers and writers of literary texts" 
(238).^  ^ Keats, then, defensively reinscribes the dominance of male over female, 
classing women with "roses and sweetmeats", and constructing heroines (so he 
believed) who "never see themselves dominant" (1:327). We could not expect Keats
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to be unentrammelled by the gender ideologies of his period, but the "gordian 
complication of [his] feelings" towards women issues as an oscillation between 
gendered subject positions (1:342). Against Keats’s masculinist stance, I would like 
to set some examples of his shifting between gender roles, though I am especially 
interested in instances of the attraction / repulsion of self-feminization. The following 
analyses wiU support my contention that the rhetorics of engenderment and of 
embodiment are entangled in a gordian knot.
* * * * *
You have maimed me again.
John Keats
In his letters, Keats frequently figures himself as feminine. In a letter to Taylor and 
Hessey (10 June 1817) in which he requests a loan, Keats declares: "I must endeavour 
to lose my Maidenhead with respect to money Matters as soon as possible - and I wiU 
to[o] - " and, suspecting that they would prefer ’plain’ speaking to his 
circumlocutions, Keats explains, "I am a Uttle maidenish or so - and I feel my 
virginity come strong upon me" (1:147,148). He uses the same figure in writing to 
Dilke about the scenery on the Isle of Wight:
I have been so many finer walks, with a back ground of lake and 
mountain instedd [sic] of the sea, that I am not much touch’d with it, 
though I credit it for aU the Surprise I should have felt if it had taken 
my cockney maidenhead - But I may caU myself an old Stager in the 
picturesque, and unless it be something very large and overpowering,
I cannot receive any extraordinary reUsh. (11:135)
Keats appropriates the feminine as an ironic manoeuvre: this is an identification that 
is adopted in order to be rejected (by the reader), yet the terms of the identification
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destablize the strategy. Keats uses the word "maidenhead" to connote innocence, 
integrity, self-sufficiency, but it is a word, too, which refers to a physical boundary, 
the unbroken hymen that marks the intact female body. To accept money from 
another is to place oneself in a position of feminine dependence (I’ll come back to 
the intersecting economies of class and gender in Keats’s writing), to prostitute one’s 
identity. Keats, the reluctant whore, writes himself into a Hminal space, the unhappy 
hymen between masculinity and femininity, and this issues as wayward style, 
precisely the type of indirect discourse which HazHtt finds so offensivly effeminate. 
In the Isle of Wight letter, Keats’s gender positions are erratic: Keats’s concern for 
his "[un]touch’d" "cockney maidenhead" places him as virginally feminine, while the 
"old Stager" performs the part of masculine maturity; then this role is destabilized by 
the comically pornographic desire for "something very large and overpowering" (here 
is the phalHc sexiness of the Sublime rather than the prettiness of the picturesque), 
which recasts this narrative as the memoirs of a woman of pleasure (or, alternatively, 
suggests the dynamics of homoeroticism). The insecurities of a culturally- 
marginaUsed male issue in the rhetorical sHppage between male and female bodies, 
between the internal and the external, and are mediated by the performative self- 
consciousness of the "old Stager".
Keats’s "maiden" tendencies are perhaps most famously figured in the simile 
comparing "human life to a large Mansion of Many Apartments" in which he charts 
the progress from "the infant, or thoughtless Chamber" to "the Chamber of Maiden- 
Thought" (1:280-81). The latter is a curiously doubled space: it succeeds the infant 
chamber and yet seems to constitute a regression to a womb-like space; its "maiden" 
status is compromised by the aura of sexual promise (the subject is "intoxicated".
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"delaying ...in  delight"); it is a maternal space with paternal effects ("among the 
effects this breathing is father of..."). The chamber produces a bisexual being: 
"sharpening one’s vision into the heart and nature of Man", it incisively defines the 
penetrating gaze of masculinity; but another effect is "of convincing ones nerves that 
the world is full of Misery and Heartbreak, Pain, Sickness, and oppression". Here the 
appeal is to female sensibility, drawing on the extensive body of poetry, philosophy 
and criticism which hystericized the female body, turning the body into a text which 
signified its experiences literally, that is, physiologically. Keatsian poetic theory must 
be tested on our pulses: "axioms in philosophy are not axioms tül they are proved on 
our pulses" (1:279), Keats tells us, proleptically echoing the bodily ground of much 
feminist theory, as well as disrupting the masculine codification of philosophy by 
mapping it onto the (implicitly female) body.
In other letters this bodily ground radically disturbs Keats’s sense of selfhood, 
as Keats ascribes to, and finds himself marked by, the ideology of female ’lack’. 
Replying to a letter from Haydon, in which Haydon reproaches Keats for falsely 
raising his financial hopes, Keats writes suggestively: "[Y]ou have maimed me again; 
I was whole I had begun reading again - when your note came I was engaged in a 
Book" (11:55). Phallic wholeness, the closed, classical body (to use Bakhtin’s terms) 
is for Keats always provisional, its boundaries have to be constantly resecured ("you 
have maimed me again"). As a "maimed" body, it is akin to Bakhtin’s and Kristeva’s 
account of the grotesque [feminine] body (the body which melts, leaks, dissolves). 
Significantly, bodily parameters are connected with reading (and implicitly, with 
writing): the feminine body may not be able to express itself in the language of the 
Symbolic, but the connection also reminds us that the body is always the body in
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discourse. Many of Keats’s commentators, whether their critique is positive or 
negative, describe Keats in terms of the body, especially a penetrable, or maimed, 
body. In the preface to Adonais. Shelley writes that "Keats’s [heart was] composed 
of ...penetrable stuff" (Shelley 391). James Russell Lowell, who like many other 
critics constrasts Wordsworth and Keats, writes that "Poesy was his [Wordsworth’s] 
employment; it was Keats’s very existence, and he felt the rough treatment of his 
verses as if it had been the wounding of a Hmb" (Matthews 361); David Punter places 
his comments on Keats under the heading "Keats and the wound" (Romantic 
Unconscious 57). In a letter to Fanny Brawne, Keats declares: "I hold that place 
among Men which snub-nos’d brunettes with meeting eyebrows do among women" 
(11:133). Keats is arguing at this point that he is "not a thing to be admired", that, 
unlike Fanny, he cannot be the object of the other’s gaze.^  ^ But the analogy he uses, 
though motivated by the desire to place himself "among Men", equates him with 
"snub-nos’d brunettes with meeting eyebrows" who do not fulfil cultural ideals of 
female beauty. The surfaces of these female bodies are inscribed with modalities of 
imperfection: Keats and these brunettes are marked by a kind of cultural ’graffiti’ as 
inadequately gendered. The "snub-nos’d brunettes" function as both Other and self- 
image, the site onto which anxieties about physical and social status - cultural 
boundaries - are displaced, and the mirror image that marks precisely the blurring of 
these boundaries.
In a letter to Reynolds (19 Feb. 1818), Keats figures himself as a flower, 
flirtatiously feminizing the Wordsworthian epistemology of "wise passiveness" 
This passage has drawn the attention of several recent feminist critics:
It has been an old Comparison for our urging on - the Bee hive -
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however it seems to me that we should rather be the flower than the 
Bee - for it is a false notion that more is gained by receiving than 
giving - no the receiver and the giver are equal in their benefits - The 
flower I doubt not receives a fair guerdon from the Bee - its leaves 
blush deeper in the next spring - and who shall say between Man and 
Woman which is the most delighted? Now it is more noble to sit Hke 
Jove tha[n] to fly like Mercury - let us not therefore go hurrying about 
and collecting honey-bee like, buzzing here and there impatiently from 
a knowledge of what is to be arrived at: but let us open our leaves like 
a flower and be passive and receptive - budding patiently under the eye 
of Apollo and taking hints from eve[r]y noble insect that favors us with 
a visit ... . (1:232)
Keats subverts the gendered hierarchies male/female, active/passive, aligning himself 
with the productive sexual passivity and receptivity of women and flowers rather than 
the busy masculinity of the bee. He deflects attention from a linear teleology ("a 
knowledge of what is to be arrived at"), substituting process for progress. Though 
flowers, women and poets bud "under the eye of Apollo", they also elude the Law of 
the Father, promiscuously receiving/giving pleasure from/to "eve[r]y noble insect that 
favours us with a visit" and producing a bodily script, a surface "blush". Earlier in 
the letter, Keats aligns himself with the "beautiful circuiting" of the spider which is 
spun from her own body, and he thereby implicitly associates himself with the 
’feminine’ activities of spinning and w e a v in g .A n n e  Mellor argues that in the 
flower and spider analogies, and in his privileging in the same letter of "hints" and 
"whispers", "Keats has anticipated the categories of what modem feminist
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philosophers have called ’women’s ways of knowing’", ways that cannot be 
comprehended within the boundaries of analytic reasoning (Romanticism and Gender 
178).
However, to return to the details of the passage above, Keats then extends the 
flower/bee analogy to take in the figure of Jove, and "[n]o one", as Margaret Homans 
points out, "could be less passive or flower-like than Jove" ("Keats Reading Women" 
345). Homans expounds that "Keats habitually makes the apparent femininity of his 
negative capability enhance masculine power and pleasure" ; the suggestion here is that 
he appropriates aspects of femininity, while avoiding the threat of emasculation by 
invoking the figure of Jove, whose passivity is the solidity and immovability of 
power. The male poet can therefore receive a double measure of delight (if Tiresias 
thought that woman was more "delighted" than man, here the ’woman’ in question 
is Jove). I would suggest that socio cultural imperatives urge Keats towards 
réinscriptions of masculinity, but that this project cannot be seen in absolute terms. 
Masculinity itself is not presented as an homogeneous category, but is fissured by 
differences within, the gap between manly Jove and boyish Mercury. At the end of 
the letter, Keats shifts from privileging either feminine receptivity or Jovean 
sublimity: "I am sensible all this is a mere sophistication, however it may neighbour 
to any truths, to excuse my own indolence - so I wül not deceive myself that Man 
should be equal with jove - but think himself very well off as a sort of scuUion- 
Mercury or even a humble Bee" (1:233). Finally, he evades the politics and poetics 
of engenderment: "It is [no] matter whether I am right or wrong either one way or 
another". Rather than appropriating femininity in order to underwrite masculine 
identity, this seems to me the most striking example of Keats as a Kristevan "subject
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in process". The oscillation between male and female destabilizes any concept of 
bounded identity, as the subject "traverse[s]" sexual differences (Kristeva, 
"Oscillation" 165).
* * * * *
Touch has a memory.
John Keats
If Keats at times inscribes himself "on the opposite side from that to which [he] is 
anatomically destined" (Mitchell and Rose 49), yet the signifiers of the body that 
punctuate his letters remain bound to the female ’other’. In A Lover’s Discourse 
Roland Barthes writes that "the lover - the one who has been ravished - is always 
implicitly feminized" (188-89). From early in its history, the verb "to ravish" takes 
a female object and denotes a male subject (famously, in Keats, the "still unravished 
bride" portrayed on the Grecian um), yet, in a reversal of classical gender positions, 
Keats writes to Fanny Brawne in October 1819: "You have ravish’d me away by a 
Power that I cannot resist" (11:224).^  ^ Keats attempts to maintain the illusion of self- 
possession by framing Fanny as the object of his gaze (focusing on her beauty, while 
emphasizing that he is "not a thing to be admired"), but his visual rhetoric is engulfed 
by the discourse of dissolution.^* He succumbs, for example, to "a swooning 
admiration of [Fanny’s] beauty" (H:133). Keats exhibits the symptoms of sensibility, 
the quality that, from the late eighteenth-century, was more and more associated with 
women. According to Janet Todd, sensibility was generally regarded as being 
"physically based, a quality of nerves turning easily to illness and described in 
contemporary medical treatises in terms of movements within the body"; the noun is 
disparagingly qualified by "’acute’ in Austen, ’trembling’ in Hazlitt, ’mawkish’ in 
Coleridge, and ’sickly’ in Byron" (Sensibility 7-8). "[Y]ou might almost say", muses
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James Russell Lowell, that "he could feel sorrow with his hands, so truly did his 
body, like that of Donne’s mistress, think and remember and forebode" (Matthews 
360). Keats writes from the Isle of Wight to his "sweet Physician" that he has 
recovered from illness "only to feel the languor I have felt after you touched with 
ardency", for touch has a memory which engenders a bodily script (11:129).^^  As 
he writes to Fanny, "my mind is in a tremble, I cannot tell what I am writing", an 
admission in which the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body is transgressed by the 
verb "tremble" (11:224). He returns again and again to the process of absorption: 
"You absorb me in spite of myself"; "[I]t seems to me that a few more moments 
thought of you would uncrystaUize and dissolve me" (11:133,142). Fanny absorbs all 
thoughts of others, blotting out thoughts of his sister, for example; "Every hour I am 
more and more concentrated in you", as though the self were dissolved and 
reconstituted as an/other essence. The cutting edge of masculinity is transferred to 
the female figure, who has a "crystal conscience". To Joseph Severn, Keats confesses 
that "[he has] been so very lax, unemployed, unmeridian’d, and objectless"; without 
a coherent object, the subject lacks a stable centre, as is exposed in the very grammar 
of the ravished lover which is characterised by negative prefixes and suffixes which 
erode the borders of words and concepts (11:227). In the letter to Fanny in which he 
refers to being "ravish’d ...away by a Power I cannot resist", ravishment connotes not 
the violent penetration of rape but a dangerously seductive dissolution:
My love has made me selfish - I cannot exist without you - I am 
forgetful of everything but seeing you again - my Life seems to stop 
there - 1 see no further. You have absorb’d me. I have a sensation at 
the present moment as though I was dissolving - ...I should be affraid
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(sic) to separate myself far from you. . . .I  have no limit now to my 
love - Your note came in just here. ...I could die for you. ...My Love 
is selfish - 1 cannot breathe without you. (11:223-24)
The traditional metaphor of poetic inspiration through the female muse is rewritten 
as an inability to breathe without the lover. The first person pronoun punctuates this 
passage, but it exists in a Hminal position, always aleady under erasure, absorbed by 
the other, dissolving, merging, expiring. Here is what Roland Barthes caUs "the 
gentleness of the abyss", or what SheUey described as "that verge where words 
abandon us", the domain where, despite wishful repetition, signifier and signified, and 
self and other, can never coincide (Barthes, Lover’s Discourse 11; SheUey 478).
Keats indulges in the erotic possibiHties of the letter as a physical artifact 
which metonymicaUy stands in for the body of the (necessarily) absent writer: he asks 
Fanny, for example, to "write the softest words and kiss them that I may at least 
touch my Hps where yours have been"; the adjective "softest", with its connotations 
of tactüity, is a signifier of the desire to close the gap between language and the body 
(H:123). "Do not caU it foUy," Keats begs Fanny Brawne, "when I teU you I took 
your letter last night to bed with me. In the morning I found your name on the 
sealing wax obHterated" : the signature of the feminine HteraUy melts onto the body 
of the male, blurring the boundaries between them (H:129).^® In another letter to 
Fanny, Keats reveals: "I kiss’d your writing over in the hope you had indulg’d me 
by leaving a trace of honey" (H:127).^  ^ Keats kisses the letter, producing a bodily 
reaction to language, a gesture which blends the corporeal and the mental. Keats 
shares with Helene Cixous a grounding of reading and writing in the erotic body, 
which is figured through images of proximity. In her essay, "La Venue a l’écriture".
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Cixous writes: "Texts I ate them, I sucked them, I kissed them" (qtd. in GaUop, 
Thinking 165). Cixous promotes a "feminine" textuality that is defined by analogy 
with the plurality of female sexuality ("a feminine textual body" is like "a. female 
libidinal economy"); "There’s tactility in the feminine text, there’s touch, and this 
touch passes through the ear. Writing in the feminine is passing on what is cut out 
by the Symbolic, the voice of the mother, passing on what is most archaic" 
("Castration or Decapitation" 53-54).^  ^ Keats’s ingestion of female language and 
female bodily fluid remakes the boundaries between bodies: masculine solidity slips 
into feminine fluidity. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar have theorized that in the 
masculine literary order the pen is analogous to the penis, and it inscribes a female 
blank page; the male relation to textuality is, in other words, mediated through an 
instrument. Byron famously shifts the focus of this instrumentality in accusing Keats 
of soHpsistic onanism: he described Keats’s work as "p-ss a bed poetry", "a sort of 
mental masturbation" produced by "f[ri]gg[in]g his Imagination" (Byron’s Letters and 
Journals 7:200,225,217). Oral sex, however, might be a more accurate (and generous) 
paradigm of Keatsian textuality than onanism. Keats is in direct oral/tactile contact 
with the texts he receives and reads, and, by implication, with those he sends; he is
"writing [and reading] in the feminine"
* * * * *
Would you wean a man from sensuous excesses by the 
inevitable consequences to which they lead?
William Hazlitt
Keats’s language, especially in those letters to or about Fanny, is characterized by 
repetitions, ellipses, the breathless syntax created by the frequent use of dashes, and 
a semantic emphasis on fluidity. Keats frequently plays self-consciously with the
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possibilities of language, for example, in his frivolous comment to the Dilkes: "my 
modest feathered Pen frizzles like baby roast beef at making its entrance among such 
tantrum sentences - or rather ten senses" (11:35-36); or, to Fanny Keats about a 
clergyman: "a great deal depends upon a cock’d hat and powder - not gun powder, 
lord love us, but lady-meal, violet-smooth, dainty-scented lilly-white, feather-soft, 
wigsby-dressing, coat-collar-spoiling whisker-reaching, pig-tail loving, swans down- 
puffing, parson-sweetening powder" (11:56). In a letter to the George Keatses, he 
addresses his sister: "I very much want a little of your wit my dear sister", and then 
proceeds with a breathless outpouring of questions, matched only by Laura’s at the 
end of Beppo. Most interesting, I think, are the provocative misspellings and 
unconscious puns of the later letters. If, as Lacan says, ’the unconscious is structured 
like a language’, there are some telling linguistic slips. "[A]stonished" at Fanny’s 
"luxurious power over [his] senses", Keats writes that "Even when I am not thinking 
of you I receive your influence and a tenderer nature steeling upon me" (11:126). In 
the following month (August 1819), in a "flint-worded Letter", he tells Fanny Brawne, 
"My heart seems now made of iron" (11:142,141). To Reynolds, he confesses that "all 
my thoughts and feelings which are of the selfish nature, home speculations every day 
continue to make me more Iron", and this manly solidity bolsters the conviction that 
"fine writing is next to fine doing the top thing in the world" (11:146). Though Keats 
admits, "I feel my Body too weak to support me to the height", yet if the body is a 
discursive construct, perhaps language can solidify bodily boundaries (11:147). It’s 
as though a slip of the pen ("steeling") engenders the defensive iron-clad metaphors 
that will protect him against feminine fluidity, and prioritize writing over women.^ "^  
Yet this trifling with language (whether conscious or unconscious) also reveals the
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arbitrariness of the linguistic sign system: according to Jonathan CuUer, "puns 
represent the disquieting spectacle of a functioning of language where boundaries - 
between sounds, between sound and letter, between meanings - count for less than 
one might imagine and where supposedly discrete meanings threaten to sink into fluid 
subterranean signifieds too indefinable to be called concepts" (On Puns 3). In other 
words, language offers only a shifting ground (though there is no other) for the 
construction of subjectivity; the language that demarcates bodily boundaries also 
dissolves them.
As I have suggested, Keats’s letters, in their inscription of the body, seem to 
approximate to the language for speaking the feminine, the écriture feminine gestured 
towards by certain French feminists. As well as anticipating Gallic ’body-talk’ (and 
thereby giving credence to Gilbert and Gubar’s claims for the romantic origins of 
écriture feminine), Keats’s language (like Shelley’s) evokes Kristeva’s work on poetic 
language. It is possible to describe Keats’s puns, self-contradiction, oscillation, and 
repetitions as disrupting the linear logic of the signifying chain. A few comments on 
Kristeva’s influential concept of the semiotic (or the semiotic chora) are necessary 
here.^ ^
The semiotic is conceptualized as "a psychosomatic modality of the signifying 
process, for which the maternal body is seen as the site" (Bronfen 194). It is 
understood as a pre-verbal moment when the child is symbioticaUy connected with 
the mother’s body, the site where instinctive drives and rhymthic pulsions develop. 
The acquisition of language involves the repression of the semiotic relation to the 
mother’s body, yet since this repression is fundamental to the constitution of the 
symbolic order, the semiotic and the symbolic exist in a dialectical relationship in the
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construction of the subject. Rita Felski observes that "[t]he semiotic ...constitutes its 
[symbolic discourse’s] other face, the link between language and the body, embodying 
the materiality of the sign as a source of pleasure" (34). While remaining "inherent 
in the symbolic", the semiotic "also [goes] beyond it and [threatens] its position"; 
Kristeva draws analogies between avant-garde textuality, psychotic discourse and 
infantine babble, all of which disrupt the homogeneity of coherent discourse 
(Revolution 81). The restless, outlawed pulsions of the semiotic disrupt the normative 
ordering of the language of communication. In other words, although the symbolic 
works to repress the semiotic, the power of the maternal chora persists in the oral or 
instinctual aspects of language, in the form of puns, verbal slips, evasions, intonation, 
even silences, that disturb the symbolic order. That this bodily language threatens the 
hegemony of monologic language, that is, language of the mind, which seems to 
represent and defend the power of the masculine, is demonstrated by Sir William 
Watson’s dismissal of Keats’s letters in the early 1890’s as "the veriest infantine 
prattle and babble", a comment which interestingly prefigures the characteristics of 
Kristeva’s semiotic chora.*^
In the letter (to the George Keatses, 21 April 1819) in which he articulates his 
notion of "the world" as "’The Vale of Soul-making’", Keats writes that "the Heart 
...is the teat from which the Mind or intelligence sucks its identity" (11:102,103).*  ^
In Chapter One I discussed Alan Richardson’s argument that the male poets 
supplemented masculinity with the attractive aspects of femininity. Typically, these 
"fantasies of incorporation" take the form of images of the mother’s body whereby 
the male speaker identifies with the mother’s body in pre-Oedipal fantasies 
(Richardson, "Romanticism" 15). Richardson details a range of poetic images of
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maternal nursing which allow the male speaker to incorporate ’female’ values of 
sympathy and nurture, and he argues that behind this apparent revaluation of the 
female body lies a strategy of appropriative androgyny which seeks to place female 
qualities, and the female body, as merely secondary to, and supportive of, the male 
subject. The image of nursing in Keats’s letter could be interpreted, from this 
perspective, as supporting male poetic identity, while the mother remains a fetishized 
figure (symbolized by her breast), without a voice or a desire of her own. Without 
wishing to completely suppress this interpretation, I would nevertheless suggest that 
the emphasis in Keats falls differently. Kristeva suggests that "the superego and its 
linear language ... are combatted by a return of the oral, glottic pleasure", of suction, 
expulsion, fusion, rejection (Polylogue 74).** Keats’s emphasis on the oral and the 
tactile (detailed above), and here the topos of the child at the breast, work to 
deconstruct the boundaries between bodies, the security of self-identity. If the male 
writer speaks the maternal, this is less, I would suggest, pace Richardson, a figurative 
"cannibalizing" of the m/other, than the production of a self-subverting discourse. 
Rather than self-aggrandizement, Keats’s maternal rhetoric bears the risk of self- 
annihiliation.
The threat to self-identity is most clear in the rhetoric of maternal symbiosis 
which characterizes Keats’s relationship with Fanny Brawne. "I have been 
endeavouring to wean myself from you", he writes to her in September 1819; "I am 
not strong enough to be weaned", in February 1820 (II; 160,257). The desire for 
separation is a mark of the dysphoric implications of the nurturing maternal relation. 
Keats is "absorbed" by/in Fanny; he is unable to breathe without her: the relationship 
seems to collude with his physical illness in depleting his strength. The (not-
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yet)subject is possessed by the m/other, unable to mark himself off from her, drawn 
into a confusion of bodily limits that results in the death of the (male) author.*^
Hazlitt provides the best contemporary gloss on Keats’s language. Though his 
critique is, of course, directed at Keats’s poems (and the person revealed by these 
texts), the convergence between his rhetoric and Keats’s own comments in his letters 
tells us a lot about the cultural construction of gender, and in particular about the 
anxieties provoked by the womanly man (or manly woman) in a society that has 
institutionalized oppositional sexual identities. As I noted earlier, Hazlitt cites Keats 
as an example of "an effeminacy of style in some degree corresponding to effeminacy 
of character"; he argues that such effeminacy "arises from a prevalence of the 
sensibility over the will", in other words, from an excess of feminine sensibUity, 
which during this period, as I have remarked, denotes a set of physiological responses 
("On Effeminacy" 8:254,248)."^® Alternatively, "it consists in a want of fortitude to 
bear pain or to undergo fatigue" (8:248). Represented as lack (of masculinity) rather 
than excess (of femininity), effeminacy in both instances manifests itself in bodily 
behaviour. Hazlitt writes that "Ease, vanity, pleasure, are the ruling passions" of the 
effeminate character, and he demands, "How wiU you conquer these, or wean their 
infatuated votaries from them?", and again, "Would you wean a man from sensual 
excesses by the inevitable consequences to which they lead?" (8:250,251). Hazlitt 
figures effeminacy, the transgression of proper gender boundaries, in terms of a 
closeness to the mother’s body. Twice he uses the metaphor of weaning, as though 
he is drawn obsessively to a scene of impropriety, an incestuous, emasculating 
merging with the mother’s body. He exhorts the effeminate male, who constantly 
demonstrates the failure of identity ("their identity expires with the whim, the folly.
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the passion of the hour"), to "[s]hake off the heavy honey-dew of thy soul", the
cloying liquidity which connects him with the female body. Hazlitt declares that
"[t]here is nothing more to be esteemed than a manly firmness and decision of
character" and of such a person he produces the accolade, "There is stuff in him, and
it is of the right practicable sort" (8:253)."^  ^ The ’right stuff is the solidity and
separateness of the phallocentric which engenders a corresponding "masculine energy
of style"; the "manly" character is straight-talking, he "knows his own mind and sticks
to it" and "sees at once what is to be done in given circumstances and does it"
(8:254,253). Hazlitt eschews writing which is ’unweaned’, which bears the "soft and
fleshy" traces of the [female] body (8:255).
* * * * *
As a man, and viewed in relation to social objects,
Keats was nothing.
Thomas De Quincey
Like Hazlitt, other nineteenth-century male critics deprecated Keats’s ’feminine’ 
sensibility. From Hazlitt’s characterization of Keats’s writing as "soft and fleshy" 
onward, male criticism has returned obsessively to a discourse of the body as a way 
of talking about Keats’s writing and character. Catherine Clement, who, along with 
other French feminists has reinscribed the physiological emphasis of sensibility, 
locates a language of the body which is outside of patriarchal comprehension or 
control; her comment that "Men watch but do not understand" could stand as a 
summary of the history of mainstream criticism of Keats, which is characterized by 
male aggression or embarrassment at the spectacle of Keats’s "convulsive" 
body/language ("Enslaved Enclave" 133-34). In the London Magazine (Apr. 1820), 
Peter George Patmore characterizes Endymion as "an involuntary out-pouring"; like
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the skylark’s song, Keats’s poetry "involuntarily gush[es] forth" (Matthews 136). De 
Quincey declares that "As a man, and viewed in relation to social objects, Keats was 
nothing"; the sexual resonances of the word "nothing" inscribe Keats with the ’lack’ 
of the female body (Masson 11:388). De Quincey also accuses Keats of 
"licentiousness in the treatment of his mother-tongue" (Masson 11:393)/^ Aubrey 
de Vere, writing in 1849, compares Shelley and Keats: "Shelley admired the beautiful, 
Keats was absorbed in it, and admired it no more than an infant admires the mother 
at whose breast he feeds. The deep absorption excluded all consciousness of self" 
(Matthews 342). Though I would want to question de Vere’s polarization of Keats 
and Shelley, as well as the secure objectivity of Shelleyan "admiration", what interests 
me here is that in de Vere’s formulation, Keats’s proximity to the mother’s body, 
which is figured through the physical act of breastfeeding, connotes the collapse of 
coherent subject/object boundaries, an absence of the safe distance between subject 
and object implied by the term "admiration"
The critical response to the publication of Keats’s letters to Faimy Brawne 
(1878) provides a particularly acute display of body politics. Swinburne is outraged 
at both the editor of the letters and the poet himself: "[Tjhey ought never to have 
been published ... they ought never to have been written" ; he blusters "that a manful 
kind of man or even a manly sort of boy in his love-making or in his suffering, wiU 
not howl and snivel after such a lamentable fashion". Arnold lamented in 1880 that 
the letters show "the abandonment of all reticence and dignity". For Sir William 
Watson "they bring out in strong light a poor and vulgar side of his nature", and are 
marked by "an incontinent gushiness which is neither manly nor properly boy-like, 
but simply hobbledehoyish"."^ The absorption of breast-feeding, howling and
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snivelling, incontinent gushiness: the rhetoric suggests that Keats’s writing - his 
écriture feminine - flows from a convulsed, visible body which has abandoned the 
dignity of masculinity.
Marginalizing Keats through representing him as a baby, not yet independent 
of the mother’s body and thus subject to the fluidity of the female body (an example 
of "babyish effeminacy", according to Alexander Smith [Matthews 365]) his critics 
hope to distinguish themselves from tliis inadequately gendered figure, to relegate him 
to a wild zone outside the properly defmed boundaries of gender (Matthews 365). 
As Susan Wolfson points out, "In the nineteenth-century he [Keats] has the curious 
but striking effect of making everyone who knew him or wrote about him acutely 
sensitive to definitions of manhood - that is, what it is to fulfill the conventional 
figure and behaviour of fully empowered citizenship in patriarchal society" ("Cross- 
Dressing" 615). Keats himself was, of course, sensitive to these definitions. His 
comments provide a salutary reminder that the cultural discourse of gender does not 
operate in isolation from other discourses, such as that of class. He records his 
resentment at being described as "’quite the little poet’": "You see what it is to be 
under six foot and not a lord" (11:61). Keats Hnks cultural expectations about 
masculine physique with the hegemony of class position, aware that these constitute 
mutually supportive boundary lines. Keats is marginalized in both senses, belittled 
by hostile reviewers as a "weaver boy" and "cockney poet" encroaching improperly 
into the terrain of poets and poetry, and perceived physically as insufficiently 
masculine.
The term "cockney", applied to Keats by contemporary reviewers, is worth 
looking at in more detail in this context, particularly as it reveals some of the
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problems of definition. The Oxford English Dictionary has the following entry: 
COCKNEY - egg: lit. "cocks’ egg" (noun):
1. hen’s egg, or perh. one of the small or misshapen eggs occasionally 
laid by fowls, still popularly called in some parts "cocks’ eggs".
2. "A child that sucketh long," ...a mother’s darling; pet; minion; "a child 
tenderly brought up"; hence a squeamish or effeminate feUow, "a 
milksop". . . .  Sometimes applied to a squeamish, ovemice, wanton, or 
affected woman.
3. A derisive appellation for a townsman, as the type of effeminacy in 
contrast to the hardier inhabitants of the country.
4. One bom in the city of London ...used to connote the characteristics 
in which the bom Londoner is supposed to be inferior to other 
Englishmen.
One of the ’Cockney School’.
(adj.): effeminate, squeamish. Cockney School: a nickname for a set 
of 19th century writers belonging to London, of whom Leigh Hunt was 
taken as the representative.
The term "cockney" is used, especially by John Lockhart in his Blackwood’s attack 
on the "Cockney School of Poetry", to shore up class and gender hierarchies."^  ^
Lockhart makes fun of lower-class and female poetic desire, resisting the 
encroachment of inappropriate figures into what he considers the terrain of male 
aristocratic pursuits:
The just celebrity of Robert Bums and Miss Bailhe has had the 
melancholy effect of turning the heads of we know not how many
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farm-servants and unmarried ladies; our very foot-men compose 
tragedies, and there is scarcely a superannuated governess in the island 
that does not leave a roll of lyrics behind her in her band box. 
(Redpath 519)
Because Lockhart wants to consign aU those who lack what Hazlitt calls "the right 
stuff" to a single ghetto, he uses the umbrella term "cockney", but the word’s very 
plurality creates problems of definition, of demarcating boundaries. It is a term which 
is insufficiently weaned; it remains, we might say, at a pre-Oedipal, pre-Symbolic 
level of identification, unable to differentiate coherently between child and adult, 
between an effeminate fellow and a wanton woman. The well-defended territory of 
the definition is subverted from within; to adapt Audre Lord, the master’s tools can 
dismantle the master’s house."^ ^
* * * * *
A truly manly mm [and] a truly womanly woman.
Coventry Patmore
The "definitions of manhood" alluded to by Wolfson draw attention to gender as a 
cultural construct rather than a natural fact: the body is always already the body in 
language, in representation. Coventry Patmore divides poets by gender "into two 
distinct classes" of sensibility: the first, masculine, class is dominated by the intellect, 
while the second, feminine class, of which Keats is representative, is governed by 
"beauty and sweetness"; feminine poets "are separated from the first class by a 
distance as great as that which separates a truly manly man from a truly womanly 
woman". Interestingly, though Keats is definitively located, Patmore does 
acknowledge "a border-line at which these [two classes] occasionally became 
confused" (Principle 61-62). The figure of the "border-line" concedes both the
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possibility of transgression, and the necessity to police the categories. What 
fascinates me about Patmore’s attempt to define, to separate, to establish territories, 
is that language slips from his grasp: in his effort to specify the difference between 
entities, he inadvertently subverts the notion of monolithic identity and of polarized 
identities through the use of tautology. Rhetorically, the "truly manly man" and the 
"truly womanly woman" are mirror images, each a looking-glass figure for the other. 
Moreover, the tautologous constructions expose the gap between man and masculinity, 
woman and womanliness. We might recall that Swinburne, too, can only define 
masculinity through repetition: "a manful kind of man". Tautology can be seen as 
self-cancelling, or as tracing a difference within, rather than between, entities. 
Jonathan Culler’s and Peggy Kamuf’s deconstructions of a ’ground’ of identity in 
their formulations of writing and reading as a woman are relevant here. I quote 
Kamuf’s version:
- "a woman writing as a woman" - the repetition of the "identical" term 
splits that identity, making room for a slight shift, spacing out the 
diffential meaning which has always been at work in the single term.
And the repetition has no reason to stop there, no finite number of 
times it can be repeated until it closes itself off logically, with the 
original identity recuperated in a final term. Likewise, one can find 
only arbitrary beginnings for the series, and no term which is not 
already a repetition: "...a woman reading as a woman reading as a .." 
("Writing" 298)
The series leads us in to an infinite regression, in which singular identity is always 
deferred. Tania Modleski argues that these repetitions work to dimmish the female
230
figure, while they stabilize the concept of masculine identity, "since this kind of 
tautology irresistibly suggests that man is equal to himself and his deeds"; the attempt 
to subvert the notion of "origin", according to Modleski, "works best when ’woman’ 
is the (vanishing) subject" ("Feminism and the Power of Interpretation" 134). I 
cannot address Modleski’s anxieties in detail here; I have allowed them to stand as 
a way of gesturing towards other territories of debate, other dissenting voices which 
need to be heard in the process of defining both Romanticism and feminist theory. 
My own feeling is that the pleonasms cited above rhetorically hollow out a lack at the 
heart of masculinity, inscribing insecurity about the ’essence’ of masculinity. If 
definitions of what it is to be male (or female) were so certain, there would be no 
need to supplement the nouns with qualifiers: the "truly manly man" and the "truly 
womanly woman" are the self-fissured constructs of the Symbolic order, cultural 
rather than natural, and therefore open to revision.
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Notes to Chapter Five
1. AU references to Keats’s letters are to Hyder Edward RoUins, The 
Letters of John Keats. 2 vols., subsequently cited by volume and page 
numbers.
2. These concepts are developed in Desire in Language (esp. 78-79) and 
Powers of Horror (esp. 2-11).
3. My thinking about letters has been much influenced by various studies 
of relations between the epistolary genre and the feminocentrism of the 
eighteenth-century; see, in particular, Terry Castle, Clarissa’s Ciphers: 
Terry Eagleton, The Rape of Clarissa: Peggy Kamuf, Fictions of 
Feminine Desire: Nancy K. MiUer, The Heroine’s Text. Informed by 
recent critical theories, these studies use Barthes, Derrida and Lacan (to 
name only the most prominent theorists) in constructing their analytical 
frameworks.
4. Though, of course, this apparent polarity becomes blurred when put 
under any pressure: Clarissa is, after aU, pubUshed, and exerts an 
influence in creating and sustaining ideals of femininity, while Burke’s 
politics are also sexual.
5. See, Roland Barthes A Lover’s Discourse, and Jacques Derrida The 
Post-Card and "The Law of Genre". Shari Penstock’s comments 
iUuminatingly on Derridean epistolarity in "From Letter to Literature"; 
see also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Love Me".
6. This is currently a buzz word in Keats criticism: Alan BeweU, for
instance, writes of "Keats’s stylistic cross-dressing", that is, Keats
draws on "the language of contemporary women’s poetry" (93). See
also Marlon Ross, Contours 155-72. In citing Roland Barthes, I have 
ignored the homosexual matrix that displaces a heterosexist framework 
in his writings.
7. In her earlier work. Women Writers. Homans located Keats outside the 
dominant "masculine tradition". The article under discussion in which 
she reinscribes Keats within masculine boundaries is an illuminating, 
brilliantly-written polemic which continues to make me feel a bit 
uncomfortable about ’feminizing Keats’.
8. All references to writers included in Keats: The Critical Heritage, will 
be cited as Matthews, followed by page number(s).
9. Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s comments are in Matthews 295.
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10. The male defence gives Keats ’the woman’s part’: Reynolds in his 
critique of "the Quarterly Reviewers" in 1818 moves straight from his 
observation on their treatment of Lady Morgan ("a woman is the best 
prey for its malignity, because it is the gentlest and most undefended") 
to "the unmerciful condemnation that has been passed on Mr Keats" 
(Matthews 118). Shelley in a letter to Lord Byron notes that "if [he] 
has erred" in his judgement of Hyperion, "[he] can console [himself] 
by reflecting that it is in defence of the weak" (Letters 11:308-09). 
George Gilfillan, in language evocative of sexuality, sadism and 
slavery, finds "the Quarterly critic" was "surely cruel ...who stripped, 
and striped, and cut, and branded the muse’s Son" (Matthews 304).
11. Chodorow’s theories are outlined in her book. The Reproduction of 
Mothering. Like Dorothy Dinnerstein and Jane Flax, Chodorow argues 
that the differing relationship of the male and female child to the 
mother during the pre-Oedipal period results in a differing 
configuration of identity. The daughter’s pre-Oedipal attachment to the 
mother does not have to be repressed in order for her to turn her libinal 
impulses to the father. Thus, her experience of herself is characterized 
by "more flexible and permeable ego boundaries" (127). On the other 
hand, the boy’s accession to masculine power requires the repression 
of desire for the mother. According to Chodorow, "the basic feminine 
sense of self is connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of 
self is separate" (169). See also, Judith Gegan Gardiner who 
"picture[s] female identity as typically less fixed, less unitary, and more 
flexible than male individuality, both in its primary core and in the 
entire maturational complex developed from this core. These traits 
have far-reaching consequences for the distinctive nature of writing by 
women" (183).
12. Jong is clearly also thinking here of Keats’s comments on "the poetical 
Character".
13. Margaret Homans and Susan J. Wolfson cite this interview in their 
recent essays on Keats; see Homans, "Keats Reading Women" 344-45, 
and Wolfson, "Feminizing Keats" 348.
14. See alternative readings by Margaret Homans, Women Writers and 
Poetic Identitv 83-85; Susan Levin, Dorothy Wordsworth and 
Romanticism: Anne K. MeUor, Romanticism and Gender 155-57; 
Susan J. Wolfson, "Individual in Community" 145. In her more recent 
work, Homans argues that Keat’s concept of identity shifts between his 
"Negative Capability" (Dec. 1817) and "no identity" formulations 
(Oct. 1818) and his use of the term "identity" in his account of "the vale 
of Soul-making" (April 1819); she suggests that the self-dissolution 
involved in Keats’s love for Fanny Brawne makes him self-defensive 
("Keats Reading Women" 352-54). Susan Wolfson argues, similarly, 
that Keats "realized that his love for Fanny had made him
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exceptionally conscious of himself, or ’selfish’"; "Keats is now aware 
that his easy self-annihilation [of negative capability], though a creative 
asset, is an existential liability" ("Composition and ’Unrest’" 57,66). 
Marlon B. Ross provides a recuperative reading of "negative 
capailiity": "What is ’negative capability’, after all, but [the] very 
process of self-crystalization through self-dispersal? It is the ability to 
lose the self in another object - the song of a nightingale or an urn or 
a woman’s peerless eyes - and therefore to reaffirm the previous reality 
of self-identity" (Contours 177). This is a reading supported by 
Patricia Yaeger (Honey-Mad Women 53).
15. Keats is "on the verge of non entity" (like Blake’s Oothoon). Charles 
Lamb makes an observation very similar to Keats’s: in a letter of 26 
April 1816, he writes that "If I lived with him [Coleridge] or the 
Author of the Excursion. I should in a very little time lose my own 
identity, & be dragged along in the current of other peoples thoughts, 
hampered in a net" (Letters 111:215). Lamb is more specifically 
concerned with his literary identity.
16. See Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract 96.
17. Alan Richardson in his article "Romanticism and the Colonization of
the Feminine" and Diane Long Hoeveler in Romantic Androgyny, both 
argue that the male Romantic poets ’cannibalize’ the feminine. While 
accepting many aspects of this argument, I have argued throughout this 
thesis that the male Romantics are more vulnerable than this figure 
suggests. For a critique of the premises of this argument, see Barbara 
Gelpi, Shelley’s Goddess 42.
18. Interestingly, H.W. Garrod uses Woolf’s figure, though he reverses the 
gender terms: "[U]pon whatever page of Keats’s poetry there falls the 
shadow of a living woman, it falls calamitously like an eclipse" (57).
19. As far as I know, this rhetoric of embodiment has not been studied by
other critics, though the somatic dimension of the self has always 
received critical attention: critics have either reviled or revelled in the 
oral/tactile quality of Keats’s work; from Byron onwards the 
metphorics of masturbation has been part of Keats’s critics’ 
vocabulary; several recent commentators (notably, Wolfson and MeUor) 
have studied the implications of Keats’s physical stature. Janet Wolff 
provides a good account of the status of the body, the move towards 
reinstating corporeality, in recent feminist theory (Feminine Sentences. 
Chapter 8).
20. Conversely, Byron capitalizes on the female readership: Medwin quotes 
Byron’s pleasure at the fame of his Corsair, and his playful comment, 
"Who does not write to please the women?" (206).
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21. On Keats’s relation to women writers, see Sonia Hofkosh, "The 
Writer’s Ravishment" 106-110. Anne Mellor argues that "[djuring the 
early 1800s in England, the production of the less prestigious forms of 
poetry - of sonnets, odes and romances - was dominated by women"; 
in choosing to write in these forms Keats aligns himself with women 
(despite the number of other men who produced poems of these types), 
and this was "a source of anxiety for Keats" (Romanticism and Gender 
179). On the feminization of the literary marketplace during the 
second half of the eighteenth-century, and through the Romantic 
period, see Hofkosh (above); Stuart Curran, "Romantic Poetry: The I 
Altered" and "Women readers, women writers"; Marlon B. Ross 
"Scott’s Chivahic Pose".
22. Bahktin’s "grotesque body" is not necessarily female, but it is 
connotatively feminine. See, Bahktin, Rabelais and His World. 25-26, 
and Kristeva, especially Powers of Horror. The grotesque body is the 
body of becoming (the body-in-process); unlike the closed, classical 
body which figures the aspirations of bourgeois individualism, it is 
connected with the rest of the world. In this sense it connects with the 
theories of feminine identity purveyed by Nancy Chodorow and others.
23. Like his reference to his "maidenhead", Keats’s identification with 
"snub-nos’d brunettes" is intended to be ironic.
24. As Diane Hoeveler points out, the Romantic emphasis on new ways of 
knowing, especially the mode of "wise passiveness", is connected with 
the rise of the domestic woman and the Romantic privileging of the 
maternal (33).
25. I refer the reader to the shifting and destabilizing pronouns Keats uses 
in the unfolding of this analogy (Letters 1:231-32).
26. Susan Wolfson, commenting on this same passage, writes similarly that 
"Keats often finds it necessary to circumscribe this playful androgyny" 
("Feminizing Keats" 328-29). For an alternative reading of the 
passage, see Alan BeweU, "Keats’s Realm of Flora" 85-86.
27. The OED provides examples from as early as 1300 of the sUppage 
between ravish and rape: "To carry away (a woman) by force 
(sometimes implying subsequent violation)" (OED 2); "To commit rape 
upon (a woman), to violate" (2b; the range of examples cited is from 
1436 to 1782). The OED also notes that the word may be used 
figuratively of death (an obsolete, but interesting usage, in the present 
context).
28. I am indebted to Margaret Homans’s comments on Keats and 
admiration: "Keats cannot bear the thought of her [Fanny] admiring 
him, because in his view admiration transforms its object into a ’thing’. 
But to turn her into an etemaUy beautiful thing, a star or planet.
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enhances his sense that he himself could never be reified in this way" 
("Keats Reading Women" 351). Interestingly, David Masson recounts 
a scene in which Keats is the object of the female gaze: he notes that 
the fame of Endymion "made Keats’s name more widely known ... 
when he attended Hazhtt’s lectures, ladies to whom he was pointed out 
looked at him instead of listening to the lecturer" (Matthews 371; this 
might help to explain Hazlitt’s animosity to Keats).
29. Keats’s languomess repeats the somatics of Burke’s absorption in 
beauty, discussed in Chapter Three. I borrow the evocative phrase 
"touch has a memory" from Keats himself (see the ode "What can I 
do").
30. I realise that this scene invites a counter interpretation, that is, that 
Fanny’s name, or subjectivity, is erased in this nocturnal encounter; 
this would accord with the reading of male romanticism as 
appropriative, even cannibalistic. (I would like to know whether Fanny 
took Keats’s letters to bed with her).
31. Patricia Yaeger defines honey as a ’Hminal’ substance (Honey-Mad 
Women 4 and 35; for her discussion of Keats, see 41-43, 52-53).
32. For critiques of Cixous’s I’ecriture feminine, which point out the risks 
of essentialism and the lack of cultural specificity, see Rita Felski, 
Bevond Feminist Aesthetics 35-40; Mary Jacobus, "The Question of 
Language" 37. For an insightful and detailed discussion of French 
feminists’ use of metaphors of maternity, see Domna Stanton, 
"Difference on Trial".
33. This regendering of Keats through aligning him with contemporary 
French feminists is open to the criticism that Susan Wolfson makes of 
other recent feminist appropriations of Keats. She argues that, "[ajlbeit 
with a different emphasis, these readers [Homans, Rich, Jong] 
perpetuate Victorian discriminations, for they have, in effect, 
regendered Keats by naming as ’feminist’ those capacities which they 
find anomolous to their ideology of the ’male’ character and the 
’masculine’ tradition, rather than studied him as an opportunity to 
investigate the multiple and often conflicting interests that animate 
men’s writing within patriarchal culture" ("Feminizing Keats" 349). 
Though I try to pay attention to these conflicts, it remains, I believe, 
as I argue in Chapter Two, important to deconstruct gender hierarchies 
through strategic critical cross-dressing.
34. On Keats’s "suggestive misspelling", and the way in which "[t]he 
’steeling’ of the self emerges in the ode" entitled "What can I do ...?", 
see Susan Wolfson, "Composition and ’Unrest’" 72-74.
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35. As Elisabeth Bronfen points out, "Kristeva’s use of the word ’semiotic’ 
runs counter to the more general use of the term ... employ[ed] to 
designate the semantic value of a signifier" (Over Her Dead Bodv 202, 
n.23). I trust the context makes clear in which sense I am using the 
term.
36. Watson is cited in Hyder Rollins’s "Introduction" to Keats’s Letters 7. 
Many critics have commented on Kristeva’s theories; in addition to 
Bronfen and Felski, see useful discussions in Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual 
Politics 150-173; Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Shuli Barzüai, 
"Borders of Language"; Kelly Oliver, "Kristeva’s Imaginary" and Pam 
Morris, "Re-routing Kristeva". Elaine Millard discusses Kristeva’s 
work and applies her theories to produce a reading of Wuthering 
Heights in Sara Mills et al.. Feminist Readings/Feminists Reading 
(ch.5). Rita Felski questions the essentialist argument that the semiotic 
is the site of contact with the mother’s body, as well as the "relevance 
to a feminist theory of language or literature" of the homology between 
the feminine and the semiotic on the grounds of their marginality to 
patriarchy and to language, respectively (35). I concur with the many 
critics who argue that we are constrained to use available images, and 
that revalorizing maternal figures is one way of subverting patriarchal 
attitudes (as is the application of these images to ’male’ figures).
37. In Buxton Forman’s edition of Keats’s letters, the phrase reads: "the 
Heart ... is the text from which the Mind or Intelligence sucks its 
identity" (11:54). He is picking up Keats’s own analogies of the heart 
as a hornbook or bible, but the substitution provides a succinct 
demonstration of the body as text (the body as a linguistic construct).
38. My translation; the French text reads: "Le surmoi et son langage 
linéaire ... sont combattus par un retour du plaisir oral et glottique. "
39. My formulations here are influenced by Kristeva’s theory of abjection, 
outlined in her Powers of Horror, a text which is nevertheless of 
limited heuristic value because of the difficulty of Kristeva’s prose. 
Kristeva defines abjection as "what disturbs identities, systems and 
orders. Something that does not respect limits, positions, rules. The 
in-between, the ambiguous, the mixed" (12). Like the semiotic, the 
abject involves the relation of the ’subject’ to the mother, but it 
signifies the archaic attempts to demarcate the self from the maternal 
entity. Paul Smith rightly points our that the abject differs from 
Kristeva’s earlier notion of the semiotic in that it involves "the 
recognition of psychical pain", "it is the mark of the painful difficulty 
for the ’subject’ of being constituted in the symbolic/semiotic dialectic" 
(Discerning 127). For a stringent critique of Kristeva’s book, see 
Jennifer Stone, "The Horrors of Power".
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40. "Sophia", writing in the middle of the previous century in the tradition 
of replies to anti-female satire, exposes the arbitrariness of such terms: 
"When they [men] mean to stigmatise a Man with want of courage 
they call him effeminate, when they would praise a Woman for her 
courage they call her manly. But as these, and such like expressions, 
are merely arbitrary, and but a fulsome compUment which the Men 
pass on themselves, they establish nothing" (Beauty’s Triumph. 1751, 
from Part One, Woman not Inferior to Man. 1739; Jones 230). As 
Davidoff and HaU observe, the views held by Cowper, who "argued for 
a more modest male demeanour, valuing reflection, peace, the 
protection of the weak and of animals", were regarded as "dangerously 
effeminate" (164). Unsurprisingly, Hazlitt thinks that Cowper "shrinks 
from and repels common and hearty sympathy". Many other critics 
describe Keats in terms of effeminacy: Louis Etienne in 1867 writes 
that "Keats is perhaps the least English of the poets produced by Great 
Britain during our century. He lacks that manliness [the English word 
is used] whose first impulse is to emerge from sterile dreams and 
effeminate lamentation, to accept what cannot be altered and make the 
best of it" (Matthews 34). Leigh Hunt writing in mid-century thought 
that "Mr Keats’s natural tendency to pleasure, as a poet, sometimes 
degenerated, by reason of his ill health, into a poetical effeminacy" 
(Matthews 251). According to George Gilfillan, "A curious feature of 
Keats’ mind was its elegant effeminacy" (Matthews 305). De Quincey 
(1846) alludes to "fantastic effeminacy", while William Howitt (1847) 
notes that "his unworldliness was effeminacy" (Matthews 309,311).
41. Coventry Patmore writes about Keats and masculinity in a similarly 
aphoristic vein: "A man without a belief is hke a man without a 
backbone" (Matthews 332).
42. This reference comes from a footnote to De Quincey’s essay "Notes on 
Gilfillan’s ’Gallery of Portraits’"; to be fair. De Quincey is partially 
recanting his earlier comments on Keats’s "licentious" language, 
suggesting instead that he shows "too little reverence" for the mother- 
tongue.
43. Some commentators use a vocabulary that implicitly figures Keats as 
a breast-feeding infant: Leigh Hunt praises Keats for "sucking the 
essence out of them [his feelings on a subject] into analogous words" 
(London Journal. 21 Jan. 1835; Matthews 278).
44. Swinburne, Arnold and Watson cited in Rollins’s "Introduction" to 
Keats’s Letters 4,7.
45. Lockhart’s article appears in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine m  
(August, 1818) 519-524; repr. in Theodore Redpath, The Young 
Romantics Reviewed 467-472. Maijorie Levinson analyses the class 
aspects of Lockhart’s comments in her Keats’s Life of Allegorv. 1-25.
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Nicholas Roe examines "the subversive function of Keatsian 
childishness"; he suggests that Keats is seen as being "unwilling to ’bid 
farewell’ to the joys of early sensual experience at his mother’s breast", 
that he is "the ’new brood’ of a treacherous sensibility that had 
formerly been associated with the French Revolution" ("Keats’s 
Lisping Sedition" 50,51). The "cockney" tag, with its connotations of 
effeminacy and childishness, is a way of depoliticizing Keats. On the 
liberal politics of Keats’s poetics, see William Keach, "Cockney 
Couplets", and David Bromwich, "Keats’s Radicalism". Anne Mellor 
turns to the OED definitions to support her claim that "Lockhart ...was 
engaging in a politics of both class and gender", a point also made by 
Susan Wolfson, who details how "Lockhart’s language attached itself 
to Keats with adhesive force" (Romanticism and Gender 172-73, 
"Feminizing Keats" 319-321).
46. My thoughts on definition have been much influenced by Jane Gallop’s 
terrific article, "The Problem of Definition".
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Chapter Six
"Some horrid alien nature": De Quincey’s Flowers 
of Rhetoric and Contagious Femininity
Heaven in a Wild Flower 
Blake: "Auguries of Innocence"
In an essay on William Wordsworth, published in Tail’s Edinburgh Magazine during 
the early months of 1839, De Quincey tells us that Wordsworth describes his sister 
Dorothy "in a philosophic poem ...as one who planted flowers and blossoms with her 
feminine hand upon what might else have been an arid rock" (Recollections 201).  ^
According to De Quincey, it was Dorothy who "fnsi couched his [Wordsworth’s] eye 
to the sense of beauty - humanized him by the gentler charities, and engrafted with 
her delicate female touch, those graces upon the ruder growths of his nature, which 
have since clothed the forest of his genius with a foliage corresponding in loveliness 
and beauty to the strength of its boughs and the massiness of its trunks" (132). 
Dorothy’s "mission" in relation to Wordsworth was "above all other ministrations, to 
ingraft, by her sexual sense of beauty, upon his masculine austerity that delicacy and 
those graces which else . . . i t  would not have had" (201). De Quincey’s gender 
configurations are nothing if not conventional, based on Burke’s paradigms of the 
Sublime and the Beautiful: the feminine is floral, delicate, associated with loveliness, 
beauty, graces; it has a softening, civilizing and decorative effect on rude and massy 
masculinity, on that "ascetic harsh subhminity" of which De Quincey perceives 
Wordsworth to have been "enamoured" (132).^ Yet there is an interesting suggestion 
of male ’lack’ ("arid rock", "would not have had"), to which flowers and women are
the necessary supplement. De Quincey himself emphasizes the role of the feminine 
as "complement": "I have thought that it would be a proper complement of the whole 
record, to subjoin a very especial notice of his sister" (206). Michael Cooke bases 
his claims for the feminine as the crux of value in Romanticism on the 
’complementary wholeness’ of the sexes desired by the male poets, arguing that the 
feminine thereby accrues power and that the parameters of masculinity are changed. 
However, this idea of complementariness in fact functioned conservatively, especially 
in the nineteenth century: to demarcate the difference between, but to accord equal 
value to, men’s and women’s virtues, was to effectively keep women in their properly 
subservient place and to frustrate demands for equality. Within the terms of a gender 
economy, the notion of complementarity posits women as the appropriate ’other’ for 
man, that "old dream of symmetry", in Irigaray’s phrase.^ Lacan reminds us of 
"Freud’s often repeated warning not to reduce the supplement of feminine over 
masculine to the complement of passive to active" (Mitchell and Rose 93). Though 
De Quincey uses the term "complement", I would argue that the grain of his text 
lends itself to the substitution of the Derridean term "supplement", a term which 
connotes the disruptive difference that deconstructs binary systems (it is, undecidably, 
that which is added on and that which substitutes and supplants). In this chapter, I 
attempt to trace the ’graft’ of the subversive feminine supplement in various De 
Quincey texts, that language or graffiti (sic) of flowers that De Quincey ascribed to 
Dorothy Wordsworth."^
The chapter is broadly divided into five sections. Firstly, on the principle that 
De Quincey’s rhetoric is not purely personal but is enmeshed in the discourse of the 
period, I look briefly at the clustering of the feminine, the floral, ornamentation and 
figuration in some texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then I look in
241
some detail at the gendered narratives encoded in the parasitical flowers of rhetoric 
of the "Introductory Notice" of the Suspiria de Profundis. In the third section, I focus 
on De Quincey’s account of the life and death of Kate Wordsworth, tracing the roots 
of what he calls his "nympholepsy". Then I comment on the uncontrollable 
arbitrariness of the figure of the rose in De Quincey’s narrative of the transformation 
of Miss Fanny of the Bath Road (in The English Mail-Coachl. Finally, I situate my 
discussion within the context of recent feminist theory. I read De Quincey alongside 
Freud, especially the essay on "Fetishism" and the Studies on Hysteria, and suggest 
that the rhetorical parallels between both sets of texts facilitate a feminist 
deconstruction of the hierarchical opposition, male/female. I wül argue that a 
principle of contamination is at work in De Quincey’s texts, and that they enact the 
feminization of the male subject. I read the feminine here as that which is alien, 
extrinsic, exotic, outwith the boundaries of male knowledge and control, but which 
is refigured, particularly through the trope of flowers as inner, as a foreigness within 
the male subject.
* * * * *
[The] flowery diction which has slid from essays into novels, 
and from novels into familiar letters and conversations.
Mary WoUstonecraft
In "Epistle to a Lady", Pope yokes the feminine and the irrational, using the trope of 
flowers to ’naturalize’ his cultural construction: "Ladies, like variegated Tulips, show, 
/ ’Tis to their changes half their charms we owe" (U.41-42); in his misogynist 
formulation, "Women are fine by defect, and delicately weak" (1.44). Pope wittily 
displaces the disruptive collorary of locating woman outside of Reason, that is, that 
she may be a ’dark continent’, unexplored and potentially unknowable, by ascribing
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to her an absence, or lack, of meaning: "Woman and Fool are two hard things to hit; 
/ For true No-meaning puzzles more than wit" (11.113-114). Woman is merely 
puzzling, trivialized and contained in a couplet. Edmund Burke’s Enquiry posits that, 
"it is the flowery species, so remarkable for its weakness and momentary duration, 
that gives us the liveliest idea of beauty, and elegance" ; Hke flowers, "the beauty of 
women is considerably owing to their weakness, or deHcacy, and is even enhanced 
by their timidity" (116). I have discussed Burke’s treatise in detail in Chapter Three; 
what is significant in terms of the present chapter is the particular polarity that Burke 
sets up between a feminized and floreated beauty and the sublime masculinity of a 
robustly phalHc "tree of the forest". Certain quaUties, such as weakness and the 
ephemeral, are troped as feminine through the use of the floral figure. Women are 
represented, again, as anti-rational, their perfection, from the male point of view, 
residing in their ’imperfection’. Burke attempts to shore up his subject position by 
representing women, in Popean rhetoric, as defective; however, as I have noted in 
Chapter Three, Naomi Schor observes that "the weakness of the ’weaker sex’ is ...an 
artificial imperfection. Recognizing the aesthetic appeal of the weak, women, 'leam 
to Hsp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit weakness, and even sickness’" (Reading 
in Detail 151, Enquiry 110).  ^ The woman’s body is fetishized, that is, fragmented, 
idolized, and isolated from its historically contingent context but - to summarize a 
scenario explored at length in Chapter Three - the safety of the spectatorial position 
is threatened by this masquerade of femininity, which both defamiHarizes the gestures 
of femininity and reinscribes the body as a site of materiaHty. "The unsteady [male] 
eye sHdes giddily" over such theatrical display, "without knowing where to fix" (115). 
Significantly, Burke’s flowers mimic the feminine which they signify for they are
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presented in language which emphasizes the constructed rather than the organic; like 
tropes, flowers are "turned and fashioned into an infinite variety of forms" (94). 
What is interesting in terms of the configuration of gender is that at this particular 
historical moment, on the the cusp of Romanticism, the bisexuality of the floral in 
literary history (in Christian discourse, for example, the rose is associated with both 
the feminine and with godhead) is repressed in order to gather flowers to the feminine 
side of a male/female binary opposition.
The whole enterprise of defining the sublime and the beautiful reflects a 
collective obsession about what constitutes masculinity and femininity.^ Kant, like 
Burke, deploys a vegetal metaphorics: "Tall oaks and lonely shadows in a sacred 
grove are sublime; flower beds, low hedges and trees trimmed with figures are 
beautiful" (Observations 47). Kant devotes one section of his treatise specifically to 
gender distinctions (Section Three, "Of the Distinction of the Beautiful and Sublime 
in the Interrelations of the Sexes"), and he extols the virtue of "neatness ...in the fair 
sex" (84). Like Burke, Kant’s discourse foregrounds the activity of cultural 
construction: femininity, like flower beds, must be cultivated.^ Earlier in the century, 
’Philogamus’, writing on the state of marriage, urges that women should be 
"cultivated to Virtue from their tender Infancy", for "[t]he more tender a Plant is, the 
more capable of being formed to any Shape; though perhaps not so capable of 
retaining it, as a more stubborn one, without proper Ways and Means to keep it in it’s 
primary Bent" (Jones 80). Women, hke malleable plants, are in need of "Restraint". 
Laetitia Matilda Hawkins in Letters on the Female Mind (1793) imphcitly invokes the 
tradition of the sublime and the beautiful in her demarcation of the domain of 
"subjects fitted to their [women’s] exertions": "Let not the advocate for female
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excellence be alarmed", she writes, for "the field is ample, and little is excluded from 
its boundary; every shrub, every flower of literature is contained within it; forest trees 
only are excluded [that is, abstruse subjects]: and surely no woman, who has ever 
contemplated the oak, will complain that she is not permitted to bear it away from its 
native soil" (Jones 119).
Hannah More’s Strictures in one sense tend towards the enfranchisement of 
women from certain ideologies of femininity; she proposes that women
should cultivate every study, which, instead of stimulating her 
sensibility, wiU chastise it; which ...wül bring the imagination under 
dominion; will lead her to think, to compare, to combine, to methodize; 
which will confer such a power of discrimination, that her judgement 
shall learn to reject what is dazzling, if it be not solid. (188)
However, although she wants women to cast off the shackles of sensibility, they are 
not to assume the mantle of masculine inteUect: "Both in composition and action they 
[women] excel in detaUs; but they do not so much generalize their ideas as men, nor 
do their minds seize a great subject with so large a grasp" (202). "[Sjumming up the 
evidence ...o f the different capacities of the sexes", she asserts "that women have 
equal parts, but are inferior in wholeness of mind, in the integral understanding" ; in 
particular, "they seem not to possess, in equal measure, the faculty of comparing, 
combining, analyzing, and separating ...ideas; that deep and patient thinking which 
goes to the bottom of a subject" (202-3). More, then, reinscribes women as secondary 
complements to men; excelling in detaüs, they will no doubt ornament their houses 
and cultivate their gardens as fit objects for the encompassing, incisive male gaze. 
More remains within the confines of "propriety", which is itself a keyword in her
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discourse. She valorizes "propriety", "the centre", "proportion", the "properpath", "a 
regular, orderly, undeviating course" (14); More appropriates the rational discourse 
of the eighteenth century, and furnishes, as Marlon Ross argues, "the ideological 
stance and the tone that wiU characterize women’s presence in literary discourse for 
the duration of the nineteenth century" (Contours 206).*
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821) presents women as ’plant-like’, 
complacent, placidly content, lacking any desire for the Ideal, lacking what Mary Ann 
Doane calls ’the desire to desire’. As the irrational ’other’, woman gives definition 
to "[t]he status of manhood ...[which] is attained only by the stress of thought and 
much technical exertion", her immobility ("Men correspond to animals, whüe women 
correspond to plants") provides the still point which produces meaning for another 
(263-64). According to Hegel,
[W]omen regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but 
by arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are educated - who 
knows how? - as it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by 
acquiring knowledge.
Hegel’s marginalization of the feminine encodes the sublimated threat (witness his 
anxious parenthesis "who knows how?") that the "arbitrary" might overrun the 
universal, jeopardizing the grounds of the male subject. In other words, the 
apparently oppositional relationship between the neat (ordered, bounded) and the 
arbitrary is unstable: ’neatness’ is an imposed categorization designed to corset and 
domesticate the arbitrariness of the feminine, but the unpredictable, that which is 
outside the parameters of masculine knowledge, may deconstruct man-made 
boundaries from inside the universal order.
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Hazlitt inveighs against the flowers of rhetoric in his essay "On Familiar Style" 
(1821): "The florid style ...is resorted to as a spangled veil to conceal the want of 
[ideas]. When there is nothing to be set down but words it costs little to make them 
fine. Look through the dictionary, and cuU out a florilegium, rival the tulippomania. 
Rouge high enough, and never mind the natural complexion" (8:246). This traditional 
(neo-classical) metaphorics equates rhetorical ornaments with the artifices of painted 
ladies. Hazlitt’s vision of (Huysmanesque) rouged tulips figures a femininity that 
stands for rhetoric, ornament, deception, for all the shameless seductions of language 
which transgress the boundaries of propriety, and by which nature itself becomes 
unfamiliar.^
Mary WoUstonecraft’s Rights of Woman is a counter-text to those that inscribe 
a debilitating aesthetic of decorative flowers and weak women. Moreover, whUe 
many of the writers I have looked at associate woman with the tropological, 
WoUstonecraft privUeges the literal. She aims to "rouse [her] sex from the flowery 
bed, on which they supinely sleep life away" (227). The metaphor of the flowery bed 
and the adverb "supinely" pose women as passive and prostrate creatures, contained 
within the borders of the bedroom. For her, women are "like the flowers which are 
planted in too rich a soU, strength and usefulness are sacrificed to beauty"; the result 
is a fecundity deprived of force, a kind of sterility, in WoUstonecraft’s words, "a 
barren blooming" (79). She rejects aU flaunting figures, "those pretty feminine 
phrases, which the men condescendingly use to soften our slavish dependence ...I  
shaU try to avoid that flowery diction which has sUd from essays into novels, and 
from novels into famUiar letters and conversations" ; at the utopian margins of her 
project, she proclaims, "I shaU be employed about things, not words!" (82; Mary
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Astell had earlier claimed that "it is not intended she [woman] shou’d spend her hours 
in learning words but things"' [Jones 204]). Other women writers of the period 
employ similar diction to WoUstonecraft. Martha Mears, a ’Practitioner in Midwifery’ 
gives "Candid Advice to the Fair Sex" in 1797: "I do not mean to amuse them [her 
countrywomen] with an idle parade of learning: I do not come dressed out in a rich 
wardrobe of words, to dazzle their attention: such pomp, such ornaments would U1 
become the humble handmaid of nature" (Jones 94).^° In pursuit of phUosophic 
clarity, the plain prose of masculine power, WoUstonecraft attempts to outlaw 
metaphors and thereby excise traditional femininity, to weed out what she caUs "a 
romantic twist of the mind" (305). But, as should be apparent from my citations, the 
flowers of rhetoric cannot be suppressed: they flourish in the text which attempts to 
banish them. The Vindication teems with tropes, often metaphors which specificaUy 
use flowers as their vehicle, for example, "Modesty must be equaUy cultivated by 
both sexes, or it wiU ever remain a sickly hot-house plant, whUst the affection of it, 
the fig leaf borrowed by wantonness, may give a zest to voluptuous enjoyments" 
(233). Clarity is lost in "a mist of words" (92); this phrase, itself a metaphor, 
suggests that words are inevitably metaphoric in a generalized sense for they are not 
"things" (that is, referents). Jane Moore argues persuasively that the Vindication is 
subversive precisely because it disrupts the opposition between phUosophic and 
Uterary uses of language, between genre and gender difference ("Promises" 167). The 
tenacity of flowers, and thus, of the feminine and of figuraUty, upsets the neatness of 
binary schemes.
It is worth noting that during the historical period under consideration, women 
were not only characterized in terms of plants and flowers but they played a special
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domestic role in relation to the garden. As Davidoff and HaU point out,
’the language of flowers’, originating in France, had been taken up and 
forwarded by romantic and nature poets and is reflected in
commonplace books ... Women became responsible for decorating 
mantles and tables with flowers, a practice introduced in the 1820s, 
overcoming earUer superstitions about bad luck caused by bringing 
Uving or wUd things into the house. A paraphemaUa of stands and 
containers, plus many books of expert advice accompanied this
’naturaUy’ feminine occupation. (374)
According to one amateur poet, "In every woman’s soul there dweUs pre-eminently 
a natural fond affinity for flowers" (374). Jane Webb Loudon, a prominent writer on 
gardening for ladies, could not wholeheartedly advocate female management of 
vegetable or fruit gardens, but declared that the flower-garden is "pre-eminently a 
woman’s department" (qtd. in Davidoff and HaU 374). PrisciUa Wakefield, 
endeavouring to suggest suitable occupations whereby the female sex might improve 
their lot, is more ambitious: she proposes that "[o]mamental gardening, and the laying 
out of pleasure-grounds, with the improvement of natural landscape, one of the 
refinements of modem times, may likewise afford an eUgible maintenance to some 
of those females, who, in the days of their prosperity, displayed their taste in the
embellishment of their own domains" (Reflections on the Present Condition of the
Female Sex. 1798; Jones 126-27).
Flowers are potentiaUy hybrid figures in various ways, connoting both life, 
beauty, and innocence, but also death, as in De Quincey’s recoUection "of having 
connected a profound sense of pathos with the re appearance, very early in spring, of
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some crocuses" (Suspiria 96-97). The flowers function as semes of death and rebirth 
("annual resurrections"), as "memorials", or written artifacts, they are part of that 
"chapter" of De Quincey’s always textualized life which deals with the death of Kate 
Wordsworth (Recollections 369). In terms of gender, flowers may signify femininity 
and/or masculinity.“ The classificatory systems for plants and flowers current 
during the Romantic period emphasized the gender of plants. Erasmus Darwin 
prefaces The Loves of the Plants (1789), the second part of his poem The Botanic 
Garden, with an outline of Linneus’s system. Darwin gives details of categories of 
plants denominated "Feminine Males" and "Polygamy"; this latter class he explains 
as "[m]ale and female flowers on one or more plants, which have at the same time 
flowers of both sexes" (3). The final class recorded by Darwin is termed "Clandestine 
Marriage, Cryptogamia", which "contains the plants whose flowers are not 
discernible"; in the poem itself, he tells us, "the word 'secret' expresses the Class of 
Clandestine Marriage" (5). "Not discernible": these are flowers which frustrate the 
putative phallocentric desire for visible guarantees of gender, making it impossible to 
tell the difference between male and female.
Curiosity about the sexuality of plants was reasonably widely disseminated: 
The Loves of the Plants was a bestseller for its author, whose publisher paid him an 
advance of 1000 guineas on The Economv of Vegetation, which, with looking-glass 
logic, came out after the second part, in 1791.^  ^ Richard Polwhele, in his poem The 
Unsex’d Females, castigates the female study of botany, and indirectly attacks 
Darwin’s The Loves of the Plants, which describes sexual reproduction in plants in 
anthropomorphic te rm s.P o lw h e le ’s unsexed females demonstrate their defiance 
of "NATURE’S law", for they.
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With bliss botanic (b) as their bosoms heave,
Still pluck forbidden fruit, with mother Eve,
For puberty in sighing florets pant;
Or point the prostitution of a plant; (11.29-32; Jones 187)
The footnote (b) explains: "Botany has lately become a fashionable amusement with 
the ladies. But how the study of the sexual system of plants can accord with female 
modesty, I am not able to comprehend. ...I  have, several times, seen boys and girls 
botanizing together" (Jones 189).^ "^
Recently, Claudette Sartiliot has argued that the "actual morphology" of 
flowers "seems to invite [the] symbolic crossing of the genders: the receptacle-shaped 
corolla readily becomes a symbol of the womb, whereas the pistil with its erect stylus 
points to phallic symbolism" (72). But even this erotic crossing narrows the field of 
signification, effacing the contingent differences between flowers, and setting up a 
binary paradigm, womb/phallus, an unexpected configuration which elides any 
reference to the female genitalia (I discuss the dissemination of this occluded detail 
during my reading of the ’Kate Wordsworth’ and ’Fanny of the Bath Road’ episodes 
below).
For the male Romantic poets, flowers provided a figure for signifying their 
own gender mobility. Keats seems to recognise something of the transvestite allure 
of flowers; as I noted in the previous chapter, here is a male poet who says, "let us 
not therefore go hurrying about and collecting honey-bee like, buzzing here and there 
impatiently from a knowledge of what is to be arrived at: but let us open our leaves 
hke a flower and be passive and receptive .. .taking hints from every noble insect that 
favors us with a visit" (Letters I: 232). Keats proposes a withdrawal from the
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teleological trajectory of traditional male writing in favour of a more diffuse feminine 
jo u is s a n c e .Byron’s Sardanapulus thinks of himself as "softer clay, impregnated 
with flowers" (2.1.522), the metaphor, as Susan Wolfson points out, "revealing a 
feminine reconception of self" ("Problem" 880).
It’s worth summarizing at this point, I think, the contradictory discourses 
which are generated in this context by woman’s perceived secondariness to man. R. 
Howard Bloch observes that the creation of woman from, and for, man as it is 
recounted in Genesis coincides with the creation of language as supplement to things 
(WoUstonecraft’s desire for the literal can thus be explained as the desire for the lost 
plenitude of the unfallen world, a gesture towards a space which is precisely 
ungendered, before the imposition of gender difference). Eve, as a "part" to Adam’a 
"whole" (to use Hannah More’s words) connotes difference, matter, the body, the 
temporal, facticity; but the engenderment of the female simultaneously involves the 
loss of the literal, the creation of language as mediation and metaphoricity, so that the 
feminine is also associated with the figurai as perversity, deviation and derivation.
’Woman’ may be either/and matter or decoration, either Hegel’s "plant-like" 
figures, or "cow-like", as Toril Moi puts it ("Patriarchal Thought" 195), or Hazlitt’s 
harlots. This bifurcated view of woman also informs the cultural history of woman’s 
association with nature. As I suggested in the previous chapter, woman’s place is at 
the negative pole of a series of binary oppositions. The feminine form - so fluid that 
it can fill any desired shape - is traditionally used as a metaphor for nature, which 
acts as a surrogate mother for the male subject/creator; female nature is nurturing and 
life-giving, certainly in much of the poetry of the male Romantics (see Chapter One). 
Yet the unruly female body is also mirrored in perceptions of nature as excess, as
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wild, destructive and uncivilized; in her association with artifice, woman denaturalizes 
nature. Constructed as the ’Other’ to culture - as nature/body - woman in the history 
of Western thought is ’object’ for the male subject, an entity to be colonized, 
fetishized, disempowered, domesticated.^^
It is precisely because of this bifurcation, this fissure within a figure, that 
women and flowers perform as a ’supplement’. As a third or plural term (though 
clearly not a third term in a traditional system of dialectics), they destabilize the 
binary systems which operate through such oppositions as the central and the 
peripheral, the pure and the contaminated, the natural and the unnatural. As I will 
demonstrate, in De Quincey’s texts women and flowers frustrate the ideal unity of the 
male subject.
* * * * *
Those parasitical thoughts, feelings, digressions, which climb 
up with bells and blossoms round about the arid stock.
Thomas De Quincey
In a well-known passage in the "Introductory Notice" to the Suspiria de Profundis 
De Quincey uses the metaphor of flowers to describe the subject and style of his own 
narrative:
The whole course of this narrative resembles, and was meant to 
resemble, a caduceaus wreathed about with meandering ornaments, or 
the shaft of a tree’s stem hung round and surmounted with some 
vagrant parasitical plant. The mere medical subject of the opium 
answers to the dry withered pole, which shoots all the rings of the 
flowering plants, and seems to do so by some dexterity of its own; 
whereas, in fact, the plant and its tendrils have curled round the sullen
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cylinder by mere luxuriance of theirs ... The ugly pole ... is there only 
for support. Not the flowers are for the pole, but the pole is for the 
flowers. Upon the same analogy view me, as one ...making verdant 
and gay with the life of flowers, murderous spears and halberts - things 
that express death in their origin .. .things that express ruin in their use.
The true object in my ’Opium Confessions’ is not the naked 
physiological theme - on the contrary, that is the ugly pole, the 
murderous spear, the halbert - but those musical variations upon the 
theme - those parasitical thoughts, feelings, digressions, which climb 
up with bells and blossoms round about the arid stock; ramble away 
from it at times with perhaps too rank a luxuriance. (93-94)
These meandering ornaments are like Dorothy Wordsworth’s sensitive grafts, but the 
implied significance of forest and foliage has been mixed up ("Not the flowers are for 
the pole, but the pole is for the flowers"). The aporetic horror is engendered not 
merely by the inversion whereby the essential is seen as accessory, a transference of 
significance that would enable difference to be re-stabilized as opposition, but in the 
slippeiiness of the deconstruction of difference, that is, what remains perceived as the 
accessory (the floral) is also perceived as the essential. De Quincey describes the 
impotent centre as "the shaft of a tree’s stem", "the dry withered pole", "the sullen 
cylinder", "the ugly pole"; evidence of the availability of the phallic symbolism of 
these terms may be confirmed by reference to John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman 
of Pleasure (1748-9), in which these nouns are (among the many) euphemisms for the 
penis (though, in contrast to De Quincey, the adjectival appendages in the novel are 
characterized by a quality of glorious inflation). The supremacy of the centre (and
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all the prestigious terms of binary oppositions which this term comprehends) cannot 
hold - it is exposed as a cultural phallacy, mere "arid stock" (this phrase echoing the 
description of Wordsworth as "arid rock"; the second passage accentuates my earlier 
doubts about male potency). Instead, we have a profusion of "meandering 
ornaments", "parasitical plant[s]", "tendrils [which] have curled round the sullen 
cylinder", "bells and blossoms". Flowers here are (self-)contradictory, perverse signs, 
figures of a mutability which might be represented by the unstable opposition 
"verdant"/"rank", which inscribes flowers as both fresh and foul (obviously, the 
primary contextual meaning of "rank" is ’overgrown’, but other connotations persist, 
though under erasure); flowers are life-giving, yet the pole around which they are 
entwined is "dry [and] withered". The feminine plant generates an excess of 
signifiers, the entangling of near-synonymous terms: "meandering", "vagrant" and 
"ramble" all point to an erratic or irregular wandering. Tautology overruns any sense 
of teleology. Where Hannah More, with her desire for an "undeviating course", 
voices the ideology of masculinity. De Quincey produces what Baudelaire considered 
a 'feminine style" (qtd. in McFarland 97).^*
Throughout the passage the reader finds inscriptions of the ornamental, the 
sinuous and the serpent-like (as well as the obvious reference to the caduceus, 
"wreathed", for example, derives from the Old English "to writhe"). The OED cites 
a Miltonic usage of the verb "to curl" which prefigures De Quincey’s: "So varied hee 
[the serpent], and of his tortuous Train Curld many a wanton wreath". As well as 
serpents. De Quincey’s words evoke an image of curled or ringleted hair, hinting at 
a combination of Eve and the serpent (think of the Renaissance paintings in which the 
serpent has Eve’s face). Perhaps these "tendrils" also trace the serpentine ringlets of
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the Medusa. I will come back to the significance of the Medusa, especially in her 
Freudian incarnation; here I want to cite two intertexts that will buttress my 
arguments about the threat to masculine subjectivity encoded in the wayward rambling 
of flowers.
Dorothy Wordsworth notes in her AJfoxden Journal (1798):
January 22nd. Walked through the wood to Holford. The ivy twisting 
round the oaks like bristled serpents. The day cold - a warm shelter 
in the hollies, capriciously bearing berries. Query: Are the male and 
female flowers on separate trees? (Journals 1)
Wordsworth’s speculations on gender and flowers resonate with the De Quincey 
passage under analysis, in the analogy between the ivy and serpents, in the 
capriciousness of the hoUy which carries connotations of femininity, arbitrariness, and 
irrationality (De Quincey elsewhere links the "capricious" with feminine "coy[ness]" 
[Confessions 154]), and most significantly, in the query about the difference between 
male and female flowers which, as in Linneus and Darwin, suggests the recognition 
that there are no visible marks to ground this demarcation. Dorothy Wordsworth 
views the serpentine ivy with a naturalist’s detachment; Rebecca Hey in The Moral 
of Flowers (1833) spins a narrative out of a natural detail. "We are indebted", she 
writes, "to the ivy for the picturesque beauty it throws around every object to which 
it attaches itself" ; "it decks indiscriminately ’the loftiest height’ and ’the humblest 
grave’" (45-46). Hey, it seems, is praising the egalitarian sensibilities of the ivy, but 
her reference to the indiscriminate pre-echoes the promiscuous entangling of 
differences effected by De Quincey’s parasitical plant. Interestingly, the poem which 
Hey appends to her short essay on the ivy is a romance story which casts the ivy as
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a female lover entwined around a masculine arch or column. This is a story of 
unmanning: the woman’s love, like the ivy, remains "unshaken", "Around its earliest 
prop still cling[ing]", while the decay of the prop itself is analogous to what Hey calls 
the "waning splendour" of "manhood", the loss of "proud manhood’s strength" 
(47).^  ^ I would argue that De Quincey’s ’maleness’ is textually (and existentially) 
unstable, and that this facilitates his playing out of a similarly emasculating drama.
At times. De Quincey’s voice rings with the tones of nineteenth century 
masculinity (or, at the least, strives to compete on this terrain), as in the ’clubmanese’ 
of "The Palimpsest’ section of the Suspiria. wherein he patronizes female educational 
aspirations, or the glow of superiority that emanates from his recollections of going 
down from Oxford recorded in The English Mail-Coach (though it’s important to note 
that the implicit sexual politics here are inflected by the explicit discourse of class). 
In his essay, "Style", De Quincey asks his male reader, "Would you desire at this day 
to read our noble language in its native beauty, picturesque from idiomatic propriety, 
racy in its phraseology, delicate yet sinewy in its composition?" (Jordan 66-67). To 
satisfy this desire, he advocates the violation of female letters, advising his reader to 
"steal the mail bags, and break open aU the letters in female handwriting" (Jordan 64). 
De Quincey can only appropriate or "borrow" the ’natural’ "mother tongue": "I often 
borrow their seals from young ladies - when closing my letters" (Suspiria 147). De 
Quincey’s Lovelacean gesture of opening the letters of the ’other’ scripts a sexual, as 
well as a textual, penetration (enforcing the link between coiporeal and corpus). Most 
disturbingly. De Quincey’s narratives are strewn with the bodies of dead women, 
replicating the pattern that Elaine Showalter has aimotated in nineteenth century 
novels (in A Literature of Their Ownk As Mary Jacobus observes, "women in his
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writing are especially accident prone" (Romanticism 133). On the other hand, as Eve 
Sedgwick observes, De Quincey "seems normally to have taken the women around 
him with a good deal of seriousness, to have been unusaUy open to their intellectual 
and emotional influence" (Coherence 74). He takes Dorothy Wordsworth’s writing 
seriously, and indeed, writing himself in the ’minor’ art of prose in an age of 
luminary poets, may have felt himself outside the mainstream/malestream genre.^° 
De Quincey distinguishes himself from Wordsworth’s "masculine and Roman 
harshness"; his "self-bafflement" makes him a textual double of Dorothy Wordsworth, 
of whom De Quincey writes that "[a]t times, the self-counteraction and self-baffling 
of her feelings, caused her ...to stammer", which suggests that he identified both with 
her repressed energy and with her secondary role vis-a-vis William (Recollections 
319,207,131-32). He is content that his "infant feelings were moulded by the gentlest 
of sisters, not by horrid pugilistic brothers" (Suspiria 96). Like Keats, his stature is 
diminutive, failing to conform to ideals of masculinity. De Quincey’s is a fragile 
masculinity.^^ He is susceptible to the feminine. The dark side of this receptivity 
is the possibility of parasitical infestation by a feminine foliage/figure, which erodes 
the grounds and bounds of masculinity.^^
There are provocative parallels between De Quincey’s ’parasitical’ figure and 
the rhetoric of certain contemporary literary theorists, and a short digression into 
recent inscriptions of this trope may help to illuminate the sexual politics that are 
involved in its usage. In his essay, "The Critic as Host", HiUis Miller discusses the 
image of deconstructive criticism (as portrayed by Wayne Booth and M.H. Abrams) 
as "’parasitical’" on the "’obvious or univocal reading’" of a text (217).^  ^ In this 
view, deconstruction threatens to contaminate "pure" (sic) literary criticism. Miller’s
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aim is to deconstruct the binary oppositions purveyed by these other critics, but, 
interestingly, there are unassimilated traces of masculine paranoia in his De 
Quinceyan obsession with invasive, feminine foliage:
"Parasitical" - the word suggests the image of "the obvious or univocal 
reading" as the mighty oak, rooted in the solid ground, endangered by 
the insidious twining around it of deconstructive ivy. That ivy is 
somehow feminine, secondary, defective, or dependent. It is a chnging 
vine, able to live no other way but by drawing the lifesap of its host, 
cutting off its light and air. I think of Hardy’s The Ivv-Wife ...
(Miller 218)
Though I am indebted to Miller’s subsequent argument, in which he deconstructs the 
difference between host and parasite, Barbara Johnson nevertheless rightly observes 
of Miller’s essay "how effortlessly the vegetal metaphor is sexualised" (World 35). 
In other words, in articulating his parodie vision of literary studies in terms of gender 
difference. Miller both intensifies the anxiety evident in the primary metaphor of host 
and parasite, and reproduces classic phallocentric discourse: the description of the 
feminine as "defective" and "dependent" is reminscent of Hegel and Burke, and 
locates Miller in a line of masculine thought extending back to Aristotle and to early 
Christian writers. The intrication of the feminine and the parasitical is a subset of this 
discourse, appearing in texts as disparate as WoUstonecraft’s Rights of Woman, in 
which she criticizes those fragile females who "cling" with "parasitical tenacity" to 
male support (153), to Jonathan Culler’s On Deconstruction: "in Freud’s writings the 
feminine is treated as supplementary, parasitic" (167).^ In the passage cited above, 
Hülis Miller produces a nightmarish version of De Quincey’s vision, or, rather, he
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makes explicit the danger enfolded in the "too rank a luxuriance" of De Quincey’s 
parasitical plant which draws the lifesap from the host, reducing it to a "dry withered 
pole". Miller describes the parasite as an invading "alien" but then proposes that the 
"obvious or univocal reading" (the host) may "itself be the uncanny alien which is so 
close it cannot be seen as strange" (218). What is uncanny, finally, about the 
relationship between host and parasite, and, implicitly between male and female, is 
that "each is already inhabited by the other as difference from itself" (Johnson, World 
35). Miller’s metaphors take a turn which helps to map out my reading of De 
Quincey: the twining of the deconstructive ivy around the oak - or the parasitical 
plant around the pole - engenders, I wül argue, a paradigm of self-difference, a 
destabilization of the univocality of gender.
* * * * *
Witchcraft has seized upon you, nympholepsy has struck you.
Thomas De Quincey
In Recollections. De Quincey recounts the moving story of his attachment to Kate 
Wordsworth. He is "fascinated" by her flower-like innocence and independence, 
citing Wordsworth’s lines (from "Characteristics of a Child Three Years Old") on 
" ’this happy creature [who] of herself / Was all sufficient: solitude to her / Was blithe 
society’" (371). De Quincey ascribes "some witchery to the nature and manners of 
this innocent child". What is the attraction of such self-possession? Freud theorizes 
about the appeal of the narcissistic woman who attains the "self-sufficiency" of loving 
only herself; such women - along with children, cats, large beasts of prey, criminals, 
and "humorists" - represent a tantalising vision of paradisical completeness from 
which the lover is excluded, the satisfaction of his desire eternally deferred ("On 
Narcissism" 14:69). The self-sufficient, self-satisfying woman eludes the grasp of the
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phallocentric system that would put her in her proper place, for she is impenetrable, 
indifferent to male desire. I recall that De Quincey has to "entice" Kate to share his 
walks and his bed.^^
Stephen Spector, in his brilliant reading of this episode, also turns to Freud’s 
essay, but he chooses to quote a line which focusses on "’the charm of the child’", 
on "'his narcissism, his self-contentment’" (Spector 504; my i t a l ics ) .The  fact that 
it is a female child in De Quincey (a nymph, no less) is a matter of indifference. 
Spector argues that Kate’s self-sufficiency makes her "almost a double of her father 
... She serves as a substitute, a replacement for Wordsworth, both of whom attract De 
Quincey because they seem to possess what he cannot have". He elaborates the ties 
between De Quincey’s textualization of Kate Wordsworth and Wordsworth’s "Lucy" 
poems, positing that "the entire story ... solicits an interpretation as a reading of 
Wordsworth", for example, as "a deconstructive reading of the Lucy poems" 
(503,506). Spector’s substitution argument is, at least intially, seductive: we know 
that De Quincey was infatuated with Wordsworth - he idolized the latter’s work, often 
quoting or alluding to Wordsworth’s poems in his own texts; he "trembled", lover­
like, in "intense expectation" of their first meeting, and he went to live in Dove 
Cottage (Recollections 128). Spector’s subtle deconstructive reading is, on one level, 
a sensitive response to De Quincey’s own obsession with the textualization of 
experience, but on another it accedes to what Barbara Johnson has called the 
"patriarchal filiation" of the male (Yale) deconstructionists (World 361 For example, 
while De Quincey views Kate as an "impersonation of the dawn", an Auroran acolyte, 
Spector argues that De Quincey "had linked Catherine to the mosferlink, the master 
trope, the sun" , thus connecting her explicitly with a male luminary (505, my italics).
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Though it is true that De Quincey supplements his vision of Kate as the dawn, 
observing "the visionary sort of connection which ... she assumed with the summer 
sun" (Recollections 372), and that elsewhere in his essay Spector acknowledges the 
Kate/dawn link, his rhetoric here may be read symptomatically. It is surely not 
insignificant that Spector’s theorizing eliminates the (narcissistic) woman, leaving 
only what Eve Sedgwick has called male "homosocial desire", the bonding between 
De Quincey, Wordsworth and Spector .Though I go on to trace the ’feminization’ 
of De Quincey, this is not to negate a reading of De Quincey as a homoaesthete with 
eyes only for Wordsworth, but it is to question that effacement of woman - the way 
in which woman’s ’difference’ is made unnoticeable - by which the homosocial / 
homoaesthetic bond is naturalized. In other words, I want to question the patriarchal 
fabrication of an ’in-difference’ to the feminine difference on which it is grounded. 
I will shift the focus of the critical gaze, privileging those marginal details which may 
be connoted as ’feminine’.
It is worth noting that the ’blind spot’ of Spector’s critique is replicated in 
other criticism of De Quincey. John Beer’s commentary, too, is marked by the desire 
to elide female sexuality (sometimes, sexuality, per se) from De Quincey’s texts. The 
repression of female sexuality often entails "making a nun out of a nymph" (Johnson, 
World 34). Beer analyses De Quincey’s description of his feelings after the 
disappearance of Arm of Oxford Street: De Quincey wishes that "the benediction of 
a heart oppressed with gratitude ... might have power given it from above to chase - 
to haunt - to way-lay - to overtake - to pursue thee into the central darkness of a 
London brothel or (if it were possible) into the darkness of the grave" (Confessions 
22). Beer observes that these words (chase, haunt, waylay) "look strangely at odds
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with the rest of the passage, suggesting as they do a language of sexual pursuit", but 
in mitigation he proposes that "De Quincey is in fact haunted by the opening stanza 
of Wordsworth’s ’She Was a Phantom of Delight’" (175-176).^* For Spector, Kate 
is a substitute for Wordsworth; in Beer’s reading, though there is no disputing the 
verbal echo, a Wordsworth poem usurps the place of the prostitute ("De Quincey is 
in fact haunted"). Beer argues that De Quincey "sees the imagery as transcending 
female beauty"; the gender politics are despecified in order to celebrate "a love of the 
heart between human beings" (176,168; my italics - the heart displaces other organs 
of feeling). Earlier in his essay. Beer proposes that, "Like others in that age he [De 
Quincey] found in such a relationship of the heart [the reference here is to De 
Quincey’s sister, Elizabeth] qualities which seemed to him to transcend those of 
sexual attraction" (169, my italics); "De Quincey could hardly have lived in close 
association with these men [Wordsworth and Coleridge] ... without picking up some 
of the implications of a love of the heart which seemed to transcend sexual desire" 
(171, my italics). The subjunctives inscribe the possibility of non-transcendence, but 
this is an (unconscious?) insight which Beer sublimates in favour of the certainty that 
"it was fully in consonance" with the "Wordsworthian programme" of "cultivating 
intense personal relationships", that De Quincey "should have fallen in love, sexlessly, 
with Catherine, the Wordsworth’s three-year old daughter" (170, my italics). 
However, to this reader, De Quincey’s relation with Catherine, as it is textually 
mediated, is laced with the language of desire: "ties of passion", "excess of love", 
"entice", "sick, frantic yearning", "frenzy of grief". Beer has to ignore the erotic 
connotations of De Quincey’s words in order to validate a transcendental trajectory.
The texture of De Quincey’s erotic obsession should become clearer (if more
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complex) if we return to the episode dealing with Kate’s death. Her death does not 
sever the "ties of passion", for the ghosts of self-sufficient tropes continue to haunt 
De Quincey:
my eye was haunted ... with a facility, but at times also with a 
necessity, for weaving, out of a few simple elements, a perfect picture 
of little Kate in the attitude and onward motion of walking ... usually 
the first hint upon which the figure arose commenced in wild plants, 
such as taU ferns, or the purple flowers of the foxglove; but, whatever 
might be the colours or the forms, uniformly the same little full-formed 
figure arose, uniformly dressed in the little blue-gown and black skirt 
of Westmoreland, and uniformly with an air of advancing motion. 
(Recollections 373)
In the involuted folds of this passage, Kate Wordsworth is female form, (rhetorical) 
figure, and flower, the enwreathing of these elements enacted by alliteration and 
r epe t i t ion .She  is always observed in proximity with the wild plants, and De 
Quincey’s homonymie play generates a picture of Kate as a/rose. De Quincey is 
conscious of her female fashioning, her child-woman body (a "full-formed figure", 
the conjunction of adjective and noun semantically overdetermining her shape; the 
figure is also a playful Platonism); he is attentive to the details of dress (falling for 
a girl in uniform?). The figure is always advancing, provoking desire but deferring 
satisfaction. De Quincey is fixated, a condition emblematized by his adherence to 
the consonant /f/ which takes on a talismanic force in this passage. The flowers of 
rhetoric are involved in a process outwith De Quincey’s control (he is "haunted ... 
with a necessity"). This trope flaunts its forms, it turns and turns again, feeding De
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Quincey’s "frenzy of grief". By night, De Quincey embraces Kate’s grave - "I ... 
stretched myself every night, for more than two months running, upon her grave; in 
fact, often passed the night upon her grave" - as though his body can stretch across 
the abyss of death and prevent mortification or stasis; by day, he is haunted by her 
figure. De Quincey analyzes his "self-surrender to passion", a "self-surrender" which 
inversely (or perversely) mimics the self-sufficiency of the female figure, calling it 
a "luxury" ("I cling to it as a luxury"), with all the connotations of excess, sensuality, 
even femininity that that word b r i n g s . I s  femininity contagious?
De Quincey writes of being "under the possession of some internal nervous 
malady, that made each respiration which I drew an act of separate anguish" 
(Recollections 373). It is as though he is being asphyxiated by a parasitical plant. 
I would speculate that these respiratory problems affect De Quincey’s eloquence, 
constraining his wit, and producing a kind of stuttering (making him more like 
Dorothy Wordsworth, who, as De Quincey tells us, is afflicted with a nervous 
stammer [Recollections 131-32]). The initial onset of the ailment involves "a sting 
as it were, of some stationary torment left behind", its departure leaves De Quincey 
partially immobilised "with difficulty to stand or walk" (373-74). In a type of mirror 
narcissism, the death of the other is experienced as a death of the self. De Quincey’s 
malady is a mimicry of Kate’s illness, for she was "not what could be called 
paralysed, but suffering a sort of atony or imperfect distribution of vital power" (371). 
De Quincey’s loss of physical and linguistic mobility may be attributed to what might 
be called the ’Medusa-effect’. Earlier in this chapter, I postulated traces of the 
Medusa in the ’parasitical plant’ passage; here. De Quincey stiffens like those 
spectators turned to stone by the Medusa head. Moreover, he informs us that he was
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"blindly, doatingly, in a servile degree, devoted to this one affection", a blindness 
which, is traditionally symbolic of castration (372). Thus, De Quincey’s transfixed 
attention to the feminine threatens to ’unman’ him, to reduce him to what he describes 
as "languishing impotence", a state which names the loss of fixed ego boundaries and 
of a secure social identity.
There is, however, an ambiguity at the heart of the Freudian text which 
replicates a double movement in De Quincey. Freud argues that "the terror of 
Medusa is [thus] a terror of castration that is linked to the sight of something", though 
this is an absence (of the penis) rather than a presence ("something") ("Medusa’s 
Head" 18:273). The disturbingly split/multiple female genitalia (or "plural" as 
Irigaray puts it in her revalorisation of this "sight") are metamorphosed into the 
snakes which are a "multiplication of penis symbols". The sight of the Medusa offers 
both "horror" and "consolation to the spectator" : the snakes offer a replacement of the 
penis, covering the disturbing ’lack’ of femininity, and, most significantly, Freud 
reads the spectator’s horrified "stiffening" as a trope for erection, "he is still in 
possession of a penis, and the stiffening reassures him of this fact". In other words, 
and to return to De Quincey, this spectacle threatens to ’unman’ him, but it also, 
paradoxically, promises to ’man’ him: De Quincey’s obsession with Kate involves the 
identification of the subject with the object of desire, with a corresponding loss of 
phallic authority (or castration), but the very fact of obsession is the fact of difference, 
so that the separateness of the self is perpetually reconstituted and a sense of mastery 
is reinscribed.
The gender destabilization of the ’Medusa-effect’ is reinflected in the way in 
which De Quincey’s passion for the dead Kate Wordsworth is inscribed on, or within,
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his body: "I felt, to my horror, the sting as it were, of some stationary torment" 
(Recollections 373). The word "sting" recurs elsewhere in De Quincey: in "The 
Affliction of Childhood" (a section of the Suspiria de Profundisl De Quincey writes 
of "the earliest instances in [his] life which left stings in [his] memory"; these 
instances are associated with the feminine, being "a remarkable dream of terrific 
grandeur about a favourite nurse" and "the fact of having connected a profound sense 
of pathos with the reappearance, very early in the spring, of some crocuses" (Masson 
1:32-33).^^ In the same text. De Quincey mourns deeply for his sister: "when I was 
told insultingly to cease ’my girlish tears’, that word ’girlish’ had no sting for me, 
except as a verbal echo to the one eternal thought of my heart - " (Suspiria 111). 
There is no "sting" here, no movement from outer to inner, for the word "girlish" 
echoes a feminine that has already been introjected (but which is under De Quincey’s 
control). But a couple of pages earlier, De Quincey had pondered on "those dreadful 
words of St. Paul applied to my sister ... For here lay the sting of it, viz. in the fatal 
words - ’We shall be changed.' How was the unity of my interest in her to be 
preserved, if she were to be altered, and no longer reflect in her sweet countenance 
the traces that were sculptured on my heart?" (109). De Quincey’s investment in the 
woman is narcissistic {"my interest", "my heart"), his desire seeks a reflected self. But 
this mimetic guarantee of his subjectivity is shattered by the possibility of an alien 
image ("if she were to be altered") - then the internal inscriptions of femininity would 
have no external image to ground them, and onto which De Quincey can displace his 
own femininity, that is, another body (differently sexed) which embodies his own 
’Otherness’.
In the Recollections De Quincey is horrified by penetration ("I felt, to my
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horror, the s t i n g I  noted above that he ascribes some "witchery" to Kate 
Wordsworth, while in an earlier essay on William Wordsworth, De Quincey writes: 
If there be an enchantress’s spell yet surviving in this age of ours, it is 
the haughty grace of maidenly pride - the womanly sense of dignity, 
even when most in excess, and expressed in the language of scorn - 
which tortures a man and lacerates his heart, at the same time that it 
pierces him with admiration. (Recollections 185, my italics)
Significantly, this is the penetration of the male by female power, a sexual reversal 
to which Wordsworth is apparently immune, but De Quincey is drawn to this 
"spectacle", overwhelmed by the ’excess’ of a feminine which is also phallic and 
experiencing an erotic wounding from which he has no recourse (Recollections 186). 
To annotate this laceration is to acknowledge the ’castration’ of the Subject, the split 
within the self.^^
One way of describing De Quincey’s textual sexuality is to invoke paradigms 
of masochism: "she who spares a man the agitations of this thraldom, robs him no 
less of its divinest transports" (Recollections 186). Eve Sedgwick, commenting on 
"the pervasive masochistic component in De Quincey’s writing", reminds us that "it 
is important to realize that passivity and paralysis can be ...unspeakably delicious as 
well as unspeakably painful" (Coherence 72). Like the "sting" which penetrates the 
male, masochism poses the masculine subject as feminine: in a theatrical, even 
melodramatic, identification with female passivity, masculine subjects, according to 
Adela Pinch, "transfer themselves into the part of a woman" (843).^^
De Quincey describes his condition as a case of "nympholepsy".^^ In "The 
Affliction of Childhood", the signs of nympholepsy are "a disease which seems no
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disease; ... a languishing which, from its very sweetness, perplexes the mind and is 
fancied to be very health" (Suspiria 119). In such an instance, "Witchcraft has seized 
upon you, nympholepsy has struck you ...Sweet becomes the grave." Nympholepsy 
is an uncarmy disease, a languishing that masquerades as health, and which collapses 
the gap between erotic and death wishes - desire for the "sweet faces" becomes 
synonymous with desire for the darkness of the grave. It is, in other words, a 
condition which confounds differences. The perplexity does not stop here, for the 
signifier "nymph", as the root of "nympholepsy", brings with it a host of unruly 
cultural associations. The original Greek word means ’bride’, but the OED cites an 
obsolete anatomical usage of the plural "nympha". This angle was picked up by 
seventeeth century anatomists who used the term "nymph" as a name for the labia 
minora: "Nymph: little pieces of Flesh in a Woman’s Secrets", a secret ’something’ 
that subverts Freud’s "nothing to see" (Blancard’s Phvsical Dictionary. 1693; qtd. in 
Mills, Womanwords 181). Nymphaea is the botanical name for a waterlily: in 
Bataille’s "The Language of Flowers", the waterlily signifies indifference (qtd. in 
Sartiliot 68), while for Mrs. Hey, "if the rose may be the queen of the bower, the 
water lily may certainly aspire to be queen of the stream" (95). These notions of the 
regal, and of indifference, recall the self-sufficiency ascribed to Kate Wordsworth (as 
well as to Freud’s narcissistic woman). The invaginated textual folds of the word 
"nymph" inscribe the traces of female autoeroticism, a resistance to appropriation by 
the phallocentric system which would reduce woman to a lesser and ’lacking’ man. 
Kate, as nymph, cannot be securely objectified. Moreover, I would argue that 
"nympholepsy", which classically names a male, voyeuristic desire for young girls, 
a frenzy inspired by the unattainable, and "nymphomania", that is, uncontrollable
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female desire, may be seen as mirror images of each o t h e r T o  speculate on this 
mirroring might lead to the suggestion that the voyeur is implicated in the feminine 
which he objectifies. Typically, De Quincey confounds any binary opposition of 
difference, characterising his relation to Wordsworth as one of "nympholepsy" 
(Recollections 119).
Near the end of the lakeland essay which documents the life and death of Kate 
Wordsworth, De Quincey inscribes a regaining of fluency. His "awful malady" and 
his "grief for" and "remembrance of" Kate Wordsworth disappear together: "The 
traces of her innocent features were utterly washed away from my heart; she might 
have been dead for a thousand years, so entirely abolished was the last lingering 
image of her face or figure" (Recollections 374). The memory of Kate is effaced so 
that De Quincey can be regenerated. But, of course, the "traces" of Kate are 
(re)inscribed in the very fact of writing: De Quincey uses the past tense while writing 
from an unspoken present in which Kate’s death clearly does make a difference. In 
the Confessions. De Quincey tells us "that there is no such thing as forgetting possible 
to the mind; a thousand accidents may, and wiU interpose a veil between our present 
consciousness and the secret inscriptions on the mind; accidents of the same sort will 
also rend away this veü; but alike, veiled or unveiled, the inscription remains forever" 
(69). Deferring commentary on this rhetoric of veiling, I want to observe here that 
De Quincey’s desire to suppress the feminine, to put (female) sexuality under control, 
is, necessarily, imperfectly fulfilled: at the margins of the text, there remain displaced 
reminders of femininity. De Quincey writes of his radical amnesia: "The little 
memorials of which her mother had given me, as, m particular, a pair of her red 
morocco shoes, won not a sigh from me as I looked at them" (Recollections 374).
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This detail, from which De Quincey perversely takes away significance, continues to 
haunt me. To use De Quincey’s word, I might say that it "stings" me, or, in 
Barthesian terminology, that it is the "punctum" of the text.^  ^ It’s a little detail 
which is excessive, extraneous to the episode, that type of "disorderly" detail which 
Jane Gallop would call "truly sexy" (Thinking 48).
By way of linguistic coincidence, Freud in his essay on "Fetishism" remarks 
that "the horror of castration has set up a memorial to itself m the creation of this 
substitute", that is, the fetish substitutes for the maternal phallus/penis which "the little 
boy once believed in and ...does not want to give up" (21:352-53, my italics). "It 
remains a token of triumph", Freud theorizes, "over the threat of castration and a 
protection against it". Shoes are a popular fetish, synecdochically representing the 
woman’s genitals: "the subject’s interest comes to halt half-way, as it were; it is as 
though the last impression before the uncanny and traumatic one is retained as a 
fetish" (354). In other words, the fetish acts as a screen, or, to pick up De Quincey’s 
rhetoric, an erotic veiling of the real female genitals. Like Freud’s patients, De 
Quincey might well "praise the way in which it [the fetish] eases [his] erotic life" 
(351)."^ ° Like the red shoes in De Quincey’s text, the fetish is located in the 
margins: "As a rule . . .the fetish made its appearance in analysis as a subsidiary 
finding".
Before moving on to discuss The English Mail-Coach. I would like to 
comment on my use of Freudian psychoanalysis (especially since I return to Freud in 
the next section). I wül also offer some self-criticism of the implications of my 
methodology for feminist reading. Psychoanalysis is not invoked here in the 
traditional sense of a pure metalanguage offering an insight into the existential ’truth’
Ill
of De Quincey’s fixation; rather my purpose is to trace the rhetorical parallels, the 
contiguity, between De Quincey’s texts and the scenarios of psychoanalysis, both of 
which are concerned with the cultural/linguistic construction of gender. The 
symptoms, repressions and representations of psychoanalysis are themselves textual,
’slips’ of an unconsious pen; Freud himself observed that his case histories ’read hke 
short stories’. The main problem with the textualization of fetishism is that it repeats 
the movement inherent in fetishism itself, that is, it acts as a double displacement, 
twice distancing us from the ’real’ Kate Wordsworth, and, in a sense, consigning her 
to death again. In this chapter, I am concerned with the appropriation, 
aestheticisation, and fetishization of the female body by the male subject, and with 
the ways in which this perversely destabUises male ego boundaries; but, as I 
suggested in Chapter Two, the risk here is of colluding with the effacement of women 
in the triumphant production of deconstructive ’Woman’ (De Quincey, ultimately, in 
this instance). How, then, to negotiate between aesthetics and ethics, or between "the 
formalist and the ideological"."^  ^ One way, perhaps, is to emphasize the body as the 
site where the figurative becomes literal or material. Though the body is always 
already culturally coded, though it is not outside of representation, it is possible to 
interrogate the rhetoric of representation for those instances when the flesh becomes 
word or the word becomes flesh. In the next section, I turn from the red shoes, those 
poignant material "memorials" of an absent body, to De Quincey’s use of flowers as 
figures of the symbolization or displaced representation of female sexuality. The 
instability of this trope, which is (un)grounded, in De Quincey, in the shifting space 
between the real body and its image, helps me to keep the existential within my field 
of vision."^ ^
* * * * *
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A strange sort o f contradictory life.
Thomas De Quincey
The full-bloom of De Quinceyan fetishism is exposed in The English-Mail Coach. 
At the beginning of the "Dream Fugue" section, De Quincey recalls his vision of the 
woman in a gig, whose fate forms the subject of "The Vision of Sudden Death". He 
makes reference to "the shadows of ...averted signs" and provides an explanatory 
footnote: "I read the course and changes of the lady’s agony in the succession of her 
involuntary gestures; but let it be remembered that I read all this from the rear, never 
once catching the lady’s full face, and even her profile imperfectly" (Mail-Coach 
225). This is an oblique vision, an imperfect glimpse which is doubly mediated 
("shadows", "averted"). The vocabulary of fetishism articulates the inattentive 
strategy by which the subject distances himself from any of the immediate 
implications of perception, that is, the perception of female ’lack’, the mutilated 
female body. The distraught figure of this unknown woman is subsumed into De 
Quincey’s dreams, metamorphosing into aU the frail female figures of the "Dream 
Fugue".
However, a more destabilizing glimpse of the feminine in this text is provided 
by the details of the transformation of Miss Fanny of the Bath Road. The narrative 
itself structurally mimics the fetishist’s glimpse, for we glance at Fanny four 
paragraphs before the episode proper begins (193-94). The language of flowers 
characterizes De Quincey’s description of Fanny, as it marks his obsession with Kate 
Wordsworth. Fanny is perenially "blooming", and thus her figure maintains its life 
in his dreams thirty-five years after his intermittant flirtation with her. The "rosy 
blossoms" on her face derive from her "youth and innocence, and from the fountains 
of the dawn" (196); waiting for her grandfather, the mail coachman, she is "a constant
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watcher for the dawn, and for the London mail that in summer months entered about 
dawn into the lawny thickets of Marlborough Forest" (194-95). The topography here 
invites a symbolic reading (later. De Quincey will describe the thickets as "dewy" 
[199]). The rose/Fanny dyad transfixes De Quincey, who is mesmerised by the 
almost "infinite iteration" of luxuriant plants:
Out of the darkness, if I happen to call up the image of Fanny from 
thirty-five years back, arises suddenly a rose in June; or, if I think for 
an instant of the rose in June, up rises the heavenly face of Fanny.
One after the other, like the antiphonies in a choral service, rises Fanny 
and the rose in June, then back again the rose in June and Fanny.
Then they come both together, as in a chorus; roses and Fannies, 
Fannies and roses, without end - thick as blossoms in paradise. (198)
Fanny is figured, exorbitantly, as a rose. In Mrs. Hey’s rather De Quinceyan rhetoric, 
"So many are the classical legends and poetical associations connected with the rose, 
that they crowd almost too thickly on the memory, baffling it by their very profusion" 
(79). Roses have been associated throughout history with sainthood (from Dante’s 
mystic rose to the wild-rose bush of De Quincey’s transatlantic contemporary, 
Hawthorne), and De Quincey’s religious rhetoric draws on this tradition ("heavenly 
face", "the antiphonies in a choral service", "blossoms in paradise"). It suggests a 
desire to sanctify the heart’s affections, but this language also enacts the 
dematerialization of the ’other’ (the return of the nun). The rose is a slippery 
signifier, connoting secular as well as divine love, and it recurs as a traditional 
emblem of romance, and of sexuality (we recall that The English Mail-Coach begins 
with talk of a marriage). In traditional ballads, such as Waller’s "Song. Goe lovely
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Rose", the woman and the rose resemble each other in terms of feminine beauty 
("sweet and fair"), but this analogy (though ironized in Waller - "How sweet and fair 
she seems to be") is founded on the Christian association of the rose with purity. 
Roses may be signifiers of the maidenhead: in As You Like It. "He that the sweetest 
rose will find / Must find love’s prick, and Rosalind" (3.2.107-8), while Naomi Schor 
argues that a "black rose ... is the metaphor for the female sexual organ that [is] 
disseminated throughout Flaubert’s writings" ("Fetishism" 92).^^ Wetenhall Wilkes 
deploys the trope of the rose in June in his conduct text: the woman who lives up to 
the rules of chastity "ever flourishes, hke a rose in June, with aU her virgin graces 
about her - sweet to the sense, and lovely to the eye" (A Letter of Genteel and Moral 
Advice. 1740; Jones 29). Shelley’s poem "The Sensitive Plant" graphically unfolds 
the sexual symbolism, as well as linking the rose with a nymph:
And the rose like a nymph to the bath addresst.
Which unveiled the depth of her glowing breast.
Tin, fold after fold, to the fainting air
The soul of her beauty and love lay bare: (11.29-32)
As in De Quincey, the rose provokes the miscegenation of discourses: "the soul of her 
beauty" is exposed."^
In the entanglement between the terms of a transcendent and an earthly desire 
in the De Quincey passage, the sexual resonances predominate, partly because of the 
happy coincidence of Fanny’s name. The OED records that "fanny" is first used as 
a slang term for the female genitals in 1879, but I suspect that this is a somewhat 
belated recognition. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure was published a century 
before De Quincey’s text; Cleland’s novel is a comocopia of euphemisms for the
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male and female genitalia, and it seems likely that the more commonly known title, 
Fanny Hül. had been assimilated into this field of meaning (particularly given the 
sexual connotations of ’hill’ - as well as of ’fans’ - in literary h i s t o r y ) De 
Quincey’s essay "Introduction to the World of Strife" provides an appropriate 
metacomment: "I found, in almost everybody’s words, an unintentional opening left 
for double interpretation. Undesigned equivocation prevails everywhere" (Masson 
1:77-78).^®
De Quincey’s representation of Farmy may be read, then, as a rhetorically 
overdetermined displacement of the fetishized part, the disembodied genitalia 
blossoming as the folds of a rose. Indeed, the very word "rose" is fetishized; as 
Roland Barthes puts it: "Desire is not in the text by the words which ’represent’ it, 
which relate it, but by words sufficiently delineated, sufficiently brilliant, triumphant, 
to make themselves loved, in the fashion of fetishes" (qtd. in Gregory Ulmer 337). 
De Quincey’s work, like Barthes’s, proceeds through a series of such amorous 
infatuations (in De Quincey’s case, infatuation with ’flower’ words).
In Mary Ann Doane’s words, fetishism involves "the ability to balance 
knowledge and belief", to simultaneously acknowledge and deny woman’s castration, 
and hence "to maintain a distance from the lure of the image" (Desire to Desire 12). 
An homologous temporal disjunction matches the spatial distance, for De Quincey 
writes: "Did I then make love to Fanny? mais oiu done; as much love as one can 
make whilst the mail is changing horses"; out of its abundance, the affair yields the 
moral that "the man making love ...ought to be made a ward of the General Post- 
Office, whose severe course of timing and periodical interruption might intercept 
many a foolish declaration" (Mail-Coach 196). The exigencies of the postal service
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interrupt between desire and its full satisfaction, constantly renewing the pursuit for 
a perpetually lost object. There is no seven-year itch for De Quincey, only an 
endlessly repeatable scene of fetishized eroticism
De Quincey laments (tongue-in-cheek): "Roses, I fear, are degenerating", 
literally, departing from kind, "the Fannies of this island ...are not improving" (Mail- 
Coach 197-98). The fetishist must preserve the security of his distance from the 
’real’ body, the fetish must stay in its place, but the rose/Fanny fetish gets out of 
control, frustrating rather than facilitating male mastery of the feminine. De Quincey 
mixes memory and desire, and a monstrous regiment is engendered, for Fanny brings 
with her "a chain of signifiers" (Spector 518). "[B]y links of natural association she 
brings along with her a troop of dreadful creatures", perhaps the "new and monstrous 
phenomenon" to which De Quincey refers elsewhere (Masson 13:285; Suspiria 89). 
The randomness of the law of association is emphasized: "by an accident o f fanciful 
caprice, she brought along with her into those dreams a troop of dreadful creatures" 
(Mail-Coach 195, my italics). This account of "the slight case of Miss Fanny on the 
Bath Road" is propelled by the erratic motor of free association (193). The first link 
is with Fanny’s grandfather who, like Fanny herself, is described as "blooming", 
though his rosiness is artificially induced by alcohol rather than metonymically linked 
with the pink flush of dawn (196). His appearance demonstrates the transformations 
and substitutions associated with flowers, for in his "monstrous inaptitude for turning 
round", the coachman "too much resembled a crocodile"; when De Quincey 
"happen[s] to call up the image of Fanny", along with the ubiquitous roses "comes 
a venerable crocodile, in a royal livery of scarlet and gold ... and the crocodile is 
driving a four-in-hand from the box of the Bath mad" (198). This visionary mail-
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coach arrives in Marlborough forest, where
the thickets are rich with roses; the roses call up (as ever) the sweet 
countenance of Fanny, who, being the granddaughter of a crocodile, 
awakens a dreadful host of wüd semi-legendary animals - griffins, 
dragons, basilisks, sphinxes - tül at length the whole vision of fighting 
images crowds into one towering armorial shield, a vast emblazonry of 
human charities and human loveliness that have perished, but quartered 
heraldically with unutterable horrors of monstrous and demoniac 
natures; whilst over aU rises, as a surmounting crest, one fair female 
hand, with the fore finger pointing, in sweet, sorrowful admonition, 
upwards to heaven, and having power ...to awaken the pathos that kills 
in the very bosom of the horrors that madden the grief that gnaws at 
the heart, together with the monstrous creations of darkness that shock 
the belief, and make dizzy the reason of man. (199)
In one sense, the overt logic of the text points to the transformation of the coachman 
as the signal for the generation of monsters, but this metamorphosis is occasioned by, 
and dependent on, Fanny’s shape-shifting, that is, the "floral luxuriations" of the 
dream-text ( 2 0 0 ) . In the passage there are (again) provocative thickets embedded 
with roses; the roses disseminate monstrous signifiers which are framed by the image 
of an heraldic shield. The shield is "'quartered heraldically" (my italics), demarcating 
the cross-coupling of "human charities and human loveliness" with "monstrous and 
demoniac natures". Just as images which are originally gay open into "sudden 
capacities of horror" during their evolution, so the monsters engendered are curiously 
self-divided, hybrids marked by "the horrid innoculation upon each other of
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incompatible natures" (193,200). Above the armorial shield there is a "surmounting 
crest" : a "fair female hand, with the forefinger pointing, in sweet, sorrowful 
admonition, upwards to heaven" (199). This hand, another fetishized object, acts as 
a sort of female signature on the shield - "surmounted" by the female hand, 
monstrosity comes under the aegis of the feminine.'^  ^ As in the ’parasitical plant’ 
passage, the feminine is marked by (linguistic) excess (here, the insistent layering of 
poetic devices, such as alliteration, assonance and consonance). Syntax, as well as 
signifers, slides beyond De Quincey’s control, disorientating and dissolving the 
implied subject of the discourse (see especially the convoluted syntax of the clause 
beginning "to awaken the pathos..."). This vision of the feminine, which eludes 
possession, makes ’male’ Reason dizzy.
The horror does not stop here, for in the dizzying involutions of this section 
of the Mail-Coach the outside invades the inside, external horror devolves into an 
internal parasite, an alien diffemce within the self: "The dreamer finds housed within 
himself ... some horrid alien nature", which maintains "a secret and detestable 
commerce with his own heart" (201).^° De Quincey often represents himself as a 
split, or doubled, subject. Fantasising about Wordsworth and the Lake District, he 
writes: "I viewed myself as a phantom-self - a second identity projected from my own 
consciousness, and already living amongst them!" (Recollections 120). The figure of 
the Dark Interpreter in the Suspiria is "originally a mere reflex of [his] inner nature", 
but. De Quincey teUs us, "the Interpreter sometimes swerves out of my orbit, and 
mixes a little with alien natures. I do not always know him in these cases as my own 
parhelion" (Suspiria 156). But the passage in question unveils an unkinder graft, 
generating an interiorized, wayward split, a wound that cannot be sutured: De
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Quincey ponders the curse that "the alien nature contradicts his own, fights with it, 
perplexes, and confounds it", and that, like the monstrous multiplicity of femininity 
(as it is culturally conceived), "not one alien nature, but two, but three, but four, but 
five, are introduced within what once he thought the inviolable sanctuary of himself" 
(Mail-Coach 201). As De Quincey anxiously writes elsewhere, "there might be 
supplements to supplements" (Suspiria 133). Contagious self-division defines this 
dangerous supplement within the self. The fetishist’s protective distance from the 
object of desire collapses as the feminine is engrafted upon "inviolable" masculinity. 
Or, to put this another way, the fetish loses its metonymic efficacy, so that proximity 
rather than distance characterizes the relation between male and female subjects. 
Interestingly, this scenario of an alien within the body, an other within the self, is 
close to recent conceptualizations of maternity, particularly Kristeva’s thesis that the 
maternal space is a place "simultaneously dual and alien"; "Within the body, growing 
as a graft, indomitable, there is an other" (Desire in Language 237).^  ^ The 
boundaries between self and other are destabilized, and the notions of a unitary, 
inviolable identity and a phallocentiic order based on differentiation, are put in 
jeopardy.
"I was placed in a strange sort of contradictory life; feeling that things were 
and were not at the same instant; believing and not believing in the same breath" 
(Recollections 381). De Quincey is referring here to Wordsworth’s "ridicule" of 
many books which he himself admired, and the ensuing "perplexity of mind which 
possessed [him]" because of the conflict between his powerful recollection of the 
books and "[his] blind and unquestioning veneration for Wordsworth". De Quincey’s 
comment is striking as an almost textbook definition of fetishism ("He [the boy] has
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retained that belief [that women have a penis], but he has also given it up" [Freud, 
"Fetishism" 21:353]). Note that De Quincey’s figurative blindness inscribes the crisis 
of visibility that so is so central to Freud. In another Freudian text. Studies on 
Hysteria. Fraulein Elizabeth von R. is also in the "peculiar situation of knowing and 
at the same time not knowing", or, as Freud puts it in a footnote to the case of Miss 
Lucy R., that "strange state of mind in which one knows and does not know a thing 
at the same time" (2:165,117). Moreover, Freud posits that Elizabeth von R .’s "love 
for her brother-in-law was present in her consciousness like a foreign body", a 
formulation which is reminiscent of De Quincey’s introjection of alien bodies 
(2:165).^^ There are other parallels: De Quincey and Freud’s female hysterics share 
symtoms such as paralysis, stammering, hallucinations, nightmares, a general somatic 
excess, while Brener’s famous phrase "Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences" 
could be De Quincey’s epitaph (Freud 2:7). Freud, of course, later universalizes the 
problem of the impossibility of complete knowledge: the hysterical symptom of 
female sexuality yields the recognition of a split at the heart of being itself. Freud 
also recognized that hysteria was not only a female condition, and he described cases 
of male hysteria. However, the case studies of the famous Studies on Hysteria are 
aU of female patients and, etymlogically, hysteria describes a disease of the uterus, 
and thus the name marks the specificity of the woman’s body. Hysterical disturbance 
remains associated with the feminine.^"  ^ I would argue, therefore, that the 
entanglement between the discourses of fetishism and hysteria remains provocative 
for reading De Quincey as - undecidably - male and/or female, fetishist and/or 
hysteric.
The focus on femininity (whether fetishized or as hysterical symptom) disrupts
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stability, but the typical trajectory of a De Quincey text is to recuperate this threat, 
to regain a type of masculine order. For example. De Quincey "gloomily retires" 
from the gothic scene that I have analyzed as the deconstruction of gender opposition, 
opting for exclusion and repression - he shifts register, referring to the "transfigured 
coachman" and rewriting the "horror" as merely "playful" (Mail-Coach 201, my 
italics). Significantly, in Masson’s edition, much of the final paragraph of this 
episode is relegated to a footnote; according to Masson, "this paragraph is but about 
one-fifth of the length of the corresponding paragraph as it appeared originally in 
Blackwood’s. De Quincey’s taste having led him, on revision in 1854, to cancel the 
other four-fifths as forced or irrelevant. The condensation was judicious for its 
particular purpose; but, as the original paragraph is too characteristic to be sacrified 
altogether, we reproduce it here in detached form" (13:289-90). Deconstructive and 
psychoanalytic readings have taught critics to be attentive to the marginal (footnotes 
and the like). It is ironically appropriate, given the subject of this chapter, that the 
passage itself is fetishized in Masson, represented in "detached form", a supplement 
to the main text. Masson’s own reading of De Quincey is judicious, for the notion 
that the latter erased some text because of its "irrelevance" is a gift for psychoanalytic 
reading. It was the only substantial cut De Quincey made to the essay, and this from 
a man who, though a congenital reviser of his own work, tended to add rather than 
to delete. Certainty is always only precariously generated out of the abyss of 
uncertainty.
* * * * *
I want, finally, to comment on the pleasure a feminist reader may take in reading De 
Quincey; in particular, I want to situate the impropriety of flowers and fetishes within
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the context of recent feminist theory. Fetishism has become critically fashionable, 
but the question remains as to whether the whole concept is inescapably contaminated 
by phaUocentrism.^^ Is fetishism a masculine perversion, a male discourse? Do 
feminists really want to get involved here? As I suggested in Chapter One, I would 
argue that ideological ’purity’ should not be the privileged aim of feminist reading - 
indeed, such a stance might weU be seen as merely reproducing a masculine fiction. 
To engage with the discourse of fetishism, to refashion it, is to deconstruct patriarchy 
from within. Derrida suggests that the sexual subversiveness of floral figures lies in 
their formal reversibility; like shoes and gloves (two of De Quincey’s fetishes), 
flowers can be turned inside out: "For castration to overlap virginity, for the phallus 
to be reversed into the vagina, for alleged opposites to be equivalent to each other and 
reflect each other, the flower has to be turned inside out like a glove and its style like 
a sheath" (Glas 4 7 b ) F l o w e r s  and fetishes enable an oscillation between apparent 
contraries, such as "erection/relapse", "total body proper/fetishised morsel" (126b)/^ 
Recently, several feminist critics (Schor, Kofman, Berg, Jardine) have celebrated the 
paradigm of undecidability offered by the theory of fetishism in its Derridean 
reincarnation. Naomi Schor writes of a certain kind female fetishism, which 
duplicates, or doubles, the fetishist’s double Hfe, his "oscillation between denial and 
recognition of castration", and by which "women can effectively counter any move 
to reduce their bisexuality to a single one of its poles" ("Female Fetishism" 368). 
Schor also calls for a strategic "refetishizing [of] the fetish" (Breaking the Chain x). 
Again, I would gloss this as a double process of defetishization (or defamüiarization), 
that is, understanding the nature of the fetish, and refetishization, or the réinscription - 
rehteralization - of the sexual and textual particularity of the fetish, a reading of/in
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detail. In this chapter, I have refetishized (female) sexuality, making visible the 
details of those parts of the female body from which male critics have averted their 
eyes.
Perhaps De Quincey is a model for Nietzsche’s "third woman", the 
"affirmative woman" identified by Derrida in Spurs (77), who is both masculine and 
feminine, in Elizabeth Berg’s words, "the female equivalent of the fetishist, who treats 
castration as an undecidable question" (13). De Quincey, however, is ultimately 
horrified by this hybrid position, but his discourse is seductive for the feminist critic 
precisely because his fetishism - paradoxically - feminizes him, because of the 
enticing collapse of the distance between male and female. De Quincey’s fascination 
with the feminine engenders an "hysterical" discourse, wherein the foreign or the 
exotic turns out to be inside the body of the ’masculine’ subject, as close to home as 
the transsexuality inscribed in two of De Quincey’s early letters to his sister, which 
are signed, "your affectionate sister, Tabitha Quincey" (Lindop 27).
* * * * *
I remain uneasy that my critical pleasure is somewhat disembodied, that the women 
whose bodies provide the material for De Quincey’s dreams remain, in my text, 
secondary to the tropes which displace (and silence) them m De Quincey’s texts. 
The figure of "a young female dancer" haunts my thoughts. De Quincey
writes:
I have witnessed more than once the case, that a young female dancer 
at a certain turn of a peculiar dance, could not - though she had died 
for it - sustain a free, fluent motion. Aerial chains fell upon her at one 
point; some invisible spell (who could say what!) froze her elasticity.
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(Masson 1:9)
The dancer is spellbound, her body frozen, reified, suspended in a pause in time. She 
has the arrested quality of a statue or a photo, her gesture captured mid-way ("at a 
certain turn of a peculiar dance"). Immobility and distance are the prerequisites of 
the fetish, which is gratifyingly non-invasive; the subject is untouched by the other. 
The fetishized body of the dancer provides a fixed point to which the male subject 
returns, a spectacle to be consumed by his gaze.^* The dancer’s discourse is 
suppressed, her ability to teU her own story frozen along with her body. De Quincey 
tells us that she "cannot be confidential", she does not have it in her "power to lay 
aside reserve", unlike De Quincey himself whose autobiographical impulse extends 
through fourteen volumes of the collected writings. And yet, her body does speak to 
me, both in its anterior uninhibited fluency, and in the enigmatic eroticism of stasis 
(the sexual resonances of "though she had died for it"). Her image is elusive, slipping 
between the substantial and the insubstantial ("aerial chains"), the precise and the 
vague ("a certain turn of a peculiar dance"). Paradoxically, her ’power’ resides in not 
putting things into words, for her meaning, therefore, cannot be ’fixed’. She remains 
unbound, and she continues to move me.
285
Notes to Chapter Six
1. The articles collected under the title Recollections of the Lakes and the 
Lake Poets are a series of pieces published in Tait’s Edinburgh 
Magazine between September 1834 and October 1840. In this chapter 
I use the most widely available texts, those edited by Lindop and 
Wright, who follow the first published versions of De Quincey’s texts. 
Wright notes major deletions and additions to the revised text, and, for 
ease of reading, follows the paragraphing of the revised version. 
Lindop uses the first version of Confessions of an English Opium- 
Eater. which first appeared in the London Magazine in September and 
October 1821. The text of the Suspiria de Profundis is the version 
which appeared in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in March, April, 
June and July 1845. The English Mail-Coach is reprinted from the two 
separate papers, subsequently joined when De Quincey revised his 
works, which appeared in Blackwood’s in October and December 
1849. The Confessions, the Suspiria and The English Mail-Coach aU 
appear in Confessions of an English Opium-Eater and Other Writings. 
When discussing essays not included in their editions, and elsewhere 
when appropriate, I refer to editions by Masson and Japp. These texts 
will be superseded by The Works of Thomas De Ouincey. Gen.Ed. 
Grevel Lindop, Pickering and Chatto, forthcoming 1996. De Quincey’s 
reference is to Wordsworth, The Prelude Xm , 11.231-34.
2. As I have noted throughout this thesis, the ideology of femininity 
promotes women as "designed to soften our [men’s] hearts and polish 
our manners" (John Gregory, A Father’s Legacy. 6-7). Gregory argues 
that this function is not debasing: "I have considered your sex ....as 
our companions and equals" (6).
3. In one sense the notion of complementarity ascribes ’lack’ to both 
women and men: George Savile, Marquis of Halifax (1688), instructs 
his daughter that "We are made of differing Tempers, that our Defects 
may the better be mutually supplied: Your Sex wanteth our Reason for 
your Conduct, and our Strength for your Protection: Ours wanteth your 
Gentleness to soften, and to entertain us" (Jones 18). For an influential 
account of how the idea of complementarity was used to subvert 
women’s demands for equality, see Kate MiUett, Sexual Politics, esp. 
106-11, 179-201. The full Irigarayan phrase is ’The Blind Spot of an 
Old Dream of Symmetry’, which is the title of the long first section of 
Speculum of the Other Woman.
4. See De Quincey’s remark in his ’Notes for the Suspiria’ which 
explicitly links flowers and writing: "the hope is but as a dim augury 
written on a flower* ... *I allude to the signatures of nature" (Japp 
1:27). Though my focus is on floral ’graffiti’ in De Quincey’s 
writings, in broader terms we might say that his texts are themselves
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graffiti; often De Quincey’s writing presents itself as writing on the 
walls of other discourses. For example, in The English Mail-Coach De 
Quincey inscribes a kind of obscene, personal text over the public 
language of English imperialism. I am indebted to Drummond Bone 
for this insight.
5. Burke’s rhetoric is echoed by later Romantic writers; HazHtt, for 
example, writes of the poet Samuel Rogers that "[h]e is an elegant, but 
feeble writer, and his language is a tortuous, tottering, wriggling, 
fidgetty translation of every thing from the vulgar tongue, into all the 
tantalizing, teasing, tripping, lisping, mimminee-pimminee of the highest 
brilliancy and fashion of poetical diction" (5:148). Hazhtt’s judgement 
is gendered: Rogers is "a very lady like poet". Femininity here is the 
acquisition and production of an artificiality which is perceived as both 
defective and excessive (all those qualifiers).
6. The gendered boundaries of the Sublime and the Beautiful remain 
insecure during the Romantic period: the male Sublime in romantic 
writing is haunted by the feminine, for example, the Witch in Byron’s 
Manfred who is the personification of the Alps. On Mary Shelley’s 
representation of the traditionally masculinized Alps as female, see 
Fred Randel.
7. De Quincey, of course, was familiar with Kant’s paradigms; his
translations of Kant include "Kant on National Character in Relation 
to the Sense of the Sublime and the Beautiful" (Masson XIV:46-60).
8. Kant’s desire to keep the definitions of sublime and beautiful,
masculinity and femininity under control is similarly marked by his 
insistence on the "proper" and "propriety" (76-81). See Irigaray on the 
significance of "proper, proper name, property, appropriate" ; she argues 
that "[Tjhis word cluster suggests close connections between the related 
systems of capitalism and patriarchy - more specifically, between their 
demands for order, neatness, the proper name, and the proper or literal 
meaning of a word, on the one hand, and the concepts of property 
ownership and appropriation, on the other" (This Sex 221).
9. I am, of course, aware that Against Nature, the text I have in mind
here, postdates De Quincey, being first published in 1884.
10. The full title of Mears’s work is The Pupil of Nature: or Candid 
Advice to the Fair Sex: the section quoted is from "Essay 1". As 
Elaine Showalter wül do almost two centuries later, Mears’s use of the 
trope of fashion suggests her anxiety about disguise: plain words and 
plain clothes are closer to ’nature’. Mears rejects one available version 
of femininity, that which associates it with artifice and disguise (the 
aspects that men find most troubling), in order to reclaim pregnancy as 
a natural state, as opposed to male physicians who defined it as a 
disease. Moreover, she is writing at a time when the practice of
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midwifery was increasingly being taken over by men, and therefore is 
trying to defend this sphere against encroachment.
11. In his discussion of plant symbols in Romanticism, Robert M. 
Maniquis argues that the plant "can bring to mind death or life, chastity 
or orgasm, memory or oblivion" (130).
12. The information on publishing history is provided by Desmond King- 
Hele, in the unpaginated ’Note’ which prefaces his edition of Darwin.
13. Alan BeweU alludes to a popular form of eighteenth century writing 
which he calls "botanical pornography", the most notable text being 
James Perry’s Mimosa or the Sensitive Plant" (87).
14. Priscilla Wakefield’s An Introduction to Botany (1796) is a series of 
letters written by Felicia to her absent sister Constance. Felicia takes 
to botany on the advice of her mother in order to pass the time while 
her sister is away. She tells us that Linnaeus’s "system is now 
universally adopted" (26). The trend of botanizing women continues 
healthily into the 1840’s; on women’s popular science writing, and 
especially the writer Maria Jacson, see Ann B. Shteir, "Botanical 
Dialogues".
15. To valorise Keatsian passivity and uncertainty as a feminization of the 
male writer is to simplify Keats’s subject position; I explore this 
passage, and Margaret Homans’s critique of it, in more detail in 
Chapter Five. If some of the male Romantics wanted to incorporate 
the femininity of flowers, it remains open to argument whether to read 
this as subversively proto-deconstructionist or as just another gesture 
of colonization.
16. I was alerted to the relevance of Bloch through Elisabeth Bronfen’s 
summary of his argument (68-69).
17. This ’double vision’ of the female also involves the dualistic system of 
literary stereotypes, that is, woman as virgin or whore. Madonna or 
Magdalen, angel in the house or wicked vamp.
18. McFarland quotes Baudelaire’s view of De Qumcey’s "feminine style", 
and he provides a biographical explanation: "[Rjeared by women, 
bathed in the softness of woman ... [De Quincey] ends by contracting 
a certain tenderness of skin, a refinement of speech, a sort of 
androgyny" (97). McFarland’s metaphor of disease ("contracting a 
certain tenderness of skin") is provocative: as I wül argue, femininity, 
in De Quincey’s texts, is contagious. I have dealt more fuUy with the 
problems of Romantic androgyny in Chapter Five. On the question of 
digression, it is important to note that this is a strategy used by writers 
to preserve the life of the text, to defer ending, stasis, death; in Sterne’s 
words (in Tristram Shandyl. "digressions are the life of the text".
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Virginia Woolf provides another reading of De Quincey’s digressive 
style, seeing it as the mark of his desire for the unattainable: De 
Quincey "could not teU the simplest story without qualifying and 
illustrating and introducing additional information until the point that 
was to be cleared up has long since become extinct in the dim mists of 
the distance" (Second Common Reader 236-37).
19. The feminine ivy or vine twined around a masculine oak or pine is a 
commonplace trope. The following anonymous verse is from the 
commonplace book of Mary Young, Walthamstow, Essex 1828:
Man is the rugged lofty pine
That frowns on many a wavebeat shore;
Woman the graceful slender vine 
Whose curling tendrils round it twine.
And deck its rough bark sweetly o’er, ...
(qtd. in Davidoff and Hall 397).
20. I do not wish to lay too much emphasis on this line of argument, since, 
as I argue in Chapters One and Two, women were increasingly 
successftil and visible as poets during this era. However, De Quincey 
perceives himself in relation to Wordsworth, and moreover, he is 
writing much later in the century than the heyday of Romanticism, at 
a time when notions of the Victorian "poetess" were being codified.
21. Interestingly, Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall in their sociological 
study of the period observe that, "Far from carrying the blustering 
certainty of the late Victorian paterfamilias, early nineteenth century 
masculine identity was fragile, still in the process of being forged and 
always measured against the background of condescension from the 
gentry as well as a long tradition of artisan pride" (229).
22. De Quincey is increasingly attracting feminist readers, such as 
Josephine McDonagh. For a fine feminist reading which intersects 
with mine at several points, see Angela Leighton, "De Quincey and 
Women". We diverge on the angle of our approach: Leighton 
emphasizes "the guilt of masculinity ...[which] dogs all De Quincey’s 
writing about women", whereas I focus on the seductive threat of the 
feminine (168). A specific difference is that Leighton argues that 
"[t]he figure of the woman may provide him, as in ’Suspiria’, with a 
still point for the caducean ’meanderings’ of his ’narrative’ ... - a point 
of origin or of imaginative difference, from which the dream can take 
its bearings", while my thesis is that that difference (within) is 
destabilizing, indeed, that it engenders the "meanderings" (163). On 
the question of "guilt", see also Michael Haltresht’s psychological 
reading which emphasizes the "sense of personal guilt" and "self- 
reproach" in De Quincey’s writings, "especially in relation to women" 
(32).
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23. Parts of this article are quoted in Barbara Johnson, World 35. De 
Quincey’s own writings, in particular, his textualization of experience, 
lend themselves to deconstructive criticism (for deconstructive readings 
see, Mary Jacobus, "The art of managing books" in Romanticism and 
Sexual Difference and in Reed, ed. 215-46; Arden Reed, "’Booked for 
Utter Perplexity’", and Stephen Spector).
24. Derrida uses the metaphor of the parasite in defining the law of genre, 
which is also, he teUs us, a law of gender: "It is precisely a principle 
of contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical economy" ("The Law 
of Genre" 59). Derrida’s notions of gender, genre and the "law of 
impurity" have been influential in formulating my thinking about De 
Quincey.
25. This is not to deny that the existential Kate is not fond of De Quincey, 
but it is to suggest that the aesthetic figure who inhabits his texts is a 
type of the narcissistic woman.
26. I am indebted to Spector’s provocative analysis of De Quincey’s texts; 
indeed, my choice of passages for analysis has been partly motivated 
by my desire to reinscribe the traces of gender - of the feminine - in 
those places where Spector has elided, or failed to see them. In doing 
this, I participate in that area of feminist criticism which reveals the 
’blind spots’ of male writing.
27. Sedgwick’s theory of homosocial desire is developed in her book 
Between Men.
28. De Quincey uses a very similar locution in his essay on Coleridge: he 
tells us that it is among those features of nature such as the "lawny 
recesses of forests" "that such evanescent hauntings of our past and 
forgetton selves are most apt to startle and to waylay us" (Recollections 
92). A sexually resonant topography engenders a haunted self.
29. By saying that Kate is a rhetorical figure I mean to suggest two things: 
firstly, she could be read as a figure of metonymy - here, it is the 
contiguity of feminine figure, flower, and trope that is important; or, 
she could be seen as a figure of metaphor - metaphor being the trope 
of movement and trans^rwation.
30. On the conjunction of child-women, flowers and desire, see Schlegel’s 
Lucinde: "Since he was the first one who had ever attracted her by his 
interest in her, the sweet child turned her soul toward him like a flower 
inclining itself toward the light of the sun. The fact that she was 
scarcely grown-up, that she was hardly more than a child, only served 
to incite his desire more irrestibly" (79, see also 80).
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31. The passionate excess of De Quincey’s response to the life and death 
of Kate Wordsworth is also inscribed in his letters; see especially a 
letter written to Dorothy Wordsworth in June 1812 (Jordan 265). For 
an analysis of the differences between De Quincey’s and Wordsworth’s 
responses to Kate’s death, see Michael Thron.
32. The Medusa has become a popular figure in recent accounts of 
Romanticism. Nigel Leask uses the very phrase, the ’Medusa effect’, 
in his essay "Shelley’s ’Magnetic Ladies’" (coming across this phrase 
was an uncanny experience, involving both loss [of originality] and 
consolation). Leask argues that "Freud’s account of the Medusa 
highlights the displaced phallocentrism of Shelley’s version [of this 
trope]; the ambiguity of Freud’s ’stiffening’ signals a moment of 
phallic return which - in the case of Shelley - normally marks the 
collapse of his bid to unbind the Promethean male will" (60). See also 
Elisabeth Bronfen, who discusses Freud’s essay alongside Poe’s 
"Philosophy of Composition" (69-70). Her most pertinent insight, in 
the present context, is that "[g]iven that for Freud ’to decapitate =to 
castrate’, the threat of castration emerging from Medusa not only 
threatens to kül the viewer, but conversely the decapitation of Medusa 
also means a castration of castration. It enacts a killing of the 
metonymy for Other sexuality, for feminine genitalia, which have been 
culturally construed as a signifer for castration" (70). Since Bronfen’s 
book deals with the linkage of "Death, femininity and the aesthetic", 
it makes fascinating reading for anyone excavating the trail of dead 
female bodies in De Quincey (or, more generally, in Romantic texts). 
On Medusa, see also Neil Hertz.
33. Lindop’s edition differs slightly, notably in the omission of the word 
"stings". Lindop follows the first published version of De Quincey’s 
text, so that this section of the Suspiria is taken from Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine LVn (March 1845): 275. De Quincey 
dismembered and revised this text in preparing the first volume of 
Selections Grave and Gay, published as Autobiographic Sketches in 
1853; Masson follows the revised text.
34. The OED provides a range of definitions for the word "sting" which 
involve penetration and wounding; see, especially, OED 2,4,5a. See 
also, Dudu’s dream in Byron’s Don Juan: "A bee flew out and stung 
her to the heart, / And so she woke with a great scream and start" 
(VI: St.77), and Uvedale Price: "We talk of the stings of pleasure, of 
being goaded on by desire. The god of love ...is armed with flames, 
with envenomed shafts, with every instrument of irritation . . ." (An 
Essav on the Picturesque, qtd.in Paulson, Representations 133).
35. I use the term "castration", both in its Freudian sense, wherein it refers 
specifically to sexual difference, to genital ’lack’ (of a penis), and also 
in an extended sense - deriving from Lacan - to denote a split within
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the self, a severing of unity, a wound that involves the loss of power. 
This cut is exposed in the encounter with death and with the feminine, 
two ’lacks’ which are frequently conjoined in De Quincey. On this, 
see Bronfen 74. Note McFarland’s suggestive vocabulary when he 
writes of "the special prose style [exemplified by the ’Caduceus’ 
passage] that he [De Quincey] developed to cauterize and bind up the 
wound [of the loss of his sister, of the feminine]" (104).
36. Pinch’s remark is a quote from Freud’s essay "’A Child is Being 
Beaten’: A Contribution to the Study of Sexual Perversions". For 
discussion of De Quinceyan masochism, see Eve Sedgwick, Coherence 
79-90 and Mary Russett 359-60. There are obvious connections at this 
point between my readings of De Quincey and of Burke.
37. On "nympholepsy" during the Romantic period, see Marilyn Butler, 
"Nymphs and Nympholepsy"; see also James A. Heffeman’s recent 
essay "Blake’s Oothoon: The Dilemma’s of Marginality", for a 
provocative discussion which links flowers, nymphs and language.
38. Historical usage supports this theory: the OED gives references to 
nympholepsy from 1775-1974, and for nymphomania from 1775-1973. 
On the medical (and aesthetic) status of "nymphomania" in the 
eighteenth century, see G.S. Rousseau ("Nymphomania").
39. The "punctum" is a moment or detail of an image which wounds any 
obvious meaning; because it is indifferent to the narrative, it has "at 
least a distancing effect with regard to the referent, to ’reality’ as 
nature" (Barthes, Responsibility 55); "it is not I who seek it out ...it it 
this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, 
and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this 
prick, this mark made by a pointed instrument: ...This second element 
which WÜ1 disturb the studium I shall therefore call punctum; for 
punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole - and also a cast of the 
dice. A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but 
also bruises me, is poignant to me)"; "Thepunctum, then, is a kind of 
subtle beyond - as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits 
us to see" (Camera Lucida 26-27,59). The "punctum" is described in 
a hybrid rhetoric that connotes both the male and the female body - it 
is both "wound"/"little hole" and "prick". In Barthes and De Quincey, 
there is an eroticization of castration, an experience which is inscribed 
on the body of the subject, and which is outside the control of "[his] 
sovereign consciousness" (Camera Lucida 26). Barthes subsequently 
positions the passive spectator in a more comphcitious dialectic: "Last 
thing about the punctum: whether or not it is triggered, it is an 
addition: it is what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless 
already there" (55).
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40. As Freud points out, "[t]he meaning of the fetish is not known to other 
people, so the fetish is not withheld from him: it is easily accessible 
and he can readily obtain the sexual satisfaction attached to it. What 
other men have to woo and make exertions for can be had by the 
fetishist with no trouble at all" ("Fetishism" 21:354).
41. I borrow this phrase from Angela Leighton, "De Quincey and Women" 
163. Leighton’s fine essay explores the "continual conflict in [De 
Quincey’s] work between the sublime ambition of the imagination, on 
the one hand, and the sympathies of real hfe, on the other; between an 
aesthetics of woman as pure and perfect and therefore figuratively dead 
and a pohtics of woman as the actual victim of some external 
destructive force". In other words, she suggests that the clash between 
the aesthetic and the existential is self-consciously perceived as a 
problem by De Quincey.
42. See Bronfen esp. Chapter 3 ("Violence of representation - 
representation of violence") for an extensive and fascinating analysis 
of Ferdinand Hodler’s pictures of his dying mistress Valentine Gode- 
Darel which attempts to answer - from a feminist perspective - the 
questions: "Do we see the real, while denying the representation or do 
we see the representation, thus putting the real under erasure?" (51). 
Bronfen’s work has helped me to articulate some of the problems I 
struggled with in earlier versions of this chapter.
43. Stephen Heath argues that ’[pjlucking the rose is quickly [in terms of 
literary history] an image for the climax of male sexual desire, as in 
the Victorian poet Robert Browning:
I kiss your cheek
Catch your soul’s warmth, - 1 pluck the rose
And love it more than tongue can speak
Then the good minute goes.
"Two in the Campagna"
(The Sexual Fix 114-15).
44. I have discussed the implications of the Shelleyan trope of (un)veiling 
in Chapter Four.
45. See Jane Mills, Womanwords 78 for a short history of the word 
"fanny". Fans are signifiers of female sexuality in much Restoration 
drama; for a wonderful example of the erotic connotations of fans, see 
the anonymous poem "To a Lady, with a Present of a Fan" (1789), in 
which the fan is a proto-De Quinceyan hybrid, both feminine 
"rosebud[s]" and masculine "shaft[s]" (Lonsdale, Eighteenth Century 
Verse 759). I am indebted to Martin Aske for getting me thinking 
about fans.
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46. See Sundelson, who argues that psychoanalysis can help us to "see a 
coherent pattern of threats and defenses in [De Quincey’s] prose" as 
revealed in "the sexually charged vocabulary" of The English Mail- 
Coach (16).
47. Timothy Corrigan uses Lacan’s theory that "[d]esire is metonymy" in 
the service of his argument that in De Quincey’s writings "the only 
maneuver available is a metonymic courtship in which his longing to 
speak his vision is never consummated and in which the linguistic 
displacement of the romance is necessarily a veering off from any final 
meaning" (138). In the present context, it is worth recalling that De 
Quincey compulsively turns his experiences into text, indulging - 
literally - in the grammar of desire: "whispering into a young woman’s 
ear a great deal of truth; and (by way of parenthesis) some trifle of 
falsehood" (Mail-Coach 196). The dissemination of De Quincey’s 
desire involves what Shari Benstock, in another context, has described 
as "a substitutionary and supplementary principle of sexual 
satisfaction", that is, an obsessional erasure and refilling of this female 
space ("From Letter to Literature" 280). De Quincey’s desire is 
"metonymic" both in its fetishistic substitutions and also in the 
rhetorical interchangability of the women who traverse his texts (Ann, 
Fanny and Kate are all liiüced with dawn and roses; Ann and Fanny are 
both "ingenuous"); De Quincey’s irritated comment on "Coleridge’s 
movable verses upon 'Sara\ [written] for some forgotton original Sara, 
and subsequently transferred to every other Sara who came across his 
path" (Recollections 130), may be read ironically as self-referential. 
See also Thomas McFarland, who reads the accounts of the deaths of 
Catherine Wordsworth and Ann of Oxford Street as recapitulations of 
the death of De Quincey’s sister Elizabeth (103).
48. One could give more weight to male sexuality here by arguing that De 
Quincey recoils in horror from the vision of the crocodile as phallic 
mirror image, and that this precipitates his plunge into the abyss of 
femininity.
49. This fetishized signature is reduplicated in the "Dream Fugue", for 
example, in the images of the revenant in the elfin pinnace "raising at 
intervals one hand to heaven", and the girl sinking in the treacherous 
sands whose "marble arm ...rose above her head ...clutching as at 
some false deceiving hand stretched out from the clouds" (Mail-Coach 
226-27).
50. On the deconstructive tendencies of outer/inner structures in De 
Quincey, see Angela Leighton, "De Quincey and Women" esp. 170, 
and Sedgwick, Coherence esp. 41-44; Eve Sedgwick is concerned, as 
am I, with "[h]ow permeable and subtle the circumferences of the self 
are" (43).
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51. See also John Barrell’s wonderfully obsessive book, The Infection of 
Thomas De Ouincey. which I came across after I had written the first 
version of this chapter. From a different direction - though he 
discusses the feminine "other", his main focus is on the discourses of 
race and class - BarreU arrives at remarkably similar formulations to 
those outlined in this chapter. He writes of "De Quincey’s horrified 
discovery that his is (to use Homi Bhabha’s term) a hybrid identity [I 
used this term without having read Bhabha]; that his relation with an 
imaginary East, like that of an imperial power with its colonial 
dependencies, is a relation (at best) of symbiotic interdependence, and 
can no longer be thought of in terms of a safe transaction between a 
self and an other" (18).
52. Earlier in this case study, though, Freud retreats from the notion of a 
"foreign body", as weU as from the epistemological undecidability of 
the subject: "From the beginning it seemed to me probable that 
Fraulein Elisabeth was conscious of the basis of her illness, that what 
she had in her consciousness was only a secret and not a foreign body" 
(2:138-39).
53. See Jacqueline Rose on "Freud’s move ...from the sexuality of the 
woman to the necessary faUure of a knowledge or consciousness which 
would control either the woman or itself" (Sexualitv 109).
54. Stephen Heath discusses the links between hysteria and women in his 
essay, "Difference".
55. On fetishism in recent feminist theory, see Alice Jardine and Paul 
Smith, Men in Feminism, and Maqorie Garber, and Diana Fuss, 
"Fashion and the Homospectorial Look".
56. Claudette Sartiliot (77) and Alice Jardine, (Gynesis 192, n.60) both cite 
this passage (Jardine with a slightly different translation). For De 
Quincey and gloves, see Suspira 163.
57. Gayatri Spivak’s article "Displacement" is, among other things, a 
fascinating critique of what she argues is Derrida’s own textual 
fetishism.
58. John Berger’s paradigms of western painting (mentioned at the start of 
Chapter Three) are pertinent here.
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Afterthoughts
In this study, I have interrogated notions of gendered subjectivity, emphasizing the 
fabricated nature of the connection between body and text, and I have tried to find a 
space for the ’feminine’ in the textuality of my own text. I have focussed on a 
limited number of texts produced within an extended Romantic period, and asked, in 
various ways, what happens when the male authorial voice seems to be cross-dressed. 
I have tried to contribute to the project of revising, or revisioning (in Adrienne Rich’s 
sense) Romanticism, by revealing that the stability of gender in these texts is what 
Judith Butler has described as a structure of impersonation: "gender is a kind of 
imitation for which there is no original" (21). The riddle of femininity is that 
femininity occurs in men as well as in women. The textual transvestism that I locate 
remains attached to specific analyses, and I do not wish to suggest that this is 
necessarily a general Romantic trend.
The stories I have recounted, which speak of the slippage between male desire 
for women (or, more frequently, that idealized construct. Woman) and identification 
with the feminine, do not follow a teleological plot. The tropes of self-feminization 
in the work of selected male writers between Burke and De Quincey do not reach 
some sort of climax in the late Romantic period. Indeed, to construct such a plothne 
would be to reproduce the sexual/textual rhythms of phallocentric narrative.^ De 
Quincey’s dancer, who enigmatically figures the feminine as both fixity and 
performance, and who, in the light of my previous analyses, holds open the possibility 
of spectatorial identification, is not the ’end’. As I suggested at the beginning of 
Chapter Four, the order of this thesis is not immutable. Depending on the sequence
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in which they are read, these analyses can tell the personal encoded narrative of my 
own academic career, broadly the shift from a dependence on male theorists to a 
position in which I consciously try to privilege the writing of female critics and 
theorists. I no longer have a fancy French guy, a Derrida or a Barthes (Foucault was 
never for me), but rather a network of women (Irigaray, Spivak, Gallop, Miller, 
Schor, to name just a few).^ The Gallic connection remains in that these writers, 
whatever their nationality, work within (and sometimes against) the context of French 
poststructuralist thought, and it is within the parameters of such thought that this 
thesis is clearly situated.
Rather than presenting a formal conclusion in these final pages, I would like 
to mark my resistance to closure by acknowledging some anxieties about, and 
omissions from, this project. I wiQ briefly record three roads not taken, which may 
be summarized under the following headings: the discourses of nationality/race; 
absent male prose writers; gender and the issue of women’s writing.
On the question of national identities, I should say that it strikes me as 
surprising, in retrospect, that a woman (myself) who is notionaHy English, who 
worked for several years in Greece, studied in Scotland and supports Scottish 
independence within Europe, and who is finishing this thesis between Scotland and 
The Netherlands, should have paid so little attention to the politics of geography, the 
discourses of nationality. Perhaps this omission, hke the changing allegiance already 
mentioned, points to the theoretical moment in which this study was conceived, a time 
around 1989 when I, hke many other feminist critics, was between feminism and 
psychoanalysis.^ This, of course, is the title of an influential anthology (Between 
Feminism and Psychoanalysis!, edited by Teresa Brennan, and pubhshed in 1989.
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The big issues debated in its pages are essentialism, language and sexual difference, 
the meaning of the phallus (for women), the rereading and appropriation of Lacan. 
Moreover, though critics in the 1980’s were debating the significance of the 
intersections of gender, race and nationality, this was not foregrounded in Romantic 
Studies until quite recently; Moira Ferguson’s brilliant feminist study. Subject to 
Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery. 1670-1834. for example, was 
published in 1992. I lament now that though I use the tropes of geography - the 
contours and terrain of Romanticism, the spatial emphasis of the whole concept of 
marginality - my writers inhabit an unspecified locale.
There are several male writers of letters, journals and essays during the 
Romantic era who are not included in this study, and who, if time and the demands 
of teaching were not against me, would certainly find a place. Byron, Lamb, Hunt 
and Hazlitt make cameo appearances, but are never centre stage (though Hazlitt’s 
contribution is perhaps more substantial). Of these four, I am insufficently acquainted 
with Hunt’s oeuvre to judge how he would fit in, but his essays in Men. Women and 
Books would certainly repay further attention. More analyses of the configurations 
of gender in the work of Charles Lamb are certainly necessary, but he does have the 
advantage of a fabulous feminist reader in Jane Aaron, whose book A Double 
Singleness I have discussed in Chapter One. I regret Byron’s absence, for I have read 
his letters and journals throughout the time I have spent on the present project. 
Byron’s fluid prose, punctuated almost solely by dashes, as weU as the self-reflexivity 
of his writing, has affinities with contemporary theories of feminine writing. 
Moreover, in the context of the particular concerns of this thesis, both Susan Wolfson 
and Caroline Franklin have discussed the question of transvestism in Don Juan, but
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the possibility of textual cross-dressing in Byron’s prose writing has yet, to the best 
of my knowledge, to be examined (though Sonia Hofkosh does discuss the en- 
genderment of Byron’s prose in her article "The Writer’s Ravishment")/
Most especially, I wish I had written a chapter on Hazlitt: his essay on 
effeminacy plays a significant role in my reading of Keats, while his observations on 
Burke’s posturings (in particular, his vision of Burke coqueting with the Speaker of 
the House of Commons) are scene-stealers. I would like to analyse further (in some 
future project) the fabrication of gender during the Romantic period, and especially 
the significance of clothes or fashion implied by fabrication (I looked at the trope of 
fashion in contemporary criticism in Chapter Two, but only marginally at romantic 
dressing-up). George GilfiUan, in his essay on Keats (1845), suggests that "[njone 
save Keats, and Tennyson after him, has adventured on the delicate yet lovely theme, 
the poetry of dress" (Matthews 305). Hazlitt adventures on this theme in prose: his 
writing is full of the details of female dress (as weU as bodUy marks), and raises 
interesting questions about the imbrication of the languages of gender and class. 
Consider the foUowing extract from "On Great and Little Things" (in Table-Talk): 
Some gaUants set their hearts on princesses; others descend in 
imagination to women of quaUty; others are mad after opera-singers.
For my part, I am shy even of actresses, and should not think of 
leaving my card with Madame Vestris. I am for none of these bonnes 
fortunes; but for a Ust of humble beauties, servant-maids and shepherd- 
girls, with their red elbows, hard hands, black stockings and mob-caps,
I could furnish out a gaUery equal to Cowley’s, and paint them half as 
weU. Oh! might I but attempt a description of some of them in poetic
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prose, Don Juan would forget his Julia ...I admire the Clementinas and 
Clarissas at a distance: the Pamelas and Fannys of Richardson and 
Fielding make my blood tingle. (8:236)
Hazhtt (like Burke) is seduced by the spectacle of ’WomanVwomen; his gaze is 
drawn to the minutiae (mob-caps) of femininity, though unlike Byron’s Don Juan, the 
objects of his desire are housemaids, rather than ladies of quality. The power 
dynamic here directs attention, in a particularly acute way, to the necessary factoring- 
in of class to the analysis of gender.^
In my introductory material (Chapters One and Two) I discuss the way in 
which feminist theory and criticism has facilitated a consideration of masculinities; 
indeed, as I point out, there is a whole new area of study, represented by anthologies 
such as Men in Feminism and Engendering Men (ed. Boone and Cadden), which 
analyses the cultural construction of masculinity. Though my work is clearly a part 
of this broad project, I remain anxious about what Jane Gallop has called a "shift 
from women’s studies to gender studies" (Around 1981 242). Gallop argues that, 
"Although it is theoretically invaluable for feminist scholars to intervene in the 
understanding of men, within literary studies, this tends to mean work on canonical 
authors. When we study their ambiguous and multiform gender, we often lose sight 
of their cultural authority, aU the whüe contributing to it". In other words, we can 
end up again "beyond the cruel binarized oppressions of the [real] world" I still 
believe that the analysis of gender in male writing can make a (feminist) difference 
to the world we inhabit (which, after aU, does include the academic world), but I 
would like to reiterate the gist of my earlier comments, that an adherence to the idea 
of the fabrication of gender and of a subject constructed and deconstructed in
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language, does not preclude the necessity of a strategic essentialism, the recognition 
that male and female voices are politically different. For a man to pose (textuaUy) 
as a woman, or for him to be constructed as feminine in critical discourse, is not the 
same thing as becoming a woman. Feminist critics of Romanticism need to be careful 
that work on gender does not reinscribe the old hierarchies, especially the 
marginalization of women’s writing. This is a problem that has troubled me though 
the writing of this thesis. At one point (during the writing of Chapter One), I thought 
I should have worked on the women poets; now I am conscious of the relative neglect 
of the prose works of writers such as Anna Barbauld, Mary Hays, Hannah More. The 
map of Romanticism remains painfully incomplete (though from another perspective 
excitingly open to feminist work in this area). Myra Jehlen’s call to examine men’s 
and women’s writing in the same historical period in order to expose the 
particularities and contingencies of the patriarchal set-up, provides one inviting path 
to take, and though I have focussed on male writing, I have included female voices 
and thus have tried to move in the direction that Jehlen advocates. For it is only by 
understanding the construction of gender in relation to both women and men that we 
can begin to understand its operations.^
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Notes to Afterthoughts
1. Luce Irigaray’s Speculum spectacularly renounces a teleological 
format: in her own words, "Strictly speaking. Speculum has no 
beginning or end. The architectonics of the text, or texts, confounds 
the linearity of an outline, the teleology of a discourse, within which 
there is no possible place for the ’feminine’, except the traditional 
place of the repressed, the censured" (This Sex 68). The 
nondirectiveness of Irigaray’s writing makes it impossible to extract an 
aU-encompassing feminist theory, and so it remains non-prescriptive.
2. I owe the wonderful phrase "fancy French guy" to Nancy Armstrong, 
who used it in a talk given at the University of Groningen, May 1992. 
In charting what I perceive to be a shift in my critical affiliations, I do 
not mean to imply that I am no longer interested in these male writers. 
I find the politics of seduction in the relation between female critics 
and these male ’masters’, so ably and wittily analysed by Jane Gallop, 
rivetting. Moreover, the women critics to whom I am most indebted 
have not divorced themselves from male-authored theories, but their 
attitude towards such theories has become, I think, more irreverent. 
(The Chapters which form the body of this thesis were written in the 
following order: Six, Four, Three, Five, which explains the privileging 
of Derrida at the end of Chapter Six). The notion of ’getting personal’ 
about one’s work has a high profile these days (see, Nancy K. Miller, 
Getting Personal!.
3. The phrase "around 1989" is meant to evoke Jane Gallop’s fictive 
moment "Around 1981", which designates a certain moment in 
academic feminist literary theory (see her collection of essays entitled 
Around 19811.
4. I have, however, borrowed my title from Byron: "Beyond the fitting
medium of desire", Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage. Canto m , 1.374. This
is perhaps the place to record my dissatisfaction with Chapter Four: of
the writers in this study, it is Shelley whom I love, yet it seems to me 
the most alienated of the chapters, the least able to transgress its 
theoretical ’frame’. I cannot account for this.
5. Byron himself, of course, was not averse to housemaids. On the
representation of working-class women in the nineteenth century, see 
Cora Kaplan, "’Like a Housemaid’s Fancies’" and Allon White and 
Peter StaHybrass, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, especially 
Chapters Three and Four. Both texts deal in some detail with the 
relationship between Arthur Munby and Hannah CuUwick.
6. See, in this context, Tania Modleski’s criticism of Elaine Showalter’s
introduction to Speaking of Gender, which she argues marginalizes
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feminism, making it simply a stage on the way to gender studies 
(Feminism Without Women 5).
7. This is not to perpetuate the binary opposition of biology: though there 
are some obvious Romantic pairs who have been analysed in tandem 
(Charles and Mary Lamb, Dorothy and William Wordsworth, Mary and 
Percy Shelley), they may be ’odder’ pairings (Hazlitt and Hannah 
More?), as well as the possibility of getting away from the power of 
two by analysing three or more writers alongside each other.
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